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Abstract 
The topic of this thesis is to propose a general framework for the processing 
of expressions whose interpretation involves quantification over entities 
commonly referred to as situations or eventualities. The account is based on 
the formal apparatus defined in the framework of Dynamic Syntax (DS, 
Kempson et al. 2001, Cann et at. 2005) for the processing of nominal relative 
clauses. As a case study for this type of analysis, we concentrate on natural 
language conditionals. 
One of the characteristic features of DS is its modelling of anaphoric 
phenomena by means of re-employing previously constructed terms as 
replacements for the underspecified content provided by anaphoric 
expressions. In the present account, this feature is exploited in order to 
explain the semantic representational effects associated with the processing 
of conditional sentences: a newly introduced term constructed by processing 
the protasis is copied into the structure induced by the processing of the 
apodosis in order to serve as a component of its parameters of evaluation. A 
few consequences follow from this analysis. It is shown that the rules 
developed for the handling of left-dislocation phenomena in DS can 
adequately account for the variable linear positions occupied by if-clauses. 
Therefore several phenomena which previous accounts attribute to properties 
of multiple structural representations can now be reanalysed as the effects of 
the time-linear process of deriving an interpretation incrementally from a 
natural language string. The reanalysis of the data has also led to the 
conclusion that the effects explained by Binding Theory in other frameworks 
should be expressed in different terms accommodating gradual availability of 
information at different parsing stages. The DS time-linear account of 
anaphora faces the challenge posed by the existence of cataphoric 
phenomena and conditionals are an important testing ground for the 
analytical resources of the framework in this domain. It is argued here that 
3 
such cataphoric effects are associated with special processing conditions 
which can be formally defined in accordance with fundamental DS 
assumptions. Finally, the issue of Quantificational Subordination is examined 
under the light of novel data and an account is offered of how it should be 
treated within the DS framework. 
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1. Aims of this Study 
This dissertation has two main goals. Firstly it is an exercise in extending a 
fairly new framework for syntactic analysis, Dynamic Syntax (DS, Kempson et 
al. 2001, Cann et al. 2005), to the domain of interpretations that involve 
reference to abstract entities like worlds, times and situations. Defined more 
narrowly, the more specific concern of this thesis, taken as a testing ground 
for the resources of the framework, is natural language conditionals. DS takes 
an innovative perspective in approaching linguistic analysis in that linguistic 
phenomena are approached from the point of view of the parsing mechanism. 
As a result, the mode of explanation for the relevant phenomena is presumed 
to crucially include the dynamic nature of constructing representations of 
interpretations, logical forms, for incoming linguistic strings. This means that, 
in addition to the traditional static representations exploited as explanatory 
devices in other frameworks, DS also integrates the modelling of the hearer's 
parsing task as a source of providing answers to syntactic puzzles. The 
modelling of this task which is arguably conducted in successive stages, 
necessitates the characterization of the partiality of information available at 
each parsing stage and the definition of the alternatives open for further 
processing. This provides the basis of explanation for the left-right 
asymmetries observed in the structuring of linguistic strings: because the 
hearer's parsing task is taken as the basis of the model it is naturally 
expected that the presentation of the message will be adjusted in order to 
take into account the hearer's variable state of information at the point in the 
parsing task currently being conducted. A related central property of DS is its 
commitment to modelling the radical context dependence of natural language 
and the way in which interpretation is built up relative to context. This means, 
as we shall see in detail, that the linguistic/grammatical specification of words 
12 
or structures may significantly under-specify the assigned interpretation. This 
is because the resolution of underspecified information is taken to be 
provided either by the context, or during the interpretation process. In 
particular, DS commits itself to an account of anaphoric expressions as 
contributing specifications that under-determine the particular interpretation 
that is assigned to them in context, following the general spirit of Relevance 
Theory (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995). This approach, as a tool for linguistic 
analysis, has the consequence that syntactic restrictions and variable types of 
interpretation can be given a unitary basis of explanation. Moreover, since in 
actual human parsing distinct types of information have been shown to 
interact on-line, DS is designed in such a way as to provide points of interface 
between the operation of the grammatical formalism (syntax) and other types 
of information (context) jointly deriving the output of the parsing task which 
must be a complete and fully disambiguated logical form. In the domain of 
conditionals where inherent vagueness and context dependence of 
interpretation has been noted by various researchers, a sensible method of 
analysis is suggested by this methodology integrating both the contribution of 
the context of processing and what is given explicitly by the linguistic system. 
There are multiple analyses of conditionals which attempt to classify the 
disparate interpretations derived by the processing of syntactically identical 
linguistic strings (see e. g. Declerck & Reed (2001) who identify a multitude of 
semantic interpretations). An account in the spirit of DS ought to allow such a 
multiplicity of interpretations arising from the processing of a single 
conditional sentence to be derived not as directly encoded in the linguistic 
system but as the effect of inherent context dependence. Similarly to the DS 
account of anaphora (and indeed Relevance Theory) the challenge is to 
identify a suitably underspecified encoded content which can then be 
enriched by input from its context of occurrence in order to provide the 
requisite interpretations. Since it seems to be case that the more and more 
data considered the more and more interpretive possibilities must be 
postulated in any classification it seems essential that the syntactic analysis 
must be unburdened from the task of enumerating all these options (while 
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nevertheless seeking to retain a uniform basis for interpretation at some level 
of abstraction). This is the point of view from which conditional sentence 
processing will be examined in this thesis, namely, we will not attempt to 
derive every possible interpretational effect ever observed as encoded in the 
semantics of a conditional utterance but rather attempt to provide the minimal 
skeletal form which further processes of reasoning and pragmatic processes 
will take as input in order to derive the requisite interpretations. 
A second aim of this thesis emerging as a result of the DS stance taken 
above is to attempt an explanation of how the processing of the linguistic 
input provided by natural language conditionals results in the circumscription 
of local structural domains that allow or disallow anaphoric dependencies 
among terms introduced at different parsing stages. Because of the nature of 
the DS formalism this is essential for the appropriate functioning of the 
system since the expressed aim is not only the characterisation of possible 
and impossible strings but also the provision of constraints that restrict the 
operations of the inferential mechanisms which are assumed to interface with 
the grammar. In that respect the aims of DS are similar to those of more 
established frameworks like DRT (Kamp 1981, Heim 1982) which also 
attempt to characterise the interaction between semantic interpretation and 
context dependence. However, the classical articulations of the latter 
frameworks require the intermediate stage of a syntactic representation which 
is established independently of the processing for discourse representation 
purposes. In contrast, DS integrates both syntactic and discourse/semantic 
representational constraints in one model. This reflects once more the 
commitment that linguistic structure is motivated and underpinned by 
processing considerations. In the domain of conditionals this strategy proves 
very fruitful, as we shall see, because both sentence-syntactic and discourse- 
semantic approaches have faced challenges whose resolution has led, 
contrarily, to a consolidation of the view that the two types of constraints are 
independent of each other. For example, the structural analyses provided for 
conditionals following surface-syntactic considerations are usually not directly 
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compatible with the structures necessary for semantic evaluation and 
anaphora resolution purposes (see e. g. Boeckx 2003 for a recent 
demonstration). One case in point is the fact that, whereas in the natural 
language input the linear order between antecedent and consequent can be 
variable, discourse/semantic representation requires the antecedent to be 
processed first so that it provides the context for the processing of the 
consequent (e. g. according to Stalnaker 1968 the antecedent firstly describes 
a possible world and the consequent makes an assertion about that world; 
Strawson 1986 talks about a "ground-consequent" relation; see also Carlson 
& Hintikka 1979: 4, Haiman 1978: 51, Kamp 1981). In order to achieve this 
result from the possibly incompatible sentence grammar representation 
further transformations of the output of syntactic processing are required, 
transformations whose nature is distinct from those employed in the syntactic 
component (see e. g. the construal rules employed in Heim 1982). As a further 
example consider the fact that, although noun phrases in natural languages 
like indefinites, definites and universal quantifiers behave syntactically in a 
unitary way, semantic and discourse-representational approaches postulate 
distinct representational treatments for them because it is assumed that they 
exhibit divergent anaphoric/binding behaviour and semantics. Conditionals is 
one of the environments that have provided striking evidence for such distinct 
treatments of noun phrases with respect to anaphoric potential. Discourse 
representational approaches define constraints on anaphora that interact with 
their analysis of quantificational terms and the structure attributed to 
conditionals in such a way that certain anaphoric links are precluded or 
facilitated. The exclusion of some types of anaphoric connection between the 
terms introduced by, e. g., universal quantifiers as opposed to the terms 
introduced by indefinites is taken as a primary diagnostic for the transformed 
structure assigned to conditionals and the divergent treatment of distinct 
types of quantificational phrases (in particular indefinites being analysed as 
predicates). This in turn is seen as justification for the necessity of a separate 
level of discourse processing at which such analyses can be defined. 
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In this thesis we are going to consider data, some of them novel, which 
seem to challenge the standard assumptions made in the other frameworks 
as regards the non-uniform behaviour of definites, indefinites and quantifiers 
as well as the assumption that conditional antecedents always provide a 
complete context for the processing of the consequent. The formulation of the 
DS rules of processing linguistic input employing underspecification in the 
assignment of content to anaphoric elements and in the construction of 
semantic representation will be seen to provide a natural basis for expressing 
the requisite range of anaphoric dependencies in conditional sentences. At 
the same time, we will be able to sustain an analysis of quantification in which 
the data considered will be taken care of without the need for a radical 
reorganisation of the entire framework. 
There is a great deal more to say about each of these aspects, as will 
emerge in due course. But, next we are going see in more detail the reasons 
why conditional constructions present such an interesting challenge for the 
resources made available by a grammar formalism and the semantic 
considerations that will play a role in assigning them appropriate logical 
forms. 
2. The Relevance Of Conditionals To Linguistic Theory 
2. a. Form 
2. a. 1. Structural characteristics 
2. a. 1. a. Subordination 
In the linguistic literature, structures like the following in (1) below are 
characterised as conditional sentences or conditionals. 
(1) If John behaves badly, Mary shouts at him. 
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They are taken to consist of two clauses': the if-clause (or antecedent or 
protasis, or conditional clause) and the "main" clause, known as the 
consequent (or conclusion or apodosis, or main clause). 
There is a conflict of assumptions in current analyses of conditionals 
due to the standard dissociation between the grammar and semantic 
interpretation: Discourse/semantic theories like DRT characterise the 
apodosis as subordinated to the (clause-initial) protasis for interpretation and 
anaphoric purposes (see e. g. Kamp & Reyle 1993). On the other hand, 
syntactic and traditional distributional analyses take the syntactic link between 
the two -clauses in conditional structures as the relation of adjunction or 
subordination with the antecedent clause subordinated to the consequent 
(see e. g. Borsley 2005). In terms of traditional distributional criteria, this is 
because, unlike main clauses, if-clauses are assumed to not be able to occur 
as stand-alone utterances. In fact this is not the case. Strings with the form of 
conditional protases can certainly occur as independent utterances: 
(2) A: Go away 
B: If John wants me to. 
(3) A: Do you want me to read? 
B: If you could. 
(4) A: Where is the information desk please? 
B: If you could come this way madam 
A more accurate assumption is that conditional protases are not normally able 
to express a complete, truth-evaluable proposition on their own, without the 
provision of an (implicit or explicit) consequent (the notion of "truth-evaluable 
proposition" mentioned here is equivalent to a low-level explicature in 
Relevance Theory, see, e. g. Carston 2002). Consequently, syntactic analyses 
take utterances consisting simply of an antecedent as elliptical or fragments 
(see e. g. Haegeman 2003: 320, fn. 3). If this assumption, which notably relies 
on interpretive considerations, is maintained, then there is a real asymmetry 
' In this thesis we are only concerned with conditionals with finite antecedents although the 
analysis should extend to non-finite constructions without problems. 
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between the propositional2 content provided by antecedent and consequent. 
The consequent is (mostly) expressed by a main clause and such clauses are 
taken to be independently structured. In contrast, the conditional protasis is 
dependent on the presence of the consequent (although there is no 
necessary requirement for the provision of an explicit consequent). This is 
also reflected in the interpretation of tense morphemes in the antecedent and 
consequent3. It has been observed that the interpretation of tense 
morphemes in conditional protases depends on the temporal interpretation of 
the consequent (see e. g. Dudman 1984a, b). For example, present and past 
tense morphemes in the antecedent can be interpreted as denoting future 
time: 
(5) If John comes Mary will be upset. 
(6) If John came Mary will be upset. 
These considerations provide support to the assumption that syntactically the 
antecedent is subordinated to the consequent. On the other hand, on 
semantic grounds, the interpretation of a conditional apodosis is necessarily 
dependent on the antecedent since the statement made by the proposition 
expressed by the consequent is not presented as true independently. 
Therefore, as DRT-style theories predict, the dependency is the other way 
round: the antecedent subordinates the consequent. This is evidenced by the 
possible anaphoric connections between terms in the antecedent and the 
consequent and by word order facts discussed below. 
There are two avenues to be explored here to resolve this contradiction: 
We can either develop a system that postulates a strict separation of the 
syntactic and semantic representational systems for natural language (see 
e. g. Culicover & Jackendoff 1997). Or, we can achieve the preservation of a 
single representational system by attributing the contradictory 
semantic/syntactic effects to the mechanism responsible for the construction 
2 For some distinct functions of elliptical antecedent sentences see Dancygier 1998: 142-145. 
3 We will not have much to say about tense in this thesis. For a DS analysis of tense see 
Perrett 2000. For the interpretations of tenses in conditionals see Dancygier 1998, Ch. 2. 
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of such representations and general processing considerations. Following the 
spirit of DS, the latter approach will be taken here. We will argue that the 
connection between the two clauses, protasis and apodosis, has to be 
captured (a) at the level of logical form where the representations of the 
content of the two clauses will be linked (bearing in mind that the linking 
mechanism is asymmetric) and (b) the anaphoric and structural effects 
associated with the processing of antecedent and consequent will be 
captured by means of the timing of the application of the processing rules 
employed. The latter type of explanation crucially relies on the procedural 
effects triggered by the lexical resources of a particular language. In that 
respect the particular lexical morpheme if introducing a conditional protasis 
will be employed as an important means of realising the structure required. As 
other lexicalist frameworks, DS places a heavy burden on the lexicon. 
However, idiosyncratically, words here are seen as triggers for the execution 
of whole sequences of actions and structure-building and not just as 
contributing conceptual content in the semantic representation (this type of 
view of lexical items is reminiscent of the conceptual/procedural encodings of 
Relevance Theory, see, e. g. Sperber & Wilson 1995 although incorporated at 
a different level). 
In English, as in many other languages, the conditional clause is 
distinguished from the main as it is introduced by the complementiser if or by 
special word order: 
(7) If Mary sees John she will warn him. 
(8) Had Mary seen John she would have warned him. 
This fact seen from the parsing perspective taken here acquires special 
significance as an if-clause must be taken as providing an encoded indication 
of its import and affinity to the consequent. Whereas two clauses presented 
as linked in this way provide a definite indication of the interpretational 
connection between them, this is not the case when a "conditional meaning" 
can be derived by what is sometimes called paratactic conditionals (Declerck 
& Reed 2001): 
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(9) Kiss my dog and you'll get fleas 
In these cases the presumed "conditional meaning" is solely the product of 
inference, as there is no encoded indication that a specific "conditional" 
relation is intended (cf. Culicover & Jackendoff 1997). As has been pointed 
out for many cases of coordination discussed in the Relevance Theory 
literature (see e. g. Carston 1993, Carston & Blakemore 2005) the inference 
could very well result in any number of semantic relations between the two 
propositions, e. g. causal, temporal etc. depending on the context of use. For 
example, consider the following use of the sentence in (9) above: 
(10) A: I need to testa new flea treatment for humans. I think I'll test it on myself first. I 
wonder, how could I get fleas around here? 
B: Kiss my dog and you'll get fleas 
In the above the conditional interpretation is not necessarily more salient than 
any of the causal, temporal etc. that can be derived by enrichment4 from a 
conjunctive statement. Therefore there is no need to assign a special 
"conditional" meaning to the construction or the lexical item "and". On the 
other hand, since DS provides a modelling of the interface between linguistic 
rule-governed and inferentially derived meanings, its adoption of Relevance 
Theory assumptions about inference can explain how in these instances the 
variable contribution of distinct processes can derive interpretations similar to 
those achieved by the processing of encoded conditional interpretations. As 
the two systems are taken to manipulate common representations and to 
interact on-line, the fact that two distinct formulations can receive a single 
interpretation does not have to mean that there are linguistically specified 
common characteristics. For this reason the category of paratactic 
conditionals, although enlightening from the point of view of how inferential 
processes enrich content, will not be taken as part of the concerns of this 
thesis which seeks to define how the specific linguistic input provided by 
conditionals constrains the resulting interpretations. 
4 For the process of enrichment in Relevance Theory see e. g. Carston (2002). 
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2. a. 2. Word order 
If, as DS maintains, linguistic information is progressively processed and 
integrated through the construction by the hearer of a structured logical form 
then the presentation of this information in a left-to-right fashion provides 
another dimension which can be exploited as a resource for the derivation of 
inferential effects. However, for such effects to be accounted for, firstly, the 
grammar formalism has to define how the enforced mono-dimensional mode 
of presentation of a structured message results in, perhaps arbitrary, 
encoded constraints which confer systematicity on the interpretation of 
linguistic signals (this is one view of the problem of compositionality see Cann 
et al 2005, Ch. 1). In this respect the general or language-particular word 
order constraints can be both a means for conveying additional information 
(e. g. focus or topic effects) but also a restriction on how a message can be 
articulated in time. DS caters for this latter property of natural language 
signals by providing a general system of rules which specifies the permissible 
actions that can be taken by the parser according to the particular structural 
context and accumulated information at each particular point in the parsing 
task. Linguistic restrictions like word order and patterns of extraction and 
copying5 are characterised by DS solely by means of this definition of 
admissible continuations. As one of the concerns of this thesis is to 
incorporate into DS the particular restrictions imposed by the processing of 
conditionals we will now examine the word order patterns that characterise 
strings including if-clauses. Such patterns primarily include the positioning of 
the if-clause with respect to the consequent but also the dislocation 
phenomena that affect both clauses. 
The if-clause, like other adverbials, can appear in different positions 
without obvious truth-conditional effects: 
(11) If John shouts, Mary gets upset. 
(12) Mary gets upset if John shouts. 
5 The terms "extraction", "copying", "dislocation", "deletion" etc. are only used here because 
of their usefulness in making reference to established grammatical phenomena. 
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(13) Mary, if John shouts, gets upset 
(14) If Sue raises, Bill will call6. 
(15) Bill will call, if Sue raises. 
(16) Bill, if Sue raises, will call. 
(17) Bill will,. if Sue raises, call. 




A DS analysis of if-clauses needs to provide the resources for processing 
them at different positions. As usual in DS this will be achieved by a 
combination of lexical and general processing rules. 
Another phenomenon that has to be modelled is the fact that there is no 
strict adjacency requirement between antecedent and consequent. The 
consequent corresponding to a clause-initial antecedent might be embedded 
as can be seen in the cases below: 
(18) [If John leaves] Mary believes that Bill will stay = 
a. Mary believes that if John leaves Bill will stay 
or 
b. If John leaves then Mary believes that Bill will stay. 
(19) If you leave I think that I will leave = 
a. [If you leave] (then/in that case) I think I will leave 
or 
b. I think that [if you leave] (then) I will leave 
(20) If the dinner had been ready Mary believes that John would not have complained 
a. [If the dinner had been ready] (then/in that case) Mary believes that John wouldn't have 
complained 
or 
b. Mary believes that [if the dinner had been ready] (then/in that case) John would not have 
complained 
However, the distance between antecedent and consequent is not arbitrary. 
Their separation respects what in the linguistic literature are sometimes called 
island restrictions. This means that, for example, the antecedent of a 
6 These examples should probably interpreted in the context of the game of Bridge (as 
pointed out by Ronnie Cann). 
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conditional cannot be construed as originating inside a relative clause or the 
complement of an deverbal noun (Complex NP-constraint, Ross 1967): 
(21) Mary called the man who will be hired if John leaves. 
(22) *If John leaves Mary called the man who will be hired. 
(23) Mary believed the claim that Bill will leave if John stays. 
(24) If John stays Mary believed the claim that Bill will leave. 
This seems to imply that antecedent and consequent stand in some kind of 
local relation that has to be expressed by the formalism. 
Another aspect of the properties of such structures that has to be 
explained is the fact that extraction is not allowed from inside an if-clause, i. e., 
if-clauses, like relative clauses, are themselves islands (cf. (25)-(26)): 
(25) John saw the man who shot Mary 
(26) *Who did John see the man who shot? 
(27) John will fire Mary [if she calls John]. 
(28) *Who will John fire Mary if she calls _? (29) [If John sees Mary] he will kiss her. 
(30) *Who [if John sees _] will 
he kiss her? 
On the other hand, the relation between antecedent and consequent is 
unlike that of two conjuncts related by and/or/but in that the type of relation 
between them does not allow for several phenomena that characterise 
coordinated clauses. First of all, Right Node Raising is precluded between 
antecedent and consequent (as indeed is also the case with relative clause 
structures): 
(31) John will support and Mary will try to promote the manager of their department 
(32) If John supports _ 
Mary will try to promote the manager of their department 
(33) *[Mary will support _] 
[if John tries to promote _] 
the manager of their department 
(34) Mary will support John Petropapadopoulos, who Bill met yesterday 
(35) *[Mary will support _] 
[who Bill saw _] 
John Petropapadopoulos. 
Two clauses related by the conjunction and can be made to share a common 
subject (Conjunction Reduction). This structure is not allowed for if-clauses 
and relatives alike : 
(36) John [bought the newspaper] and [sold the milk] 
(37) *John [bought the newspaper] if [sold the milk] 
(38) *If John [sold the milk] [bought the newspaper] 
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(39) *Mary [will support John], who [met yesterday] 
Another difference that points to distinct analyses for conjunctions on the one 
hand and if-clauses and relatives on the other is the phenomenon of 
Gapping. When two clauses are coordinated the verb of the second clause 
can be elided if it is identical to the one in the first one: 
(40) John will buy the newspaper and [ Mary _ 
the milk ] 
There is no corresponding construction for if-clauses (neither with relatives): 
(41) *John will buy the newspaper if Mary 
_ 
the milk 
(42) *John saw Bill who 
- 
Mary 
On the other hand, coordinated clauses allow for the phenomenon of 
Across-the-Board extraction: 
(43) The man who [ John dislikes 
_] and 
[ Mary loves 
_] came 
to see me yesterday 





/f-clauses do not generally permit extraction: 
(45) Who did John dislike 
- 
if Mary saw _? 
The parallel properties of if-clauses and nominal relatives, which 
contrast with the properties of coordinate structures, have led several 
researchers to the assumption, which will be adopted here, that, in some 
sense to be made precise, if-clauses fall within the same class of structures 
as relative clauses in the same way that when-clauses and where-clauses 
can be taken as relatives over implicit time or location specifications (see e. g. 
Geis 1985, Bhatt & Pancheva 2001). Nevertheless there is one difference 
between these clauses and if-clauses (pointed out by Geis 1985). Consider 
the following: 
(46) John left when Mary claimed that Bill left 
(46) is ambiguous between the following two interpretations: 
(47) John left at the time at which, according to Mary, Bill left 
(48) John left at the time at which Mary made the following claim: "Bill left" 
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Unlike when-clauses if-clauses are not ambiguous in that respect: 
(49) John left if Mary claimed that Bill left. 
(50) In any case that is such that Mary made the claim: "Bill left", John left (in that case) 
(51) # John left in any one of the circumstances that Bill left according to Mary's claims 
When if-clauses are analysed as the same type of construction as nominal 
relatives and when-clauses this pattern of idiosyncratic behaviour regarding 
the strict locality requirement internal to the antecedent is awkward for 
frameworks that employ uniform processes of movement, or movement-like 
operations. There can be no non-ad hoc restrictions of general mechanisms 
in explaining this difference in extractability. In contrast DS (as well as other 
lexicalist frameworks) can deal comfortably with idiosyncrasies of this type 
since by definition each word is individually associated with a particular set of 
procedural actions which, it is plausible, may deviate from their common 
historical patterns under functional or pragmatic pressures. 
The discussion about the similarity between nominal relatives and 
conditionals raises the issue of what kind of term an if-clause is a relative of. 
This brings us to the topic of what type of semantic representation is 
constructed out of the processing of a conditional sentence. Along with other 
researchers, we will assume here that if-clauses are relatives over a term 
inducing universal quantification over a domain of contextually specified 
events or situations. But before presenting this proposal we will review 
alternative possible semantic analyses and the reason why we will not adopt 
them' in the precise form that they have been defined. This is essential in this 
context because, unlike other frameworks where syntactic issues are very 
generally taken as independent of and prior to semantics, in DS, the syntax is 
nothing more than the progressive construction of some logical 
representation. Therefore syntactic and semantic issues are fundamentally 
inter-dependent, as we shall see throughout the thesis. 
25 
2. b. Semantics 
The literature on conditionals has to be quite the most dauntingly large 
literature there is, as the semantics of this construction has attracted a great 
deal of attention from linguists, philosophers, and logicians over a very large 
span of time. As Smith & Smith (1988) put it: 
"Conditionals involve virtually every problem - logical or linguistic, descriptive or theoretical - 
that has ever been raised" (1988: 350). 
We cannot therefore in principle hope to cover all the issues here. What will 
be attempted instead is an outline sufficient for current purposes only, in 
particular the purpose of probing the interface between semantic and 
structural properties of natural language. We start with the minimal truth- 
functional analysis and continue with attempts to preserve it in the face of 
claims of its inadequacy. 
2. b. 1. The truth-functional analysis 
A first approximation to the semantics of natural language conditionals is that 
achieved by translation in the language of classical logic. Such translations 
involve two propositions conjoined by the D (or -+) symbol which is 
interpreted as material implication. Under this view, the truth conditions 
associated with the construction consisting of an if-clause and a consequent 
can be given by the truth-table interpretations of the truth-functional 
connective 7) which gives either True or False according to the truth values 
of the conjoined propositions. The truth value False for the whole construction 
results only when the antecedent is assigned True and the consequent False. 
In all other cases the conditional sentence must be taken as True. 
It was observed early on that when applied to natural language 
interpretations this analysis is associated with a lot of dilemmas, cumulatively 
referred to as the paradoxes of the material implication (see Gazdar 1979, 
Gibbard 1981). As far as linguistic issues are concerned, one serious 
problem seems to be how to derive in a systematic way the intuitive 
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interpretations associated with conditionals. The strictest version of the 
Compositionality Principle, requires that the meaning of a construction is 
solely dependent on the meanings of its component parts: 
It is only the meaning of the parts and their syntactic mode of combination that matters. 
(Hintikka 1980, cited in Partee 1984b/2004: 162) 
For semantic theories which more or less follow this principle and where truth 
conditions for natural language sentences have to be given in abstraction of 
use in context the material implication analysis for conditionals creates 
insurmountable problems as the truth conditions given do not adequately 
correspond to speakers' intuitions. Firstly, it has been claimed that natural 
language conditionals do not have a use where the fact that the antecedent is 
false or the consequent true is sufficient grounds for asserting the truth of the 
whole conditional: 
(52) [A The war in Iraq has not ended ] 
[. A If the war in Iraq has ended ] then [B there was never any conflict in Iraq ]. 
(53) -A therefore A--+ B 
(54) [B George Bush is the President] 
If [A George Bush did not win the elections ] then [B he is the President ] 
(55) B therefore A -> B 
Moreover, the standard logical equivalences between formulas that hold 
among formulas in classical logic do not seem to be valid for natural language 
sentences involving conditional structures. Faithful translation of natural 
language connectives as those of classical logic give truth-conditionally 
incorrect or at least weak results in these cases. For instance, in propositional 
logic, (57) implies (59). However, their presumed natural language 
equivalents do not seem to allow the inference from (56) to (58): 
(56) If (both) switch A and switch B are on, then the engine will run 
(57) (A A B) --+ C 
(58) If switch A is on, the engine will run, or, if switch B is on, the engine will run. 
(59)(A-*C)v(B-*C) 
The material implication analysis for indicative conditionals can be 
defended against those failures on the grounds that interpretation of language 
involves much more than simply considering truth conditions (see Grice 1989, 
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Smith 1983, Smith & Smith 1988). Therefore, since the material implication 
analysis is the minimum required for allowing properties of the human 
inferential system to be discerned in language structure and since it can be 
shown that there are uses of conditionals which necessitate the material 
implication interpretation, this interpretation should be seen some kind of 
initial encoded meaning which can be pragmatically enriched to derive the 
interpretations required for other uses. For example, it seems that the only 
way to explain the uses of sentences like (60) below for cases where a 
speaker wants to assert the falsity of the antecedent is by means of the 
material implication analysis: If the whole conditional is presented as true and 
the consequent is manifestly false then the antecedent must be presented as 
false as well, which can only be derived by a truth-functional analysis of the 
meaning of the natural language conditional (example from Suber 1997): 
(60) If Congress passes serious campaign finance reform, then I'm a monkey's uncle! 
For cases where the licensed inferences do not seem to be able to go 
through as in (56) one can then say that if a speaker intended the stronger 
interpretation (where both the switches have to be on for the engine to work) 
then it must be made clear in order to avoid misleading the audience (i. e. the 
use of both is not dispensable in this context). Another explanation could be 
that in actual language use a statement presented as the coordination of two 
propositions has to be taken as a single inferential unit, at least initially, so 
that its component parts cannot be separated without loss of inferential 
effects whatever the truth conditions (see e. g. Blakemore 1987, Smith 1983). 
However, even if such defences of the material implication are taken 
into account there remain questions. For example, in analysing what the 
explicit content of a statement is, it is standard to consider whether some 
element in dispute falls under the scope of logical operators (see, e. g. 
Carston 2002: 191-197). Now consider this test applied to a conditional 
statement under the scope of negation: 
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(61) It is not the case that if the peace treaty is signed war will be avoided. Therefore the 
peace treaty will be signed. (from Smith 1983: 10) 
Under an analysis of the conditional as material implication the argument is 
logically valid: 
(62) -'(P -+ Q) HPA -Q therefore 
(63) [ -'(P --, Q) ] --> P 
However we would not want to say that a statement involving the negation of 
a conditional would ever be able to communicate the content in the second 
part of the equivalence in (62). Whatever means of transforming the logical 
form of such sentences might be sought (see, e. g. Grice 1981: 196-197, 
Smith 1983: 13) the fact remains that a linguistic analysis of the content of 
natural language connectives has to provide a plausible minimal basis so that 
pragmatic enrichment can provide an appropriate content in each particular 
context (and, according to standard assumptions, enriched content that can 
fall within the scope of logical operators like negation has to be part of the 
explicitly communicated message conveyed by such utterances). Now if we 
can achieve such a minimal logical form without resorting to (non-monotonic) 
"re-bracketing devices" (Grice 1981) or computations of the relevance of 
alternative logical forms (Smith 1983) then the fact that such arguments are 
not even considered as potentially valid by language users can be accounted 
for (otherwise, what excludes the minimum truth-functional interpretation from 
being able to be relevant at least in some such contexts? ). 
A further consideration is that it has been argued that when an analysis 
for the semantics of counterfactual conditionals is sought the material 
implication analysis cannot be adequate. The logic that utilises the material 
implication symbol and its semantics is appropriate for the uncovering of what 
does and does not follow from facts that have been established as true. 
Although it does that in the most appropriate and efficient way, it does not 
take into account the human need to envisage and reason about situations 
where a false proposition is assumed temporarily and relevant implications in 
accordance with the actual circumstances are explored. Under a naive 
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material implication analysis of natural language conditionals, counterfactuals 
are predicted to be always true since the antecedent is not taken to be true in 
the actual world (this is the main reason for assuming that counterfactuals 
cannot be truth-functional, see, e. g. Quine 1952). For a grammatical analysis 
this means that, unless one wants to maintain radically distinct semantical 
representations for indicative and counterfactual conditionals (see e. g. Adams 
1970, Lewis 1973), a general analysis of the meaning of if must be sought 
that, while maintaining the advantages of the material implication analysis, 
also allows for both types of cases, factual and counterfactual reasoning and 
argumentation. 
In fact, as Carston (2002: 254-257) points out, there is no a priori reason 
to suppose that a cognitive-realistic analysis of the "meaning" of any natural 
language connective should correspond directly with its analogue in any 
logical calculus given that the latter has been devised with the purpose of a 
direct referential semantics whereas natural language is interpreted through 
the construction of intermediate representations in some language of thought 
(LOT, see, e. g., Fodor 1975). And, concerning the conceptual representations 
that conditional sentences have to be assigned. Stalnaker (1992) observes: 
"One can, of course, define a truth-functional connective that has some of the 
properties of the conditional -the so-called material conditional - but it neither gives an intuitively plausible account of the logic and semantics of the conditional sentences of natural 
language that we find ourselves using, nor does it have the promise to do the conceptual 
work that we would like to use conditionals to do" (1990: 316). 
From this point of view, as far as representational questions are concerned, it 
seems that there is no reason to assume that natural language conditional 
sentences should map directly to LOT formulas with the syntactic format that 
propositional or predicate logic formulas bearing the D connective display 
(even if we take propositional or predicate logic as the model for LOT 
inference) and therefore this type of semantics might not be directly 
recoverable from natural language conditionals. Striving to establish such a 
direct mapping can necessitate a lot of redundant transformational power for 
the linguistic system as, for example, in the analysis of natural language 
quantification where a separate syntactic level has to be postulated (LF) so 
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that the linguistic representations that are input to the semantic component 
resemble syntactically predicate logic formulas (see e. g. May 1977). On the 
other hand, if we eschew intermediate linguistic levels of representation we 
are left with the problem of how to maintain some notion of compositionality 
for the linguistic system since, beyond cases of underspecification and 
analyses of linguistic elements as contributing only procedural type of 
information, the simplest linguistic analysis will maintain that at least some 
compositional-semantic properties of LOT are discernible in natural language 
structure (this assumption provides a basis for explaining the systematic 
contribution of the linguistic apparatus to the process of constructing LOT 
representations). The formal properties of natural language conditional 
sentences described above, especially the commonalities between if and 
when/where and relative clauses do not receive adequate motivation under a 
direct mapping to a formula with the syntactic format that involves the 
predicate logic material implication symbol since the compositional 
interpretation of these formulae simply requires two propositions with equal 
status. However, as we saw earlier and will see again in the following 
chapters, the if-clause seems to have status distinct from the main clause. 
This would not be an expected effect if the lexical item if just mapped to a 
compositionally interpreted formula involving simply a truth-functional 
connective. For all these reasons in seeking to define the appropriate LOT 
representation to be assigned as the minimal content derived from natural 
language conditionals we turn now to the significance of the modal analyses 
of counterfactual/subjunctive? and indicative conditionals. This is the purpose 
of the following section. 
2. b. 2. The modal analysis 
Intuitively, the material implication translation of counterfactual conditionals 
seems to give unacceptable results, especially when these conditionals are 
taken to be part of the set of beliefs an individual might hold or present to an 
audience. For example, the following two sentences can both express 
We will not discuss here the presumed difference between subjunctive and counterfactual 
conditionals. For the use of the terms adopted here see Barwise (1986: 22-23). 
31 
propositions that can be taken as true by an individual without having that 
individual judged as unreasonable or inconsistent (cf. Gibbard 1981): 
(64) If Labour had lost the elections in 1997 Michael Howard would be Prime Minister now. 
(65) P --> Q 
(66) If Labour had lost the elections in 1997 Michael Howard would not be Prime Minister 
now. 
(67) P --> 'Q 
The logical forms of these two sentences seem inconsistent with each other 
unless, under a material implication analysis, it is assumed that they are 
trivially true because of the falsity of the antecedent. However, such 
sentences seem to be judged as true or false according to the considered 
circumstances. (cf. the debate about the Law of Conditional Excluded Middle, 
e. g. Lewis 1973/1986, Stalnaker 1981b 8) . The difficulty seems to be that 
individuals can hold propositions as true not in isolation, or according to what 
the objective facts are, but instead as part of distinguished sets of other 
assumed or known propositions. The system of classical logic has been 
designed with the purpose of modelling implication relations between facts 
that are taken to reflect some assumed reality, a single set of circumstances, 
the actual world (this assumption underlies the suitability of material 
implication in mathematical discourse, the domain of eternal truths, although 
see Barwise 1986 for doubt regarding this domain too). Natural language 
subjunctive conditionals are not amenable to a direct, naive translation into 
classical logic because, intuitively, when such conditionals are either stated or 
considered we seem to make explicit reference to alternative (possible) 
realities where distinct facts might be taken as true. Such alternative realities 
are computed on the basis of what is taken to be the actual world and truth of 
the conditional is then judged according to these alternative states of reality, 
hence its relevance for human reasoning and communication. 
A logical system that can be interpreted as referring to alternative states 
is that of Modal Logic. Translations in Modal Logic can be utilised to model 
8 see also von Fintel (1999). 
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the semantics of modal or temporal expressions in natural languages. Since it 
is felt that the truth of a conditional involves envisaging alternative states of 
the world, the semantic representation of such sentences would seem to also 
require translation in the language of Modal Logic. Such translations can be 
given by introducing a necessity operator taking scope over the material 
implication symbol (the strict conditional analysis): 
68) Q (P --" Q) 
Under the possible worlds semantics for modal logics the interpretation of 
operators like o or 0 is provided by means of universal or existential 
quantification over possible worlds respectively. A possible world can be 
taken as "the ontological analogue of a stock of hypothetical beliefs" 
(Stalnaker 1975a: 169). Therefore the statement of truth conditions for (68) 
above will be as follows: 
(69) for every possible world w, if P holds in w then Q holds in w 
In order to model alternative conceptions of necessity or possibility (e. g. 
epistemic, deontic, metaphysical etc. ) an accessibility relation R among 
worlds can be introduced in the models so that quantification is restricted to 
the appropriate worlds. The properties of such a relation will characterise the 
type of necessity/possibility involved. For a logical form like the one in (68) the 
truth conditions for an evaluation world w* then would be as follows: 
(70) for every possible world w, if w is R-accessible from w* and P holds in w then Q holds in 
w 
Since the conceptual apparatus utilised in the semantics of modal languages 
is in any case necessary in the analysis of temporal and modal expressions of 
natural language it would seem that its extension to the semantics of 
conditionals is adequately motivated. However, in the formal 
semantics/philosophical tradition it has been felt that a simple-minded strict 
conditional semantics is not any more adequate than the material conditional 
because of problems having to do with inference patterns predicted to be 
valid from a logical point of view but unsupported by counterfactuals as used 
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in natural language or reasoning (e. g. failure of Transitivity, Contraposition 
and Strengthening of the Antecedent, see Stalnaker 1968, Lewis 1973/1986 
also below). Therefore, it is claimed, the truth conditions must be further 
specified and encoded as part of the semantic content of natural language 
conditionals. Two approaches to the problem are dominant: that of Stalnaker 
(1968) and Lewis (1973/1986). Stalnaker adds to the standard model 
structure a selection function f which selects for each antecedent of a 
conditional a particular possible world which "differs minimally" from the 
evaluation world and in which the antecedent is true. If the consequent is also 
true in this world then the whole conditional is true in the evaluation world. 
The problem identified above with (64), (66) can now be resolved if we 
assume that when giving the semantics of conditional statements/beliefs we 
take into account not the totality of all alternative possibilities but instead, a 
distinguished "most similar" world. Lewis (ibid: 77-83) criticises this analysis in 
that it presupposes that a single most similar world will always be available. 
Lewis argues that this is not the case and proposes instead that alternative 
possible worlds are to be taken as organised in a system of spheres around 
the world of evaluation in such a way that some of them are closer or more 
similar to it than others. He adds the connective Q-i to the language to serve 
as the sign translating "counterfactual"/subjunctive conditionals (the variably 
strict conditional analysis). Then one can say that when the situation arises 
where both P Q--> Q and P El--- -'Q seem to be able to be true then the set of 
worlds where P Q, Q is true must be distinct from the set of worlds where P 
E- -Q is true. The analysis of conditionals as variably strict explains the non- 
monotonic properties of conditional reasoning, e. g., the well-known fact that 
`strengthening' the antecedent of a true conditional does not preserve its 
truth: 
(71) If Otto had come, it would have been a lively party; but if both Otto and Anna had come it 
would have been a dreary party; but if Waldo had come as well, it would have been lively; 
but... 
(72) # If I strike this match, it will light. Therefore if I dip this match into water and strike it, it 
will light 
(73) # If John came, Mary would be happy. Therefore, if John came and he was drunk, Mary 
would be happy. 
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(74) # If kangaroos had no tails they would topple over. Therefore if kangaroos had no tails 
and used crutches they would topple over. 
Since the set of worlds is organised into a system of concentric spheres 
according to their remoteness from the actual world, failure of strengthening 
the antecedent is accounted for because, when a conditional with a stronger 
antecedent is considered, its semantic evaluation is accomplished at a 
different sphere, perhaps more remote, than the original one. Similar 
explanations are given for the other failures of counterfactual reasoning. One 
should note that Lewis' analysis does not do away completely with some of 
the significance of the material implication of classical logic since, e. g., when 
no world is accessible then the truth-conditions of, e. g., P El- Q coincides with 
that of material implication. 
Whatever the abstract logic of counterfactual reasoning may be the 
question that arises for natural language conditionals is whether selection of a 
restricted set of worlds is a semantic or pragmatic issue. If we seek a 
representation on which to base an analysis of the encoded meaning of 
natural language conditional sentences, the truth conditions in (70) above 
seem to provide the minimum required. As has been pointed out by Kamp 
(1988) there is an intimate connection between the concepts of universal 
quantification and implication reflected in Frege's choice to analyse 
universally quantified sentences by means of the implication symbols. We can 
then safely assume that the encoded meaning of natural language 
conditionals involves mapping to a conceptual representation that (at least) 
includes some kind of universal operator1° (universal quantification is argued 
for in von Fintel (2001,1999,1997); Schlenker 2004 takes conditionals as 
9 This parallel is somewhat obscured in a generalised quantifier analysis of universal 
cbuantification. 
' The desirable truth of examples like (60) above might be accounted for if we treat them as 
cases of universal quantification where no element in the domain of quantification satisfies 
the restrictor and therefore the implication is vacuously true, but conversationally informative 
(cf. Lewis 1973/1986: 16). This will involve abductive reasoning on the part of the hearer but 
this is as expected in a pragmatic account. This consideration seems to contradict the 
assumption of a (hard-wired) "existential presupposition" posited in the analysis of 
conditionals in e. g. von Fintel (2001), von Fintel & latridou (2002: 9). The same goes for the 
"Antecedent Requirement" in Lycan (2001: 28). 
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plural definite descriptions of worlds but since he assumes an analysis of 
definites that involves maximality, the general spirit of his analysis is 
compatible with the present point of view"). Given that in the present 
approach underspecification of linguistic content with respect to interpretation 
in context is taken for granted, this semantics seems suitable also because it 
provides the appropriate locus of interaction with the context of utterance in 
that the exact specification of the accessibility relation can be taken as 
underspecified. Arguably an adequate pragmatic theory should be able to 
provide the basis for overcoming the failures noted above by further 
specifying the properties of the accessibility relation in each particular context. 
It seems obvious that, as predicted under relevance theoretic assumptions, 
such failures must be attributed to the distinct selected contexts for the 
processing of the antecedents at each stage of the arguments (see e. g. 
Papafragou (1996,2000) for an analysis of how distinct contexts are selected 
in the domain of modality in terms of a relevance-theoretic framework 
combined with Kratzer's 1981 semantics for modals; see also von Fintel 2001 
and references cited there for similar views and explication of the pragmatic, 
in von Fintel's view, semantic, task12). This approach is corroborated by the 
fact that, as Johnson-Laird & Byrne (2002: 659) point out, inference failures 
like those observed with counterfactuals above can also result with 
disjunctions: 
(75) You put the ice-cream in the fridge or it melts. Therefore, you put the ice-cream in the 
fridge or the oven or it melts. 
We can then take the Stalnaker/Lewis analysis not as explicating the 
semantic content of natural language conditionals but rather as an abstract 
description of (part of) the task to be accomplished by a pragmatic enrichment 
of a context dependent component in their content (see also Smith & Smith 
" However, in DS definites are analysed as anaphoric, therefore, Schlenker's particular 
implementation cannot be adopted here, see below. 2 Regarding the irreversible shrinking of the "modal horizon" postulated by von Fintel, 
intuitions are not at all clear. See Lycan (2001: 30). 
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1988: 32913; from this perspective, von Fintel's analysis (e. g. 2001) also 
provides an abstract definition of some aspects of the pragmatic task 
involved). In that respect, the encoded semantic content of a natural 
language conditional could be left as underspecified in the same way that the 
domain quantified over is underdetermined in the usual cases of universal 
quantification over individuals14: since the truth conditions involve universal 
quantification it is a factor of the circumstances of evaluation in each 
particular context to determine what the domain of quantification should be. 
The intuitive idea that in many cases what is relevant to the assessment of a 
conditional is some kind of connection between the antecedent and 
consequent can only be cashed out in pragmatic terms. Reliance on an 
adequate pragmatic theory will allow us to leave the truth conditions as in 
(70)15. This type of analysis is supposedly refuted in Lewis (1973/1986: 13) 
who claims that the failure of Strengthening the Antecedent in e. g. (72) 
cannot be attributed to the changing context since the example is deliberately 
given in a single run-on sentence. As also pointed out by Schlenker (2004) 
this is not a valid assumption (see also von Fintel 2001). Current pragmatic 
theories certainly do not assume that selection of context is a static affair 
within sentence boundaries (see e. g. Carston 2002). This stance is also 
reinforced by the following example involving domain restriction for universal 
quantifiers over individuals cited by Schlenker (2004, attributed to D. 
Westerstahl): 
13 The DS analysis we are going to propose later which involves the contents of antecedent 
and consequent as being related by means of the LINK relation provides the syntactic basis 
for implementing the intuition expressed in Smith (1983: 15-19) regarding how to resolve the 
issue of failure of Strengthening the Antecedent: structures related by means of the LINK 
relation are presented by a speaker as a single "inferential unit" and therefore must be 
processed as such for relevance (conjoined clauses as well as conditionals involve such 
LINK structures). 
14 For different ways of expressing this intuition see: Stanley & Szabo (2000), Bach (2000), 
Carston (2000). 
15 A question that arises in this type of analysis is whether the process involved in the 
derivation of such interpretations can be characterised as "free enrichment" or "saturation" 
(see, e. g. Carston 2002). As we will see later, we follow Papafragou (2000) here in assuming 
that such domain restrictions are cases of saturation. 
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(76) [Situation: A committee must select some applicants. Some of the applicants are Italian, 
and there are also Italians on the committee, though of course they are not the same. ] 
Every Italian voted for every Italian. 
We conclude that Lewis' objection does not hold. Schlenker (2004) mentions 
another objection to an analysis of if-clauses involving universal 
quantification, as opposed to an analysis in terms of plural definite 
descriptions, which he finds decisive. An analysis in terms of universal 
quantification can only work if we assume that the domain quantified over is 
contextually restricted (in order to explain the failures of reasoning patterns 
mentioned above). However, he presents the following example as showing 
that, although the domain of a universal quantifier can be adjusted 
contextually, it cannot be made to achieve the same effect that use of a 
definite description can achieve. In the following, it is claimed, the definite 
description is able to pick up a salient subset of the domain whereas the 
universal quantifier is unable to do so, hence the infelicity of (77)b: 
(77) [There are ten girls and ten boys in the class. Three girls raise their hands. Talking to the 
teacher, I say: ] 
a. Wait, the girls have a question! 
b. # Wait, every girl has a question! 
This argument is not decisive under the analysis of definite descriptions and 
universal quantifiers assumed here. In DS, definite descriptions, like 
pronouns, are analysed as anaphoric in the sense that they contribute a 
radically underspecified piece of information in the representation, which has 
to be substituted by a term available in the context in order for the parse to be 
successful. On the other hand, universal quantifiers introduce a fresh variable 
and the appropriate quantificational binder which, being initially incomplete, 
has to be transformed to a complete term incorporating its scope 
dependencies at the end of the parse. In this respect, if there is a particularly 
salient (sub-)set in the utterance situation it is predicted that a speaker is 
more likely to use a definite description whose content by assumption is 
directly dependent on the context rather than the more cognitively expensive 
operation of introducing a fresh variable and then relying on a contextual 
restriction of the domain of quantification (from this point of view, this effect is 
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similar to using the speaker's name instead of an indexical like "I" although 
both lexical items could be taken to map to the same propositional constituent 
in a particular context). Moreover, use of a plural, anaphoric definite 
description is also expected to be intended to include all the distinguished 
(most salient) members of the set satisfying the description, otherwise a 
numeral would have been used. Notice, also, that it is not impossible for 
(contextually restricted) universally quantifying expressions to be 
interchangeable with definite descriptions in similar contexts in case slightly 
different effects are required. In the situation described above, after the three 
girls have asked their question the speaker can say to the hearer: 
(78) Astonishing! Every girl raised a point that even I could not answer 
In this case the universal quantifier does not have to be taken as ranging over 
the set of the ten girls (as opposed to the relevant subset of the three girls 
who asked questions). Alternatively the speaker could have said: 
(79) The girls raised points that even I could not answer. 
The conclusion seems to be that when an appropriate theory of definiteness 
and quantification is supplied, Schlenker's example does not provide a valid 
objection to an analysis of conditionals as involving universal quantification. 
The domain of a contextually restricted universal quantifier can be taken to be 
a salient set of objects if this is relevant in the circumstances. Nevertheless, 
saliency, as defined by Schlenker, is not necessarily the notion required for 
defining the domain of quantification for conditionals16: Firstly, under a 
relevance-theoretic conception of dynamic context selection, a notion of pre- 
defined saliency ordering does not provide a cognitively realistic picture. 
Moreover, especially for counterfactual/subjunctive conditionals, there is no 
reason to assume that there is anaphoricity involved in the selection of the 
restrictor as Schlenker's analysis combined with an anaphoric theory of 
16 As Papafragou (2000) argues for the domain of modality, the information needed for 
constructing appropriate restrictors is computed on the basis of cognitive considerations of 
economy and plausibility guided by the principle of relevance; from this point of view salience, 
as defined by Schlenker (2004), is not necessarily co-extensive with such notions. 
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definiteness would necessitate". In further support of his thesis, Schlenker 
finds a contrast between (80) and (81) below. According to him, (80) is 
contradictory whereas (81) is not. He takes this as indicating that whereas 
necessarily induces universal quantification, and therefore monotonic 
behaviour is expected, the if-clause does not: 
(80) If the United States threw its weapons into the sea, there would be war. However, if the 
United States and all other nuclear powers threw their weapons into the sea, there would 
be peace. 
(81) # Necessarily, if the United States threw its weapons into the sea, there would be war. 
However (necessarily) if the United States and all other nuclear powers threw their 
weapons into the sea, there would be peace. 
However, as he admits, intuitions about such examples are not at all strong. 
The mild contrast that might be taken to exist above can be attributed to the 
fact that the adverb necessarily is used in (81) which might induce a distinct 
type of domain of quantification of its own. Moreover, the fact that two 
universally quantifying expressions are used instead of one certainly 
contributes to the contrast. This is certainly expected from a relevance- 
theoretic point of view as the effect of emphasising the fact that all 
possibilities must be taken into account cannot be taken to have no impact on 
interpretation. If anything, the contrast shows that, as argued here, if-clauses 
cannot be taken to simply restrict quantificational expressions but rather as 
introducing their own quantificational force (see also von Fintel & latridou 
2002). In any case (necessarily unnatural) examples can be constructed 
where the use of necessarily does not exclude non-monotonic behaviour 
(removing the emphatic effect of "adverb preposing" for necessarily would 
also contribute to the acceptability of the argument below): 
(82) Necessarily, if the United States went to war with Iran, then Britain would go to war too. 
However if the United States went to war with Iran and the British Muslim Party had won 
the election, Britain (necessarily), would not go to war. 
We conclude that the simplified encoded semantics for conditionals in (70), 
involving universal quantification, is adequate if supplemented with an 
17 An added problem with Schlenker's account, as he also points out, is that it is difficult to 
find cases of collective predication over a set of worlds. 
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appropriate pragmatic theory defining the accessibility relation in terms similar 
to that in Papafragou 2000 (for the interaction between encoded meaning and 
pragmatics in conditionals see also Johnson-Laird & Byrne 2002). 
However, the problem that remains now is to define the appropriate 
entities that should be quantified over in the posited representations of the 
propositions expressed by conditionals. Possible worlds cannot be taken for 
granted here because the conception of alternative possible worlds as 
psychologically real entities that play a role in the computation of meaning 
has come under criticism (Partee 1979, Smith 1983). Entire, complete 
possible worlds, which by definition provide a truth value for each proposition 
(i. e. a God's eye view of possibilities), cannot be the actual objects 
considered in human reasoning or semantic evaluation of natural language 
statements. As in most cases non-denumerably infinite sets of possible 
worlds are needed in order to explicate the abstract semantics assigned to 
modalised sentences, doubts have been expressed as to whether these 
models can be assumed to be even compatible with human language users' 
abilities. Stalnaker and other possible world semanticists seem to make a 
kind of competence-performance distinction as far as the employment of 
possible worlds is concerned: worlds are not employed in order to explicate 
the mechanisms used to represent information but rather as the means of 
describing in an idealised way the information that has to be represented. 
However, possible world approaches have been criticised even if confined to 
this abstract point of view of information specification. In the domain of 
conditionals, Baravise (1986) has argued that employment of a possible world 
framework causes difficulties with the semantics of conditional statements 
that concern propositions that must be either true or false in every possible 
world (such as mathematical truths, see Barwise ibid: 25-2718). The truth 
conditions of such conditional statements, even under the Lewis/Stalnaker 
approach, will exhibit exactly the absurdities that we sought to resolve by 
18 Similar well-known problems arise of course in the domain of propositional attitudes, see 
e. g. Fox & Lappin (2005). 
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rejecting the material implication analysis, only this time transferred to the 
domain of alternative worlds. This is because the relevance of the content of 
the antecedent to that of the consequent cannot be captured by such a "blunt 
instrument" as a possible world semantics; for this reason the idealised truth 
conditions are not adequate even for mathematical reasoning. Without 
adopting Barwise's particular solution to the problem (which has a 
characteristic anti-representationalist flavour), we must consider seriously the 
upshot of his arguments which is that, even in mathematical uses, 
conditionals are radically context-dependent and that possible world accounts 
are not fine-grained enough approaches to capture the relevant distinctions. 
Contrary to Barwise's conclusion though, as far as the semantics of 
conditionals is concerned, there is no necessity to encode that there must be 
a "connection" involved between the subject matter of the antecedent and 
that of the consequent: as Stalnaker (1975a: 167-168) shows, there are 
cases where if you firmly believe the truth of the consequent, you are 
prepared to assert the truth of the entire conditional even if you believe that 
the truth or falsity of the antecedent makes no difference and has not 
relevance to it. Similar arguments are also presented in Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne (2002: 651) regarding relevance conditionals19, deontic conditionals, 
etc. What this shows is that although Barwise is right to point out that a 
possible world semantics does not discriminate adequately the relevant 
circumstances and that a "connection" must sometimes be inferred between 
the two propositions in a conditional structure, the latter is not a matter for 
semantic encoding but rather for pragmatic processing20. If the relevance of 
the subject matter in antecedent to that in the consequent can be captured by 
invoking an appropriate pragmatic theory then Barwise's arguments can be 
taken as showing that the problems he mentions arise when the 
19 These are conditionals like the following: 
(i) If you are thirsty, there's beer in the fridge. 
where the truth of the antecedent is not 
20 The relevance of the context and pragmatic processing for appreciating the significance of 
a conditional is shown in the distinct results obtained concerning the selection task in Wason 
(1966) and Wason & Shapiro (1971) (see also Sperber et al. 1995 for interpretation of the 
results in the context of Relevance Theory). 
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cognitive/representational aspect of language processing is ignored. Without 
adopting the "promiscuously" pluralistic ontology of Situation Semantics 
(Barwise & Perry 1983), we can consider for inclusion in our representations 
more cognitively realistic, localised parts of possible worlds, situations or 
events (see e. g. Kratzer 1989). Criticised by Stainaker (1986: 120) as 
retaining some representationalist biases, Barwise & Perry (1985) do mention 
that cumulative attribution of properties to situations seems a much more 
psychologically plausible approach to the acquisition of information than a 
theory postulating gradual reduction of an infinite set of possible worlds as 
assumed in possible world frameworks (see e. g. Stalnaker 1984). Since this 
seems correct to us, we will now consider an alternative semantic analysis for 
conditional sentences that employs quantification over alternative situations 
or eventualities. 
2. b. 3. The eventuality/situation analysis 
The employment of partial objects, situations or events, as part of the 
semantic ontology has been employed for the semantics of naked infinitive 
reports: situations/eventualities can be the objects denoted by arguments of 
some perception verbs (see e. g. Barwise 1981 Higginbotham 1983): 
(83) John saw [ Mary kick Bill ] 
In addition, situations can be the arguments of causal relations: 
(84) What caused the fight was [ Mary kicking Bill ] 
Portner (1992) employs situations in the analysis of the semantics of gerunds, 
infinitives and subjunctives. It seems therefore that there is adequate 
linguistic motivation for the presence of situations in the logical forms derived 
by the processing of linguistic strings. In the domain of conditionals, situations 
have been employed (Kratzer 1989)21 in the computation of the similarity 
between worlds required for the evaluation of counterfactuals. From the 
present point of view, Kratzer's situations seem to provide the appropriate 
21 For some of the distinctions between this approach and Barwise & Perry's Situation 
Semantics (e. g. Barwise & Perry 1981) see Portner (1992). 
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entities that underpin the operation of the pragmatic mechanism which must 
be employed for the evaluation of such conditionals and her approach 
delineates some of the aspects of the task that must be performed (the 
context-sensitive computation of similarity, guided by relevance theoretic 
assumptions, is explicated in Papafragou 1996,1998,2000). Moreover, 
quantification over situations, rather than worlds, can be taken as the 
common basis underlying subjunctive/counterfactual and indicative 
conditionals. As Kamp (1988) points out "many conditionals, while involving 
quantification over some other parameter, (say time), are nonetheless 
understood as pertaining to the actual world only. Such conditionals cannot 
be represented as material implications simpliciter, and yet they are 
'extensional' in the loose sense that their truth values are determined 
exclusively by what is actually the case. " (Kamp ibid: 72). Stalnaker's unified 
account of indicative and subjunctive conditionals might be misleading in this 
respect. It has been pointed out that the analysis of indicative conditionals by 
means of consideration of alternative worlds (as in e. g. Stalnaker 1975b) 
gives counter-intuitive results because evaluation of such conditionals by 
speakers and hearers seems to only take into account what is true in one 
world, the actual world. In contrast, subjunctive conditionals are explicitly 
marked as requiring consideration of alternatives to the actual world and 
therefore only those should involve consideration of alternative worlds 
(Gibbard 1981, Abbot 2004). Lewis (1973/1986: 3) maintained that distinct 
analyses should be given to indicative and counterfactual/subjunctive 
conditionals because of the distinct intuitive truth-values of the following: 
(85) If Oswald did not kill Kennedy then somebody else did: True 
(86) If Oswald had not killed Kennedy then somebody else would have: probably False 
Lewis assumed that the material implication analysis could be suitable for 
simple indicative conditionals (Lewis 1986: 152-156). Nevertheless, the 
combination of quantificational adverbs like mostly or usually with if-clauses 
led Lewis (1975) to reject the material implication interpretation at least for 
these specific cases: 
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(87) Usually if Mary's cat eats porridge she is happy. 
Following Kratzer's (1986) reformulation of Lewis' argument to involve 
situations22, suppose that the adverb usually corresponds to a quantifier 
MOST and that the latter quantifies over events or situations in the world. A 
semantic representation for (87) which follows closely surface structure would 
be as follows: 
(88) MOST s. [ Mary's cat eats porridge in s] --* [ Mary's cat is happy in s] 
The interpretation of such a representation would come out as: for most 
situations s it is the case that if Mary's cat eats porridge in s then Mary's cat is 
happy in that situation s. Kratzer (and Lewis) argue that this does not 
represent the right truth conditions under a material implication interpretation 
of -3: Suppose that there are just 1.000.000 situations in the world. 2000 of 
these situations are situations when Mary's cat eats porridge. In all of these 
2000 situations Mary's cat is not at all happy. However all the other 998.000 
remaining situations are situations where Mary's cat does not eat porridge. 
She might for example eat fish or play with the other cat or not be involved in 
the situations at all. Since all these remaining situations satisfy the description 
"Mary's cat does not eat porridge", i. e. the negation of the antecedent of the 
conditional inside the scope of MOST, then these situations, under the 
material implication analysis, verify the conditional. Since most situations 
(998.000) verify the conditional whereas 2000 situations falsify it, the whole 
sentence should come out as true although intuitively the sentence is false 
given the facts described. As a result, Kratzer, following Lewis' suggestion, 
argues that the material implication analysis of conditionals should be 
abandoned for these cases and instead the if-clause should be taken as 
having no other contribution to the meaning of the sentence than indicating 
the restrictor of the quantifier MOST contributed by the adverb usually (for 
22 Lewis rejects the claim that the quantification is over events/situations because there are 
cases involving mathematical statements like the following which, in his view, cannot be seen 
as involving specific events: 
(i) A quadratic equation usually has two solutions 
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Lewis MOST was to be analysed as an unselective quantifier over cases, i. e. 
assignments of values to any free variables in the representation): 
(89) MOSTs [ Mary's cat eats porridge in s] [Mary's cat is happy in s] 
Kratzer (1978,1986,1991) then goes on to extend this analysis to all uses of 
conditionals, subjunctive and indicative alike. In her analysis if-clauses always 
contribute a restrictor to a quantifier. This quantifier might be an adverb of 
quantification as above, or a modal as in (90) below or an implicit necessity 
operator when there is no overt quantificational element (in cases of "bare 
conditionals"): 
(90) If John comes he must greet Mary 
(91) MUST [John comes] [John greets Mary] _ 
(92) `d, [John comes in w] [John greets Mary in w] 
(93) If John is upset he blames Mary 
(94) Q [John upset ] [John blames Mary] 
(95) V,,, [John upset in w] [John blames Mary in w] 
Lewis's quantification over cases (rather than situations) and Kratzer's 
analysis of conditionals as always restricting a modal operator are combined 
in the initial DRT frameworks presented by Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982). 
Following Kratzer and Lewis, Heim (1982) adopts an analysis of conditionals 
as always (implicitly or explicitly) quantifying. Logical forms for conditional 
sentences are seen to involve unselective operators which bind all the free 
variables in their scope. In the closely related DRT framework of Kamp (1981) 
conditional sentences (and universal quantification) are analysed as causing 
'box-splitting', that is, introducing in the main DRS K two subordinate DRSs 





The semantics assigned to such structures is also equivalent to unselective 
universal quantification over the values assigned to free variables in the 
antecedent box. 
Kamp's and Heim's analyses are motivated by the need to account for 
certain puzzles in the theory of anaphora, namely, the interpretation of 
donkey sentences. The original observation due to Geach (1972) was that 
indefinites inside the antecedent of a conditional must be interpreted as 
universally quantified: 
(97) If a farmer buys a donkey he feeds it. 
(98) [ 3x. 3y. farmer(x) A donkey (y) ] -+ feed(x, y) 
(99) Vxy. [ farmer(x) A donkey(y) n own(x, y) ] -* beat(x, y) 
Since the material implication analysis of conditionals combined with the 
analysis of indefinites as existential quantifiers results in a translation of (97), 
the logical form in (99), which does not reflect the intuitive truth conditions, 
Heim (and effectively Kamp too) adopt the unselective quantification analysis 
which takes if-clauses as contributing restrictors in tripartite quantificational 
structures. This, in combination with an analysis of indefinites and pronouns 
as contributing free variables (or 'discourse referents' in Kamp 1981) that can 
be bound by the unselective quantificational operators allows for a successful 
treatment of donkey sentences. The successful treatment of donkey 
sentences is a major achievement of DRT. However, as Heim (1990) points 
out, the success of this account is not necessarily tied to the unselective 
quantifier analysis of quantificational terms and the conditional operator. In 
order to solve certain problems that arise under the above DRT assumptions, 
Heim proposes to resurrect the E-type analysis of unbound pronouns in 
combination with a situation/event semantics. Unbound pronouns like the 
ones in (98) are not interpreted any longer as bound variables but instead as 
definite descriptions in disguise (cf. the E-type analysis of Evans 1981, 
Cooper 1979). The problems that had been pointed out by Heim (1982) for 
such an analysis are to be solved by recourse to the semantics developed by 
Berman (1987) who adopts Kratzer's situation semantics (see also Farkas 
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199723). In this type of semantics worlds are not disposed of but the ontology 
is extended to include situations so that propositions are properties of 
situations or sets of situations. In Berman's implementation, possible 
situations are taken to be basic entities in the model. Thus, models come with 
a set S of possible situations. There is a partial ordering, <_, in the set S 
relating members of S to each other in such a way that for any situation sES 
there is a unique maximal situation (a world) of which s is a part, i. e. each 
situation belongs to one unique possible world. Heim's basic idea then is to 
abandon the problematic unselective quantification view of DRT and let 
operators like Quantificational Adverbs and the conditional to quantify 
selectively over situations. In this analysis every predicate now comes from 
the lexicon equipped with an additional situation argument. The inclusion of 
situations in the semantics, in association with an (admittedly problematic) 
assumption of "minimality" of quantified situations, is taken to solve earlier 
criticisms of the E-type approach to unbound pronouns. In cases like the 
following the implausible prediction of the E-type analysis when combined 
with a uniqueness assumption regarding the semantics of definite 
descriptions and a universal quantification over worlds analysis of 
conditionals, was that for the sentence to be true it is required that exactly 
one man should be in Athens in each possible world: 
(100) If a man is in Athens then he's not in Rhodes. 
(101) Vw. If a man is in Athens in w then 
the man who is in Athens in w is not in Rhodes in w. 
With the advent of situations the uniqueness presupposition that is assumed 
to accompany definite descriptions can be taken to hold only with respect to 
the (minimal) situations considered in the interpretation of such sentences. 
Additionally, according to Berman (1987) and Ludlow (1994), situations are 
needed for the resolution of other problems associated with the standard DRT 
analysis, like the proportion problem, which can be approached with a 
combination of the situation analysis and contextual enrichment of the 
23 as in Ludlow (1994) the use of the term "event" for these entities does not imply that they 
are necessarily spatiotemporal. 
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specification of the type of situations quantified over (see Berman ibid: 56-57, 
Ludlow 1994, cf. Heim 1990). We find these arguments persuasive and, 
therefore, as providing one more reason for the inclusion of situations in the 
logical forms of such sentences. 
2. b. 4. The relevance of the situation semantics for the present analysis 
The interpretation of definites in DS does not raise problems like those seen 
above with the E-type analyses since definites in DS are taken as essentially 
anaphoric and not implying any uniqueness, just the immediate accessibility 
of their intended content. Moreover, as we are going to see later, in DS, 
indefinites and quantificational terms are seen as supplying terms which can 
be re-used for the completion of the underspecified content contributed by 
pronouns. As we are going to see later, these assumptions can provide 
solutions to the donkey cases without adopting either the unselective 
quantification assumption nor the E-type analysis for pronouns with the 
associated problems for encoding some minimality condition over the 
situations quantified over. Nevertheless, the interpretation of conditional 
sentences requires that we provide a semantic representation that reveals the 
connection between antecedent and consequent, accommodates the intuitive 
universal force, and which moreover provides an explanation for their 
similarities with relative clauses pointed out earlier. For this reason, we will 
adopt the widespread assumption that semantic representations of natural 
language sentences involve situation arguments (this assumption under a 
slightly different implementation has been argued for in Perrett 2000 and 
Kurosawa 2003 in the context of DS). The situation argument will be bound 
by the term binder introduced by the lexical entry associated with the word if. 
In effect we are implementing in a DS representational guise some of the 
assumptions developed by Lycan (2001) in combination with Kratzer's 
situation semantics taking for granted relevance theoretic assumptions as 
regards the construction of appropriate restrictors for quantificational 
elements. Many researchers have analysed conditionals as uniformly 
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expressing quantifications over situations, events or cases (Geis 1985, Lycan 
1984,2001, Ludlow 1994, Schein 2001, the possibility is also raised in 
Schlenker 200524). In Lycan's analysis, which is motivated by the syntactic 
analysis of natural language conditional sentences, indicative or subjunctive 
conditionals are uniformly translated as involving universal quantification over 
events (or situations). For example, a linguistic string with the schematic form 
in (102) below can be given the logical form in (103): 
(102) If P then Q 
(103) `de (In(e, P) -+ In(e, Q)) 
The situations or events quantified over are taken as possible states of 
affairs. However, this analysis is essentially context-dependent. The events or 
situations over which the quantifier ranges are what Lycan calls "real and 
relevant possibilities" in the context. This is explicated to mean that (a) the 
situations quantified over are epistemically envisaged in the context of use, 
and (b) the situations are "relevant" in the sense of involving the antecedent 
or the consequent. As Lycan shows these assumptions can solve several of 
the problems arising from the material implication analysis. The context 
dependency of the quantification is explicitly indicated in the logical form by 
including a parameter R which represents the set of situations over which the 
quantification is restricted: 
(104) Ve E R. In(e, P) --> In(e, Q)), 
The restriction of the quantification to situations that are epistemically 
envisaged and relevant is the analogue of Stalnaker's selection function and 
of Lewis' similarity relation. In addition it can be seen as expressing the 
reinterpretation of the Kratzerian notions of conversational background/modal 
base and ordering source offered by Papafragou (1996,1998,2000). 
24 Situation-semantics accounts differ from the (usually) Davidsonian event-semantics 
accounts in that as Portner (1992) in Davidsonian accounts there is no connection between 
situations/events and propositions. However, as Chierchia (1995: 100) points out, it is difficult 
to find crucial evidence that determine the choice between one option or the other (although 
Portner 1992 provides some evidence for the Kratzerian situation account). Therefore, 
following Chierchia, I will conflate the two notions here as, for the issues considered, the 
distinction does not matter significantly. 
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In the present thesis, we will adopt logical forms similar to Lycan's 
although presented in a structured tree format in accordance with DS 
assumptions. The parameter R employed by Lycan can be given a suitable 
expression in DS as an anaphoric element which must be resolved in context 
in accordance with assumptions explicated by pragmatic theories like 
Relevance Theory. For this reason we do not think that we need to encode 
any constraints on R, as, in a way similar to pronouns, the resolution to an 
appropriately determined set of situations will be provided by the context of 
utterance under the guidance of the principle of relevance. It will then be 
shown that such representations are adequate for dealing with the problems 
raised by donkey sentences. Moreover the analysis extends to the 
telescoping cases which are problematic for the classical formulations of 
DRT, without having to introduce any further covert operations or additional 
types of anaphoric expressions (cf. Roberts 1989): 
(105) Every student walked to the stage. He took his diploma, shook hands with the Dean 
and left. 
(106) Every chess set comes with a spare pawn. It is taped to the bottom of the box 
The account will also extend to cover anaphoric links in cases where reversal 
of the order between antecedent and consequent has been claimed to 
change the anaphoric possibilities between the terms introduced: 
(107) Every student; will be rewarded if he; is on time. 
(108) *If every student is on time he will be rewarded. 
The DS account of quantification and anaphora treats both indefinites and 
other quantifiers uniformly as contributing logical names which once 
introduced remain available for the processes of substitution which deal with 
the resolution of anaphoric phenomena. In that respect, the presumed 
ungrammaticality of (108) can be seen as problematic for DS. However, it will 
be shown that data like the following attested sentences challenge the 
standard assumptions made in other frameworks whereas they are in fact 
predicted to occur under DS assumptions of quantification and anaphora: 
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(109) If every vote counts then it should count in every county 
(110) If every indictee knew he was indicted, he would have time to hide or destroy 
evidence. 
Another issue that will be addressed is the fact that since terms have to be 
introduced in order to be available for anaphoric substitution, DS has to 
provide the means for processing cases where the pronoun is encountered 
before the antecedent: 
(111) [If she; is hungry], Mary; yells at Bill. (from Iatridou 1991) 
(112) [If her; child is late from school] every mother; is upset 
(113) [If he; is late] a man; will start making excuses 
(114) If you give him; enough opportunity, every senator,, no matter how honest, will 
succumb to corruption (from Culicover & Jackendoll 1997) 
(115) [Which of his; pictures] does every photographer; dislike? 
(116) [Which woman that he; used to dislike] does a friend of yours; flatter all the time? 
These cases can be accommodated by exploiting the standard mechanisms 
that DS provides for the processing of temporarily unintegrated constituents 
of the logical form. As a side effect, we will see that the assumption of 
situation arguments construed as quantificational terms provides the 
appropriate means for the resolution of pronominals like it below: 
(117) If John sings arias, it bothers me a lot 
(118) It bothers me a lot, if John sings arias at home all day. 
(119) *John sings arias bothers me a lot 
In chapters 6-8 we will see in more detail how the analysis of the parsing 
and eventual structure assigned to conditional sentences proposed deals with 
all these issues. But first of all in the next few chapters we will introduce the 




INTRODUCTION TO THE FRAMEWORK: DYNAMIC SYNTAX 
1. Preliminaries 
The framework of Dynamic Syntax (DS) provides a formal explication of the 
linguistic processes involved in the interpretation of utterances. These 
processes are modelled in such a way as to interact directly with general 
mechanisms of reasoning and inference, the latter operating according to 
principles expounded by pragmatic theories (as, e. g., in Relevance Theory, 
Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995). For the purposes of providing a common 
interface with such systems, DS adopts the assumptions that underpin 
representational theories of mind (see, e. g., Fodor 1981). The basic tenet of 
such theories is that the functioning of the mind in tasks like human reasoning 
and the causation of behaviour can be modelled as a "syntax-driven machine" 
(Fodor 1985: 94) operating through the formal manipulation of structured 
mental representations expressed in an internalised language of thought 
(LOT). The formal properties of LOT representations that are relevant to 
these tasks are the intrinsic structural properties of hierarchically organised 
complexes of atomic concepts (propositions). The semantic properties of LOT 
representations are the means by which effective interaction between the 
human organism and its environment is achieved. 
The adoption of this view by DS has the consequence that natural 
languages are taken neither as directly semantically interpretable nor, 
therefore, as the vehicles directly supporting inferential tasks. Rather, in DS, 
the natural language apparatus is modelled as a system which, in interaction 
with contextual resources, allows the assimilation of specialised, externally 
induced stimuli having the form of utterances. Processing of these specialised 
stimuli eventuates in the construction of structured LOT expressions over 
which inference can be defined and by inducements of which information can 
be exchanged (in that respect natural language is therefore modelled as an 
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'input system' in Fodor's 1983 sense). From this point of view, linguistic 
signals do not exhibit any relevant structure beyond the time-linear (left-to- 
right) order of presentation: the "syntactic" properties that other frameworks 
invoke in order to explain phenomena pertaining to properties of natural 
language expressions are now redefined as supervening on two distinct 
systems and their interaction: (a) the language-particular, specialised 
procedural resources which allow the progressive and monotonic construction 
of LOT representations as the content of utterances; and (b) the intrinsic 
structural properties that these LOT expressions exhibit. For example, as 
regards (a), the words of a natural language are seen as specialised triggers 
that can not only contribute conceptual elements in a structured LOT 
representation but also, in conjunction with general processing rules, create 
and anticipate the structure that incorporates such elements. Regarding (b), 
the structure created through the operation of words and rules, presented in 
the form of trees, provides the basis for explicating intuitions about 
constituency and the resolution of structural ambiguities. The DS formalism is 
thus designed as a model aiming to show that a characterisation of the 
progressive interaction between contextual and structural processes provides 
adequate explanations for often noted syntactic and semantic phenomena. 
Before going into the details of the formalism, here is a quick summary 
of what we can expect: the main idea which the DS system implements is that 
natural language denotational content can be represented in the form of 
binary linked trees. The nodes of these trees are annotated ('decorated') with 
the terms of a logical language. The representational language of choice is 
constituted by epsilon calculus expressions built on the basis of the 
combinatory resources provided by the lambda calculus. The formulae of this 
logical language are accompanied by labels, i. e. pieces of information 
facilitating the parsing of the string or adding further content dimensions. The 
definition of the tree-structure and the node decorations, the data structures 
described by the DS model, will be presented immediately below. An 
important distinctive characteristic of DS is that it models the progressive 
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construction of such trees and decorations. This necessitates the additional 
definition of (a) a set of structures that includes partial objects, i. e. incomplete 
trees with partial decorations, ordered according to how much such 
partiality/incompleteness they exhibit; the definition of those constitutes the 
declarative structure of the DS model; (b) a set of transition rules that 
monotonically map partial incomplete objects to more and more complete 
ones with the eventual aim of reaching a defined point of termination, a fully 
decorated tree structure. The definition of the actions that gradually perform 
this task constitutes the procedural structure of the model25. 
2. Declarative Structure 
2. a. Tree structures 
Speakers' linguistic intuitions and the study of how natural languages operate 
reveals evidence, some of which will be discussed later, that linguistic 
processes make reference to and are constrained by notions of local domains 
and hierarchical structure. The most prominent among these domains is the 
one defined by a predicate and its arguments (although other restricted 
environments can also be shown to be relevant, for example those defined by 
permitted anaphoric dependencies; we will take those up later). For the 
purpose of circumscribing the configurational properties of a domain defined 
by a propositional formula and its progressive compilation by natural 
language input, DS proposes that the parsing process operates by 
developing binary-branching tree structures26. These structures provide the 
scaffolding on which the semantic content of the string, a propositional 
expression, is unfolded in the form of node 'decorations'. Thus the nodes of 
DS trees are inhabited by the terms of a logical language, the language 
25 These two aspects of the DS model, declarative and procedural, are based on the type of 
models defined for PDL (Propositional Dynamic Logic) enriched with requirements and an 
element of goal-directedness. Thus the distinction between the two parts of the DS parsing 
model expresses the customary distinction between propositions holding at states and 
actions which hold at pairs of states. For simplicity we suppress all such formal definitions 
below (see Kempson et at. 2001: 268-325 for details). 
26 This is a simplification at this stage as there are larger domains also defined, e. g. those 
relating to the parsing of clausal adjuncts (defined in DS as LINK structures as we will see in 
the next chapter). 
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chosen to represent the semantic content of natural language utterances. The 
asymmetry of a term's position on the propositional tree relative to other 
terms can then be taken to correspond to its asymmetric status with respect 
to other terms in the same domain thus enabling the definition of distinct 
grammatical roles and functions, e. g. derivative characterisations of the 
traditional notions 'subject', 'object' etc27. Moreover, the utilisation of the tree 
format gives immediate access to relations between nodes which can be 
exploited for encoding the interdependency of information among the 
components of complex propositional representations (for example, as we will 
see later, the structure of the tree is crucially involved in the definition of 
permitted patterns of extraction or copying). Let's now see the formal 
definition of tree format employed by DS. 
As usual, essential for the definition of a tree format is a set of nodes 
with the relation of immediate dominance potentially holding among pairs of 
them. Derivatively, relations like dominance, mother, daughter, granddaughter 
etc. can be defined. Additionally, since there is a need to distinguish between 
the two sister nodes at each level, binary trees are (arbitrarily) ordered in DS 
so that we talk about a left and right daughter relation, or a0 and I daughter 
relation. Every tree has a node which is unique in that it is the only node that 
has no mother, the roof. Terminal nodes are distinguished from the internal 
(non-terminal) ones in that they have no daughters of their own: 
(1) root 
terminal node non-terminal node 
left/O daughter right/1 daughter 
immediately dominated by the root immediately dominated by the root 
terminal node terminal node 
root's left/0 granddaughter root's right/l granddaughter 
dominated by the root dominated by the root 
27 This hierarchical organisation can also be employed in order to give a structural 
characterisation of the notion of co-argument cf. e. g. Pollard & Sag (1992) 
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From an abstract point of view, trees can be seen as Kripke frames with the 
nodes standing for the worlds/points and the tree-relations among them taken 
as distinct accessibility relations. For this reason a modal language provides 
an appropriate vocabulary to describe such constructs. DS uses exactly such 
a language, LOFT, which will be discussed later. 
The bare tree skeleton described above serves the important function of 
hosting, at each node, annotations ('decorations') responsible for combining 
and enriching the eventually derived formula. We will see those next. 
2. b. Decorations 
In DS, the binary tree format supports a Labelled Deductive System (LDS) in 
the sense of Gabbay (1996). An LDS standardly integrates distinct logical 
systems and vocabularies with the overall formalism defining the logic of their 
combination and potential controlled interaction. Accordingly, in DS, the 
decorations on the nodes of the binary trees are represented by declarative 
units, that is, pairs of a sequence of labels followed by the main target of the 
computation, the formula value: 
(2) [<labels> : Formula] 
[<labels> : Formula) [<labels> : Formula] 
[<labels> : Formula] [<labels> : Formula] 
As is natural for an LDS employed for natural language processing, the 
Formula annotations play a central role in that they are used to express the 
conceptual content (LOT terms) that processing of linguistic input gives 
access to. This content can be complex and is compositionally derived by 
systematically integrating the contribution of simpler LOT atoms whose 
content has potentially been enriched and adjusted by being processed in a 
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particular contextual environment (cf. Carston 1998). Accordingly, DS defines 
as the main goal driving the parsing process the eventual construction of a 
complete composite Formula value decorating the root of a binary-branching 
tree. The composite structure of this formula is explicitly recorded on the tree 
nodes as the term-structure of the lambda expression that annotates the 
root28. For illustration consider the type of tree derived by parsing the string 
"John left" (the conceptual content lexical items give access to is indicated by 
primed expressions): 
(3) [<labels> : Left'John'] 
[<labels> : John'] [<labels> : Ax. Left'x)] 
This compositional structure attributed to the propositional content that natural 
language strings contribute accounts for one aspect of the often-noted 
productivity and systematicity of the linguistic system (its compositionality). 
However, the derivation of such content is crucially developed in conjunction 
with interacting context-integrating processes (which are modelled as 
pragmatic actions in DS). This interaction which, for DS, models the use of 
language in particular utterance situations provides the foundation for a 
characterisation of the adaptability and flexibility of natural language 
expressions, expressions which can be effectively used in diverse situations 
serving distinct aims and purposes in each context (the "efficiency of 
language" Barwise & Perry 1983). 
We have now described the objects that model what DS considers as 
the representations constructed as the result of parsing a linguistic string. In 
order to be able to talk about these modelling objects, describe them and, 
more importantly, recount their progression from incomplete to complete 
structures we need a language and a logic where the requisite transitions can 
28 The A-calculus supports expressions from the epsilon-calculus to account for quantification; 
see chapter 3. 
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be defined. The DS formalism operates by manipulating descriptions of such 
trees expressed in a formal language, the language DU. 
3. The language DU 
Trees and their decorations are described in DS by the DU language. In DU 
terms, a tree-node is described as a set which contains formulae expressing 
facts being true of that node (a node description). Such information about a 
node is encoded by using predicates describing the decorations that inhabit 
the node and some other of its pertinent properties, for example, its exact 
position on the tree, its relations with other nodes, etc. The description of an 
entire tree as expressed in DU is then another set containing a number of 
such sets of node descriptions: 
(4) 
A (schematic) tree description: 
{ {node description 1}, {node description 2 }, ...., {node description n} } 
and its (schematic) model: 
node 1 
node 2 
... node n 
Let's now see some of the predicates that DU employs to talk about 
nodes and trees. 
3. a. The predicate Fo 
The most important information a node carries is the LOT concept that it 
contributes to the final propositional representation. Such concepts, as we 
said, are encoded on the tree decorations as terms in a typed lambda 
calculus. Therefore the decorations on tree-nodes that encode such 
concepts will be functions, their arguments and the results of function 
application over the formula values of sister nodes: 
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(5) John lef` ... Left'John' 
... 
John' 
... Ax. Left'x 
In the DU language, the formula values appearing on each node are indicated 
in the descriptions of these nodes by use of the monadic predicate Fo(... ). 
The arguments of this predicate are taken from the set DFo which contains 
terms of a typed lambda calculus. For example, the description of the tree in 
(5) by DU will be a set containing three other sets; each of the latter contains 
a description expressed by means of the predicate Fo: 
(6) { {..., Fo(Left'(John')),... }, {..., Fo(John'), ... }, {..., Fo(, kx. Left'x)... } } 
3. b. The type predicate Ty 
An additional type of information encoded on DS trees is the logical type of 
each formula value. Such logical types drive the eventual bottom-up 
derivation of the proposition at the root node by taking advantage of a 
definition of types as formulae in a conditional logic: we can take the logical 
types as equivalent to propositional premises in a natural deduction system; 
by applying Modus Ponens on two such premises another premise (type in 
our case) can be deduced: 
(7) e, e -->t 
t 
This notion as it is implemented in the DS system invokes Modus Ponens on 
the type values of the two daughters of a node so that the type value of the 
mother can be deduced. The rules define that there should be an associated 
process of functional application concerning the Fo values on the respective 
nodes so that the result will be deposited at the mother as its own Fo value. 
DS makes use of a predefined number of logical types (e, t, cn and a small 
finite number of their derivatives) determined by the lexicon of the language. 
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These types accompany the formula values as Labels (note that there are no 
productive rules which construct types as in some Categorial Grammar 
formalisms). The tree above in (5) can be shown more completely with its 
accompanying type labels as follows: 
(8) [<..., TYPE: t>: --- 
Left'John'] 
[<..., TYPE: e>:.. John'] [<..., TYPE: e -*t>, ... Ax. Left'x] 
Now in the description language DU, the predicate that indicates the type of 
the formula value at each node is the monadic predicate Ty(... ). The 
arguments of this predicate can be found in the set DTy. If we add the 
descriptions of these labels to the tree description above in (6) this is the 
more complete tree description that ensues: 
(9) {{ Ty(t), Fo(Left'John')... }, { Ty(e), Fo(John')... }, { Ty(e -*t), Fo(Ax. Left'x)... } } 
3. c. The predicate Tn 
Other types of Labels, some of which will be discussed later, are also defined. 
The contents of these labels cater for, e. g., gender specifications, clause 
type, scope etc. and act as controls in the process of constructing the 
eventual Fo value. One important among those is the label encoding the 
exact address of the node with respect to the root. The DS binary trees are 
(arbitrarily) ordered so that we can distinguish between two sister nodes. So 
sometimes we talk about the left daughter and the right daughter which, more 
formally, are distinguished from each other by means of address-labels 
consisting of sequences of zeros and ones. Starting with the address 0 for the 
root node, by convention, the left branch, the argument daughter, is always 
labelled by appending a0 to the address sequence of its mother whereas the 
right branch, the functor daughter, is always addressed by appending 1. As 
an illustration, consider how the tree in (8) should be represented now with 
the addresses on the nodes included: 
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(10) [<TREE-NODE: 0,... 
,.. 
t >:... Left'John'] 
[<TREE-NODE: 00,..., e >... John] [<TREE-NODE: 01,..., e -t >: Ax. Left'x ] 
The left daughter of a node always designates by convention the argument 
daughter whereas the right branch accommodates the functor. In the 
language DU for describing such trees, the monadic predicate Tn(... ) is used 
to refer to addresses. There is also a pointer symbol, 0, which is a constant 
indicating which node is under development at each point in the parse. The 
following can be taken as a true description of the tree above: 
(11) 
{{ Tn(O), Ty(t), Fo(Left'John', 0)... }, { Tn(00), Ty(e), Fo(John').. }, { Tn(01), Ty(e -t), Fo(Ax. 
Left'x)... } } 
This concludes our (rather partial) presentation of some of the data 
structures and their description language in DS. However, as we said earlier, 
a more effective description language for linguistic purposes requires 
enrichment of the DU language presented above with a modal logic so that 
we are able to address distinct points on the tree at each particular stage of 
parsing. The logic employed by DS is LOFT, as explained below. 
3. d. The LOFT language 
The use by DS of trees as linguistic content representations as well as the 
procedural point of view adopted requires a language to talk about trees, the 
relations between their nodes and, additionally, potential relations among 
distinct trees. For this reason, DS imports in the DU language the operators of 
a modal logic specifically designed to talk about trees, the Logic of Finite 
Trees (LOFT, Blackburn & Meyer-Viol 1994). Descriptions of trees expressed 
by means of this language offer the advantage that one can describe facts in 
any part of the tree from the perspective of any node in that tree. This ability 
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allows us to establish correlations and define constraints in the development 
of the tree at any point of processing. Let's see in more detail what LOFT can 
do for us. 
The LOFT modalities that are used in DS are either existential, 
symbolised by < >, or universal, indicated by [ ]. The angled brackets 
symbol, < >, denotes existential quantification over nodes and can be read as 
"there is a node such that ... 
" whereas the square brackets symbol, [ ], 
denotes universal quantification and can be read as "for all nodes ... ". The 
operators will also indicate whether one talks about dominating nodes, 
dominated ones, the mother, the daughter or some other point on the tree. 
To encode all these relations between nodes, up and down arrow symbols, 1, 
] are used. When the existential operator contains an upward pointing arrow, 
<T>, the intended meaning is "at the mother of this node" whereas the down 
arrow, <J>, means "at the daughter of this node" or "at the immediately 
dominated node". These arrows can be subscripted with 0 or I so that we 
can be even more specific about which of the two, left or right, daughters we 
are referring to. The left, by convention, the argument daughter, is indicated 
by <Jo> whereas the functor, the right daughter, is indicated by <,, >>. To say 
"at the mother node" when the pointer is at the argument daughter we use the 
operator <To>. With the pointer at the functor node we use the symbol <T1> 
to talk about its mother (although since there is always only one mother for 
each node we can just as well use the upwards pointing arrow, <T> by itself). 
Moreover, we can also iterate these operators to express more complicated 
points of reference. For example, if we want to say that a decoration XYZ 
holds at the argument daughter of the current node's functor daughter (i. e. at 
the argument granddaughter) we can prefix XYZ with <, j>><to> to derive the 
specification < j. >><Jo>XYZ, which can be read as "XYZ holds at the argument 
granddaughter"29: 
29 For illustration purposes we are presenting here a DU tree description in a tree format 
instead of a set language format as it has been defined, which, strictly speaking, means 
committing the offence of mixing models with their descriptions. This is a practice which will 
be maintained from now on when no confusion is likely to ensue. 
63 
(12) Tn(O), <11><10> XYZ, 0 
Tn(00) Tn(01) 
Tn(010), XYZ Tn(011) 
If we weint say "at the argument daughter of this functor node's mother, XYZ 
is a fact" we can symbolised it as follows: <Tj><4 > XYZ: 
(13) Tn(0) 
Tn(00) Tn(01) 
Tn(010), XYZ Tn(011), <Tj>< jo> XYZ, 0 
The same holds for the universal operator. By using the universal modality in 
combination with the arrows we can express statements about all daughters 
of a node. For example, the [1] XYZ means "at all daughters of the current 
node, XYZ holds": 
(14) Tn(O) 
Tn(00) Tn(01), [I] XYZ, 0 
Tn(010), XYZ Tn(011), XYZ 
Two more symbols that are added in the DU language to talk about 
trees are the verum, T, which is true of any node on the tree and the falsum, 
1, which holds at no node. As an instance of the use of these symbols, 
consider the combination of the universal daughter modality with the symbol 
for falsum 1, i. e. the annotation [1]l. Appearing on the description of a node 
this symbol indicates that this is a terminal node of a tree, that is, the node 
has currently no daughters and cannot be expanded further below by the 
addition of another piece of tree structure: 
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(15) Tn(O), -[I] I 
Tn(OO), [l] 1 Tn(01), 
Tn(010), [(] 1 Tn(011), [1] 1 
The processing of most lexical items results in such an annotation appearing 
in the node description which is a form of ensuring that no superfluous lexical 
items are ever allowed to be processed. (On the other hand, loss of the ability 
to contribute such an annotation can be taken to characterise cases were two 
distinct lexical elements seem to contribute content for the same position on 
the propositional tree as in e. g. clitic doubling in the Romance languages and 
Greek see, e. g., Anagnostopoulou et al. 1997. ) 
We are now able to include information in the description of a node that 
concerns other parts of the tree, i. e. we can talk about its daughters, 
granddaughters or its mother and beyond. However, these modalities do not 
exhaust the DS descriptive toolbox as we still do not have exactly what we 
want in terms of expressive capacity. This is because one of the distinctive 
features of DS is that it models the partiality and enrichment of information 
holding at successive parsing stages. For this reason the DS apparatus 
allows for information to be introduced during the parsing process which 
remains underspecified until a* further stage of processing. For example, if we 
need to indicate that some decoration XYZ appears somewhere above or 
below the current node but we still do not know where its exact location is, we 
can express our limited knowledge in the DU language by making use of the 
Kleene star combined with the up and down arrows. For example we can 
write things like: 1. XYZ or I. XYZ or even T; XYZ or Tö XYZ. The Kleene star 
indicates that there are zero or more steps along the relation denoted by the 
operator it combines with in order to reach the annotation XYZ. For example 
in the following, the annotation I. XYZ is true at the root node because two 
steps along the daughter relation bring us to a node where XYZ holds: 
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(16) Tn(0), J, = XYZ 
Tn(OO) Tn(01) 
Tn(010), XYZ Tn(011) 
These symbols which combine up and down arrows with the Kleene star are 
referred to as the external modalities in DS (see Kempson et al. 2001: 48-49, 
291). In all of the following diagrams the annotations employing the external 
modalities at each node are satisfied because of the facts holding at other 
nodes: 
(17) Tn(O), XYZ 
Tn(00) Tn(01) 
Tn(010) Tn(011), t XYZ 
(18) Tn(O), 4110* XYZ 
Tn(OO) Tn(01) 
Tn(010) Tn(011) 
Tn(0110), XYZ Tn(0111) 
A description in the language DU employing a Kleene star in combination with 
up or down arrows (e. g. J*) is "an underspecified description of a fully 
specified situation" (Kempson et at. ibid: 49), i. e. the node itself in the models 
satisfying the description has a fully specified position on the tree although 
the description of this position in the DU language is underspecified. 
However, as we will see later when we deal with partial trees, we will also 
require what are called internal variants of these modalities by means of the 
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combination of existential or universal modalities, arrows and the Kleene star 
(e. g. <, J*>). These modalities are used in cases where the exact tree position 
of a node is left temporarily underspecified, i. e. cases where a node 
(potentially) has not yet found its proper place on the binary tree. This brings 
us to another crucial feature of DS: besides descriptions of nodes being 
underspecified, the DS formalism also allows for the actual tree relations 
between the nodes on the tree to be partially specified at a particular stage in 
the processing; additionally, decorations on nodes can be temporarily 
underspecified and partial too. We turn now to the definitions that implement 
this partiality. 
4. Partiality and Tree-growth 
4. a. Requirements 
As, in the intermediate stages of the parsing process, DS allows the 
introduction of underspecified representations, we need to have available the 
means to ensure that this is just a temporary situation. For this purpose DS 
employs the concept of a requirement, i. e. a decoration on a node which is 
not yet a fact at this node but must become so at some point, otherwise, the 
parsing of the string will be declared as unsuccessful. Requirements appear 
on the trees along with the labels and the formula value. In Kempson et al. 
(2001), requirements are indicated by means of usual decorations expressed 
in the language DU following a dot, ., symbol, schematically: 
(19) [<labels>: Formula " Requirements] 
[<labels>: Formula] [<labels>: Formula " Requirements] 
[<labels>: Formula] [<labels>: Formula " Requirements] 
Any type of description of a decoration that has been defined can also appear 
as a requirement. For example, in (20) below whereas the two daughters 
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have proper type values, the root node's type is still unspecified and therefore 
the type label annotation appears after the " symbol: 
(20) [<0,... >: " TY(r)] 
[<00,..., e >: John'] [<01,..., ..: e -*t >: Ax. Left'x] 
In the description language DU, a question mark in front of a fact about a 
node symbolises a requirement for that particular fact to become true at the 
node. The above tree can therefore be described as: 
(21) 
{{ Tn(0),..., ? Ty(t), 0), {Tn(00),..., Ty(e), Fo(John')), {Tn(01), ..., Ty(e - t), Fo(Ax. Left'x) }} 
Requirements can be seen as constraints on the well-formedness of the 
completed structure. A requirement annotation specifies that what follows the 
question mark must appear as a decoration on the node at some subsequent 
stage in the parsing process, otherwise, the string will be declared 
ungrammatical. Grammatical strings are those for which the parser, after 
consuming all the lexical input, can produce at least one completed logical 
form with no requirements outstanding. For the (partial) tree in (20)-(21) 
above this means that the decoration Ty(t) must be achieved at the relevant 
node before the parsing process has been completed. This ensures that a 
proposition will be the outcome of the parsing of the string "John left". The 
subcategorisation frame of a predicate is also taken to be introduced initially 
by the imposition of requirements for arguments of the appropriate type (e. g. 
? Ty(e)). So parsing of the verb left in a string like "John left Mary" will produce 
a tree with a requirement at the lower argument node for linguistic input to 
provide a term of type e: 
(22) [<0,... >: 0t] 
[<00,..., .. e>: John'] [<01,..., >: 9e -4t ] 
[<010, ... >, " e] [<011, ..., .. e --* (e -->t): Ay. Ax. Left'yx] 
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(23) 
{{ Tn(0),..., ? Ty(t) }, {Tn(00),..., Ty(e), Fo(John')}, {Tn(01), ..., ? Ty(e-->t)}, 
{Tn(010), ..., ? Ty(e) , 0}, {Tn(011), ..., Ty(e --4(e ->t)), Fo(Ay. Ax. Left'yx }} 
Unless the next step of linguistic input processing provides an object of type e 
for the satisfaction of the Ty(e) requirement at the pointed node (the object), 
the parse will be unsuccessful. This is what excludes, for example, the 
processing of strings like *John left came. 
Requirements combined with the LOFT operators provide a powerful 
device which can be utilised to impose constraints introduced at one part of 
the tree but referring to another. For example, one way to deal with the 
information provided by case specifications on nouns is to analyse them as 
providing requirements regarding the tree position of the term introduced by 
processing the noun. The pronoun he in a string like he left could be taken to 
introduce a requirement that the representation of whatever male individual is 
intended by the use of the pronoun appears at a node whose mother is of 
type t. This can be expressed with the annotation: ? <? o>Ty(t), contributed by 
processing of the nominative case marking on the pronoun and appearing at 
the description of the subject node. It can be loosely read as "the mother 
node of this node must (eventually) be of type f'. In contrast, the accusative 
pronoun him in a string like he left him can be taken to introduce the 
requirement: ? <To>Ty(e -*t), read as "the mother of this node must be of type 
e-*t, i. e., a predicate", contributed at the tree description by processing of the 
accusative case morphology. Parsing of a string like *Him left he will now 
necessarily result in ungrammaticality because the requirements deposited at 
the argument nodes by the pronouns' case morphology will never be able to 
be satisfied. 
Consideration of the contribution of pronouns now brings us to the 
question of how exactly the content of anaphoric elements like pronominals is 
integrated into the derivation of a propositional representation, i. e. how their 
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inherent context-dependent interpretation is achieved as far as DS is 
concerned. This is the topic of the next section. 
4. b. Metavariables 
A general distinctive feature of DS is the inclusion of metavariables in the 
node decorations acting as temporary place-holders for proper values. 
Metavariables are indicated with bold capital letters U, V, W, etc. A 
metavariable can be used in any type of decoration as a provisional value. In 
the DU language, any predicate describing a node's formula or label can take 
a metavariable as its argument, e. g., Tn(U), Ty(V), Fo(W), etc. However, by 
definition, a metavariable will never count as a proper value because it will be 
necessarily accompanied by a requirement that will not be satisfied unless a 
new value is introduced at the node's decorations from a predefined domain 
of appropriate values. The main domains of appropriate values are: the 
domain DFo which contains the terms of the lambda calculus that DS uses as 
the logical form language, the domain DTy which contains the logical types of 
the terms in question, and, similarly for all labels an appropriate domain of 
values has been determined. In effect then metavariables are not DU object- 
level variables but substitution sites for other expressions. Context dependent 
elements like pronouns are then taken to introduce in a node description such 
metavariables as temporary formula values, e. g. Fo(U). These elements 
might satisfy a type requirement there but leave the node still essentially 
incomplete in that the metavariables are still awaiting substitution by an 
appropriate term. 
The job of providing the final values for nodes including metavariables is 
done by the process of Substitution which, in effect, replaces the 
metavariable with a proper value made available by the context of 
utterance30. The occurrence of an instance of Substitution is determined by 
30 This is metaphorical talk as Substitution introduces a new value but does not actually 
remove the annotation in the description containing the metavariable. 
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the presence of an appropriate requirement on a node. This is ensured as 
follows: The language DU includes variables that have been defined to only 
range over values from domains like DFO, DTy etc. These are indicated in bold 
font, x, y, z ..., so that they are distinguished from the variables in DR, x, y, 
z,..., employed by the lambda calculus and which can serve as proper 
formula values in tree decorations, e. g. Fo(x). A bold variable will be 
employed in the requirement accompanying a metavariable to mandate that 
an appropriate value must be found at some point in the parse. For example, 
the annotation Fo(U) introduced at a node description by processing of the 
pronoun he will be also accompanied by a requirement for a value from DFo 
as follows: 
(24) { .., Fo(U), ? 3x. Fo(x), Ty(e) } 
In order to end the parsing process without outstanding requirements an 
actual term has to replace the metavariable U because the existential 
quantifier which binds the bold variable x can only range over elements of 
DFo which includes all objects of type e in the logical vocabulary except 
metavariables like U; so the annotation Fo(U) does not satisfy the 
requirement ? 3x. Fo(x), whereas Fo(John) does because the value John is 
included in DFO. A further distinguished set of metavariables are those of the 
form WH1, WH2, ... WH,,, which are assigned as the value projected by the 
processing of wh-expressions in wh-questions. These metavariables are 
exceptional however in that they are retained in the formula that results after 
processing a string. 
We now turn to other forms of partiality, namely underspecified tree 
relations and underspecified decorations on a node. 
4. c. Underspecified tree relations 
Since DS models the gradual construction of a logical form it has to provide 
the means for accomplishing two objectives: (a) describing stages in the 
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construction process and (b) define procedures that licence the transition 
from one stage to the other. We will take up the second of those tasks in the 
next section. The first is catered for in DS by manipulating tree descriptions 
which take as models partial objects/trees. The latter are trees that have 
some information missing from them: The information can be structural, e. g. 
we can have a tree as in (25) below which still misses one branch to be a 
complete binary tree: 
(25) [<labels>: Formula " Requirements] 
[<labels>: Formula] [<labels>: Formula . Requirements] 
[<labels>: Formula] 
Alternatively, we could have a situation schematically presented in (26) below 
where the root node dominates two other nodes and of those we know that 
one is its daughter but we still do not know whether this daughter is a functor 
or argument node; in addition the second dominated node, indicated with the 
dotted line connector, is completely underspecified with respect to the root in 
that we only know that it will be dominated by it but not yet its exact position 
on this tree: 
(26) [<labels>: F_ormula " Requirements] 
[<labels>: Formula " Requirements] [<labels>: Formula . Requirements] 
To cater for situations like those, besides the notions of immediate 
dominance, left daughter, right daughter, etc. DS also introduces a new 
relation between nodes: the relation of a node being dominated by another 
node but with not yet having completely specified how many steps along the 
dominance relation intervene between the two nodes. On a tree diagram this 
is usually presented by having a branch connected by a dashed line with the 
node that dominates it (but bear in mind that the node's position is not really 
on the left or the right of the tree in any actual sense): 
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(27) I< TREE NODE: 0, ... >: 
Formula " Requirements] 
----------- 
* ----------------------- 
[<TREE NODE: 0,... >: Formula [< TREE NODE: 00, ... >: < TREE NODE: 01.... >: 
" Requirements] Formula] Formula] 
The relation shown with the dashed line stands for the reflexive transitive 
closure of the dominance relation. We could call this relation the *-relation 
(star relation) since it is based on the Kleene star definition of indicating zero 
or more steps along the dominance relation. In other words, the *-relation 
holding between two nodes A and B implies that either A and B are one and 
the same node or that node B is somewhere on the tree dominated by node 
A. 
In the language DU in order to describe trees with nodes related in such 
a way we employ the LOFT modalities in the following manner: if, while at 
some node currently under development, we need to indicate that some 
decoration XYZ appears at some node which bears the *-relation to the 
current node we can attach the operator <1*> in front of the annotation XYZ to 
construct the annotation: <j, *>XYZ, read as "there is a node which is *-related 
to this node and XYZ holds there". To indicate that the current node is related 
by the *-relation to another node with the decoration XYZ we annotate it with: 
<T*>XYZ. Nodes which are introduced as bearing the *-relation to other 
nodes are called unfixed nodes since they bear a provisional tree address 
that requires updating to become a proper tree position. This need for update 
is explicitly indicated by recording the requirement ? 3x. Tn(x) along with the 
introduction of the unfixed node: 
(28) [< TREE NODE: 0, ... >: 
Formula " Requirements] 
----------- 
---------------------- 
[< TREE NODE: 0*, 
... >: Formula 
[< TREE NODE: 00, ... 
>: < TREE NODE: O1,... >: 
" ...? 3x. Tn(x) ] Formula) 
Formula] 
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And the following is a true description of the above schematic tree employing 
the LOFT operators: 
(29) { {Tn(0), ..., <1*>? 3x. Fo(x), .. }, {<t*> Tn(O), ? 3x. Tn(x), ... }, 
{Tn(00), <jo><1. *>? 3x. Tn(x), ... }, {Tn(01), <j, ><j*>? 3x. Tn(x), ... } } 
4. d. Underspecified decorations 
Trees can also be regarded as partial in the course of the parsing process 
because of incomplete decorations on their nodes. In (30) below neither 
formula nor type values are still available for the internal (non-terminal) 
nodes. As we said, such incompleteness is usually indicated with the missing 
elements recorded as requirements, i. e. constraints to be satisfied as the tree 
and its decorations further develop: 
(30) [<... > . TYPE: f] 
[<.... TYPE: e>: John'] [<... >: " TYPE: e -. t] 
[<..., TYPE: e>: Mary'] [<..., TYPE: (e -+ (e -" t)) >: 
Ax., ky. Left'xy] 
As for DS it is essential to be able to describe such partial objects and 
their update, a tree development process ("tree growth") is defined. It involves 
a mapping from less to more specified tree descriptions in the language DU. 
The process always starts with the most minimal of tree descriptions, a one- 
node tree description called the Axiom: 
(31) { {Tn(a), ? Ty(t), 0} } 
The definition of the Axiom above sets out the ultimate aim of the parser 
according to DS, which is to evolve a completed decorated tree structure of 
type t (Ty(t)). When this goal has been achieved the requirement, ? Ty(t), will 
be satisfied and the parsing process will end successfully. On the way to the 
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satisfaction of this requirement the processes defined by DS license the 
mapping of partial incomplete trees to more complete ones as more and more 
linguistic input is processed. The address on the node, Tn(a), is a provisional 
specification which will be fully determined when the rest of the tree has been 
completed and it has been determined whether or not this is indeed the 
description of the root node (this provision is made because, for instance, in 
strictly head-final languages there is always uncertainty as to whether an 
initially constructed propositional tree will eventually be embedded in a larger 
structure or not). 
4. e. An example of tree-growth 
The parsing process is formulated by means of transformations of DU 
language descriptions to new ones under the influence of general rules and 
the consuming of linguistic input. The descriptions manipulated correspond to 
partial trees which become more and more specified as the parsing process 
unfolds. We will present these manipulations in the next section. As an 
example of how the actual models of these descriptions, the trees 
themselves, evolve consider the following simplified stages of parsing the 
string John left Mary: 
(32) a. b. 
[<TREE-NODE: a.... >" TYPE: f] [<... a.... > " TYPE: t] 
John 
[<... a0.... TYPE: e>: John'] [<... al... > " TYPE: e-+t ] 
The first minimal tree in (32) is what the Axiom describes. After the 
processing of the word John the second tree, (32), is developed which bears 
an argument node with the term John' as its formula value. The way is now 
open for the parsing of a predicate (type e->t) that will be provided by 
processing the word left. In (33) below the effect of processing that word is 
displayed: the tree is expanded with one more node, (33), an annotation of a 
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predicate term left' is provided and the way for parsing Mary is prepared by 
introducing the requirement for another type e argument node, (33): 
(33) left ). 
a. 
[<a,... > " TYPE: tJ 
[<aO,..., TYPE: e>: John'] [<al,... >: "7YPE: e-tJ 
[<al 1,.... TYPE: e -> (e -* t) l 
b. 
[<a... > " TYPE: t] 
[<aO,..., TYPE: e>: John'] [<a1.... >:. TYPE: e-*t ] 
[<a10,..., >"TYPE: e] [<al1,.., TYPE: e -*(e-+ t) >: Ax. Ay. Left'xy] 
Processing of Mary completes the contribution of lexical input: 
(34) Mary > 
[<a... > " TYPE: 0 
[<aO,..., TYPE: e>: John'] [<a1,... >: "TYPE: e-4f] 
[<a10,..., TYPE: e>: Mary'] [<all, TYPE: e -->(e--* t)>: Ax. Ay. Left'xy] 
After several intermediate steps which will be presented in detail below the 
parsing is successful since a type t term is derived at the root node of the tree 
without any requirements outstanding: 
(35) 
[<0 ,..., TYPE: t>: Left' Mary'John'] 
[<00..., TYPE: e>: John'] [<01,..., TYPE: e -t>: Ay. Left' Mary'y] 
[<010,..., TYPE: e>: Mary'] [<011,..., TYPE: (e --*(e-> t)) >: Ax. Ay. Left'xy] 
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As we said the tree growth process shown here in terms of a sequence 
of decorated trees is in fact executed through the manipulation of descriptions 
expressed in the DU language. We turn to a presentation of those next. 
5. Procedural structure 
The tree growth displayed above is induced and controlled by two interacting 
mechanisms provided by the DS formalism: 
(a) lexical procedures associated with the words in the parsed string 
(b) general computational procedures that map one partial tree to 
another if certain conditions are fulfilled. 
The linguistic string under processing is seen in DS as providing a series of 
triggers for instructions that will be executed in a left-to-right sequence 
according to each word's linear position. Interspersed among those 
instructions general computational rules might be invoked which license 
transitions from one partial tree to another without the need to consume any 
lexical input. Although the mode of presentation of these two interacting 
components is slightly different, they are both rules of exactly the same type, 
i. e. mappings from one partial tree description to another involving actions 
taken by the parser. 
Lexical rules which are stored in the lexicon of a particular language are 
presented according to the following general format: 
(36) word form 
IF a, 0 




(if decoration a appears on the 
node bearing the pointer) 
(then make x, and/or 
go to x, and/or 
put decoration x... ) 
(otherwise, i. e. if decoration a does not hold, 
abort parsing) 
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The rule as defined above first checks whether some specification holds at 
the node description where the pointer resides (the IF clause, the condition or 
trigger). If this is the case then it invokes actions like make, put, and go 
which introduce structure and decorations and move the pointer around the 
tree. Computational rules are also instructions of the same type but they are 
executed without the need of processing lexical input. They consist of the 
same type of actions as the lexical rules only this time they are presented in a 
condensed format. The condition for the rule's application is shown as the 
input tree (see below Tree Description 1), equivalent to the IF clause above in 
the lexical rule. By application of the rule the input is transformed to the 
output, shown below the line (Tree Description 2), equivalent to a THEN 
clause: 
(37) Tree Description 1 
Tree Description 2 
Since such rules are not triggered by the processing of linguistic input their 
application is always optional. Interspersed among applications of these and 
lexical rules are pragmatic actions which manipulate the logical form in 
conjunction with other externally provided information in order to derive 
contextual effects. Pragmatic actions model processes external to the 
computational/lexical system. In DS such actions are taken mainly to fulfil the 
role of updating the values contributed by underspecified expressions. As DS 
does not model the actual processes of disambiguation and selection of an 
interpretation among the many possible ones in context we will have nothing 
more to say as to how exactly these processes operate besides directing the 
reader to pragmatic approaches like Relevance Theory (see e. g. Sperber & 
Wilson 1986/1995). However it is the burden of DS to provide the constraints 
which restrict and direct the operations of the pragmatic component. These 
constraints are articulated by means of the interaction of the lexical actions 
provided by the particular words in a natural language and the rule system 
that is presented immediately below. 
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5. a. Transition Rules 
As we have repeatedly said, the goal of the parsing process is to construct a 
binary tree the top node of which is decorated by a formula of type t having 
consumed all the linguistic input provided by the sentence. In order to start 
the process off and to progress from one stage to the next, transition rules 
license steps of computation to take place and transform input tree 
descriptions to new ones. The core rules of this type are those of Introduction 
and Prediction and Completion and Elimination (for formal definition of the 
rules see Kempson et al. 2001: 81,307-325). The first two expand the node 
where the pointer resides by introducing new nodes as its daughters. 
Completion and Elimination are the rules which finish off the compilation of 
the information on the tree after all the requisite input has accumulated on the 
relevant nodes. Complementary to the actions of these rules are also two 
more: the rule of Anticipation which moves the pointer from mother to 
daughter if there is a need to satisfy a requirement there and the rule of 
Thinning which gets rid of the annotations of requirements that have been 
satisfied. We shall now see these rules in some more detail. 
5. a. 1. Introduction 
The rule of Introduction works by in effect breaking down a general goal into 
two distinct sub-goals. The rule applies at a node description where there a 
requirement for a type value and this type value could be derived by 
performing Modus Ponens on two other types each occupying one of the 
node's daughters. Introduction is defined so as to generate requirements on 
the node itself; these requirements force the node in question to subsequently 
acquire two daughters with the type values needed. The eventual fulfilment of 
these requirements will lead to the satisfaction of the type requirement on the 
node itself: 
(38) Introduction 
{... {...? Ty(Y)..., 0) ) .. 





For example, one way to initiate the parsing of a string in English is to 
assume that the rule of Introduction applies on the Axiom, the description of a 
node which just contains a requirement for a type t value. Introduction will 
then generate the appropriate requirements for one daughter with a type e 
value and another with a type e -pt value: 
(39) { {Tn(a),? Ty(t)..., 0} } 
Introduction 
{ {... Tn(a), ? Ty(t), ?< lo> Ty(e), ?<I, > Ty(e -- t) ..., 0} } 
5. a. 2. Prediction 
The Introduction rule is usually paired up with a subsequent application of the 
rule of Prediction since Introduction does not actually itself build the nodes 
that are expected to satisfy the requirements it imposes. The node-building is 
the job of the Prediction rule. The latter applies when there are modal 
requirements at a node, i. e. requirements for information to appear at its 
daughters but these daughters do not still exist. The effect of an application of 
Prediction is to construct these nodes: 
(40) Prediction 
{... Tn(n),...? <jo>X, ? <li>Y, 0) 
{ (Tn(n),...? <. (o>X, ? <tl>Y }, {<To>Tn(n), ? X, 0), {<T1>Tn(n), ? Y} } 
Typically Prediction will also move the pointer to the argument daughter just 
introduced. Continuing the example in (39) above, the enriched tree 
description after Introduction can now be extended further by introducing the 
daughter nodes in the description by an application of Prediction: 
(41) { {Tn(a), ? Ty(t), 0}} 
Introduction 
{ Tn(a),? TY(t). 
" 
? <lo> Ty(e), ?< ll> Ty(e --+ t). 0} 
Prediction 
({ Tn(a), Tn(a),? <l o>Ty(e), ? <!, >Ty(e - t) }, {<To>Tn(a), ? Ty(e), 0), {<Ti>Tn(a), ? Ty(e -ýt)}} 
The tree that this description corresponds to is as follows: 
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(42) [" TYPE: t] 
[" TYPE: e 1 [" TYPE: e -> t] 
5. a. 3. Digression regarding diagrams 
The DS parsing framework is defined over tree descriptions (see e. g. 
Kempson et at. 2001). Models for these descriptions are provided by a set of 
(partial) trees decorated by feature structures. Since for reasons of space it is 
difficult to sustain the visual presentation of both models and descriptions, for 
convenience from now on we will resort to representations of descriptions that 
mimic visually their models. So it must be kept in mind that a graph like the 
one shown in (43) below stands in fact for the third part of the description in 
(41) although for illustration purposes it is presented in a format that is 
reminiscent of its model (42) (the simplification can be seen as taking 
positions of nodes and tree branches to stand in place of the set {} brackets 
used in the actual node and tree descriptions): 
(43) Tn(a), ? Ty(t), ? <Io>Ty(e), ?<j, >Ty(e -- t) 
<To>Tn(a), ? Ty(e), 0 <j, >Tn(a), ? Ty(e --*t) 
This visual simplification does not affect the substance of the presentation 
because the descriptions are in some precise sense isomorphic to their 
models (see Kempson et al: 53-54). 
We now move to rules that instead of unfolding the tree perform 
computations on the values derived at each node. 
5. a. 4. Completion 
This rule takes as its input a tree description with a node containing the 
pointer. This node will also bear information which is appropriate in order for 
its mother to satisfy some of its requirements. The output of the rule is a new 
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tree description such that the pointer has moved to that mother node and the 
relevant information about the daughter has been recorded there31: 
(44) Completion 
{... { Tn(n), ... 
}, { <T; >Tn(n), ..., ... O}} ., 0}} 
{... {Tn(n), 
..., <li>Ty(X), ..., 0}, {<li>Tn(n), ..., Ty(X), ..., }} 
where ie{O, 1, *} 
For example, consider the following tree (description) which has been 
constructed after the parsing of the string John left: 
(45) Tn(a), ? Ty(t), <lo>Ty(e), ? <1>>Ty(e --> t) 
<jo>Tn(a), Ty(e), Fo(John') <T, >Tn(a), Ty(e ->t), Fo(Ax. Left'x), 0 
Application of the Completion rule to this tree description allows us to move 
the pointer from the type e--+t node to its mother and introduce there the 
information that the daughter is indeed of type e-4, thus satisfying the 
requirement ?< j>>Ty(e --- t): 
(46) Tn(a), ? Ty(t), ? <l, >Ty(e -, t), ßl1>Ty(e --. t), Flo>Ty(e), 0 
<jo>Tn(a), Fo(John') <1, >Tn(a), Ty(e --. t), Fo(Ax. Left'x) 
The only thing that remains to be done for the above tree to be completed is 
the satisfaction of its type t requirement. This can be accomplished by the rule 
of Elimination which is presented below. 
31 In Kempson et al. (2001) this rule is stated in a more general form which covers the 
potential to record information about the daughter nodes for any type of information that 
might be needed at the mother. Here following Cann et al. (2005) we will simplify the 
presentation by showing only a specific instance of the rule with respect to types. The same 
comment applies to the rules of Prediction and Elimination. 
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5. a. 5. Elimination 
When the rule of Elimination applies at a node description it achieves two 
things: (a) it deduces the required type for the node by applying Modus 
Ponens over the type labels of its daughters (now recorded on the node itself 
by Completion), and, (b) it performs function application over the formula 
values at the daughters and records the result at the mother as its own 
formula value. The rule also includes a condition that it can only be performed 
if there are no requirements left at the node's daughters: 
(47) Elimination 
} {... { <j0>(Fo(a), Ty(X)), <j. 1>(Fo(b), Ty(X -> Y)), ..., 
01 
{... { Fo(b(a)), Ty(Y), Flo>(Fo(a), Ty(X)), <l1>(Fo(b), Ty(X Y)). ..., 0 }} 
Condition: <l; >? c does not hold where ie {1,0} 
Continuing the example in (46) above, the effect of Elimination on the root 
node can be shown as follows: 
(48) Tn(a), ? Ty(t), Ty(t), Fo(Left'John'), <11>Ty(e -t), <i0>Ty(e) 0 
<io>Tn(a), Fo(John') <i, >Tn(a), Ty(e->t), Fo(Ax. Left'x) 
Application of Elimination at the root node performs Modus Ponens on the 
types of the function and argument daughter and records the resulting type t 
as the type of the root. In addition it performs application of the function Ax. 
Left'x at the functor daughter on the argument John' at the other daughter 
and deposits the resulting proposition Left'John' at the root. 
5. a. 6. Thinning 
As can be seen on the tree above we now have a requirement at the root 
? Ty(t) and also an annotation Ty(t) satisfying it. Therefore we now also need 
a rule that will allow us to remove the requirement from the description. This 
is the job of the following rule of Thinning. Thinning simply applies at a node 
when a requirement for some fact appears there as well as an indication that 
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, X, ...., ? X, ..., 0} 
{..., X, ..., 0) 
This is a necessary action that must be performed, otherwise the parsing 
process will not be successful with requirements still remaining on the tree. 
We will also assume here that application of this rule is obligatory as soon as 
some requirement has been satisfied: 
(50) Tn(a), ? T-y(t), Ty(t), Fo(Left'John'), <j1> Ty(e --it), 0 
<to>Tn(a), Fo(John') <T, >Tn(a), Ty(e --it), Fo(Ax. Left'x) 
5. a. 7. Anticipation 
The rule of Anticipation is needed just for pointer management purposes. The 
rule applies to enable the pointer to move down from a node under 
development to one of its daughters that has an outstanding requirement: 
(51) Anticipation 
{Tn(n), ..., 0}, {<1>Tn(n), ..., ? X, ... } 
{Tn(n), ... }, {<1>Tn(n), ..., ? X, ..., 0} 
5. a. 8. Star Adjunction and Merge 
The rules of Introduction and Prediction construct the functor and argument 
daughters of (typically) the root node. Another introductory rule, the rule of 
Star(*)-Adjunction, is responsible for introducing instead a node which is 
underspecified with respect to the root node, what we called earlier an unfixed 
node. The only information about this node's address is that it is dominated 
by the root, otherwise, the node could eventually end up at any position inside 
the local propositional tree as long as a type annotation is matched. The rule 
also moves the pointer to the newly constructed node and imposes as 
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requirements the immediate anticipation of lexical input of the appropriate 
type (here ? Ty(e)) and the obligatory search for some fixed tree address 
(? Bx. Tn(x)): 
(52) * Adjunction 
{ {Tn(a),... ? Ty(t), 0) 1 
{ {Tn(a).... ? Ty(t)}, {<1 >Tn(a),..., ? 3x. Tn(x), ? Ty(e), 0} } 
This rule is usually employed in order to allow the processing of fronted 
constituents such as question words, focalised elements etc. It is 
representative of a set of DS devices which license the introduction of content 
with an as yet unspecified role in the structure to be projected. As an 
illustration of its operation consider below the parsing steps involved when 
processing the string John, Mary likes. 
5. a. 8. a. An example involving Star Adjunction 
After the Axiom is introduced the rule of *Adjunction applies and an unfixed 
node is constructed to which the pointer moves. Since the new node requires 
input of type e, the word John can be processed to provide this input: 
(53) Tn(a), ? Ty(t), 0 Tn(a),? Ty(t) Tn(a),? Ty(t) 
*Adj: rrrcti on John 
r* Tn(a), ? Ty(e), 0 
? 3x. Tn(x) Fo(John'),? ax. Tn(x), 0 
The rule of Completion now moves the pointer up to the root node and the 
rules of Introduction and Prediction construct the subject and predicate 




Completion , Tn(a), ? Ty(f), <J*>Ty(e), 0 
- -' "- 
-' Introducli on, Prediction, diary 
<T*>Tn(a), Ty(e), Fo(John') 
? 3x. Tn(x) 
(55) 
Tn(a),? Ty(t), < j*>Ty(e),? <lo>Ty(e), ?<j, >Ty(e -, t) 
<rt>Tn(a), Ty(e), Ty(e), Fo(Mary'), 0 ? Ty(e --, t) 
Fo(John'), ? 3x. Tn(x) 
5. a. 9. The Normal Form Constraint 
According to the formal description of the DS model as defined in Kempson et 
at. 2001, the trees that satisfy the DU descriptions are always in Normal 
Form. What this means is that any nodes bearing some underspecified 
relation, e. g. the relation introduced by *Adjunction, to some other node will 
appear as low as possible on the tree. So the tree shown in (55) is not 
actually well-formed as the unfixed node should either have merged with one 
of the other nodes or hang below the node bearing the pointer: 
(56) 
Tn(a), ? Ty(t), <j*>Ty(e),? <1, o>Ty(e), ? <1, >Ty(e -->t) 
Ty(e), Fo(Mary'), 0 ? Ty(e -" t) 
<t*>Tn(a), Ty(e), Fo(John'), ? 3x. Tn(x) 
Note that on the tree above, which is indeed in Normal Form, the decoration 
<T*>Tn(a) on the unfixed node is still satisfied. This is because the 
underspecified *-relation does not exclude any tree position as long the node 
is still dominated by the root Tn(a). 
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Going back to the continuation of our parsing example involving 
*Adjunction, Completion now moves the pointer from the Ty(e) node upwards 
and the fact that there is a type e daughter is recorded at the root. The 
requirement for a type e daughter there is now satisfied and Thinning can 
apply to delete it: 
(57) 
Completion, Thinning 
Tn(a), ? Ty(t), <1*>Ty(e), ? <f 1y(e), ? <l, >Ty(e --, t), <10>Ty(e), 0 
Ty(e), Fo(Mary') ? Ty(e --, t) 
<j. >Tn(a), Ty(e), Fo(John') ? 3x. Tn(x) 
The rule of Anticipation applies to move the pointer to the functor node where 
the requirement for a type e---it input is appropriate for the parsing of the word 
like. The unfixed node, satisfying the Normal Form Constraint, follows the 




Ty(e), Fo(Mary') ? Ty(e -> t) 
? Ty(e), 0 Ty(e -> (e --> t)), Fo(Ax. Ay. Like'xy) 
<? *>Tn(a), Ty(e), Fo(John') ? 3x. Tn(x) 
At this stage, the structurally underspecified node introduced earlier by 
*Adjunction has to find a fixed place on the tree otherwise its requirement will 
not be satisfied. For this reason, the rule of Merge comes into play. 
5. a. 10. Merge 
As the simplified description of the rule below shows, Merge licenses the 
unification of two node descriptions provided that their address specifications 
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are "compatible", that is, the address information carried by one of the nodes 
is entailed by the address information at the current pointed node. Entailment 
is defined according to principles which determine what are the legitimate 
extensions of partial tree descriptions to new ones. One such entailment 
relation involves the fact that an underspecified address, e. g., <T*>Tn(a), can 
be acceptably updated to an address like <To>Tn(a) or <To><Ti>Tn(a) etc. In 
that respect, an unfixed node will always be able to legitimately merge with 
another node inside a single propositional tree, given that its address will be 
compatible with the addresses at the other nodes. The only restriction to such 
a merging is a consistency constraint which ensures that two merged nodes 
do not bear conflicting information (we will expand on this a bit more at a later 
chapter). Below ND, ND'stand for arbitrary node descriptions: 
(59) {... ND, ND'... ) 
{... ND u ND'... ) 
where 0e ND' and ( ND u ND') is consistent 
Continuing our example in (58) above, as we saw the Normal Form 
Constraint has resulted in the unfixed node hanging below the ? Ty(e) object 
node. This opens the way for Merge to occur especially since the two nodes 
bear compatible decorations: 
(60) Tn(a),? Ty(t) 
Ty(e), Fo(Mary') ? Ty(e -+ t) 
? Ty(e), 0 Ty(e --> (e -+ t)), Fo(Ax. Ay. Like'xy) 
<T. >Tn(a), Ty(e), Fo(John') ? 3x. Tn(x) 
In fact Merge which is licensed to occur in such a situation becomes now 
necessary since with no more lexical input forthcoming the only way to satisfy 
the requirements on the unfixed node and fixed object node is for them to 
unify. This will result in a proper address for the unfixed node and a proper 
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formula value of type e for the object node. Moreover the annotation on the 
unfixed node that it appears somewhere dominated by Tn(a) is also satisfied 
as the object node bears this dominance relation to the root. With all the 
requirements on this node now satisfied Thinning can subsequently apply 
and remove them: 
(61) 
Merge, Thinning 
Tn(a), ? Ty(t) 
Ty(e), Fo(Mary') ? Ty(e --* t) 
<j*>Tn(a), Ty(e), Fo(John') ? 3XTn(*),? Ty(e), 0 Ty(e --" (e --" t)), Fo(Ax. Ay. Like'x y) 
The rules of Completion and Elimination, as well as Thinning again, will now 
apply to compile all the information on the non-terminal nodes and the tree 
will be successfully completed: 
(62) 
Completion, Eliminatio n, Thinning 
Tn(a), ? Ty(t), Ty(t), Fo(Like' John' Mary') 
Ty(e), Fo(Mary') ? Ty(e )t), Ty(e -t), Fo(Ay. Like'John'y) 
<t. >Tn(a), Ty(e), Fo(John'), 0 Ty(e -- (e --+ t)), Fo(Ax. Ay. Like'xy)) 
5. a. 11. Late *Adjunction 
The rule of Late *Adjunction is introduced in Cann et al. (2005) in order to 
deal with Right Periphery phenomena: 
(63) { {Tn(n)... }, ..., {Tn(m), j. Tn(n), , ..., Ty(X), 0 }, ... } 
{ {Tn(n),... }, ..., {Tn(m), i*Tn(n), ..., Ty(X) }, 
{<T>Tn(m), ? Ty(X), ? 3x. Tn(x), 0}, ... } 
The rule applies at a node with a fixed type and creates a node bearing a 
requirement for the same type dangling underneath it. The pointer is moved 
to the newly created node so that lexical input of that type can be 
accommodated immediately afterwards: 
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(64) Tn(a),? Ty(t) 
Late * Adjunction 
Tn(m), Ty(e), 0 Ty(... ), Fo(... ) 
(65) Tn(a),? Ty(t) 
? Ty(.. ), Fo(... ) ? Ty(... ) 
Tn(m), Ty(e) Ty(... ), Fo(... ) 
<j>Tn(m), ? Ty(e), 0, ? 3x. Tn(x) 
This rule allows for right-peripheral elements (e. g. associates of expletives in 
English) to be processed locally. For example in the following string the 
semantically empty (expletive) pronoun it occupies a position where normally 
the propositional subject should appear as is obvious of the truth-conditionally 
equivalent string in (67): 
(66) It is likely that John left. 
(67) That John left is likely. 
In order to allow parsing of the propositional subject in (66) at a later stage in 
the parsing of the string, the rule of Late *Adjunction will be invoked. This will 
happen at the stage when the pointer, having completed the predicate node, 
moves by Anticipation to the subject node which, however, is type-complete 
due to the earlier processing of the expletive. 
(68) ? Ty(t) 
Tn(m), ? Ty(t), 0 
(69) ? Ty(t) 
if Completion, Anticipation ` 
? Ty(t --t) 
is likely... 4 
Anticipation 
Tn(m), Ty(t), Fo(U), ? 3x. Fo(x) ? Ty(t --, t) ,0 
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(70) ? Ty(() Laie"Adjuncrion ` 
Tn(m), Ty(t), Fo(U), ? 3x. Fo(x), 0 Ty(t --+t), Fo(Ap. Likely'p) 
(71) ? Ty(t) 
Tn(m), Ty(t), Fo(U), ? Bx. Fo(x) Ty(t ->t), Fo(Ap. Likely'p) 
<T'>Tn(m), ? ýx. Tn(x), ? Ty(t), 0 
The introduction of a type-incomplete, unfixed node dangling underneath the 
subject node will now allow the parsing of the propositional subject and 
subsequently Merge will effect the unification of the two nodes. The resulting 
representation will be identical to the one derived by parsing the string in (67) 
which is as it should be since the two strings must receive identical truth- 
conditional interpretations. 
(72) John ? TY(t) 
Tn(m), Ty(t), Fo(U), ? 3x. Fo(x) Ty(t- t), Fo(Ap. Likely'p) "'e 
<T'>Tn(m), ? 3x. Tn(x), Ty(t), Fo(Left'John'), 0 
Ty(e), Fo(John') Ty(e --*t), Fo(Ax. Late'x) 
(73) ? Ty(t) Completion & Elimination 
Tn(m), Ty(t), Fo(U), ? ýx ) Ty(t ->t), Fo(Ap. Likely'p) 
<j'>Tn(m), ? licý{x), T (t), Fo(Left'John'), 0 
Ty(e), Fo John') Ty(e -t), Fo(Ax. Left'x) 
(74) Ty(t), Fo( Likely'( Left'John) ), 0 
Tn(m), Ty(t), Fo(U), Ty(t-; t), Fo(Ap. Likely'p) 
<T'>Tn(m), Fo( Left'John') 
Ty(e), Fo(John') Ty(e --f), Fo(Ax. Left'x) 
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This completes the presentation of the main computational rules provided by 
DS. We will now deal with the issue of how to approach the analysis of 
quantification in DS. 
92 
CHAPTER 3 
QUANTIFICATION IN DS 
1. Introduction 
Noun phrases in natural languages seem to behave all alike. In terms of their 
distributional properties, quantificational expressions like every man or most 
dogs, definites, indefinites and proper names all combine with predicates as their 
arguments. Moreover, in terms of their morphological/syntactic properties, noun 
phrases of different types are not distinguished according to whether they are 
quantificational or not. In languages where case, gender or other morphological 
features accompany noun phrases, the same features appear on quantifying 
expressions too. For example, in Modern Greek quantificational expressions, 
similarly to proper names, can be combined with determiners, bear case and 
agreement features and show similar syntactic distributions: 
(1) i perisoteri fitites argisan 
the most-Nom-Masc-PI students-Nom-Masc-PI were-late 
most students were late 
(2) tous perisoterous fitites (tous) ida na-fevgoun 
the most-Acc-Masc-PI students-Nom-Masc-PI (them) saw-I to leave 
most students I saw (them) leaving 
(3) polous fitites (tous) ida na fevgoun 
many-ACC-Masc-PI students-Nom-Masc-PI (them) saw-I to leave 
many students, I saw (them) leaving 
Such evidence suggests that. the structure of natural language does not 
indicate an absolute distinction between quantificational/general and non- 
quantificational/singular/referential noun phrases. However, in terms of semantic 
interpretation, it has been assumed that proper names (as singular terms) on the 
one hand and quantificational expressions on the other have meanings which 
distinguish them sharply from each other. Whereas proper names can be taken 
to refer directly to individuals, quantificational expressions cannot be regarded as 
such (see e. g. Geach 1962). Instead those expressions must be seen as 
denoting operators or higher order properties (of sets). In terms of 
representations that directly reflect the inferential properties of quantified 
sentences, in the tradition initiated by Frege and Russell it is assumed that the 
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apparent similarities in syntactic behaviour of all noun phrases is misleading and 
that natural language form does not properly represent the semantic structure or 
inferential properties of quantified sentences. For this reason, a distinct 
representational language is introduced which differentiates the contribution of 
directly referential (e. g. proper names) and quantificational terms: in the 
translation from natural language to the language of predicate logic 
quantificational expressions, unlike proper names, no longer contribute 
arguments of predicates; instead, quantification, as second order predication, is 
expressed by means of variable binding operators which predicate properties of 
the sets denoted by open formulae in their scope. This "regimentation" of natural 
language form is considered essential in order to bring out the inferential and 
truth-conditional properties of natural language sentences. A standard predicate 
logic representation for the sentence in (4) is shown in (5): 
(4) A man loves Mary 
(5) 3x [ Man(x) A Love(x, Mary) ] 
What is notable about the representation in (5) is that there is no single 
component in the formula that corresponds to the argument expression a man. 
The two constituents of the phrase have been split between an overarching 
variable binding operator 3 and a set denoting predicate Man inside its scope. 
Under this type of representation for quantificational terms, indeed, natural 
language structure is no guide to inferential potential as it obscures rather than 
elucidates the thought conveyed by the linguistic input; and, considered from a 
psychological point of view, this analysis implies that a significant amount of 
processing is required in mapping the linguistic input to a transparent semantic 
representation useful for purposes of inference. It also seems to imply that the 
mapping from linguistic input to semantic representations for natural language 
quantificational sentences could have been as arbitrary as, for example, the 
mapping between words and their meanings: if linguistic form bears no justifiable 
correlation to the thought transmitted and its efficient recovery then any arbitrary 
way of encoding these thoughts should be available to natural languages. Since, 
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against this view, it is observed that most languages32 seem to behave similarly 
in terms of exemplifying a characteristic predicate-argument structure for 
conveying various types of semantic content we have to assume that these 
similarities among languages are not accidental and must reflect universal 
characteristics of human psychology. Moreover, the fact that in no language 
there is an encoding of quantificational structures that is isomorphically 
transparent with respect to their predicate logic representations should make us 
suspicious about how much the syntax of predicate logic presented above is 
appropriate to reflect the syntax of the semantic representations recovered by 
the processing of natural language strings. Taking these considerations into 
account, there are three ways of addressing the issue of how to provide the 
desired mapping from surface linguistic form to the message recovered by 
language users in a way that does justice to a psychologically justified theory of 
language. We take each one of these in turn next. 
The first way we can approach the issue is to maintain that it is the 
universality of the linguistic module in the human mind that imposes particular 
ways of associating thoughts and utterances. Under this view, there is a system 
dealing with linguistic representations that interfaces with semantic 
interpretation/inferential processes and there are linguistic mechanisms which 
provide for the mapping of the structures generated by phonological analysis 
(PFs) to truth-conditionally transparent forms (LFs). Since this intermediate 
system is autonomous, although universal, there is no reason to expect any 
isomorphism between surface linguistic structure and structure relevant for 
interpretation and inference since the two systems use distinct processes and 
vocabularies. This point of view is taken in generative grammar, for example, the 
framework of May (1977,1985) and Heim & Kratzer (1998) (also Culicover & 
Jackendoff 2005). May proposes that the mapping between surface form and 
semantic interpretation involves an intermediate representation at the level of LF. 
The latter is a derivationally constructed phrase-structure representation onto 
32 For disputed cases and their elucidation (in distinct terms than those employed here) see 
Demirdache & Matthewson (1995), Matthewson (2001). 
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which rules of semantic interpretation are applied. Every structural property that 
relates to interpretation is accounted for by reference to this level, for example, 
the scope of a quantificational term is defined as the c-command domain of the 
node it occupies. The system employs a transformational rule named QR which 
performs the appropriate mapping between surface forms and semantically 
transparent structures. Quantificational phrases which start life as the arguments 
of predicates in surface syntax are moved at higher positions on the tree so that 
their scope potential is explicitly represented. The traces left behind by phrases 
moved by QR as well as intra-sententially bound pronouns are treated as 
variables so that the eventual LF representation resembles the syntax of 
predicate logic with variable binding operators c-commanding their scope 
domains. The explanation of the distinct properties of referential terms and 
quantifiers is that QR discriminates between referential terms, which can appear 
as arguments of predicates at LF, and quantificational expressions which cannot. 
The question now that arises for such a system is why there are no natural 
languages where surface structures approximate closely the LFs assigned to 
sentences, especially since such languages would presumably be the most 
easier to process and acquire. Moreover, regarding the radical distinction 
between referential terms and variable binding-quantifiers, one could also ask 
how it is possible that, for anaphoric purposes, both types of element seem to 
behave similarly in that they introduce referents in a discourse which can be 
picked up by pronominals: 
(6) A man; came in. He; sat down. 
(7) Every soldier walked in. He picked up his gun and left without looking up. 
Moreover the idiosyncratic behaviours frequently observed among 
quantificational expressions with similar truth conditional properties (see e. g. 
Vendler 1962 regarding the differences between every, each, all etc. in English) 
cannot be dealt with by general movement processes like QR unless elaborate 
and unwieldy phrase structure configurations are assumed to underlie the simple 
predicate argument structure of natural languages (see e. g. Beghelli & Stowell 
1997). 
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The second way to approach the problem is the surface-compositional 
view exemplified by formal semantics accounts like Montague Grammar (see 
e. g. Dowty, Wall & Peters 1981). The solution here is to provide complex 
semantic rules mapping directly the surface form of natural language to its 
semantic interpretation (these rules might involve an intermediate level of 
representation in order to simplify presentation of the analysis but these 
representations must be dispensable). Since, according to the paramount 
principle of compositionality, syntactic and semantic rules must operate in 
tandem, the issue of how to discriminate the semantics of each type of noun 
phrase is resolved by assigning to all of them the most general interpretation and 
try to explicate the meanings that speakers find intuitive, e. g. referential 
interpretations, as derivative. In such an analysis all noun phrases are assigned 
contents of the type of a generalised quantifier, namely, «e, t>, t>, i. e. they are 
analysed as functors taking the denotation of the verb phrase as their argument 
(in a non-intensional framework). On this view, a singular indefinite noun phrase 
like a man will be interpreted as the set of all subsets of the domain of discourse 
that have a non-empty intersection with the set of men; the expression every 
man will denote the set containing all the sets which have the set of men as a 
subset; and, counter-intuitively, the NP John has to be interpreted as the set 
containing all and only those sets which have the individual 'John' as a member. 
Although it is not generally the intention of such an analysis to account for 
psychological processes33, the fact that it contradicts language users' intuitions 
both in terms of what the interpretations of NPs are and what is the predicate- 
argument structure of a sentence has to be taken as a point against it. Moreover, 
it seems that this type of generalisation as regards a uniform interpretation of 
NPs is not empirically adequate either, a fact which necessitates either partial 
abandonment of the principle of compositionality or the assignment of a single 
expression to a multiplicity of types to reflect distinct interpretations. The 
realisation that the higher type standardly assigned to NP content cannot be 
maintained leads Partee and Rooth (1983) to propose that NPs are ambiguous 
between interpretations of several types with type e the lowest possible one and 
33 see however Barwise & Cooper 1981: 191-194 
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a few higher types derivable by means of type-shifting. However, although 
processing considerations are offered as a justification for the lowest type 
operating as a default interpretation, it seems that there is no psycholinguistic 
evidence to support increased processing difficulty of referential as opposed to 
quantificational interpretations of NPs34. Furthermore, on this account, one would 
expect garden-path effects when the lowest type assignment, once having been 
selected as the default, then has to be revised later in the parsing process. 
However, we are not aware of any such effects ever arising. Examining language 
users' performance as providing evidence for what semantic content should be 
assigned to NPs, Purver & Ginzburg (2004) discuss the evidence provided by 
clarification requests in naturally occurring conversation. No examples occur 
indicating that a hearer is expected to interpret a quantificational NP in the way a 
generalised quantifier analysis would predict, an expected result since, 
intuitively, it seems highly implausible that hearers ever interpret an NP like a 
man, every man, or John as denoting second order properties of predicates. In 
order to see how we could model what speakers/hearers actually attribute as the 
semantic content of NPs we need to examine now a third solution to the problem 
of providing a psychologically adequate NP content. 
The third solution to the problem of how to explicate NP content is to take a 
more performance-oriented point of view, a strategy pursued by DS. Under a 
Fodorian conception of the human psychological mechanisms, natural language 
input is processed by means of allowing access to the representational language 
employed by inference processes (LOT). For a modelling of LOT and on the 
assumption that predicate logic constitutes a reasonable point of departure for 
capturing the semantic import of natural language quantified expressions, we 
could look into proof systems for predicate logic like Natural Deduction. Such 
34 e. g. there is no sense in which processing 'John and all the girls were smoking' is more 
complex than 'John, Mary and Sue are smoking' other than that associated with the increased 
complexity in processing lengthier sequences of words, frequency effects, familiarity etc. (in fact , depending on one's view of the interpretation of definites, there is tentative psycholinguistic 
evidence that there is no difference in processing between quantificational and referential NPs, 
see Carminati et al. 2002: 7-8 regarding the B-O-S reading times irrespective of 
binding/coreference which, in our view, affects re-reading times). 
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systems, which were explicitly designed as models of actual human reasoning 
(see Gentzen 1934/5), have recourse to the device of arbitrary names utilised as 
stand-ins when reasoning with quantificational formulae. Quantificational 
reasoning, under this assumption, is then conducted with formulas bearing a 
simple predicate-argument form. Assuming that such a system underpins human 
reasoning, quantificational terms in natural language can be modelled as nothing 
else but expressions whose processing provides such arbitrary names to be 
used in inference. Under this assumption, there is no need to strive to match, 
compositionally or otherwise, some 'autonomous' linguistic syntactic 
representation involving a VP-predicate and NP-argument structure with a non- 
isomorphic semantic representation nor to postulate a dichotomy in the 
processing of referential and non-referential expressions. Instead it can be 
assumed that the uniform formal characteristics (e. g. case specifications or word 
order) exhibited both by quantificational and by referential expressions point to 
the fact that such expressions are used invariably in order to provide 'names' 
which act as arguments of predicates. The formal uniformity of such terms in 
natural languages is therefore a consequence, not of a separate representational 
level of natural language structure, but of the structural uniformity that all such 
terms exhibit at the level of the inference language, LOT, to which natural 
languages give access to. On the other hand, the special interpretational 
properties exhibited by such terms, namely, scope dependencies, can be taken 
care of, not as a feature of the hierarchical positioning of the terms in a linguistic 
structural representation, but as an element of interpretation amenable to 
contextual determination and lexical idiosyncratic constraints. This avenue is not 
available to accounts which posit solely general-purpose quantificational 
mechanisms, for example, frameworks in which the scopal properties of NPs 
have to be accounted for by either transformational syntactic rules or semantic 
rules involving quantifying in or storage. In contrast, in DS, by assumption, as 
introduced earlier, the natural language system is a device for processing 
information in context and whose elements may systematically underspecify the 
interpretation assigned to them in any one occasion. This property is expected to 
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carry over into the quantificational system as it is a universal property of any type 
of cognitive processing. 
We thus expect that the interpretation of quantified expressions may involve 
an additional process of enriching some very weak encoded specification, as 
part of the logical-form construction process; and in all such cases DS scope 
resolution will involve a combination of the time-linear processes of parsing 
quantificational phrases and whatever enrichment processes are required. A 
case in point is provided by indefinites whose scopal properties are notoriously 
unlike other quantifiers (Farkas 1981, Fodor & Sag 1982, Ludlow & Neale 1991, 
Abusch 1994, Farkas 1997). In other frameworks, indefinites are said to be 
multiply ambiguous, e. g. specific, referential quantificational etc.. In DS, because 
the mapping procedures from language to LOT are assumed to involve not only 
proprietary linguistic means but also general reasoning processes interleaving 
their operations with each other, the possibility arises of defining all such aspects 
of the interpretation of indefinites as arising by interaction of a weak 
underspecified content with its context of interpretation. Consider as an 
illustration (8) below where there is an ambiguity concerning whether there is 
only one thesis to be read, or multiple ones, one for each professor or one for 
each student: 
(8) Every professor insisted that most students should read a recent MIT thesis 
This type of ambiguity is attributed by DS to the context dependent interpretation 
associated with indefinites. In contrast to other quantificational phrases which 
often seem to depend on order of processing for determining dependencies 
among them (witness the lack of scopal ambiguity between every and most 
above), indefinites can become dependent for their interpretation on any other 
scopal elements contributed to the representation by the surrounding sentential 
context. To implement this in DS we model the content derived from indefinite 
NPs as including an element of anaphoricity, in the sense that there is an 
enforced selection of some other term for it to depend on. Thus, as with any type 
of quantificational expression, there is no need here for general movement 
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operations displacing distinguished elements, or postulating ambiguity as to 
distinct types of indefinites or complex semantic mechanisms to derive the 
readings available. Instead an interpretation of uniform type can be assigned to 
each NP interpretation which reflects the fact that NP contents are usually the 
arguments of predicates. The fact that DS takes the mapping from language to 
denotations to be mediated by inferentially manipulated LOT representations 
provides the basis to achieve this result as well as an explanation of why natural 
languages are structured this way. Let's now see a more specific explication of 
the means provided by DS for the analysis of NP interpretation. 
2. Quantification and epsilon calculus in DS 
2. a. Natural language and Reasoning 
As models for the way LOT operates DS takes the systems that have been 
developed under the name of Natural Deduction. These are systems specifically 
designed to simulate the way human logical reasoning operates (especially in 
mathematical proofs). Since the classical way of presentation of predicate logic 
by means of quantifiers and variables does not seem to reflect the way 
quantificational inferences are carried out in ordinary reasoning (see e. g. Rips 
1994, Fine 1985), Natural Deduction proofs allow the replacement of 
quantificational statements by (provisional) statements which employ names 
standing for arbitrarily selected entities that are taken to verify the formula. The 
arbitrariness of choice for the names employed is ensured by the requirement 
that the name must be newly introduced in the proof (which in effect means that 
no (undischarged) assumptions involving this name have already been made). 
The use of name-like devices to eliminate quantifiers has been given formal 
substance in the epsilon calculus, which DS employs as part of the 
representational medium for the logical forms constructed by the parsing of 
natural language input. This assumption allows DS to assign a uniform name-like 
LOT representation as the content derived from all noun phrases; so here, unlike 
Montague-type semantics, all noun phrases map onto structured terms of type e. 
c 
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2. b. The epsilon calculus 
The epsilon calculus is a logical system originally developed by Hilbert & 
Bernays (1939). The version employed by DS is constructed on the basis of a 
predicate logic language to which two new operators are added: the epsilon 
operator, E, and its dual tau, T. For any predicate symbol in a predicate logic 
language, e. g. Man' or Woman', we can form a new term by using these 
operators in the following way: (a) we add a variable as the predicate's 
argument, e. g. Manx or Woman'x; this way we construct the restrictor of the 
epsilon/tau term, indicating the domain quantified over (b) the operator (binder) E 
or r is attached to the restrictor along with the variable it binds, for example, 
E, x, Man'x or r, x, Woman'x. The result of this process is a new term of the 
language which can be utilised as the argument of a predicate like any other 
term, e. g. Sleep'(e, x, Man'x). Moreover, the term can have an arbitrarily complex 
restrictor constructed on the basis of propositional connectives and predicate 
symbols, e. g., [c, x, Man'x A Sleep'x] or [r, y, Woman'y -* (Asleep'y v Happy'y) ]. 
Intuitively a term like E, x, Man'x denotes some individual that satisfies the 
predicate Man', if there is such an individual, i. e. it picks a witness for the 
predicate Man'. Formally, the meaning of a term E, x, Man'x is given by adding a 
choice function 0 to a standard model for predicate logic M= <D, I> with D the 
domain of individuals, Ia function mapping each elementary term of the 
language onto some element or set of elements of the domain D. The role of a 
choice function 0 is to select arbitrarily an individual for each subset of the 
domain D. This individual can be seen as standing for or representing the 
relevant set. If the restrictor of an c-term denotes a set that has a non-empty 
extension according to the model then any of the individuals in this extension 
could have been selected as the denotation of this epsilon term (this property 
encapsulates the arbitrariness of the name): 
(9) IIE, x, PxIIM9 = q)( IIPIIM 
9 ), with 0 as a function given by M= <D, I, 0> 
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On the other hand, if the restrictor of the c-term stands for a set that has no 
members according to the model, i. e., the restrictor stands for the empty set 0, 
then the choice function 0 selects arbitrarily any member of the domain D to 
assign as the denotation of the c-term (in some formulations an absurd individual 
is selected, see e. g. von Stechow 2000): 
(10) 0(0)eD 
Thus an epsilon term always has a denotation whether its restrictor stands for 
the empty set or not. This property of the epsilon calculus allows it not only to 
enrich but also supplant the standard language of predicate logic. This is 
because the quantifier symbols, V and 3, can be eliminated completely from the 
language and we can work with the epsilon and tau symbols only. The fact that 
the choice function interpreting the epsilon symbol always selects an individual 
whether its restrictor has an extension or not means that the following 
equivalences hold: 
(11) 3x P(x) H P(E, x, Px) 
(12) Vx P(x) H P(E, x, -iPx ) 
If there are some individuals in the extension of the set P then the choice 
function by definition will pick out any of those individuals as the term's 
denotation and that selected individual will of course have the property P. On the 
other hand, if every individual in the domain has the property P then the 
denotation of the predicate -'P will be the empty set. Since an epsilon term with a 
restrictor that denotes the empty set is interpreted as picking out an arbitrary 
individual from the domain D and since we know that all individuals are P the 
arbitrarily selected individual cannot fail to be aP too. We can exploit this latter 
equivalence to introduce the T-terms as the duals of c-terms: 
(13) (T, X, Px) _ (E, x, -'Px) 
(14) Vx P(x) H P(e, X, -Px) H P(T, X, Px) 
Although the epsilon calculus is a conservative extension of first order 
predicate logic in that no new theorems can be derived in it, it is more expressive 
than predicate logic in that not all formulas that can be formed by epsilon and tau 
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operators have direct translations in a predicate logic language. Moreover, for 
our purposes, what is crucial is that epsilon/tau terms can be made to directly 
encode in their internal structure the dependencies in interpretation that arise 
during the parsing of successive NPs in natural language discourse. This latter 
property of these terms allows us to pursue a more "constructive" view of context 
in that it provides us with the appropriate terms which can be picked up as the 
content of subsequent anaphoric linguistic items. A full specification of 
dependencies on other terms as part of the restrictor of a particular term, in 
effect, keeps a record of how terms are built up. This has the consequence that 
the resulting context containing these terms has a much richer structure than in 
modellings couched in strictly semantic terms. As we shall see in due course, 
this provides an obvious advantage in the characterisation of E-type effects (see 
e. g. Evans 1980) in the analysis of anaphora. 
We now move to examine how DS defines the construction of these terms 
through the projection of tree structure arising from the processing of linguistic 
input. 
2. c. The tree representation of NP content 
C 
As we said earlier, in DS, all NPs are treated as contributing structured 
objects of type e to the final semantic representation. The final structure of these 
objects is achieved by function application and type deduction on daughter 
nodes of subtrees that have been incrementally constructed through the parsing 
of the different components of an NP: the determiner, the noun and any 
adjectives or relative clauses accompanying them. The final output of processing 
an NP like a man in DS is a tree of the following general format (the shaded 
labels are just convenient names for the nodes so that we can refer to them 




Ty(e), Fo(E, x, Man'x) 
NOM Ty(cn) Ty(cn -> e) 
Fo(x, Man'x) Fo(AP. c, P) DET 
VAR Ty(e) Ty(e -4 cn) RESTR 
Fo(x) Fo(Az. z, Man'z) 
The highest node, shown as NP here, is the node where the completed term 
appears after it has been progressively constructed by compiling the information 
on its constituent nodes (this is the node characterised as DP in generative 
grammar frameworks). The node indicated as DET is where the natural language 
determiner supplies information about what kind of quantification we are dealing 
with: an NP with a determiner like a or some will eventually contribute an E-term 
(s, x, Px) whereas and NP with a universal determiner like every or each will 
contribute a T-term (T, x, Px); other quantificational terms can be defined similarly. 
The Formula value at the DET node is a functor which takes the Formula value 
at its sister NOM as its argument. Parsing of any determiner will result in the 
construction of an object of type cn-->e but different determiners can also 
contribute various idiosyncratic features in the structure (e. g. Indef (-/+)) besides 
establishing the manner of quantification (existential, universal etc. ). The noun 
accompanying the determiner, e. g. man, contributes a sub-tree containing a 
variable as Formula value on the node VAR, and a function occupying the node 
RESTR (for restrictor). The function appearing on node RESTR will apply on the 
variable with the result of constructing an appropriately structured argument for 
the function inhabiting the DET node. The reason for giving the nominal variable 
its own node is because we need to be able to reflect the fact that natural 
language input might provide this variable with additional restrictions in the form 
of (restrictive) relatives and adjectives. Note therefore that there are two type e 
nodes involved in a subtree representing the derivation of a term. 
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Now one of reasons that DS utilises the epsilon calculus for the 
representation of the content of NPs is that dependencies that might arise 
among them can be explicitly recorded. This requires a precise definition of how 
scope dependencies are constructed during the processing of linguistic input. 
We turn therefore to a presentation of how this is defined formally in DS terms. 
2. d. Scope 
Sentences containing multiple quantificational elements can result in 
interpretations in which there are dependencies among them. As is well-known, 
in a predicate logic language, this is expressed by the linear position of each 
quantifier symbol and the brackets indicating each quantifier's scope. The 
semantic rules then interpret such formulas by examining assignments of values 
to variables in order to determine whether the formula expresses a true 
proposition or not in a model on the basis of truth of the open formula under the 
assignments. As we have seen this standard practice of symbolising 
quantificational interpretations does not comport well with an incremental, 
compositional process of deriving content from natural language. For this reason, 
in the version of the epsilon calculus employed by DS, dependencies that might 
arise among terms are ultimately explicitly encoded inside the structured terms 
themselves. Reflecting the incrementality of processing, the construction of these 
complex names has to be a two stage affair: first, as a result of parsing an NP, 
an initial, uninterpreted, "incomplete" term is constructed. Along with it, a 
requirement will also appear on the tree indicating that there must be a 
scope/dependency relation between the term constructed and the other terms in 
the same propositional structure. However, determination of exactly what kind of 
scope relation this will be cannot occur at this stage. DS assumes that scope 
relations among terms are partially constrained by the order of presentation of 
the linguistic input, partially determined by lexically encoded idiosyncratic 
requirements of certain elements and, moreover, they can be partially 
underspecified in that complete determination involves an element of pragmatic 
choice. Thus the initial term provided by the linguistic input (the NP) is only a 
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provisional name which has to be expanded when all dependencies among 
terms have been finalised. There is no semantic interpretation assigned to that 
name exactly for this reason. Eventually, at the time of completion of the parsing 
routine for a sentence, a process will apply which will construct the final complex 
terms. These complex names now will encode in their internal structure what 
kind of dependencies have been assumed to hold among them. They can now 
also be semantically interpreted by the choice function semantics standardly 
assumed for the epsilon calculus. For illustration, consider the sentence (16) 
below: 
(16) Every woman saw a man 
At the first stage of parsing such a sentence the following formula will be 
constructed at the top node of the tree35: 
(17) Fo(Saw' Marx r, y, Woman'y ) 
This formula is incomplete in that there is no way of knowing whether it is a 
specific man who every woman saw or whether for each woman there is a 
(potentially different) man who she saw, that is, we do not know whether the 
choice of man depends on the choice of woman or the other way round. In order 
for the ambiguity to be resolved the formula in (17) will always be accompanied 
by a Scope Statement which will unambiguously indicate which term depends on 
which other. In such a scope statement a term is represented by the variable it 
binds (e. g. the term e, x, Man'x above will be represented by x). This variable is 
guaranteed by the parsing rules to be fresh and unique for each term. The 
variables in a scope statement are presented as ordered according to their 
dependencies. The particular ordering found in each representation is usually the 
result of pragmatic actions and is indicated by means of the predicate Scope: 
(18) Scope( x<y) 
35 Dotted underlining will sometimes be used instead of brackets to improve readability. When 
brackets are not used to indicate the order of the arguments the convention we assume is that 
the object is closer to the predicate than the subject. For example, 'Saw' ex Manx r, yWomany. 
is equivalent to: 'Saw'(ExMan'x)(TyWoman'y)' with the interpretation: 'Every woman saw a man'. 
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The symbol < between the two variables x and y indicates that the term 
employing the variable on the left (E, x, Man'x) outscopes the term employing the 
variable on the right (c, y, Woman'y). If such a Scope Statement accompanies the 
formula in (17) above then the interpretation that it represents would be 
expressed in predicate logic as follows: 
(19) 3x [ Manx A (Vy Woman'y --> Saw'xy) ] 
On the other hand if the dependency is presented the other way round, i. e., 
(20) Scope( y< x) 
then the equivalent interpretation in predicate logic will be: 
(21) Vy [Woman'y -* (3x (Man'x A Saw'xy )) ] 
The formula in (17) and the Scope Statement accompanying it will be utilized at 
the end of the parse as input to a rule of quantifier evaluation (Q-Evaluation 
Rule) which will construct the appropriate complex terms that record inside their 
restrictors the scope dependencies selected to hold. 
In order to show in detail how all the various rules interact in the parsing of I- 
sentences with quantificational expressions we will go through the incremental 
construction of a semantic representation for a sentence with two quantifiers 
next. 
2. e. An example of parsing a quantificational structure 
We now present the DS routine for parsing a sentence like: 
(22) A man saw every girl. 
As always, the parsing starts with the pointer at the ? Ty(t) node. Here we will 
also assume that the situation argument, initially a metavariable S, will be 
inserted after a step of Introduction and Prediction and the application of an 
appropriate computational rule (we discuss this process in more detail in Ch. 
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5`36. The metavariable S can be immediately substituted by a free variable v which 
we assume is accessible in the context. After that, Introduction and 
Prediction again will build the nodes for the subject and the predicate. The 
pointer now appears at the ? Ty(e) node that has been newly created: 
(23) ? Ty(t) 
Ty(es), Fo(v) ? Ty(e3 -->t) 
NP ? Ty(e), 0 ? Ty(e -+ (es --t)) 
The parser now encounters the indefinite determiner a. This will trigger the 
activation of the lexical entry for a which includes the following instructions for 
the parser to follow: 
(24) a 
IF ? Ty(e) 
THEN put(Indef(+)); make(<ji>); go(<j1>); put(Fo(AP(c, P)), Ty(cn -* e)); 
go(<Ti>); make(<jo>); go(<jo>); put(? Ty(cn)) 
ELSE abort 
If the pointer is currently at a node with a requirement for a type e formula value 
(? Ty(e)), then the specification above determines firstly that the feature Indef(+) 
will be inserted there. This is because the expression a initiates the construction 
of an indefinite quantificational name, i. e. a necessarily dependent term, whose 
scope is partially underspecified by the linguistic input. Later scope resolution 
rules will depend on the presence of this feature for their appropriate application. 
Next in the instructions comes the construction of the node's function daughter 
and movement of the pointer there. The new node, highlighted with the label 
36 In Kempson et al. (2001), Cann et al. (2005), the situation/event argument is represented as a 
label eventually inserted at the front of the formula, e. g. Fo(S: Saw(r, yGirl_y, In the 
present treatment, we adopt a view of event/situation terms as parts of the tree rather than 
external labels. One of the reasons for this is the ability of these terms to take scope with respect 
to other terms contributed by nominal phrases. World labels will be treated as labels, see 
Chapter 4. 
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DET37 on the tree below, will be annotated with the Formula value (AP. c, P), i. e. a 
function which requires an argument of the appropriate shape (an open formula 
with a distinguished variable) in order to built an epsilon term by applying to it. 
The node is also decorated with the type specification Ty(cn- *e) which indicates 
that the type of argument that is expected can only be provided by linguistic input 
in the form of a common noun: 
(25) ? Ty(t) 
Ty(es), Fbýv) ? Ty(e3 -t) 
NP ? Ty(e), Indef (+) ? Ty(e ->(es --. i)) 
Ty(cn --* e) DET 
Fo(AP. c, P), 0 
J 
Next the instructions in (24) indicate movement of the pointer to the NP node 
above. From there the left daughter, the argument daughter NOM, is created. 
The pointer moves to that newly created daughter and a decoration is inserted 
with a requirement for the type of the formula value that appears there to be cn. 
The tree now looks as follows: 
(26) ?T (t) 
Ty(es), Fo(v) ? Ty(es -, t) 
NP ? Ty(e), Indef (+) ? Ty(e --, (e3 -31)) 
NOM ? Ty(cn), 0 Ty(cn -* e) DET 
Fo(AP. E, P) 
Now the tree awaits lexical input that will provide a formula of type cn in order for 
the parsing to continue. Processing of the common noun man provides the 
37 The labels NP, DET, VAR, NOM and RESTR are here used just as names of nodes for 
illustrative purposes and have no status whatsoever in the mechanics of the formalism. One 
should note that, unlike here, in Kempson et. al. (2001) these labels encode modal addresses. 
We will not use that notation here. 
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appropriate input by giving access to a lexical entry which contains the following 
instructions: 
(27) man: 
IF ? Ty(cn) 
THEN make(<, 1>); go(<j1>); put(Fo(Ax. x, Man'x)), Ty(e -4 cn); } RESTR 
go(<j, >); make(<lo>); go(<lo>); freshput(x, Fo(x)); put(Ty(e)); } VAR 
9o(<To>); 9o(<To>) Put(? Sc(x))38; go(<10>); 9o(<, o>)" 
ELSE abort 
For the noun input to be incorporated in the tree the pointer must reside on a 
node with a requirement ? Ty(cn). As this is the case in our example the rest of 
the actions specified can be executed: Firstly the function daughter, RESTR, is 
created and the pointer moves there. A formula and a type specification are 
inserted: Fo(Ax. x, Man'x), Ty(e -* cn). The formula value is a function that 
requires a type e variable as its argument in order to build a restrictor of the 
appropriate shape for the epsilon calculus term that will eventually be 
constructed. This variable that will become bound by the s or T operator is 
therefore distinguished by appearing in two places inside the restrictor: on its 
own separated by a comma and inside the common noun predicate in argument 
position (e. g. x, Manx). Accordingly, the type of the node indicates that it 
requires something of type e in order to result in a structure of type cn. Here is 
the tree resulting from this: 
38 The actual action at this point should have the form: < {<jp><jo> (x)}, put(? SC(x)), Abort> 
which is an IF THEN statement for seeking the variable at the VAR node and entering the scope 
requirement for it. We use instead a simplified notation for simplicity of presentation. 
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(28) ? Ty(/) 
Ty(es), Fo(v) ? Ty(e5-'t) 
NP ? Ty(e), Indef (+) ? Ty(e -(es --"f)) 
NOM ? Ty(cn) Ty(cn - o), Fo(AP(E, P)) DET 
Ty(e -> cn), RESTR 
Fo(Ax. x, Man'x), 0 
After completing the decorations on this node, the lexical entry for the noun man 
indicates that the pointer should move at the mother node NOM above and the 
other daughter, the left daughter VAR, is created. The pointer moves to this 
newly created argument daughter and now its type and formula values must be 
placed there. Because we need a fresh variable as formula value on this node 
the action freshput is invoked. In simple terms, this action checks the rest of the 
tree under construction and inserts, as formula value on the current node, a 
variable that has not appeared anywhere else (this ensures that each epsilon 
calculus term will be associated with a unique, fresh variable and there will not 
be any accidental bindings; it also reflects the fact that use of such terms 
introduces new "referents" in the discourse context). Assuming that the fresh 
variable selected was z, the annotation Fo(z) is placed on the node as well as its 
type: Ty(e): 
(29) ? Ty(t) 
Ty(es), Fo(v) ? Ty(es -->t) 
NP ? Ty(e), Indef (+) ? Ty(e -)(es --*t)) 
NOM ? Ty(cn) Ty(cnn --> e), Fo(AP(e, P)) DET 
VAR Ty(e), 0 Ty(e -> co), RESTR 
Fo(z) Fo(Ax. x, Man'x) 
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After completing the decorations on this node one last thing remains before 
completion of this particular subtree: we must ensure that the epsilon calculus 
term created will eventually participate in some scope relation with the other 
quantificational terms on the tree; otherwise, the interpretation of the natural 
language string will remain incomplete. In order to achieve this a scope 
statement will need to be constructed later including the variable employed by 
this particular term now under construction. So inside the lexical entry associated 
with the common noun we need to have the means to address the newly 
introduced variable (z in our case) which will be taken as a representative of the 
entire quantificational term inside the scope statement. In the language in which 
the lexical entry's instructions are formulated, bold variables by definition range 
over any actual formula value that might appear on a node. Therefore by use of 
the bold variable x in the formulation of the instruction put(? Sc(x)) in the lexical 
entry in (24) we are able to pick up the actual fresh variable z standing currently 
as the Formula value of the VAR node. Having picked up that variable we can 
now construct a requirement that concerns it, in this case the requirement: 
? Sc(z). This requirement is inserted at the highest type e node, NP: 
(30) ?T (t) 
Ty(e3), Fo(v) ? Ty(e3 -1) 
NP ? Ty(e), Indef (+), ? Sc(z), 0 ? Ty(e -*(es _mot)) 
xom ? Ty(cn) Ty(cn -* e), Fo(AP(e, P)) vE-r 
VAR Ty(e) Ty(e -> co), RESTR 
Fo(z) Fo(Ax. x, Man'x) ) 
What this requirement means is explicated by looking at the definition of the 
monadic predicate Sc. This predicate is in fact an abbreviation of a complex 
specification defined as follows: 
(31) Sc(a) =df 
(<lo> <1o> Fo(a) A Ty(e)) A <1, >(Ty(t) A 3y( Scope(a < y) v Scope(y < a)) ) 
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The above definition says that for a formula value/variable a to satisfy the 
predicate Sc, firstly a itself must appear as Formula value on a completed VAR 
node found in the local subtree below the node where the predicate is evaluated. 
Secondly, this node must be dominated by a type t propositional node bearing a 
decoration (a scope statement) which indicates that a is involved in some scope 
dependency (this is indicated by the annotation employing the predicate Scope). 
This means. that a has wider or narrower scope with respect to some other 
variable on the tree. 
Going back to our example, for the requirement ? Sc(z) on the NP node to 
be satisfied, it must become the case that the variable z is involved in some 
scope statement at the higher ? Ty(t) node (e. g. Scope(z < y) or Scope(y < z) etc. 
must appear there). This ensures that the logical form derived at the end of the 
parse will be complete in the sense that all quantifier dependencies are explicitly 
encoded at the root node in the form of scope statements. 
Continuing the processing of the word man and following the last pair of 
instructions in the lexical entry, after the requirement ? Sc(z) has been deposited 
on the NP node, the pointer returns to the variable node VAR. The tree remains 
the same except from this movement of the pointer: 
(32) ? Ty(t) 
Ty(es), Fo(v) ? Ty(es -*t) 
NP ? Ty(e), Indef (+), ? Sc(z) ? Ty(o -(e, -t)) 
NOWT ? Ty(cn) Ty(cn -> e), Fo(AP(e, P)) DET 
VAR Ty(e) Ty(e -> cn), RESTR 
Fo(z), 0 Fo(Ax. x, Mlan'x) ) 
At this point, with the pointer being at the VAR node it would be possible for 
a restrictive relative clause to be the next input to the parsing task. In such a 
case, another tree would be constructed which would necessarily include a copy 
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of the variable z somewhere inside it. However, we will not take this option here; 
instead the rules of Completion and Elimination (see Chapter 2: (44), (47)) will 
take over in order to gradually compile the information from all daughter nodes in 
the NP subtree to the mother nodes. This is expected to satisfy the requirement 
on the NP node for a completed type e formula value which will be the indefinite 
epsilon term e, x, Man'x. In order to achieve this result, firstly, the pointer moves 
from the completed VAR node to its mother above. Then we can fully complete 
the NOM node by combining the Formula and Type values of its daughters and 
recording the information: 
(33) ? Ty(t) 
Ty(es), Fo(V) ? Ty(e5 -t) 
NP ? Ty(e), Indef (+), ? Sc(z) ? Ty(e ý( es -. t)) 
NOM ? Ty(ei), Ty(cn), Fo(z, Man'z), 0 Ty(cn --> e), Fo(AP(s, P)) DET 
VAR Ty(e) Ty(e -> cn), RESTR 
Fo(z) Fo(Ax. x, Man'x) 
Now the highest type e node can be compiled too by applying the same rules: 
(34) ? Ty(t) 
Ty(es), Fo(v) ? Ty(e5 -°t) 
NP ? Ty(e), Ty(e), Fo(e, z, Man'z), Indef (+), ? Sc(z), 0 ? Ty(e -"(o --, t)) 
NOM Ty(cn), Fo(z, Man'z) Ty(cn -> e), Fo(AP. e, P) DET 
VAR Ty(e) Ty(e -> cn), RESTR 
Fo(z) Fo(Ax. x, Man'x) 
With the pointer at the higher type e node we are now left with the 
requirement ? Sc(z) to be dealt with in order to complete the NP subtree. As we 
said previously this is a requirement for the epsilon term that has been 
constructed (E, z, Man'z) to participate in a scope relation with the other terms 
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that will appear in its propositional environment. The technical means DS makes 
available for this to be achieved are as follows: Since the actions for processing 
each quantificational noun phrase necessarily introduce a fresh variable on the 
tree, we can assume that the quantifier itself can be provisionally represented in 
any scope relations by its own variable. In order to handle the idiosyncratic 
scope requirements of each quantificational expression in natural language (in 
our case the difference between indefinites and non-indefinites), DS defines 
rules which address the variable representative of its quantifier and establish the 
appropriate restrictions which will constrain how the scope dependencies of the 
quantificational terms on the tree should be resolved. The application of these 
rules relies on features that each type of quantificational determiner contributes 
on the NP node, in our case the feature Indef(+/-). The result of applying one of 
those rules will be that a scope statement, a proposition which defines some 
quantificational dependency, will be deposited at the most local ? Ty(t) node (e. g. 
Scope(x < z) or Scope(y < x) etc. ). 
Returning to the processing of our example sentence in (22), the presence 
of an indefinite noun phrase in the linguistic input has resulted in the construction 
of an epsilon term and in the feature Indef(+) to be placed at the NP node. The 
scope-related rule that will be invoked now is one which refers to the presence of 
this feature on a type e node where the pointer resides. The specification of this 
rule is as follows: 
(35) Scope action for indefinites: 
IF { Indef(+), ? Sc(x) } 
THEN gofirst, ( ? Ty(t) ); 
put(Scope(U < x), 
? 3y(DOM(y) A Scope(y < x) A Vr(Scope(y < r) -" Scope(x < r)))) 
ELSE abort 
Let's look at the instructions the rule gives in detail. Initially there is a condition 
that the rule can only apply if the pointer is at a node carrying the Indef(+) feature 
and a requirement for a scope participation for some variable. Recall that as we 
116 
said above the bold variable x employed in the rule will be instantiated to the 
actual variable appearing on the node (z in our case) appearing in the annotation 
? Sc(z). If this condition for the application of the rule is satisfied, as it is in our 
example, then there is a course of action that must be taken. Firstly, the pointer 
has to move to the most local dominating ? Ty(t) node (gofirst, (? Ty(t)). Then a 
scope statement has to be introduced there according to the following 
instructions; Because the natural language determiner that gave rise to the term 
was an indefinite, there must be another element on the tree on which the 
epsilon term constructed from the indefinite depends for its interpretation. At this 
stage, we do not yet know which term this will be, as this will be resolved 
eventually by means of free pragmatic choice constrained by the input 
contributed by other elements in the linguistic string. Therefore we need to 
express now the fact that at some point in the future of the parse there must exist 
some dependency relation, symbolised by <, between two variables, as 
representatives of their terms. The second member of this dependency relation 
will be the variable currently employed in the scope requirement, in our tree, 
? Sc(z), because the epsilon term it represents will be the dependent one. The 
first member of this relation will be a variable representing some other term on 
which the currently being constructed epsilon term will depend. However, as we 
said, we still do not know which variable this will eventually be. For this reason 
we now need to employ a metavariable to stand temporarily as the first member 
of the < relation. Accordingly, the scope action rule in (35) above, which will 
apply now, specifies that the statement Scope(U < x) must be put at the ? Ty(t) 
node with x now instantiated to an actual variable. Therefore, in our case, the 
annotation will take the form Scope(U < z): 
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(36) ? Ty(t), Scope(U<z), 
? 3y(DOM(y) A Scope(y <zA Vr(Scope(y < r) -" Scope(z < r))), 0 
Ty(es), Fo(v) ? Ty(es -. t) 
NP Ty(e), Fo(E, z, Man'z), Indef (+), ? Sc(z) ? Ty(e -. (e, --. t)) 
NORM Ty(cn), Fo(z, Man'z) Ty(co -- e), Fo(AP. e, P) DET 
VAR Ty(e) Ty(e -> cn), IESTR Fo(z) Fo(Ax. x, Man'x ) 
Since the metavariable must be substituted by a proper formula value at some 
point we thus ensure that there will be a scope relation involving the variable of 
interest z (therefore ? Sc(z) on the NP node will also be satisfied). However, we 
need to impose some restrictions on the choice of term that will replace the 
metavariable U. The rest of the annotation inserted above is motivated by the 
fact that the actual value for the metavariable just inserted must be selected from 
the terms that have been produced as a result of parsing the current string (that 
is, the value for U cannot be supplied freely by the context as was the case for 
metavariables that have been produced by the processing of pronouns). To 
achieve the expression of this restriction requiring a local replacement for our 
metavariable, DS employs a monadic predicate symbolised as DOM which 
seeks all the Ty(e) variables that are located inside the currently being 
constructed Ty(t) structure. The predicate DOM is defined as follows39: 
(37) Tn km DOM(a) 
Tn km ? Ty(t) A[ (1 J* [Ty(e) A <lo> <lo> Fo(a)l) v (<lo> Fo(a) )] 
The definition says that the predicate DOM is true of a Formula value a at a tree 
node if currently the pointer is on a ? Ty(t) node and either one of the following 
39 In Kempson et al (2001) where the situation argument is treated as a label there is a slightly 
different definition of the predicate DOM. 
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two conditions is satisfied: either (i) somewhere below dominated by the ? Ty(t) 
node there is a Ty(e) node which has one argument granddaughter bearing the 
Formula value a, or, (ii) the daughter of the ? Ty(t) node has the formula value a, 
i. e. a is the situation argument. Thus this requirement indicates specific locations 
for finding values to appear in scope statements: the granddaughter of a Ty(e) 
node is always a variable (VAR) bound by a quantificational term, therefore, the 
actual value of a can only be a variable somewhere inside the local tree under 
construction (ensured by fl ) or, in the second case, the situation argument for 
that tree (as we will see later the situation argument might be a term or a variable 
itself). 
Having defined DOM we can now return to the rest of the annotation 
introduced by the scope action rule for indefinites in (35), partially repeated 
below: 
(38) Scope action for indefinites: 
THEN 
... 
put(Scope( U< x), 
? 3y(DOM(y) A Scope(y < x) A Vr(Scope(y < r) -- Scope(x < r))))) 
We see that the requirement deposited on the ? Ty(t) node states that there must 
be some variable instantiated to y which satisfies the DOM predicate (i. e. it can 
be found somewhere below) and which outscopes the variable of interest x (the 
latter instantiated to an actual value, z in our case). In most cases, the fact that U 
must outscope x will force the value for U and the value for the instantiation of y- 
to be one and the same40. The rest of the requirement states that any other 
variables which might previously have been outscoped by the instantiation of the 
variable y will now also be outscoped by the instantiation of the variable x. This 
40 The value for U could in principle have been different from the value of y but it is assumed that 
there will be a strict linear ordering of all variables participating in the scope statements. This 
makes it impossible that the value of U will not also outscope y so that x is outscoped by both, 
i. e. U<y<x. 
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is because we need to produce a strict linear order of variables representing 
terms on the tree in terms of scope relations and therefore we cannot allow 
undefined scope relations among them. 
These are all the constraints regarding scope that can be attributed to 
linguistic input and the function of the DS formalism. Otherwise, the choice of 
which one of the variables on the tree will be the actual replacement for U is left 
open by the grammar and to be determined according to pragmatic factors. 
Let's then return to our example of parsing the sentence: A man saw every 
girl. As we said, the variable taken to represent the newly built epsilon term is 
the fresh variable z. By applying the scope action rule for indefinites (35) with 
respect to the variable z (i. e. by instantiating the x on the rule to the actual 
variable z) decorations regarding z's scope dependencies have been deposited 
at the ? Ty(t) node. Since now there is a scope statement that involves the 
variable z if we had a value for it available on the tree, e. g. if the situation 
argument were as a substituend for it, then the requirement ? Sc(z) on the NP 
node would be satisfied and could be deleted. However we do not take this 
option here and leave the requirement on the node: 
(39) ? Ty(t), Scope(U < z), 
? 3y(DOM(y) A Scope(y <z)A Vr(Scope(y < r) -" Scope(z < r))) 
Ty(es), Fo(v) ? Ty(o -'t) 
Ty(e), Fo( c, z, Man'z), Indef (+), ? Sc(z), 0 ? Ty(e -->(e, -"t)) 
Ty(cn), Fo(z, Man'z) Ty(cn --> e), Fo(AP. e, P) 
Ty(e) Ty(e -), cn), 
Fo(z) Fo(Ax. x, Man'x) 
We then assume that this is a case where the epsilon term resulting from 
processing the indefinite a man is intended to take narrow scope with respect to 
all the other terms on the tree, i. e., the interpretation of the sentence a man saw 
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every girl will be that for each girl there is a separate man who saw her. In DS 
terms this will mean that the epsilon term (s, x, Man'x) will depend on the r-term 
that will result from parsing the phrase every girl. However, since we still have 
not processed this phrase we have no choice now but delay the selection for a 
replacement for the metavariable U and continue with the parse hoping that an 
appropriate replacement will be found in due course. (Of course the choice is 
open to select the situation argument as a replacement but let's assume here 
that this option were not taken since this would give wide scope to the E-term). 
By the usual processes, the pointer now moves, in due course reaching the 
predicate node decorated with ? Ty(e -*(es ->t)). While there, parsing of the verb 
saw leaves the tree as follows (we are not dealing now with the parsing of the 
tense specification which presumably will substitute the metavariable on the 
Ty(es) node with an actual variable v or some epsilon or tau term retrieved from 
context): 
(40) 
? Ty(t), Scope(U < z), 
? -y(DOM(y) r. Scope(y <z) AVr(Scope(y < r) - Scope(z < r))) 
Ty(e5), ? Ty(es , t) 
Fo(v) 
Ty(e), ? Sc(z) ? Ty(e ->( es -+t)) 
indef (+) 
Fo(c, z, Man'z) 
Ty(cn), Ty(cn -* e), ? Ty(e), 0 Ty(e-+(e->(e, -"t)), 
Fo(z, Man'z) Fo(AP. e, P) Fo(Ax., \y. At. See'xyt) 
Ty (e), Ty(e > co), 
Fo(z) Fo(Ax. x, Man'x) 
Now the pointer awaits on a node requiring input of type e. Parsing of the 
phrase every girl is expected to provide such input. The gradual construction of 
this ? Ty(e) node will go on in a similar way as with the indefinite above with only 
a few differences owing to the fact that we are now processing a strong (non- 
indefinite) quantifier. The lexical entry for every is as follows: 
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(41) every. 
IF ? Ty(e) 
THEN put(Indef(-)); make(<11>); go(<11>); put(Fo(AP. T, P), Ty(cn 
go(<j, >); make(<1o>); go(<1o>); put(? Ty(cn)) 
ELSE abort 
The only difference with the lexical entry of the determiner a is that a formula 
value involving the term binder r is introduced and the feature Indef(-) is 
deposited on the top type e node. The latter will have consequences for the type 
of scope action that will apply regarding this node: 
(42) ? Ty(t), Scope(U<z), 
? 3y(DOM(y) A Scope(y < z) A Vr(Scope(y < r) -" Scope(z < r))) 
Ty(es), ? Ty(e, - t) 
Fo(v) 
Ty(e), I ndef(+),? Sc(z) 
Fo(E, z, Man'z), 
Ty(cn), Ty(cn -). e), 
Fo(z, Man'z) Fo(AP. e, P) 
? Ty(e _*( es --, t)) 
? Ty(e) 
Indef() 
Ty(e) Ty(e -). cn), NOM ? Ty(cn), 0 
Fo(z) Fo(Ax. x, Man'x) 
Ty(e, (e-+( eý ->t)) 
Fo(Ax. Ay. At. See'xyt) 
Ty(cn -> e), DET 
Fo(AP. z, P) 
We go on with the processing of the lexical item girl which has an entry identical 
to that of man except that the concept Girl' is introduced as formula value: 
(43) girl: 
IF { ? Ty(cn) } 
THEN make(<J 1>); go(<j, >); put(Fo(Ax. x. Girl'x)), Ty(e -; ý cn); 
go(<11>); make(<Io>); go(<Io>); freshput(X, Fo(x)); put(Ty(e)); 
go(<To>); go(<To>) put(? Sc(X)); go(<lo>); go(<. o>)" 
ELSE abort 
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After executing these actions and compiling the information on the higher type e 
node in the same way as previously, the tree should look as follows: 
(44) ? Ty(t), Scope(U < z), 
? 3y(DOM(y) A Scope(y <z)A Vr(Scope(y < r) -* Scope(z < r))) 
TY(es), ? TY(es-. t) 
Fo(v) 
Ty("e), I ndef(+),? Sc(z) 
Fo(s, z, Man'z), 
Ty(cn), Ty(cn -). e), 
Fo(z. Man'z) Fo(AAP. E, P) 
? Ty(e ->( es -. t)) 
Ty(e), Fo(T, s, Girl's) Ty(e-(e, ( es -t)) 
Indef(-), ? Sc(s), 0 Fo(Ax. Ay. At. See'xyt) 
Ty(e) Ty(e -), cn), NOM Ty(cn) Ty(cn -a e), DET 
Fo(z) Fo(Ax. x, Man'x) Fo(s, Girl's) Fo(AP. r, P) 
Ty(e), Ty(e -> cn), 
VAR Fo(s) Fo(, kx. x, Girl'x) 
Now it is time again for the scope action rule to apply in order to be able to 
satisfy the requirement ? Sc(s) at the NP node. This time though it will be a rule 
suitable to a term resulting from the parsing of a strong quantifier. The 
appropriate rule is the following: 
(45) Scope action for non-indefinites: 
IF { Indef(-), ? Sc(x) } 







{az(DOM+(z) A Scope(y < z))} 
abort 
put(Scope( y< X)) 
This rule firstly checks for the presence of the Indef(-) feature on the pointed 
node and for a requirement for a scope statement involving an actual variable 
which will instantiate x in the rule. In our case the variable s on the NP node will 
be an appropriate instantiation for x and the feature Indef(-) is indeed found on 
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the same node. Following these instructions the pointer moves to the most local 
dominating ? Ty(t) node (gofirstt(? Ty(t)). From there a search will be 
performed of all the dominated variables on the tree this time employing the 
predicate DOM which is defined as follows: 
(46) Tn 1M DOM'(a) 
Tn km ? Ty(t) A[ (1 J* [ Indef(-) A <lo> <lo> Fo(a) ])v (<je> Fo(a)) ] 
The definition says that a formula value a, a variable in our case, satisfies the 
predicate DOM+ if the pointer is currently at a ? Ty(t) node and either one of these 
two conditions hold: either there is a node somewhere below which bears the 
feature Indef(-) and has an argument granddaughter (VAR) with formula value a 
or, alternatively, the formula value a appears on the node bearing the situation 
argument. Let's now return to the scope action for non-indefinites rule (45) 
partially repeated again below and see what purpose the definition of DOM+ 
serves: 






{ 3z(DOMi(z) A Scope(y < z) )} 
abort 
put(Scope(y < x)) 
The condition on the application of the rule: IF DOM (y) which employs the bold 
variable y allows its instantiation to any variable on the tree that has been 
contributed by an non-indefinite (Indef(-)) quantificational expression. To 
illustrate the function of the rule, let's suppose for a moment that the lndef(-) 
variable rwere found somewhere below on the tree and that we instantiate the y 
on the rule to r. Now we have DOM+(r) being true. According to the third 
condition on the rule: IF az(DOM+(z) A Scope(y < z)), we must now check if 
there is another Indef(-) variable on the tree which depends on r, i. e. check if 
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Scope(r < z) is true. If one such variable is found then the process aborts. This is 
because, in the DS framework, quantificational expressions which contribute the 
lndef(-) feature are assumed to acquire scope analogous to their order of 
presentation with the most recently introduced terms taking more narrow scope. 
It is only indefinites which can overrule this restriction. Therefore, if there is a 
lndef(-) variable which has narrow scope with respect to r, then this variable 
must have been introduced after the processing of the quantificational phrase 
that gave rise to r. The variable we need to instantiate y to is the most recently 
introduced lndef(-) variable and for this reason r will not do. By aborting the 
process another instantiation of y can take place since we have the requirement 
? Sc(x), with x instantiated to some actual variable, to satisfy. We see therefore 
that the Scope action rule in effect initiates a search for the most recently 
introduced variable that has not been contributed by an indefinite. This is 
achieved by selecting different variables as instantiations for y. Suppose that this 
process is successful and we manage to find the variable most recently 
introduced by a non-indefinite quantifier. As soon as this variable is found the 
rule allows us to introduce a scope statement which indicates that the newly 
discovered variable has wider scope than the instantiation of x, the newly 
introduced variable of interest (Scope(y<x)). The result of this is that the term 
currently being constructed employing the instantiation of x has narrow scope 
with respect to the most recently introduced non-indefinite term employing the 
instantiation of y and as a further consequence it has also narrow scope with 
respect any other previously introduced non-indefinite terms as well. This is 
because, as we said before, we have assumed that strong quantifiers display 
scope dependencies that respect their order of introduction to the tree 
(disregarding terms contributed by indefinites). The scope action rule for non- 
indefinites ensures this for all cases. 
Let's now leave the digression and return to the process of parsing our 
example at the stage where we attempt to satisfy the requirement for a scope 
statement: ? Sc(s). The first condition of the Scope Action for Non-indefinites rule 
has been satisfied, that is, we have instantiated the x in the rule (45) to s, the 
125 
pointer has moved upwards to the most local ? Ty(t) node and we are now 
searching for a variable for s to depend on: 
(48) 
? Ty(t), Scope(U < z), 
? 3y(DOM(y) A Scope(y <z)A Vr(Scope(y < r) -> Scope(z < r))), 0 
Ty(e3), ? Ty(e5-4) 
Fo(v) 
Ty(e), Indef(+), ? Sc(z), 
Fo(E, z, Man'z) 
Ty(cn), Ty(cn -> e) 
Fo(z, Man'z) Fo(AP. e, P) 
Ty(e) Ty(e -ý cn), 
Fo(z) Fo(Ax. x, Man'x ) 
? Ty(e -*( eS -, t)) 
Ty(e), Fo(T, s, Girl's) Ty(e-->(e-( eS -st)) 
Indef(-), ? Sc(s) Fo(Ax. Ay. At. See'xyt) 
? Ty(cn) Ty(cn > e), 
Fo(s, Girl's) Fo(AP. T, P) 
Ty(e), Ty(e > co), 
Fo(s) Fo(Ax. x, Girl'x) 
It can now be seen that the search initiated by the Scope Action for Non- 
indefinites rule will in fact yield no variable which was most recently introduced 
by a strong non-indefinite quantifier since the only other quantificational 
expression processed was the indefinite a man. Therefore according to the 
definition of DOM+ only the situation argument v can now be taken as having 
wider scope than s (as we said the variable contributed by the indefinite a man 
does not count for DOM+). By placing on the top of the tree the proposition 
Scope(v<s), the requirement ? Sc(s) will be satisfied and can be deleted. Now 
the tree looks as follows: 
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(49) ? Ty(t), Scope(v<s), Scope(U<z), 
? 3y(DOM(y) n Sc2pe(y < z) n dr(Scope(y < r) -* Scope(z < r))) 
Ty(e3), ? Ty(es-, t) 
Fo(v) 
Ty(e), Indef(+), ? Ty(e -. ( es - t)) 
Fo(c, z, Man'z), ? Sc(z) 
Ty(cn), Ty(cn -> e), Ty(e), Fo(T, s, Girl's), 0 Ty(e-*(e-, ( es -->t)) Fo(z, Man'z) Fo(AP. s, P) Indef(-), ? S&(s) Fo(Ax. Ay. At. See'xyt) 
Ty(e) Ty(e -> cn), Ty(cn) Ty(cn -* e), 
Fo(z) Fo(Ax. x, Man'x) Fo(s, Girl's) Fo(AP. r, P) 
Ty(e), Ty(e -> cn), 
Fo(s) Fo(Ax. x, Girl'x) 
Since there is no more linguistic input to be processed, the rules of Completion 
and Elimination apply as usual and complete the tree. Since there are no other 
quantificational terms to be parsed, a decision must now be made regarding the 
metavariable U which is the first member of the relation < involving the variable z 
contributed by the indefinite a man. Suppose that we decided to substitute U by 
v as it is indeed possible in principle given that this choice is a free pragmatic 
one. We now have to check whether the requirement ? 3y(DOM(y) A Scope(y < 
z) A Vr(Scope(y<r) -* Scope(z<r))) can be satisfied. First of all, we have to find 
a formula value that satisfies DOM which according to the definition in (37) 
repeated below means that it is either a variable inside an epsilon or tau term 
subtree or the situation argument: 
(50) Tn km DOM(a) a 
Tn km ? Ty(t) A[ (11"[(TY(e) A <Jo> <jc> Fo(a)] )v (<! c> Fo(a) )] 
Let's instantiate y in the requirement at the top node to the situation argument v 
which clearly satisfies DOM(v). The requirement also contains the conjunct 
Vr(Scope(y < r) -* Scope(z <r )) which with y instantiated to v now says that 
whatever variables were already outscoped by the situation v will now be also 
outscoped by the variable z: dr. Scope(v < r) -* Scope(z < r). The annotation 
already present on the ? Ty(t) node states that v outscopes the variable s: 
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Scope(v<s). Therefore if we choose to substitute the metavariable U by v then 
we will be obliged to also take the quantifier contributed by the indefinite a man 
as having wide scope with respect to the quantifier contributed by the phrase 
every girl. This is a possibility but it will not ensue in the intended interpretation 
here as what we wanted to achieve was that the choice of man should vary 
according to the choice of girl, i. e. we wanted the term r, z, Man'z to have narrow 
scope with respect to T, s, Girl's. For this reason the only option available to us is 
the substitution of the metavariable U by the variable s. Now the statement 
Scope(s < z) replaces the statement Scope(U<z) on the ? Ty(t) node and the 
requirement ? Sc(z) has been satisfied: 
(51) 
Ty(t), Scope(U<z), Scope(v<s), Scope(s<z) 
Fo( See' r, s, Girl's £z Man'z v ), 0 
Ty(es), Ty(e3-. f), Fo(At. See'T s_Girl's s z, Man'z t) 
Fo(v) 
Ty(e), Indef(+), ? Sc(z), 
Fo(E, z, Man'z) 
Ty(cn), Ty cn -> e), 
Fo(z, Man'z) Fo(AP. E, P) 
Ty(e) Ty(e -* cn), Fo(z) Fo(Ax. x, Man'x) 
Ty(e -( es --4)), Fo(Ay. At. See' r, s, Girl_s y t) 
Ty(e), Fo(T, s, Girl's) Ty(e-ý(e- ( es -. t)) 
Indef(-) Fo(Ax. Ay. At. See'xyt) 
Ty(cn) Ty(cn --> e), 
Fo(s, Girl's) Fo(AP. r, P) 
Ty(e), Ty(e > cn), 
Fo(s) Fo(Ax. x, Girl'x) 
The requirement ? 3y(DOM(y) A Scope(y<z) A Vr(Scope(y<r) -> Scope(z<r))) 
with y instantiated to s is satisfied because there is a variable, namely s, that is 
dominated by the ? Ty(t) node, it outscopes z and also satisfies trivially the 
requirement that all the variables that it outscopes are also outscoped by z41. 
Therefore we derive the result: Scope(v <s< z). 
41 Note that the relation < is transitive and irreflexive and therefore z<z is by definition not 
allowed. On the other hand the facts v<s and s<z imply that v<z and therefore v<s<z which 
is how we annotate the scope statement for brevity: Scope(v<s<z). 
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Since the parsing of the string has been completed it is now time to present 
how the quantifier evaluation rule by repeated application restructures the 
formula value at the top of the tree in such a way that the significance of the 
scope statement s<z will be incorporated explicitly in the formula annotation (for 
simplicity we will ignore the situation argument here). The computational rule 
named Q-Evaluation is responsible for performing the requisite actions42: 
(52) Q-Evaluation Rule: 
{ .. {Ty(t), ..., Scope(x1<... < xn), Fo(T[v xn ypn/xn]) ,... } 
} 
{... { Ty(t), ..., Scope( xc<... < xn-1), Fo( fn, xn wn(ýP))ý ... } } 
where for x occurring free in cp, the values ffnxnwn((p), for ve {e, T, Q} are defined by: 
(a) = tp[a/x] - cp[a/x] 
where a=Tx(ip-. (p) 
(b) fF X. w (w) = 4i[b/x] A (p[b/x] 
where b=cx(gjAT) 
(c) fQ. X. w ((P) = (4y[c/x]) ((Plc/x]) 
where c= vQx((gJ)((p)). 
The rule takes as its input the scope statement containing a (strictly) ordered 
sequence of variables, Scope(x1 <... < x ), and the formula at the type t node of 
the tree symbolised here as T. The formula contains epsilon and tau terms 
binding the variables appearing in the scope statement. The term inside the 
formula that binds the rightmost, variable x in the scope statement is indicated 
here as v x W n. The definition of the rule (above the line) indicates that all 
occurrences of this term are to be removed and replaced by the variable xn. The 
new formula constructed in this way, indicated as qp in the rule, will now be 
transformed by applying to it a function appropriate for the type of operator 
binding the variable. The transformation consists in introducing connectives, A, 
-+, etc. appropriate to the quantificational force implicit in the term and 
replacement of the free variable x inside cp by complex terms abbreviated as a, 
b, c etc.. These complex terms record in their structure all the information that 
42 We differ here from both Kempson et al. (2001) and Cann et. al. (2005) in that we present the 
Q- Evaluation Rule as an update of tree descriptions. The rule will be modified in Chapter 4 to 
take into account the world and situation argument. 
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makes explicit the scope relations among them. The rule applies repeatedly, 
each time focusing on the rightmost variable in the sequence until all variables in 
the scope statement have been consumed and the initial formula has been 
transformed. 
Let's now apply this rule to the formula derived at the root of the tree in (51) 
shown completed below (we assume that the situation variable v remains free in 
the formula'since it is not bound inside any term, for more extensive discussion 
and modifications see Chapters 4,8)43: 
(53) 




Fo(e, z, Man'z) 
Ty(cn), Ty(cn -> e), 
Fo(z, Man'z) Fo(AP. E, P) 
Ty(e) Ty(e -> cn), 
Fo(z) Fo(Ax. x, Man'x ) 
Ty(es 4), Fo(Xt. See'rts 
_Girl: s. E, z 
Agy)'z t) 
Ty(e -+( es -t)), Fo(Ay. At. See' r, s, Gi y§ y . 
t. ) 
Ty(e), Indef(-), Ty(e, (e-( eS -. t)) 
Fo(i, s, Girl's) Fo(Ax. Ay. At. See'xyt) 
? Ty(cn) Ty(cn -> e), 
Fo(s, Girl's) Fo(AP. r, P) 
Ty(e), Ty(e -- ý co), 
Fo(s) Fo(Ax. x, Girl'x) 
The formula that we wish to apply the Q-evaluation rule on is (disregarding 
the situation argument): See' (E, z, Man')(T, s, Girl's); This will now be transformed 
to match the formula specification q in the rule. The scope statement that will 
guide the transformation is: Scope(s < z). Since the variable z has narrow scope 
with respect to s, i. e. is shown as the rightmost element in the sequence, 
according to the rule, we must start with the epsilon term in which it is bound. So 
firstly we replace all the occurrences of the term (E, z, Man'z) with its variable z 
which now occurs free in the formula. This gives us the following formula (all 
changes on the formula will be highlighted with shading from now on): 
(54) See'(z)(i, s, Girl's). Scope(s < z) 
43 Again we employ dotted underlining instead of brackets for readability purposes. 
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This formula now matches rp in the Q-evaluation rule (52) above. We now apply 
to this formula the function which is appropriate for an epsilon term (f,, ,, ). In the 
present case, yi will be the restrictor of the epsilon term, i. e., Manz. According 
to the rule in (52), we are required to apply f£, z, Man'z to (p, i. e., in our case, See' z 
rl_. s, Girl's, which gives us: ff, z, Man'z (See' z r= s, Girl's ). The result of this 
operation is as follows: 
(55) (Man'b) A (See' b T, s, Girl's_) Scope(s < z) 
where b=E, z, (Man'z A See' z. TLs, Girl. s ) 
The symbol b in the formula is just an abbreviation of the epsilon term that 
records the entire formula in its restrictor. The same formula can also be 
presented without the abbreviatory name as follows: 
(56) 
Man' E, z, Man. z"n, See'_ýz)(TtsýGirl'ý n 
See' £z Manz n See' (z)(r s Girl's) rs Girl's 
We will only use formulas like the one in (55) above containing the abbreviatory 
names but it must be born in mind, especially when performing substitutions, that 
these names really stand for the more complicated representations. 
The formula in (55) or (56) is what we get after we've dealt with one of the 
variables in the scope statement, the one associated with the epsilon term. Now 
since we still have one more variable remaining in the scope statement, namely 
the variable s, we have to apply the Q-Evaluation rule once more. The input to 
this rule is the formula in (56) above. Following the instructions in the rule we first 
replace all occurrences of the term r, s, Girl's inside the formula in (56) with its 
variable s. Note that we must also replace the r-term occurring inside the name b 
with the variable s. The new name that results from this replacement now takes 
the updated name, bs, since it contains a free occurrence of s: 
(57) Man'bs A See'b, s Scope(s) 
where bg = c, z, (Man'z A See' 4 s) 
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Now we can take the formula in (57) as our qp in applying the Q-Evaluation Rule 
(52). To this formula we have to apply the function appropriate for dealing with 
tau-terms: f, ,,, ,,. In our case we will have as the value for qi, the restrictor of the 
original T-term, therefore: fr, s, Gid . The result of applying this function to (57) gives 
us a new formula where the connective -º has been inserted and a new name, 
a, has replaced all previous occurrences of s (even inside the term bs): 
(58) Girl' a --> [ Man'ba A See'ba, a] 
where ba = c, z, (Man'z A See'z, a) 
where a=T, S, (Girl's - [Man'bs A See' b5 s ]) 
where bs = E, z, (Man'z A See' g s) 
The name a stands for the reconstruction of the original T-term. Additionally by 
substituting a for all occurrences of s, another name, ba, has also been derived 
from bs which now stands for the original c-term and which shows explicitly its 
dependency on the term a by bearing it as a subscript. In DS this is the way that 
scope dependencies are shown on the final product of the parsing: the term with 
wider scope occurs as a sub-term inside the term which depends on it. Now let's 
briefly see how the transformation of the formula would have looked like if the 
scope relations between the two terms had been the other way round. The 
following would be the appropriate step-by-step reconstruction: 
(59) See' (e, z, Man'z)(T, s, Girl's) Scope(z <s) 
(60) See' (E, z, Man'z)(s) Scope(z) 
(61) Girl'a -+ See' (e, z, Man'z)(a) 
where a=T, S, ( Girl's -. See' £z Manz s) Scope(z) 
(62) Girl'a, -" See' z, aZ where aZ= r, s, (Girl's --> See' gs) 
(63) Man'b A [Girl'ab-" See' b, ab ] where ab = T, S, (Girl's --> See' b s) 
where b=E, z, (Man'z A [Girl'az --+ See'z, aZ ]) 
where aZ = r, s, (Girl's -+ See' z s) 
Here, because it is assumed that the term c, z, Man'z has wider scope, namely 
Scope(z < s), the name b that ensues after the transformation of the formula 
occurs as a sub-term inside the name a which has been derived by the narrower 
scoping term r, s, Girl's. 
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We have now concluded the presentation of how the main DS processing 
mechanisms for constructing trees operate. In addition we have just seen how 
quantification is treated in a dynamic way. In the next chapter we will see how 
the framework is extended in order to deal with the processing of strings 
requiring as representations trees built in tandem. 
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CHAPTER 4 
LINK STRUCTURES IN DS 
1. Context in processing 
A central motivation for the development of DS is the formal modelling 
of the self-evident fact that sequences of words are crucially processed inside 
the surrounding linguistic and extra-linguistic context. As a result, a basic 
assumption underlying the DS design is that extraction of information from a 
string of words can only be achieved through the interaction of the 
architecture constitutive of the parser and the context of processing. As we 
have seen already, the DS toolkit provides the means for parsing strings 
which provide minimal predicate-argument structures. Here the interaction 
with context consists in the fact that these structures can only be built up in 
conjunction with extra-grammatical processes (pragmatic actions) which in 
due course resolve underspecified information provided by the parser. The 
underspecification of information that we have seen is (a) underspecifed 
content, e. g., the input that anaphoric expressions like pronouns provide, and, 
(b) underspecified structural information seen, e. g., in the intermediate tree 
representations that result from the processing of left-dislocated elements. 
The resolution of both these types of underspecification is treated in DS as 
"grammaticised44" in that the weak input provided by parsing the string comes 
with requirements for its obligatory enrichment45: If parsing of a string of 
words results in the construction of an unfixed node, the string will be 
ungrammatical/unsuccessful unless the unfixed node finds a proper place in 
the semantic tree. Similarly an anaphoric expression introduces a 
requirement that a replacement must be found at some point for the 
metavariable that it contributes in the representation; therefore, according to 
44 The term "grammaticized" comes from von Fintel (1994) although there it is used under 
distinct syntactic assumptions. It is also intentionally used here to approximate the notion of 
"grammaticalisation" in the philological and functional/typological literature (see e. g. Meillet 
1912, Hopper & Traugott 1993). 
45 This contrasts with other general forms of enrichment which cannot be assumed to be 
encoded as part of the grammar, e. g. ad hoc concept construction (see Carston 1998,2002). 
134 
DS, a string that is parsed in a context that provides no terms for the 
replacement of the metavariables in its semantic representation will also be 
declared ungrammatical by the formalism representing the grammar since the 
parsing process will abort (unless repair strategies can be invoked to modify 
the context). 
Thus the DS design provides a rule-governed interface with the extant 
context of processing. However, under the Relevance theoretic assumptions 
espoused by DS, the context appropriate for recovering an interpretation can 
also be constructed on the fly. Under the assumption that there is an infinite 
number of interpretations that can be assigned to a linguistic string, i. e. there 
is inherent underspecification of content by linguistic elements, the role of an 
appropriate context supporting processing is maximised. Moreover, given that 
the speaker is responsible for providing the hearer with the best chance for 
recovering the intended meaning of his/her utterance, a processing 
framework must provide formal acknowledgement of the fact that sometimes 
the speaker will explicitly make salient information which is particularly 
relevant for the recovery of the intended interpretation of the main assertion46 
and will attempt to make explicit how pieces of information are correlated with 
each other. The inevitability of this process of context construction and 
interaction necessitates the availability of hard-wired mechanisms which allow 
the speaker to encode the specific correlation of information presented. 
These mechanisms must be captured by a grammar formalism. The 
discussion that follows concerns how DS models this process. 
46 Of course assertion is only one of the message types that can be encoded through the use 
of a main clause; we limit ourselves to those for simplicity. And it is the case that e. g. the 
content of secondary structures, e. g. a relative clause, does not necessarily fall under the 
scope of the main speech act indicator: 
(i) Is it the case that John, who you dislike, left? 
(ii) It is not the case that John, who you dislike, left. 
This is consistent with the DS assumption that the information provided by such clauses is 
not necessarily presented by the speaker as having the same status as the information in the 
main clause. Here the content of the relative is taken as background, i. e., context- 
constructing material (see below). 
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2. Juxtaposition and Subordination 
One form of context-dependency in DS is modelled as relying on the set 
of logical forms/trees constructed by the processing of linguistic and non- 
linguistic input (see Cann et at. 2005 Ch. 9). This set minimally includes the 
trees derived by processing the immediately previous and current discourse. 
This ordered set is defined by Cann et al. (2005) as follows: 
(1) the sequence of trees < T1, ..., Tn, T> where each of T, for 1 <_ i <_ n is an arbitrary 
complete tree and T is some partial tree under construction 
We are going to call this set of trees the Discourse Context in order to 
distinguish it from two other concepts of context defined by DS. This 
sequence of the recently processed logical forms models the background on 
which anaphoric resolution and reasoning processes rely. In that respect, if a 
speaker needs to provide information that is not already included in this set 
then linguistic (or other) input can be presented to the hearer to explicitly 
introduce the relevant information. Following such an introduction to the 
Discourse Context, the presentation of subsequent input can exploit the 
context that has been so created by including underspecified expressions 
which rely on the accessibility of the just introduced information for their 
resolution. As regards the structuring of discourse, this feeding process can 
appear in the form of a sequence of clauses/minimal predicate-argument 
structures with anaphoric connections between them: 
(2) The Chinese are industrious. They outcompete Europe now. 
(3) The Chinese outcompete the Japanese. They are industrious 
There is no necessity for the grammar to provide encoded means for 
processing and integrating such sequences as explicitly correlated to each 
other. According to the general cognitive and communicative principles 
postulated by pragmatic theories, the mere fact that the clauses in such a 
sequence are being presented as juxtaposed by the speaker will lead a 
hearer to recover some intended inferential connection between them (cf. 
Asher & Lascarides 2003). However, beyond mere juxtaposition, all 
languages seem to make available encoded means of presenting 
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complementary information in a form that makes explicit their intended 
parallel processing. In that respect the fact that two clauses must be 
processed as a single inferential unit is specifically encoded by formal means. 
The sentences below present the same information as (2)-(3) above with the 
difference that instead of employing radically underspecified anaphoric 
means, e. g. the pronoun they, in order to relate the information in the two 
clauses,, here, separate predications are presented as unambiguously linked 
with an argument in the main clause. This is achieved by employing an 
attributive adjective in (4) and a relative clause in (5)-(8): 
(4) The industrious Chinese outcompete Europe now. 
(5) The Chinese, who outcompete Europe now, are industrious. 
(6) The Chinese, who are industrious, outcompete Europe now. 
(7) The Chinese, who are industrious, outcompete the Japanese. 
(8) The Chinese outcompete the Japanese, who are industrious. 
As we have seen, according to DS assumptions, a pronoun introduces a 
metavariable in the semantic representation and a search of the context must 
be initiated in order to find a replacement for it. For instance, the metavariable 
introduced by the pronoun they in (3) above can either be substituted by the 
term representing the content of the phrase the Chinese or the term 
representing the Japanese (assuming that there are no other salient entities 
in the context). In that respect, according to Relevance Theory and DS 
assumptions, the processing of the string in (3) is only appropriate in a 
context where the speaker believes that it is relatively unequivocal whether 
he/she is referring either to the Chinese or to the Japanese as industrious; 
otherwise the speaker producing such an utterance will not be conforming to 
the general principles that govern communication since the hearer will be 
unable to achieve the intended interpretation. On the other hand, the 
unambiguous linking of the separate predications in (4)-(8) above with a 
particular argument in the main clause can be seen as a more versatile 
structure. This is because such structures can be used in any context, 
regardless of the relative salience of the attribution of "industriousness" to 
either the Chinese or the Japanese. Since these structures leave no 
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alternatives for the hearer but the obligatory attribution of a property to a 
designated term in the ensuing semantic representation, their use in 
discourse has a twofold facilitating role: (a) they provide an unambiguous 
structure which reduces the effort required to process the utterance 
contrasting in that respect with mere juxtaposition and (b) they construct 
explicitly the appropriate minimal context in which the main assertion is 
intended to be processed (for example, in (6) the claim that the Chinese 
outcompete Europe now is intended to be relevant for the hearer in the 
context of the fact that the Chinese are industrious); the latter property is 
shared to a certain degree with juxtaposed clauses. Viewed from the DS time- 
linear perspective taken here, as we saw earlier, the Discourse Context can 
take care of the cases that involve simple sequences of clauses in that such 
sequences do not necessarily involve intentional or rule-governed correlation 
of information (for instance, the Discourse Context will contain information 
that only incidentally happens to be present in the discourse environment and 
has not been specifically introduced by the discourse participants). However, 
in view of the structures in (5)-(8), it is also essential that there is a grammar- 
internal mechanism, beyond the general context structuring processes, that 
allows for a rule-governed update of the parsing environment that a speaker 
might want to introduce. This is because (a) there seem to be precise 
linguistic means of signalling these inferential connections between separate 
predications, e. g. relative pronouns like who, and, (b) from a dynamic 
perspective, the processing of each predication seems to be interleaved with 
the processing of the other. 
In deciding to model such a mechanism the question that now arises for 
the formalism is whether it can be assumed that there is a unified concept of 
"grammaticised" context update that underlies the different apparent forms 
that such context introduction assumes inside the grammar of a single 
language and cross-linguistically (e. g. modification by adjectives or relative 
clauses, restrictive relatives, appositive relatives, correlatives etc. ). Or 
whether there are several distinct modes of syntactic/semantic combination 
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as argued in "constructional" frameworks (see e. g. Fillmore & Kay 1996, 
Ginzburg & Sag 2000). We are going to see that DS takes the first approach 
in that a single processing device allows for the update of information that all 
such structures provide. It consists in allowing the building of separate 
propositional trees in parallel: the processing of a single propositional 
structure can be interrupted by means of the input provided by specialised 
linguistic devices and a new structure can be initiated; copying of information 
from one structure to the other will also be possible. This grammatical 
mechanism which allows the parallel processing of distinct predications 
provides a formal underpinning for the notion of a single inferential unit, a set 
of propositions that is intended to be relevant to the hearer as whole (cf. 
Carston 2002: 242-250). Such a unit is modelled in DS as the global tree, a 
tree encompassing (potentially infinite) minimal predicate-argument tree 
structures (minimal predicate-argument structure representations constitute a 
domain termed the local tree in DS). The global tree is going to be utilised 
later in this thesis in providing an explication of the notion of scope domains, 
semantic subordination and phenomena that in other standard frameworks 
are analysed in terms of bound variable anaphora. From a theoretical point of 
view, it can be seen here that, in extending the notion of context dependent 
processing into the grammar formalism, the DS framework seems to integrate 
both aspects of more traditional grammatical frameworks like Minimalism (see 
e. g. Chomsky 1999) and discourse based approaches like various versions of 
DRT (Kamp & Reyle 1993, Asher 1993). It is a crucial assumption of the 
framework that such a separation of remit is not necessary (at least for the 
phenomena that involve structural and monotonic processes) since many of 
the phenomena that pertain to this distinction can be treated in a unified way. 
We are going to see now how and why this point of view offers a solution to 
many issues traditionally arising at the syntax/semantics interface as well as 
in the processing of discourse. 
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3. LINK structures 
Beyond the mere sequential juxtaposition of clauses in a discourse the 
concept of a "grammaticised" linking between separate predications seems to 
be an option available in the grammars of all languages. But the specific 
formal means that achieves the encoding of such linking varies. In some 
languages there is a general subordinating marker used to loosely encode 
some type of correlation between two clauses. In the examples below from 
Warlpiri the two clauses in each sentence could be taken as sequentially 
juxtaposed but for the fact that the subordinating conjunction kutja appears in 
one of them: 
(9) Warlpiri, from Hale (1976: 78) 
yankiri: li kutja-lpa gapa qa nu, gatjulu: lu na pantu nu 
emu-ERG SUBORD-PAST water drink-PAST, I-ERG-AUX spear-PAST 
The emu which was drinking water/While the emu was drinking water, I speared it. 
(10) Warlpiri, (ibid) 
gatjulu: Iu-na yankiri pantu-nu, kufja-lpa gapa qa-nu 
I-ERG-AUX emu spear-PAST, SUBORD-PASt water drink-PAST 
I speared the emu which /while it was drinking water. 
These might be interpreted as the equivalent of a relative clause and a main 
clause in English, in which case there is an obligatory overt anaphoric 
connection between the arguments of the two verbs; on the other hand, the 
clause including the conjunction kutja can be interpreted as an adverbial 
modifier of the other clause. The underspecification of interpretation for such 
structures, which relies on context and other linguistic means like tense for 
disambiguation, shows that although at minimum there is a necessary 
correlation of the information in the two clauses (see Keenan 1985), there is 
no need for positing distinct syntactic underlying structures as a means of 
achieving this correlation in each particular instance. Instead, the context- 
dependent underspecification of this type of correlation can be captured by a 
general device, available to all languages, which allows the processing of two 
separate predicate-argument structures in parallel. In DS this general device 
is modelled by employing the concept of a new relation between two separate 
trees called LINK. The LINK relation between two tree-nodes will be shown 
diagrammatically by means of an arrow connecting the node where the LINK 
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relation originates and another tree which becomes correlated to it. We will 
call the node from where the LINK relation originates the LINK mother (Tn(n) 
below) whereas the node where the LINK relation terminates will be called the 




To allow the construction and processing of such correlated trees the 
language-particular DS toolbox includes specific actions that introduce the 
LINK relation and move the pointer and information from one linked node to 
another. The onus for introducing such relations can be assumed by general 
Computational Rules or be born by specialised lexical items or even be 
shared among those grammatical devices. The subordinator kutja in Warlpiri 
above could be taken to impose a requirement that the two trees to be 
constructed out of the two clauses are connected by means of the LINK 
relation. This requirement will only be satisfied if a general Computational 
Rule exists which can establish this relation between nodes of the two trees. 
The anaphoric/rhetorical connections perceived as necessarily holding 
between the two clauses can be taken as a result of the common requirement 
accompanying LINK constructions that there is sharing of information 
between the two trees. Since the establishment of the LINK relation does not 
seem to unambiguously indicate which piece of information should be copied, 
such structures can be analysed as involving either copying of a term from 
the individual domain (relative) or from the temporal/modal domain (adverbial 
clause) (see e. g. Bittner 2001 for an analysis in these terms). 
Although the LINK connection between two logical forms may have no 
unambiguously expressed shared term as in Waripiri above, in other 
languages two clauses can be juxtaposed through the use of specialised 
anaphoric devices which explicitly indicate which piece of information should 
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be copied from one tree to the other. For example, relatives and correlatives 
in Hindi are introduced with specialised pronouns Jo below) whereas a 
demonstrative pronoun (vo) in the main clause is obligatorily construed as 
correferential with it: 
(12) [Jo larkii karii hail vo lambii hai 
[who girl standing is] that tall is 
The girl who is standing is tall 
(13) Vo larkii lambii hai Do kharii hail 
that girl tall is [who standing is] 
The girl who is standing is tall 
Hindi, from Srivastav (1991) 
In these cases the relative pronoun jo can be taken to impose the restriction 
that there must be a LINK relation between the current tree and another one, 
similarly to the Warlpiri conjunction kutja. But, being a pronoun, jo also 
contributes a term in the tree constructed out of the correlative. The fact that 
there must be an anaphoric connection between the two clauses can be 
encoded in the grammar if we analyse pronouns like jo as indicating that 
there must be a copy of the term they contribute in each of the two trees. This 
shared term is then obligatorily provided by assigning the requisite 
interpretation to the demonstrative vo in the second clause: 
(14) Tn(n) Tn m) 
Fo(a) Fo(a) 
The Warlpiri and Hindi constructions seen above involve two 
sequentially juxtaposed clauses (correlatives) with specialised lexical items 
indicating their connection. It can also be seen that such correlatives show 
variable linear orders like if-clauses and other adverbial clauses in English. 
Moreover, adverbial clauses in many languages employ similar formal 
devices as nominal correlative clauses, a fact which strengthens the claim 
that, cross-linguistically, there is a single means of integration instead of 
various unrelated constructions: 
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(15) [ dzo manus itha sikawto] to madzha bhau ahe Marathi (Pandharipande 1997, 
who man here teach that mine brother is cited in Bhatt & Pancheva 2001) 
the man who teaches here is my brother 
(16) [ dzithe sawa Ii hoti] , tithe Ram basla Marathi (Andrews 1985) 
where shade was there Ram sat-down 
'Where there was shade Ram sat down. ' 
(17) [ dzarto itha yel], tar mi tya-la goli marin. 
if he here comes then I him bullet kill-will 
If he comes here, then I'll kill him. ' 
Across languages there are also constructions where the two clauses 
show more structural integration than simple linear juxtaposition. For 
example, the Hindi correlatives seen above in (12)-(13) have clause-internal 
counterparts: 
(18) Vo larkii [jo kharii hai] lambii hai Hindi, from Srivastav (1991) 
that girl [who standing is] tall is 
The girl who is standing is tall 
This construction is the parallel of English relatives where the processing of 
the relative can be interleaved with the processing of the main clause: 
(19) The Chinese, who are industrious, outcompete Europe now. 
Viewed from a time-linear perspective it seems that there are clear 
processing reasons that explain why relative clauses that are adjacent to the 
head noun and interrupt the processing of the main clause should evolve in 
natural languages. First of all there is the minimisation of ambiguity that 
results from the elimination of free context search mentioned above in relation 
to (4)-(8). Secondly, the existence of two strategies for presenting the same 
truth-conditional content, either by interrupting the processing of the main 
clause or by using two separate clauses, can be exploited by the speaker for 
additional inferential and truth-conditional effects. For example, the effect of 
restrictive and non-restrictive interpretations can be equally achieved by 
juxtaposition as well as the use of a relative; however, presentation by use of 
a relative structures the information it as the background for the processing of 
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the information in the main assertion (this is why sometimes it is claimed that 
relatives present presupposed information47): 
Restrictive interpretations: 
(20) Some Europeans are industrious. Those will survive the competition. 
(21) The Europeans that are industrious will survive the competition. 
Non-restrictive: 
(22) The Chinese outcompete the Japanese. They are industrious. 
(23) The Chinese outcompete the Japanese. The Chinese are industrious. 
(24) The Chinese, who are industrious, outcompete the Japanese 
In this respect it is notable that English also maintains the correlative strategy 
seen above in Hindi in the so-called extraposed relative construction (see 
Kempson 2003): 
(25) A friend visited John yesterday who I haven't seen for years. 
In these structures the ambiguity as to the attachment of the relative's content 
is maintained and there are inferential effects associated with the choice of 
such a positioning of the relative (as well as restrictions as to the context that 
will be selected for its processing). Moreover, adverbial clauses in English, 
although they can be integrated, appear often in the correlative construction 
(see Geis 1985, Bhatt & Pancheva 2001 and Chapter 6): 
(26) If John comes then Mary will leave 
(27) When John comes then Mary will leave 
The case of embedded relatives is also interesting in terms of the 
function of anaphora in that the relative is processed in the context created by 
the processing of (part of) the main clause while, at the same time, the 
47 This is not a justified claim because relatives can certainly introduce new information in the 
discourse e. g. 
(i) A: What did Mary do? 
B: Mary cursed John, who then left 
Informational downgrading of the content presented by the relative seems to be a more 
accurate description of what is often achieved by the use of a relative as opposed to a main 
clause. See also Kadmon (2001: 13), Kempson (2003), Arnold (2005). 
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relative itself provides the immediate context for the processing of the rest of 
the main clause. This can be seen in the potential for anaphoric relations. A 
term introduced inside the main clause can provide a copy for the substitution 
of a metavariable contributed by a pronominal inside the relative; therefore, in 
that respect, the main clause contributes the context in which the relative is 
processed (besides the grammaticised correlation of the head with the 
relative pronoun): 
(28) A woman; [ who I saw leaving her, house ] has been taken to hospital 
On the other hand, the relative can introduce terms to be used as 
replacements for the metavariables contributed by pronominals in the main 
clause: 
(29) The man [ who a friend of mine; likes ] told her, to shut up. 
And in fact both types of anaphoric connection can exist at the same time: 
(30) A woman; who a friend of minek saw kicking her, car decided to sue himk. 
From a discourse point of view it is therefore essential that such structures 
are constructed in parallel following the time-linear introduction of information 
so that at each stage in the parse there is a record of what terms become 
available. 
In the next section we will provide the precise mechanism for the 
processing of nominal relative clauses in English. The point of the previous 
discussion though is that the rules employed for the processing of such 
structures in English must be seen as specialised variants of general rules 
available in all languages and underlying many natural language 
constructions. 
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3. a. Processing of Relative Clauses in DS 
Relative clauses in English occur adjacent to the nominal to which they 
are related (except in cases of extraposition). The noun to which the relative 
is attached is called in the traditional and syntactic literature the head of the 
relative (John below): 
(31)John, who I like, left 
Characteristically, the relative clause and the head noun must share some 
semantic content. Since the element inside the relative that is construed as 
providing the shared content has an independent syntactic role there, truth- 
conditionally, there are two separate propositions constructed by the parsing 
of such constructions. In the DS semantic representation this is modelled by 
the construction of two trees none of whose nodes are related by a 
dominance relation. Instead, a distinct type of tree-relation, the LINK relation, 
is defined between two nodes of the two independent trees. In terms of the 
tree description language LOFT a new operator <L> is introduced to express 
this relation. From the LINK mother's perspective below, the position of the 
LINK daughter can be described as <L>Tn(m), which can be read as "it is 
possible to take one step across the LINK relation and find Tn(m)". From the 
perspective of the LINK daughter Tn(m) we can talk about the LINK mother 
by employing the inverse LINK modality <L-s >: <L-1 > Tn(n) below means "it is 





In the particular case of nominal relatives in English the LINK connection is 
established between a type e node and a type f one: 
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(33) Tn(n), ? Ty(t) 
Ty(e), Fo(a) ... 
L<1 >Tn(n), Ty(t) 
Fo(a) 
In terms of the dynamics of such structures, the fact that the 
construction of a representation for the content of the main clause is 
interrupted by the need to process the relative requires the means for 
initiating a new propositional structure during the processing of another. 
Therefore a transition rule has to be defined that initiates the new proposition 
and moves the pointer there. Moreover, the need for a shared formula value 
between the two trees has to be catered for. We will present the rules and 
representations appropriate for the parsing of such structures through the 
presentation of the parsing of two sentences, one containing a restrictive and 
the other a non-restrictive relative. We start with Non-Restrictives as the 
simpler case. 
3. a. 1. Parsing of non-restrictive relatives 
We will go through the parsing steps leading to an interpretation for the 
following sentence containing a non-restrictive relative: 
(34) John, who cried, left 
We start with the Axiom, the minimal tree consisting of just a root node with a 
requirement for the derivation of a Formula value of type t. 
(35) Tn(a), ? Ty(t), 0 
As usual the rules of Introduction and Prediction will construct the subject and 
predicate nodes and parsing of the lexical item John will lead to the following 
representation (we will give the address of the subject node as simply Tn(n) 
since, for the purposes of the illustration here, it does not matter what the 
exact specification of the node address is; we omit the other addresses for 
simplicity): 
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(36) ? Ty(t) 
Tn(n), Ty(e), Fo(John'), 0 ? Ty(e --t) 
At this point in the parsing there is the option of invoking a new rule called the 
rule of Link Adjunction which will allow the processing of the relative clause 
that is to follow: 
(37) Link Adjunction 
{... { Tn(X), Fo(a), Ty(e) ... 0) ... } 
{... {Tn(X), Fo(a), Ty(e) }, {<L'>Tn(X),? Ty(t), ? 1* Fo(a), 0) ... 1 
This rule applies if the pointer is at a node that matches the node description 
given above the line: because of the schematic letters X and a employed in 
the rule, any address (Tn(X)) and any completed formula value (Fo(a)) can be 
matched as long as the node is of type e. The effect that application of this 
rule has is given below the line: a new tree is initiated by building a root node 
bearing a requirement for a type t formula; a LINK connection is constructed 
between the "head" type e node (the LINK mother) and the ? Ty(t) node (the 
LINK daughter); the pointer is moved to the newly constructed ? Ty(t) node; a 
requirement is placed on this node that it has to dominate a node which bears 
a copy of the formula value decorating the LINK mother (? f Fo(a)). This is 
how the tree above would look like after the Link Adjunction rule has applied 
(the schematic Tn(X) in the LINK Adjunction Rule has matched the value 
Tn(n) in the tree and Fo(a) has matched the value Fo(John): 
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(38) ? T(t 
Tn(n), Ty(e), Fo(John) ? Ty(e, t) 
<L-1 >Tn(n), ? Ty(t), ? 1* Fo(John), 0 
The newly initiated propositional tree is an ordinary tree in every respect 
except the requirement for dominating a copy of the formula decorating the 
LINK mother. As all the usual rules of processing apply to this tree, the 
description at the LINK daughter node matches the input specification for the 
rule of *Adjunction (see Ch. 2, repeated below); therefore the actions specified 
in this rule can apply to the tree in (38): 
(39) * Adjunction Rule 
{ ... { {Tn(a),... ? Ty(t), 0} }... } 
{... { {Tn(a).... ? Ty(t)}, {<T,. >Tn(a),..., ? 3x. Tn(x), ? Ty(e), 0)) ,... 
} 
Applying this rule will have the effect of introducing an unfixed node bearing 
requirements for its type to be of Ty(e) and for a fixed position on the tree 
(? Bx. Tn(x)): 
(40) ? Ty 
Tn(n), Ty(e), Fo(John') ? Ty(e -it) 
1'1: ý 
<L' >Tn(n), ? Ty(t), ?f Fo(John') 
<T, ><L-'> Tn(n), ? Ty(e), ? 3x. Tn(x), 0 
Now with the pointer at the unfixed node the relative pronoun who must be 
processed. Relative pronouns in English are taken in DS as specialised 
lexical items whose main function is to place a copy of the formula occupying 
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the LINK mother node at an unfixed node where the pointer currently resides. 
Combined with the LINK Adjunction rule this satisfies the need for a term 
shared between the relative and the main structure. The lexical entry 
associated with processing the relative pronoun who in English is as follows: 
(41) who,, r 
IF ? Ty(e), ? 3x. Fo(x), <T. ><L-'>Fo(x) 
THEN put( Fo(x), Ty(e), [1] 1) 
ELSE abort 
The rule in (41) first checks if the pointer is at an unfixed node (? 3x. Fo(x)) 
with a requirement ? Ty(e). Moreover that unfixed node must be located 
beneath a LINK daughter node. The LINK mother's Formula value can now 
be captured by use of the bold variable x inside the Fo value. Whatever 
Formula value is found at the LINK mother node instantiates x in the rule and 
will now be copied at the node where the pointer is (put(Fo(x)). Additional 
decorations indicating that this is a node of type e and a terminal node Q]1) 
are also placed there. Here is the tree constructed after the processing of the 
relative pronoun who: 
(42) ? Ty(t) 
Tn(n), Ty(e), Fo(John') ? Ty(e -t) 
<L-' >Tn(n), ? Ty(t), ? J*Fo(John') 
<i*><L1>Tn(n), Ty(e), Fo(John) 
The fact that the copy of the formula at the LINK mother node is introduced at 
an unfixed node inside the LINKed tree makes it possible to process 
structures where the shared term can be as deeply embedded in the relative 
as required. In our current example in (34) the shared term plays the role of 
the subject in the relative but it is equally possible for the term to be at any 
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embedded position as long as this position can be characterised as 
dominated by the LINK daughter: 
(43) John, [who Mary said that Bill dislikes _a 
lot) left yesterday. 
What is excluded, exactly because of the nature of unfixed nodes, is the 
shared term appearing inside another relative clause: 
(44) *John, [ who Mary saw a man [ who liked _]], 
left. 
This is because processing of the second relative will ensue in a new L1NKed 
tree. But the requirement for the unfixed node to merge at a position 
dominated by the first LINK daughter (<t*><L-1>Tn(n)) does not allow for 
merging inside another LINKed tree. By definition there are no dominance 
relations between the nodes of two LINKed trees (in that respect a LINK 
mother is not a mother and a LINK daughter is not a daughter in the 
dominance sense). The schematic tree below shows what is disallowed in 
that particular case: 




....................... _ ........................................ .. ..................... <r, ><L-'>Tn(n), Fo(John), ? 3x. Tn(x) Fo(Mary') 
Fo("a man") Fo("saw") 
L 
? TY(t) 
? Ty(e) Fo("liked") 
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It can be seen from the above that the requirement for the unfixed node 
bearing the copied term John'to merge at some dominated position will never 
be satisfied in (44) and the structure will be declared ungrammatical. 48 This is 
how the strong island property of relatives and other similar structures is 
captured in DS. 
Going back to our example in (42), with the type and formula 
requirements on the unfixed node now satisfied the rule of Completion (see 
Ch. 2: (44)) can move the pointer at the ? Ty(t) node. The presence of the 
decoration Fo(John) at the unfixed node now satisfies the requirement ?J 
Fo(John). Parsing of the linked tree can now proceed in the usual way. 
Introduction and Prediction (see Ch. 2: (39)-(40)) will build the subject and 
predicate nodes and the unfixed node will come to hang below the subject 
node (the Normal Form Constraint, see Ch. 2: 5. a. 9): 
(46) ?T (t) 
Tn(n), Ty(e), Fo(John') ? Ty(e --. t) 
<L1 >Tn(n), ? Ty(t), . 2f-Fo(John) 
<To><L'>Tn(n), ? Ty(e), 0 ? Ty(e -4) 
<T><L-'>Tn(n), Ty(e), Fo(John') 
At this point the unfixed node can merge with the subject node providing an 
appropriate address for itself and a Formula and Type value for the subject 
node: 
48 In addition to <L>, the modality <D> and its inverse <U> are interpreted across both 
dominance and LINK relations. Those modalities would allow merging inside LINK structures. 
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(47) ?T (t) 
Tn(n), Ty(e), Fo(John') ? Ty(o -t) 
L 
<L1 >Tn(n),? Ty(t) 
<To><L' >Tn(n), Ty(e), Fo(John'), ? Ty(e), 0 ? Ty(e ->t) 
Parsing of the verb cries will now decorate the predicate node and the tree 
can be completed as usual deriving a formula value of type t at its root, the 
LINK daughter node: 
(48) ? Ty(t) 
Tn(n), Ty(e), Fo(John') ? Ty(e --. t) 
<L-'>Tn(n), Ty(t), Fo(Cry'John'), 0 
Ty(e), Fo(John') Ty(e -->t), Fo(, \x. Cry'x) 
By means of the rule of Completion the pointer now moves from the LINK 
daughter to the LINK mother. After parsing of the verb left and completion of 
the main tree the semantic representation for the string in (34) will look as 
follows: 
(49) Ty(t), Fo(Leave'John'), 0 
Tn(n), Ty(e), Fo(John) Ty(e -*t), Fo(Ax. Leave'x) 
L 
<L-' >Tn(n), Ty(t), Fo(Cry'John) 
Ty(e), Fo(John') Ty(e --*t), Fo(Ax. Cryx) 
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The fact that the two propositions were presented as a single unit by the 
speaker can now be taken into account by integrating the content of the 
relative into the content of the main clause (this is the sense in which the 
relative is subordinated to the main clause, the content of the main clause 
incorporates the content of the relative not the other way round). The 
following rule takes two propositional trees connected by means of the LINK 
relation and transfers the content of one to the root node of the other. The 
combined content of the two trees appears as a conjunction of the two 
propositions: 
(50) Link Evaluation I (non-restrictives)49 
{... { Tn(n), Fo(a), Ty(t) ... 0) ... {<L-'>MODTn(a), Fo(b), Ty(t) }... } 
{... {Tn(n), Fo(a A b), Ty(t)... 0) ... { <L' >MODTn(a), Fo(b), Ty(t) } ... } 
MOD e {<To>, <T1>}* 
The result of the application of this rule to the tree in (49) above is the 
following: 
(51) Ty(t), Fo(Leave'John'A Cry'John'), 0 
Tn(n), Ty(e), Fo(John) Ty(e -*t), Fo(Ax. Leave'x) 
<L-'> Tn(n), Ty(t), Fo(Cry'John') 
Ty(e), Fo(John') Ty(e -'t), Fo(Ax. Cry'x) 
This is the (simplified) completed structure derived from the parsing of a non- 
restrictive relative50. Before we present the derivation that gives rise to a 
49 In view of comments in the literature regarding truth judgments of speakers when asked to 
evaluate sentences containing false non-restrictive relatives it has been proposed that at 
least some cases involve two distinct propositions rather than one conjoined proposition (see 
e. g. Bach 1999, Neale 1999, Carston 2002: 131 and fn. 26). The fact that all rules are 
optional in DS can be utilised here to account for these intuitions. The specific Link 
Evaluation Rule above can be taken as applying optionally without ungrammaticality ensuing 
especially since DS now provides a formalisation of the context (see Cann et al. 2005, ch. 9) 
which will ensure that the two propositions, inhabiting the two LINKed trees will be maintained 
(however for this to be implemented a means for pointer return to the main tree has to be 
defined independently, i. e. without copying of information). 
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semantic representation for a restrictive relative we have to explain what the 
distinction between Restrictives and Non-Restrictives relatives is taken to be 
in DS. This is the purpose of the next section. 
3. a. 2. The distinction between restrictive and non-restrictive 
relatives 
In the syntactic literature a distinction is commonly made between Restrictive 
and Non-Restrictive/Appositive relatives. Distinct attachment sites are 
assumed for each type of relative clause and sometimes distinct grammatical 
levels are taken to be relevant for their combination with the main clause 
(Safir 1988). In terms of truth-conditions, according to Quine (1967), the 
content of a restrictive relative is a predicate, not a full proposition. On the 
other hand, the content derived from a non-restrictive is generally assumed to 
be propositional. As a result, Restrictives are usually interpreted as objects of 
type <e, t> (Partee 1975) whereas Appositives yield propositions of type t 
(Sells 1985, Demirdache 1991, Del Gobbo 2002). 
3. a. 2. a. Interaction with quantification 
The assumption that restrictive relatives yield predicative content has led to 
the claim that they can only modify nominals of type <e, t>, thus providing 
additional restrictors for quantificational expressions. Besides the distinct 
syntactic mechanisms that are used to analyse restrictive relatives, Heim and 
Kratzer (1998) and Del Gobbo (2002) a. o. invoke distinct rules of 
interpretation to deal with restrictive modification. The rule of Predicate 
Abstraction creates a predicate out of a proposition by, in effect, abstracting 
over a variable (the trace) included in the representation of the relative's 
content. A new semantic composition rule called Predicate Modification 
combines the content of the relative with that of the noun. In this type of 
analysis pronouns inside a relative construed as coreferential with the head 
so For simplicity of the illustration we have assumed that proper names project simple terms 
of type e. However, in fact, proper names, as well as all other NPs, are assumed in DS to 
give rise to terms with complex structure (see Cann et al. 2005). Definite noun phrases also 
project a complex structure including a metavariable to be identified from context and a 
restrictor which incorporates the content of the common noun (see Kempson et al. 2001). 
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are also interpreted as variables bound by the quantificational determiner 
which combines with the common noun head: 
(52) Every man [ who admitted he was late ] was given time to prepare 
On the other hand, the assumption in much of the literature has been 
that Appositives are independent sentences interpreted as propositions of 
type t. For this reason they can only combine with referential phrases whose 
semantic content is of type e (Ross 1967, Rodman 1976, McCawley 1988). In 
Heim & Kratzer's (1998) system the Predicate Modification method of 
composition is not available for the content of such clauses as they are not 
interpreted as predicates. As a result, it is claimed that Appositives cannot 
modify quantificational phrases. However, these claims do not seem to be in 
agreement with the data. The following are a sample of actually attested 
examples (see Appendix 1 for more examples and sources) in which a non- 
restrictive relative combines with a quantificational phrase (even if a restrictive 
interpretation might be available is some of the examples, it is not necessarily 
the only one): 
(53) Voter turnout will be maximized by hands-on GOTV efforts. GOTV should be more than 
signing up voters leading up to the election, it should be about energizing voters NOW. 
What better way to maximize this than to have a consistent message passed to every 
county chair, who then passes it on to every District chair, who then passes it on to every 
block captain, who then discusses it with their friends and neighbors at the park, the pool, 
the coffee shop, the diner. 
(54) The colonizers, in their efforts to create scarcity in order to dominate the nation - they 
came and forcibly channelled the country's wealth i. e. land and natural resources to few 
white settlers who then had power over the majority of the indigenous people. 
More recently, under her analysis of relative pronouns in Appositives as E- 
type pronouns, Del Gobbo (2002) has claimed that Appositives can be 
combined with certain types of quantifier as long as the relative appears 
sentence-finally (and in special "telescoping" or subordination contexts, see 
Sells 1984). This also do not seem to be the case as these attested examples 
show (see Appendix 1 for full list): 
(55) In some state and local jurisdictions, Route 6 mileage markers are found every mile, and 
in many places the current 6 is given such names as "6 Hwy" (Ohio) or "Hwy 6 Trail" 
(Iowa). Most old segments, which have been bypassed either by a newer Route 6 or by 
placement of 6 on an interstate highway, are not marked in the western states. 
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(56) How about talking to Academy members about this? These folks are bright, visionary 
and creative. It appears that most Academy members, who certainly care about 
intellectual property rights, profits they helped create, and their job future are shocked, 
appalled and very troubled by the hasty MPAA actions and they would prefer a 
suspension of this action and an opportunity to help find and execute the better solutions. 
(57) The audience for the debate largely sided with Suzuki. Not surprisingly, most Americans 
(who of course never read "Philosophy East and West") tended to prefer Suzuki's 
timeless truths to Hu Shih's medieval past, his idealized Zen Japan to Hu Shih's 
remembered Chinese tradition. 
(58) Often the construction is carried by few wealthy individuals who then recoup their 
expenses by collecting funds from farmers of the newly irrigated land who then own and 
operate the system. 
(59) Holbek could not of course make use of such performance data, as he was working with 
texts collected in nineteenth century Denmark, a period when most collectors (who of 
course lacked modem recording methods) habitually omitted or excised materials not felt 
to be part of the text proper. Mrs Kerfont's comment validates a sexual reading of this and 
other symbols. 
As can be seen from the data and contrary to claims in the literature non- 
restrictives modifying quantifiers neither necessarily appear only sentence- 
finally nor require special subordination contexts or particular quantificational 
expressions. Moreover, analyses which postulate special "restructuring" rules 
of movement for the content of the appositive relative to be integrated under a 
Text node (see e. g. Del Gobbo 2002) fail to account for the fact that such 
clauses, like Restrictives, fall inside the scope of the quantifiers they co-occur 
with. This can be seen in the following sample of examples51 (see Appendix 1 
for full list): 
(60) Every candidate has a message, which he keeps repeating to people's attention until 
they memorize it 
(61) There are in the month of Ramadhan in every day and night those to whom Allah grants 
freedom from the Fire, and there is for every Muslim a supplication which he can make 
and will be granted. 
(62) Almost every man had a belt, which he did not want to let out of his possession. 
(63) The smaller force of guerrillas had none of these, but virtually every soldier had a gun, 
which he used. 
51 The quantificational expression every has been used in the examples because it has been 
claimed that its combination with a singular pronoun gives a clear indication as to its scope. 
Similar examples have been found with other quantificational expressions. 
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(64) One difference I noted was that, in this war, the American soldier is a technological 
wonder. Nearly every soldier owns a laptop, which he or she uses to play games or 
exchange e-mails from home. 
In contrast, the DS analysis in Kempson et at. (2001) and Cann et al. (2005) 
treats appositive relatives, as well as Restrictives, as providing content of type 
t. The manner of combination of the content of the relative with the content of 
the main clause is dealt uniformly with the same machinery as other 
coordinated, subordinated or juxtaposed clauses, i. e. as LINK structures. In 
conformity to such an analysis and contrary to claims in the literature, 
coordinated clauses and restrictive and non-restrictive relatives are expected 
to behave all similarly, for example, with respect to allowing extension of the 
scope of quantifiers (see Kempson 2003). The following attested examples 
show that, contrary to assumptions in the literature, quantifiers can extend 
their scope inside coordinated and other subordinated and juxtaposed 
clauses (see Appendix 1 and 4 for the full list and sources): 
(65) After all, every murderer when he kills runs the risk of the most dreadful of deaths, 
whereas those who kill him risk nothing except promotion. 
(66) Every citizen, if he is a good citizen, will bring to bear on such questions his best 
judgment and will do whatever his duty demands toward putting into effect such policies 
as are determined upon. 
(67) Liberty is given to every individual. If he wants to turn himself towards a good path and 
be righteous, the power is in his hands; and if he wants to turn himself towards the path 
of evil, the power is in his hands.... 
(68)At the turn of the century, there was no question about it --marriage was thought to be 
the ideal state for every woman, and she pretty much spent most of her young life 
preparing for it. 
(69) Every man, and he need not be always a professional sportsman, longs for being the 
best at something sometimes. 
The parallel scope-extended domain for quantificational expressions that both 
appositive relatives, restrictive relatives and coordinated/subordinated 
clauses exhibit can be captured by the time-linear sensitive mechanisms that 
DS provides. As we have seen these mainly consist of: (a) construction of 
preliminary name-like entities as the content of all noun phrases, (b) 
modelling of the gradual information accumulation as parsing proceeds, and, 
(c) a common manner of combination for the content of correlated clauses 
(which is the function of the LINK relation among trees). A clear sense of how 
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all these factors interact can be discerned in the processing of restrictive 
relative clauses to which we turn now. 
3. a. 3. Parsing of restrictive relatives 
3. a. 3. a. Restrictive relatives and quantification 
As we said earlier, quantificational phrases in DS give rise to structures 
of the following shape (for illustration we use the representation derived from 
the NP a man)52: 
(70) nP 
Ty(e), Fo(e, x, Man'x) 
NOM Ty(cn) Ty(cn -> e) 
Fo(x, Manx) Fo(AP. e, P) DET 
VAR Ty(e) Ty(e -* cn) RESTR 
Fo(x) Fo(Az. z, Man'z) 
Since in this representation there are two type e nodes, the LINK Adjunction 
rule in (37) above can apply either when the pointer appears at the NP node, 
in which case the interpretation of the relative will be as a Non- 
Restrictive/Appositive, or when the pointer appears at the VAR node in which 
case the interpretation of a Restrictive will ensue. In order to illustrate how 
this is achieved in the latter case we will go through the steps of processing a 
restrictive relative combined with an indefinite. 
3. a. 3. b. The parsing steps 
We will provide (a condensed version of) the steps leading to the 
construction of a logical form for the following sentence: 
r 
(71) A man who cried left 
As usual the construction process starts with the Axiom and Introduction 
and Prediction build the subject and predicate nodes (we ignore situation 
arguments and several other decorations here for reasons of space). Parsing 
52 Remember that the shaded labels on nodes are just there for the purpose of being able to 
refer to the nodes in the presentation and play no role in the DS framework. 
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of the phrase a man will lead to the construction of the complex structure 
appearing below the subject node. The lexical input provided by the common 
noun man will leave the tree as follows: 
(72) ? Ty(t) 
NT ? Ty(e) ? Ty(e -a t) 
NOM ? Ty(cn) Ty(cn ->e), Fo(AP. EP) DET 
vAR Ty(e), Fo(x), 0 Ty(e -+cn), Fo(Az. Man'z) REsTm 
With the pointer being at the lowest type e node, VAR, the LINK Adjunction 
rule (repeated below) can now apply since the description above the line 
matches the description appearing in VAR: 
(73) Link Adjunction 
{... { Tn(X), Fo(a), Ty(e) ... 01 ... } 
{... {Tn(X), Fo(a), Ty(e) }, {<L-'>Tn(X), ? Ty(t), ? 1* Fo(a), 0) ... } 
The effect of this rule on the tree above is shown below: 
(74) ? Ty(t) 
? Ty(e) ? Ty(e -t) 
? Ty(cn) Ty(cn -. e), Fo(AP. EP) 
VAR Tn(n), Ty(e), Fo(y), 0 Ty(e --cn), Fo(Az. Manz) 
L 
<L-' >Tn(n), ? Ty(t), ? 1* Fo(y) 
A LINK relation is established between the VAR node (the LINK mother) and 
a new ? Ty(t) tree (the LINK daughter). The root node of this tree bears the 
requirement for a copy of the variable appearing at the VAR node to also be 
found in some dominated position (? I*Fo(y) above). This is what eventually 
provides the shared element between the content of the main clause and the 
content of the restrictive relative. As in our case this shared term is a free 
variable, the linked tree will provide the type of object that in the Heim & 
c 
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Kratzer (1998) framework has to be created by the case-specific rule of 
Predicate Abstraction. 
Going on with the parse of the string in (71), the rule of *Adjunction can 
now apply since the decorations on the ? Ty(t) node matches what is required 
for its application. Application of *Adjunction will have the effect of introducing 
an unfixed node awaiting lexical input of type e. This input is expected to be 
provided by the relative pronoun: 
(75) ? Ty(t) 
? Ty(e) ? Ty(e -t) 
?T (c i) Ty(cn -. e), Fo(AP. eP) 
Tn(n), Ty(e), Fo(y) Ty(e --cn). Fo(Az. Manz) 
L 
<L-1 >Tn(n), ? Ty(t), ?1 Fo(y) 
<r*><L-'>Tn(n), ? Ty(e), ? 3x. Tn(x), 0 
At this point everything is in place for the condition (IF ... ) in the lexical entry 
of the relative pronoun who to be matched and the set of actions associated 
with it to be activated: 
(76) who,, 
IF ? Ty(e), ? 3x. Fo(x), <j. ><L-'>Fo(x) 
THEN put( Fo(x), Ty(e), [1] 1) 
ELSE abort 
The IF condition checks whether the pointer appears at an unfixed node on a 
LINKed tree with a requirement for an object of type e. If this condition is 
fulfilled then there is a copying of the Formula value decorating the LINK 
mother node to the unfixed node where the pointer appears. This will satisfy 
the requirement, ? Ty(e), on this node and will provide the requisite copy of 
the head inside the relative. The tree will be transformed as follows: 
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(77) ?T (ý) 
? Ty(e) ? Ty(e ->t) 
?T (cn) Ty(cn ->e), Fo(AP. EP) 
Tn(n), Ty(e), Fo(y) Ty(e -. cn), Fo(Az. Manz) 
<N >Tn(n), ? Ty(t), ?I Fo(y) 
< ý, ><Ll>Tn(n), ? Ty(e), Ty(e), Fo(y), ? 3x. Tn(x), 0 
Completion can now move the pointer from the unfixed node to the 
? Ty(t) node. The requirement for a copy there has now been satisfied and 
can be deleted. Introduction and Prediction build the subject and predicate 
nodes and the pointer moves to the subject node. Conforming to the Normal 
Form Constraint the unfixed node comes now to hang under the subject 
node: 
(78) ? Ty(t) 
? Ty(e) ? Ty(e --t) 
? Ty(cn) Ty(cn -*e), Fo(AP. cP) 
Tn(n), Ty(e), Fo(y) Ty(e -. cn), Fo(Az. Man'z) 
L 
<L-' >Tn(n), ? Ty(t), ? ý-bo(y) 
? Ty(e), 0 ? Ty(e -, t) 
<Tt><L-'>Tn(n), Ty(e), Fo(y), ? Bx. Tn(x) 
The rule of Merge can now apply to unify the unfixed node with the subject 
node. The requirement for a proper address for the unfixed node and a type e 
formula value for the fixed node are now both satisfied: 
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(79) ?T (t) 
? Ty(e) ? Ty(e -. t) 
? Ty(co) Ty(cn -e), Fo(APiP) 
Tn(n), Ty(e), Fo(y) Ty(e - cii), Fo(Az. Manz) 
<L' >Tn(n), ? Ty(r) 
< T*> <L-' > Tn(n), Ty(e), ? Ty(e ->1) 
Fo(y), ? Iy{e), ? 3x T-,,; ,, 0 
After movement of the pointer to the ? Ty(t) node by Completion, the 
parsing of the verb inside the relative clause will now decorate the predicate 
node and Completion, Elimination and Thinning will compile the information 
inside the LINKed tree: 
(80) 
NP 
NOM ? Ty(cn) 
vi Tn(n), Ty(e), Fo(y) 
C 
<L1 >Tn(n), -ly«), T 
<T> <L-1 >Tn(n), Ty(e), Fo(y) 
? Ty(t) 
? Ty(e) ? Ty(e -t) 
Ty(cn ->e), Fo(AP. cP) LWT 
Ty -. cn), Fo(Az. Man'z) RESTI 
y(t), Fo(Cry'y), 0 
? Ty(e--%t3, Ty(e -'t), Fo(Ax. Cry'x) 
We now need a rule to move the pointer to the LINK mother node and 
integrate the information appearing in the two trees. The effect of this 
operation will be a new complex restrictor for the epsilon binder occupying the 
DET node. The rule is as follows: 
(81) Link Evaluation 2 (restrictives) 
{... { Tn(Z), ? Ty(cn) ... } ... {<To>Tn(Z), Fo(x), Ty(e) }, { <1i>Tn(Z), Fo(Az. z, Pz), Ty(e -cn)}, { <L-1><jo>Tn(Z), Fo(Q), Ty(t), 0} 
{... { Tn(Z), Fo(x, Px A Qx) Ty(cn), 0... } ... {< jo>Tn(Z), Fo(x), Ty(e) {<T, >Tn(Z), Fo(Az. z, Pz), Ty(e -acn)}, { <L'><10>Tn(Z), Fo(Q), Ty(t)} } 
163 
If the pointer is at the root node of a LINKed tree with completed Formula and 
Type values this rule will move the pointer to the ? Ty(cn), NOM, node of the 
main tree. There a Formula value is inserted which is a conjunctive 
proposition with a distinguished free variable (x, Px A Qx). The actual value of 
the distinguished free variable will be whatever variable occupies the VAR 
node (y in the tree in (82) below). The first conjunct of this proposition is the 
predicate found at the RESTR node applied to the distinguished free variable 
(Px in the rule, Many below). The second conjunct is whatever Formula value 
occupies the root node of the LINKed tree. Because, by the LINK Adjunction 
rule, the latter formula is necessarily a predication on the same free variable 
that occupies the VAR node we have now constructed a complex restrictor for 
the quantificationa) binder occupying the DET node: 
(82) ? Ty(t) 
r' i' ? Ty(e) ? Ty(e ->t) 
NoM Tn(Z), ? Iy(Gn), 0 Ty(cn -*e), Fo(XP. EP) DET 
Ty(cn), Fo Many A Cry'y) 
VAR Tn(n), Ty(e), Fo(y) Ty(e ->cn), Fo(Az. Man'z) RESTR 
L 
<L'>Tn(n), Ty(t) Fo(Cry'y) 
<1><L1 >Tn(n), Ty(e), Fa(y) Ty(e -. t), Fo(J\x. Cry'x) 
After this, the usual rules apply to compile the information at the NP 
node and construct the term which is the content of the string a man who 
cried: 
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(83) ?T (t) 
NP? Ty(e), Ty(e), 0 ? Ty(e ->t) 
Fo(E, y, Man'y A Cryy) 
NOM Tn(Z), Ty(cn), Ty(cn --, e), Fo(AP. EP) DET 
Fo(Man'y A Cry'y) 
VAR Tn(n), Ty(e), Ty(e --ýcn), RESTR 
Fo(y) Fo(Az. Man'z) 
L 
<Ll >Tn(n), Ty(t), Fo(Cry'y) 
<1><L1> Tn(n), Ty(e), Fo(y) Ty(e -t), Fo(Ax. Cry'x) 
Parsing of the verb left will now annotate the predicate node and the 
Completion, Elimination and Thinning rules will carry out the compilation of 
the information at the root node: 
(84) ? Ty(t), Ty(t), Fo(Left'(e, y, Man'yACrx'y), 0 
NP ? Ty(e), Ty(e) ? Ty(e , Ty(e -> t), Fo(Ax. Left'x) Fo(e, y, Man'yACry'y) 
Nor Tn(Z), Ty(cn), Ty(cn -->e), Fo(AP. EP) nE r 
Fo(Man'y ; Cry'y) 
VVAHHTn(n), Ty(e), Fo(y) Ty(e ýcn), Fo(Az. Man'z) m srlt 
L 
<><N >Tn(n), Ty(e), Fo(y) Ty(e -*t), Fo(Ax. Cry'x) 
The rule of scope evaluation (Q-Evaluation) can now apply at the formula 
decorating the top node of the tree to derive an epsilon term incorporating the 
predications contributed by the common noun man, the verb left and the 
relative clause verb cried: 
165 
(85) Ty(t), Fo(Man'a A Cry'a A Left'a, where a=e, y, Man'y n Cryy n Left'y), 0 
Ty(e) Ty(e -> t), Fo(Ax. Leff'x) 
Fo(s, y, Man'ynCry'y) 
Tn(Z), Ty(cn), Ty(cn -. e), Fo(AP. cP) 
Fo(Man'y A Cry'y) 
Tn(n), Ty(e), Fo(y) Ty(e -"cn), Fo(Az. Pý9an'z) 
<L1 >Tn(n), Ty(t), Fo(Cry'y) 
< i. ><L-' >Tn(n), Ty(e), Ty(e -"t), Fo(Ax. Cry'x) 
Fo(y) 
This completes the processing of the sentence with the restrictive relative. We 
now have a complex term, the term abbreviated as a above, which can serve 
as an element in the context available for subsequent metavariable 
substitutions, e. g. the metavariable that will be contributed by he below: 
(86) A man who cried left. He was very upset. 
In the Heim & Kratzer (1998) framework, a pronoun inside a restrictive 
relative construed as correferential with a quantificational head is modelled as 
involving a distinct use of pronouns as bound variables. However, in DS such 
pronouns are interpreted in the same way as any other pronoun, i. e. by 
means of Substitution. The replacement for the metavariable contributed by a 
pronoun which is interpreted as coreferential with the head will be a copy of 
the variable contributed by the common noun and appear inside the Restrictor 
of the quantificational term if the relative is restrictive. Such variables are 
legitimate accessible members of the context since they have just been used 
in the construction of the NP node. We present the tree derived by a 
restrictive interpretation for the relative included in the sentence in (87) below. 
It can be seen that the pronoun he is construed as the variable y which has 
been contributed by the common noun man. This variable ends up bound by 
the T-binder because of the copying of the information in the LINKed structure 
to construct a complex restrictor at the Ty(cn) node: 
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(87) Every man who said he cried left. 
Ty(t), Fo( [Man'a A Say' Cry'a a] -+ [Left'a], where a=r, y, [Man'y A Say' C(T'y yl -. [Left'y] ), 0 
Ty(e) Ty(e -+ t), Fo(Ax. Left'x) 
Fo( [Many] n [Say' Cry'y y] ) 
Tn(Z), Ty(cn), Ty(cn -*e), Fo(AP. r, P) 
Fo( [Mang] n [Sa ' Cry'y y] ) 
. Ty(e), Fo(y) Ty(e -"cn), Fo(Az. Man'z) 
L 
<L1>Tn(n), Ty(t), Fo(Say' Cryy y) 
Ty(e), Fo(y) Ty(e --"t), Fo(Ax. Say' Cryy x) 
Ty(t), Fo(Cry'y) Ty(t --3(e --3t)), Fo(Ap. Ax. Say' p x) 
Ty(e), Fo(y) Ty(e, t), Fo(Ax. Cry'x) 
For the same string, a non-restrictive construal for the relative can be 
achieved if the LINK relation associates the higher type e node of the main 
tree with the tree derived from the relative. The effect of this linking is that the 
incomplete T-term constructed out of processing the phrase every man will be 
copied inside the LINKed tree. At the last stages of the parsing process the 
LINK Evaluation Rule for non-restrictives will incorporate the content of the 
relative in the formula value derived at the root node of the tree. Therefore 
when the Q-Evaluation Rule applies the content of the relative will be taken 
as part of the Nuclear Scope (the consequent of the conditional) inside the 
completed tau term: 
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(88) Every man, who said he cried, left. 
Ty(t), Fo ([Man'a] --. [ (Say' Cry. a a) A (Left'a) ], where 
a=T, y, [Man'y]-, [(Say'Cryyy)n Left'y)j 0 
Ty(e) Ty(e -" t), Fo(Ax. Left'x) Fo(T, y, Man'y) r, 
Ty(e) 
Tn(Z), Ty(cn), Ty(cn --*e), Fo(AP. T, P) 
L Fo(Man'y) 
Fo(y) Ty(e ->cn), Fo(Az. Man'z) 
<L-1>Tn(n), Ty(t), Fo(Say Cry'_ryMan'y, Ty, Man'y ) 
Ty(e), Fo(T, y, Many) Ty(e -->t), Fo(Äx. Say' Cry'ry, Many x) 
Ty(t), Fo(Cry'T, y, Man'y) Ty(t -+(e -pt)), Fo(Ap. Ax. Say' p x) 
Ty(e), Fo(r, y, Many) Ty(e->t), Fo(Ax. Cryx) 
It can be seen from the above that a unified notion of information copying 
from one tree to another and the intuitive assumption that anaphoric 
expressions just provide substitution sites for salient terms can allow the 
derivation of the requisite truth-conditional effects associated with restrictive 
and non-restrictive interpretations without employing structurally 
unprecedented representations or specialised semantic rules. We will employ 
the same tools in the following chapters that provide, in essence, an analysis 
of if-clauses as restrictive relatives on the situation argument of a 
propositional tree. This analysis will reconstruct in a dynamic way the widely 
held assumption that if-clauses constitute context-building devices in the form 
of restrictors for quantificational structures (see e. g. von Fintel 1994). 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONDITIONALS: STRUCTURE AND PROCESSING 
1. The tension between coordination and subordination 
1. a. The theoretical alternatives 
Conditionals present one of a number of cases where there is tension 
between analyses in terms of the traditional notions of coordination and 
subordination. As it was discussed earlier, DS distinguishes only two ways of 
combining the input provided by the processing of distinct clauses in order to 
produce a complex proposition as their content: 
(a) a clause can contribute the argument of a predicate as in, e. g., the 
propositional object of a verb; in this case the local tree will consist of two 
predicate-argument structures one embedded into the other, or, 
(b) two clauses can introduce two separate trees connected by a LINK 
relation between their nodes. The latter mode of processing results in an 
overall structure called the global tree which can encompass any number of 
linked trees and is a representation equivalent to an inferential/cognitive unit 
(cf. Blakemore 1987, Carston 2002). 
As regards the latter option, it must be noted that punctuation indications like 
full-stops between strings are not taken as significant as in other frameworks 
where the notion of a sentential unit is what is characterised by the grammar. 
In DS a global tree incorporating LINKed trees can result from the processing 
of two sentences punctuated with full stops among them as well as restrictive 
and non-restrictive relatives, the processing of adjuncts etc.. In addition to 
that, as we saw, there is also the possibility of having independent trees as 
part of the context (the Discourse Context, see Cann et al. 2005: Ch. 9) as 
the construction process crucially interacts with and relies on externally given 
information. Within this theoretical framework the question that we are going 
to discuss now is how such a view of semantic representation can account for 
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the phenomena associated with the processing and the syntactic properties of 
conditionals. 
In providing a structural description for the content derived by 
processing a conditional structure the following possibilities present 
themselves within the means that DS makes available: 
a. there is an embedding relation between protasis and apodosis 
as in (a) above. This can be implemented as follows: the content 
of the particle if contributes a functor which takes the content of 
the two clauses as arguments; the whole structure exemplifies a 
single proposition with function application relating its 
components. 
b. the tree derived by processing one clause is LINKed to a tree 
derived by the processing of the other (as in (b) above). There 
are two separate possibilities distinguished here: 
1. the root nodes of the two trees are LINKed as in, e. g. the 
DS analysis of coordinate clauses; two further alternatives are 
also available here: 
i. the if-clause content is LINKed to the main clause tree 
ii. the if-clause content is inversely LINKed to the main 
clause tree 
2. there is a LINK relation between a term in one of the trees 
and the tree representing the content of the other, as in, e. g., 
nominal relative clauses; another two alternatives are 
available here too: 
i. the content of the main clause is LINKed to a term 
inside the proposition contributed by the if-clause 
ii. the content of the if-clause is inversely LINKed to a 
term inside the main clause. 
We now turn to examine the evidence supporting each analysis available to 
us 
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1. b. Parallels between conditionals and coordinate structures 
The logical form assigned to a natural language conditional structure under 
the truth-functional material implication interpretation and a compositional 
view of the syntax-semantics interface implies a logical form where the two 
clauses are conjoined by a two place connective and are equivalent in status. 
Under one such possible account, if ... then in natural language can be 
viewed as a discontinuous connective relating two sentences (see e. g. 
Chomsky 1957: 22, Strawson 1986). Other semantic accounts are compatible 
with this view too as a lot of the complexity of interpretation can be assigned 
to the semantic/interpretive rules. Schachter (1972), adopting Stalnaker's 
analysis of conditionals, provides the following syntactic analysis for 
counterfactuals (W is the variable representing the world of evaluation and > 





In such an analysis the connective if... then is assigned the same syntactic 
properties as the connective and. The representation though, although 
including an additional element (W) indicating the modal interpretation, is not 
explicit enough as regards the eventual proposition expressed as there is no 
overt indication of either quantification over worlds or the selection 
function/accessibility relation etc (and in the case of indicative conditionals the 
assumption is that the variable W is missing). For us this means that, since 
we do not assume a separate syntactic structure for the string which is then 
compositionally interpreted, adopting a similar representation will make the 
logical forms proposed (LOT representations) to be reliant on a powerful 
semantic component or to unrestricted pragmatic free enrichment53 to derive 
53 For the distinction between free enrichment and saturation see, e. g. Carston 2002 
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the desired proposition expressed. However, the syntactic evidence that we 
saw in Chapter 1 and will see again below seem to show that natural 
language forms are more transparent than that. Moreover, structurally a 
similar analysis in not directly available in DS since binary branching is taken 
for granted. However one legitimate expression of the spirit of this analysis in 
a DS logical form would be a structure similar to that arising from coordinate 
structures. The propositional content of protasis and apodosis could appear 
as a pair of LINKed trees and an appropriate (conditional) LINK Evaluation 
rule would be invoked to derive the implication relation between the two 
propositions (notice that copying of information from one tree to another 
implies some form of subordination of one propositional content (the copied 
one) to the other): 





Ty(t), F P) 
antecedent 









There are a few technical problems with such an analysis, for example the 
fact that the lexical item if ... then that is supposed to induce this structure is 
discontinuous or the fact that there is no overt shared term between the two 
structures, a typical hallmark of the LINK relation54. Another more substantial 
problem is the weakening of the formula value at the root node of the tree 
derived by the consequent: unlike what happens in structures related by and 
where the effect of the LINK Evaluation Rule is cumulative, in the structure 
above, the parser, having derived Q, applies the putative Conditional LINK 
Evaluation Rule which will induce another formula value P-Q. The latter can 
be seen as a partial retraction of the original formula value55. Although such 
non-monotonic inference processes are legitimate outcomes of pragmatic 
operations it is not certain that they should be induced by the computational 
actions of a monotonic grammatical formalism. This is especially important for 
DS where there is no assumption that there is a temporally prior stage of the 
entire structure being derived first by the parser and then being submitted for 
pragmatic processing: the incremental, dynamic nature of the structure 
building process interacts on-line with the equally dynamic inference and 
integrating processes defined by relevance theoretic frameworks. From the 
point of view of explaining the efficiency of deriving appropriate inferences on- 
line, it seems much more appropriate that the parsing mechanism will not 
provide initially misleading evidence, which has to be retracted (the problem 
is more acute in cases where the if-clause follows the apodosis since there a 
look-ahead mechanism induced presumable by the processing of if would not 
be available). 
Supposing that these problems could be overcome (for example by an 
appropriate analysis of then and with the appropriate LINK Evaluation rules) it 
54 In cases of propositional coordination we could assume a shared situation argument. 
ss There is another technical problem here in that, since all rules are optional, there is nothing 
to force application of the putative Conditional Link Evaluation Rule. This is harmless in the 
case of non-restrictive relatives where the two trees have relatively independent content but 
in the case of conditionals, provisions will have to be made so that we do not end up with a 
representation implying the semantic interpretation of conjunction. Although this might seem 
a mere technicality, it shows that the connection between the antecedent and consequent is 
something that goes beyond mere juxtaposition of propositional contents. 
173 
could be assumed that words like and, or and if contribute conceptual content 
very nearly identical to their analysis as connectives of the propositional 
calculus and induce the building of logical forms that reflect the fact that two 
independent propositions have been uttered (plus the appropriate relation 
between them). However, we saw in Chapter 1 and we are going to see again 
later that there are some hints in the behaviour of if-clauses that indicate the 
subordination of its content to the propositional content derived by the 
consequent, for example, the if-clause cannot bear independent "illocutionary 
force" indicators, it can appear in any position with respect to the main clause 
etc. In that respect, notice that, although there is a hint of an asymmetry 
between the clauses in the representation in (2) (what is copied where), there 
is no real justification for making any non-stipulatory decision as to which of 
the two trees should be taken to accommodate the final formula (especially 
since the linear order of antecedent-consequent varies). The same problem 
could be said to arise with coordination but it could be argued that there the 
problem is only apparent since, unlike in the case of non-restrictive relatives, 
there are reasons to apply the LINK Evaluation Rule so that content is copied 
across to the initial tree (see also Humberstone 2005: 557-559); compare, 
e. g.: 
(3) John believes that Mary is my friend and she is angry with me. 
(4) John believes that Mary, who is my friend, is angry with me. 
Cases parallel to (4) arise with conditionals too but the point is that because 
c 
of the linear order freedom the structures in (1) and (2) do not provide 
adequate justification for which one is the main structure where the 
propositional content has to be copied. Where the problem appears to be 
similar is the case of restrictive relative clauses. There are significant reasons 
for assuming that the content provided by the relative clause is 
accommodated inside the tree derived by the processing of the main clause, 
and for this reason DS makes provision for the appropriate rules to be 
available (and this is not only because of the linear order of such structures in 
English but also because of truth-conditional and pragmatic effects). 
Therefore what we need to consider now is whether if-clauses pattern with 
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relatives or co-ordinate/juxtaposition structures. We are going to see, as has 
been pointed out by many researchers (see, e. g. Haiman 1978, Geis 1985, 
Lycan 2001), that there is linguistic evidence against a parallel analysis of and 
and if, and that the content of the if-clause plays an auxiliary role in the 
processing of the consequent. This evidence also indicates that the content of 
natural language sentences cannot be directly mapped to predicate or 
propositional calculus formulae (and given that these calculi are artificial 
languages devised by logicians in order to overcome the "complexities" of 
natural language there is no reason to expect a direct mapping anyway). 
2. Coordination and Subordination structures 
It is usual in frameworks that maintain the traditional distributional analyses 
assigning structure to strings of words to postulate that coordination and 
subordination can be sharply distinguished as exemplifying two completely 
distinct modes of combination. Under such analyses, the coordination mode 
relates two components with symmetric properties and no dependency of one 
on the other whereas subordination relates components associated by a 
dependency relation so that an asymmetry between them ensues (see e. g. 
Matthews 1981: 195-198). In these frameworks there are criteria for 
establishing whether a clause can be taken as subordinated or coordinated. 
Although these criteria do not have the same status from a DS point of view, 
we will examine those that have been applied to the identification of the status 
of if-clauses and we will consider whether, under a reinterpretation in DS r 
terms, they support the above purported DS analysis of conditionals or not. 
2. a. Coordination or Subordination: the Evidence 
Geis (1985), Lycan (2001) and latridou (1991) compare the syntactic 
properties of coordinate structures and conditionals and conclude that if- 
clauses should be characterised as subordinated to the main clause 
(consequent). Although this evidence is examined in order to justify some 
proposed constituency structure for the sentential string itself, since this 
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constituency structure is many times motivated by semantic/pragmatic 
considerations, we can find evidence here that is pertinent to a DS analysis 
too. One such piece of evidence is the fact that if-clauses, like most adverbial 
adjuncts, can occur in various positions, before the verb, post-verbally and 
even left-dislocated unlike coordinated clauses: 
(5) If John cries Mary leaves 
(6) Mary leaves if John cries 
(7) If John cries Sue said Mary leaves 
(8) John cries and Mary leaves 
(9) *And Mary leaves John cries 
(10) *And Mary leaves Sue said John cries 
This could be taken to indicate that if introduces a proposition that does not 
have to be necessarily processed and integrated after the content of the 
consequent clause has been derived, in fact it is very frequent for things to be 
the other way round (but not always, so we cannot take the consequent as 
parallel to the second conjunct in coordination). On the other hand, if we take 
the if-clause as providing content essential for the processing of the main 
clause (similarly to the way restrictive relatives provide content essential for 
the processing of the main clause) these facts can be explained in that the 
content of the if-clause must be integrated and constitute part of the 
proposition derived by processing the consequent and this is clearly indicated 
by the presence of the lexical item if marking which clause provides the 
auxiliary content56. Notice however that the same argument does not go 
through when the adverb then is used in the consequent: 
(11) If Mary cries then John leaves 
(12) # Then John Leave's if Mary cries 
So this evidence does not necessarily completely disconfirm the 
discontinuous connective if-then view discussed above. One might assume 
that there is a rigid structural arrangement and in cases of clause-initial if- 
clauses where then is not involved an implicit secondary connective might be 
56 The phenomena of order flexibility are not untypical of relative clauses either: there are 
extraposed relatives in English and there are also correlative structures in many languages. 
Needless to say that this is also the case for adverbial clauses cross-linguistically. 
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postulated with postverbal if-clauses presenting something like a revision of 
what has been said. This does not seem as an immediately plausible 
analysis, although postverbal if-clauses have been assumed by some 
researchers to have distinct significance from preverbal ones and one might 
interpret their claims as requiring a "grammaticised" topic-comment structure 
for conditionals (for the distinct pragmatic interpretations assigned to 
postverbal and preverbal if-clauses see Ford 1993, Dancygier 1998: 145- 
159). However, it is not necessarily the case that there are such encoded 
radically truth-conditionally distinct interpretations between the two structures 
and therefore we are not going to assume that anything more is going on 
beyond distinct order of processing with pragmatic consequences. The issue 
of the contribution of then will be discussed further in the next chapter where 
we will see that the rigidity of word order in these cases is as expected 
according to present and general DS assumptions. For now we will look at 
another set of arguments which show that certain phenomena appear in 
coordinated structures whereas they are excluded in conditionals. The 
explanation of these phenomena also casts doubt on the putative analysis 
presented in (1) and (2). 
First of all, two clauses related by the conjunction and can undergo 
certain structural reductions which are not possible in other constructions. For 
example, the two conjuncts can be made to share a common subject 
(Conjunction Reduction). This is not possible between antecedent and 
consequent in conditionals: 
(13) John [bought the newspaper] and [sold the milk] 
(14) *John [bought the newspaper] if [sold the milk] 
(15) *If John [sold the milk] [bought the newspaper] 
Moreover, the phenomenon of Right Node Raising is precluded between 
antecedent and consequent: 
(16) John will support _ and 
Mary will try to promote _, 
the manager of their department 
(17) if John supports _ 
Mary will try to promote _, 
the manager of their department 
(18) *[Mary will support _) 
[if John tries to promote _ 
], the manager of their department 
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The phenomenon called Gapping can occur between two coordinated 
clauses: the verb of the second clause can be elided if it is identical to the one 
in the first one: 
(19) John will buy the newspaper and [ Mary _ 
the milk J 
There is no corresponding construction for if-clauses: 
(20) *John will buy the newspaper if Mary _ 
the milk 
Coordinated clauses exhibit the phenomenon of Across-the-Board extraction 
which is usually analysed under some requirement for symmetry between the 
two clauses (see, e. g., Smith & Cormack 2005),: 
(21) The man who [ John dislikes _] and 
[ Mary loves 
_] came 
to see me yesterday 





On the other hand, extraction from a single conjunct is not allowed: 
(23) *What did John see _ and 
Mary confronted him? 
(24) *Who John saw Sue and Mary confronted -? 
In contrast there is no such symmetry requirement in a conditional: The 
antecedent of a conditional does not allow extraction at all whereas the 
consequent can be extracted from freely: 
(25) *Who if Mary likes 
- will 
John be upset? 
(26) The man who if Mary likes _I will 
be upset... 
(27) *Who will John be upset if Mary likes _? (28) Who will be upset if Mary likes Bill? 
(29) If Mary likes Bill who will be upset? 
Lastly, the focusing adverbials even and only can combine with if-clauses but 
not with and conjuncts: 
(30) Only if John works hard does Bill work hard 
(31) Even if John works hard Bill works hard 
(32) John works hard and Bill works hard 
(33) *John works hard only and Bill works hard 
(34) * John works hard even and Bill works hard 
Although these indications of structural contrast has been adduced in the 
context of frameworks that explicate them in terms of the structure assigned 
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to strings (GPSG, GB or Minimalism), the contrasting behaviour exhibited by 
and-conjuncts and if-clauses is no less problematic for the putative DS 
analysis of conditionals illustrated in (1) and (2). DS aims to explain such 
phenomena as either following from the (dynamic) construction procedures 
for tree structures or by the (static) properties of the structures eventually 
achieved. Since in DS coordinated clauses are analysed as LINK structures 
(see Cann et al. 2005, Cann et al. 2003) the parallel structure assigned to 
conditionals in (1) and (2) above does not allow us to resort to (static) 
structural properties of the representations constructed in order to explain 
these contrasts. So if one wanted to maintain a straightforward analysis of 
if... then in parallel with and, or and but it would have to be shown how these 
systematic differences in the behaviour of the clauses linked by them occur in 
terms of the procedural means provided. There are two avenues to be 
explored in order to explain these differences. Firstly, it could be claimed that 
it is a lexical property of and, or and but that they induce those phenomena 
and this contrasts with the lexical properties of if or if... then. This solution 
seems ad hoc in the context of the analysis in shown (1) and (2) because it is 
not at all obvious what would motivate such distinct lexical properties cross- 
linguistically, especially if the semantics is assumed to be truth-functional for 
all these connectives. It is also liable to cause a lot of redundancy in the 
grammar since every general rule will have to check whether the input context 
has been contributed by an if-clause or an and-conjunct. Additionally to 
account for the above phenomena the lexical entries of those items will 
presumably have to make reference to what computational rules could or 
could not apply either before or after they have been encountered and since 
separate predicate-argument structures are involved this will require a lot of 
anticipatory provisions. Although it is not in principle impossible to coordinate 
things this way, it does not seem a desirable solution and it does not explain 
the cross-linguistic validity of the above distinctions between coordinate 
structures and (explicitly marked) if-clauses (cf. Haiman 1986). The 
alternative solution, that will be adopted here eventually, is to attribute the 
distinctions above to the fact that the propositional content of an if-clause is 
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not directly linked to the main structure (therefore we also give a (static) 
structural characterisation of the distinction between coordination and 
conditionals), and direct linkage can then be taken as a requirement for 
phenomena like Conjunction Reduction, Right Node Raising etc. to appear 
(see e. g. Cann et al. 2002,2005). It is then possible to obtain a derivative 
differentiation between coordination and other structures. For example, as we 
will see below, many properties of if-clauses are shared with relatives clauses 
which also contrast in similar respects with coordinate structures. Notice, for 
example, that there is no Right Node Raising out of relative clauses: 
(35) John will support _ and 
Mary will try to promote _, 
the manager of their department 
(36) *John [who initially supported _] 
finally fired 
_ 
the manager of their department 
Although both relatives and and-conjunctions involve LINK structures at some 
point, according to the DS analysis, it is the distinct overall structures 
assigned to the propositions derived from coordinated conjuncts as opposed 
to those for relatives which accounts for the impossibility of (36) (see Cann et 
al. 2002,2005). Additionally, the fact that there are no "extraction" 
phenomena from a relative clause to the main clause is also accounted for in 
DS as the result of structural restrictions on the application of rules that make 
reference to the tree relations holding among nodes: 
(37) *Who the man who likes - will 
be upset? 
Under this light, it seems preferable to assume that even though DS does not 
make any reference to a subordination-coordination distinction in terms of 
structure defined on strings, nevertheless, it allows for some derivative notion, 
not as sharp as in traditional frameworks, to be defined in terms of three 
parameters: (a) the order of processing of distinct units of information, (b) the 
constituent structure of the resulting logical form, (c) copying of information 
derived at one tree to another tree. Under this assumption, we will put aside 
the analysis in (1)-(2) above and we will now examine what kind of 
"subordination" relation, with respect to these parameters, can be assumed to 
hold between the propositions derived by the antecedent and consequent in a 
conditional. 
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3. Subordination: the options 
3. a. The if as a functor subordination analysis 
From one point of view, the two propositions related in a conditional structure 
can be taken as the two arguments of a binary functor symbolised neutrally 
here as: ->. Stalnaker (1968) talks about the "conditional function", "a 
function, usually represented in English by the words 'if... then', taking ordered 
pairs of propositions into propositions" (1968: 98). An appropriate logical form 
for such an analysis of the meaning of the connective is shown below: 
(38) If John comes, Mary will leave 
(39) -+(Come'John', Leave'Mary') 
A compositional interpretation of such a logical form under a possible world 
semantics will make reference to alternative possibilities which are not 
represented in the object language. As we said above, such interpretations 
require a significant amount of free enrichment of the encoded content if they 
are to be sustained. Under a truth-functional semantics (not espoused by 
Stalnaker), this type of structural analysis of conditionals is also what 
underlies the material implication interpretation of -º in propositional/predicate 
logic. What matters for the semantics of such a structure is the truth of each 
conjunct and their order of combination with the functor. Since the order of 
combination of the two arguments with the functor matters (as for example it 
matters when a transitive predicate combines with its subject and object), we 
can immediately derive a semantic asymmetry between the two propositions 
(although the extent of the required asymmetry can be said to not be 
adequately represented in such logical forms). This asymmetry could be seen 
as the basis of explaining some of the distinctive properties of if-clauses: the 
combination of the functor translating if and the first propositional argument 
applies to (and "subordinates", takes as an argument) the proposition derived 
from the second clause (although notice that this will not necessarily derive 
any distinction with regard to coordinate structures as those could also be 
taken to display exactly the same functional analysis). Over the years the 
material implication semantics attributed to such structures has been 
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criticised (see Gazdar 1979) but some of the arguments against it can be 
rebuffed especially if one takes into account Gricean principles of 
communication, relevance-theoretic notions of inference or any other 
pragmatic theory that purports to explain the added significance attached to 
natural language conditionals. On the other hand, of course, independently of 
the material implication semantics, the fact that the formal languages 
constructed by logicians happen to express conditional propositions under a 
similar structural analysis is not an a priori argument that this is the 
appropriate minimal representation underpinning the semantics of natural 
language conditionals. Nevertheless, the fact that that the material implication 
interpretation does not seem to account for all the effects associated with 
natural language conditionals does not provide a knock-down argument 
against this structural analysis derived from propositional logic, especially 
when combined with an adequate pragmatic theory like Relevance Theory 
(see Smith 1983 and Smith and Smith 1988). But notice also that, from our 
perspective, this analysis does not bear the usual advantage that it has in 
more standard frameworks, i. e., postulating less "hidden" constituents in 
natural language syntax. Since here we do not assume any syntactic 
structure for the linguistic string beyond the time-linear order of presentation 
we do not face the problem of having to defend implicit elements in the 
syntactic structure of the natural language sentence (cf. Stanley & Szabo 
2000). As long as such elements are shown to be essential for the eventually 
derived semantic content, the only contention, from the current perspective, is 
how much of the burden of deriving the correct representation we have to 
allocate to the linguistic system as opposed to general pragmatic principles 
and free enrichment. What we seek to posit is a minimal, underspecified 
structure that will provide the appropriate input to pragmatic processing. 
However, as we eschew any other explanatory mechanisms beyond the 
syntactic structure assigned to logical forms and the process of constructing 
those, there remain linguistic phenomena that have to be accounted for. The 
latter consideration might force us to adopt a logical form that is more explicit 
than what one would expect as a consequence of assuming a powerful 
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syntactic framework in combination with a powerful semantic/pragmatic 
module since here we can only exploit a single level of representation. We 
start though with a minimal structural proposal, namely, that the processing of 
natural language conditional sentences induces a function-argument structure 
as its logical form. This has been defended in the literature as a plausible 
structure and seems to be compatible with the general requirement to avoid 
postulating implicit elements if the data can be accounted for otherwise. 
Cormack and Smith (2005) assume that if is a subordinating operator57 
taking two clauses as its arguments. Similar analyses employing the if-as-a- 
functor assumption in a deep structure representation or (intermediate) LF is 
also found in Rivero (1972: 210) and Boeckx (2003). As we said, at first 
glance, this assumption makes the syntactic structure assigned to 
conditionals seem as minimal as possible which is a desirable feature. 
However, the fact that syntactically the if-clause appears to have different 
status to that of the consequent, indicated by all the asymmetries noted 
above between the two clauses, is expressed in Cormack & Smith (2005) by 
an unprecedented structural assumption: the main clause, although being in 
fact the (second) argument of the operator if, nevertheless projects its own 
category at the mother node: 
(40) TP main clause 
if-clause: T/T Tmain clause 
if: (T/T)/C C Pclause 
Given that this proposal is expressed within a framework that assumes a 
separate syntactic component, this provides the basis for explaining (some) of 
the asymmetries. For our purposes, as in DS we do not explain syntactic 
asymmetries by means of logical form structure alone we can consider the 
57 In fact they suggest that if and then are probably "agreement" markers agreeing with an 
invisible conditional operator D. 
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structure above as a candidate for an appropriate DS logical form if we find a 
way of explaining the asymmetries noted in terms of the procedural 
mechanisms of construction of such representations. In support of this 
assumption, one should note that, arguably, the language of thought LOT 
includes a modus ponens rule (see e. g. Sperber and Wilson 1995). Therefore 
some implication connective --+ is part of its syntax58 (whatever the exact 
interpretation of this connective has to be taken in LOT). The question that 
arises in this respect for DS is whether there is a direct encoding of such a 
connective in natural language. What this would mean in DS terms is that the 
tree that is generated by the parsing of natural language conditionals reflects 
the articulation of the formula derived at the top node in terms of functor- 
argument relations. A suitable re-interpretation of the Cormack & Smith 
analysis would be as follows (simplifying somewhat): 
(41) if p then q 
(42) Ty(t), Fo (-ý(p, q)) 
Ty(t), Fo(p) Ty(t -+t), Fo(As. - *(s, q) 
Ty(t), Fo(q) Ty(t -*(t --pt)), Fo( At. As. --+(s, t) ) 
In reflecting on whether this analysis is appropriate it is relevant to consider 
the fact that the connective A is also taken by DS to be part of the syntax of 
LOT. DS "translates" a construction containing a main clause and a relative 
as deriving conjoined propositions59 and the same goes for and-coordinated 
58 Any logical system based on propositional logic does not necessarily have to have the full 
set of connectives since it is well-known that these are inter-definable. Therefore seeing LOT 
at a more abstract level as the language at which inferences are performed, irrespective of 
how those are expressed in natural language, it could be claimed that the existence of 
multiple connectives in artificial formal languages does not provide evidence that the same 
connectives can be found in LOT. This would be especially pertinent in cases where the 
natural language evidence suggests a different analysis than the one assigned to 
propositional logic connectives. For example it could be claimed that we can do with only 
conjunction, A, and negation, -, as LOT connectives. Then a conditional string if P (then) Q 
will be mapped to a LOT sentence of this form: -'(P A -'Q). The truth-functional/material 
implication analysis of natural language conditionals is compatible with such a possibility. The 
encoded semantics assumed here not necessarily so. 
59 This analysis has implications for the status of tree representations in DS and the 
characterisation of LOT: Conjoined propositions are derived at the root node of the global 
tree. Since there are no conjoined trees only conjoined formulas, the trees must be simply the 
means for deriving the LOT formula and LOT inference must be defined over root node 
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and juxtaposed structures. However the LOT A connective derived by such 
natural language structures is not directly encoded by any lexical item, i. e. 
there is no formula value in DFo that has the form: Ap. Aq. A(p, q). The 
conjunctive formula at the root node of a tree is induced by general 
computational rules which evaluate the content of the two trees and insert the 
connective A. So in relevance theoretic terms the conceptual content that is 
indicated by the LOT connective A is either not contributed by any lexical 
items at all (e. g. in relatives) or is derived by a combination of lexical actions 
and computational rules (coordination, juxtaposition). Therefore there is no 
direct encoding of a LOT coordinate structure in natural language (i. e. there is 
no node on a DS tree where the connective A is located as formula value with 
its two arguments decorating other nodes) . The reason that things are set up 
this way in DS is because there is no natural language where there is any 
direct evidence for a lexical item that operates like the presumed functor 
which takes propositions one-by-one as its arguments. In what concerns us 
here there are now two conflicting considerations: Firstly since it has proved 
extremely hard to provide an account of the semantics of if-then sentences for 
natural language (witness the huge literature) it is far less likely that there is a 
direct encoding in natural language of the conceptual content represented by 
implication, --*, than that represented by A. Therefore the if as a functor 
analysis does not look very promising in the context of DS assumptions. On 
the other hand, because the conceptual content A is a weaker and much 
more ubiquitous notion than the content expressed by the connective --ý, 
whatever this is, it is a legitimate question whether the latter is specifically 
encoded in, perhaps some, natural languages, especially since the English 
expression if p, q looks suspiciously like the encoding of a functor preceding 
its two arguments (that could be a case of "grammaticization" since it is not 
formulas not trees; in that sense the root of a (global) tree has a certain significance beyond 
its constituents. Therefore the fact that propositions can be presented in the form of trees is 
irrelevant for the actual operation of LOT; although such a system could be defined, at 
present, operations like Modus Ponens are not defined to apply on tree representations. In 
that respect, the trees are just a necessary intermediary between natural language and LOT, 
not LOT expressions themselves. On the other hand, the notion of global tree captures nicely 
the concept of a single inferential unit that will be exploited later for binding purposes. 
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absolutely clear that all languages morphologically mark conditional 
structures see Haiman 1986). Moreover, the functor analysis admittedly 
would provide a straightforward and therefore theoretically pleasing (surface-) 
compositional view of natural language if the syntax/semantics asymmetries 
that motivate unprecedented structural analyses like the one in (40) could be 
overcome. Since DS places a large part of the burden of deriving the 
structured semantic representation onto the processing mechanisms it could 
be argued that we could maintain a simple functor-argument analysis for the 
semantic representation of conditional sentences without having to include 
extraneous representations or operations. 
We now need therefore to question whether there is linguistic evidence 
for or against the direct encoding of the LOT connective -+ as a functor: Even 
if the truth-functional interpretation for - is not necessarily preserved, is there 
syntactic evidence that the natural language construction if p, q derives 
directly a P--+Q LOT-sentence by means of function application? Or is it the 
case that, like in the DS derivation of A-LOT-sentences with relatives, we 
have some derivative encoding of P--+Q? And would the insistence on 
maintaining the functional analysis lead to an overwhelming gap between 
natural language structure and conceptual structure that has to be bridged by 
postulating unwieldy mechanisms and introducing new primitives? There are 
two types of consideration here. Is an if-clause-main clause structure the only 
way to encode the -* LOT connective? If it is not, then it is quite possible that 
the intuitive truth conditions of a conditional are not necessarily directly 
encoded by any natural language lexical item. In the same way as with the 
DS analysis of conjunction and juxtaposition it could be the case that 
derivation of -> representations is the result of general computational actions 
or free pragmatic inference or even a combination of the two. The other type 
of evidence is distributional/syntactic. As we said we need our 
representations in combination with the processing rules to account for the 
linguistic phenomena that need to be explained because we do not have any 
other explanatory mechanisms available. We will start with the latter. 
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3. a. 1. SyntacticlDistributional evidence against the functor analysis 
The traditional notion of subordination or adjuncthood reflects the 
distributional properties of some clauses as not being able to appear in 
isolation (see e. g. Bloomfield 1948 , cf. Haiman 1983: 923). From this point of 
view if-clauses seem to pattern with other embedded clauses and would be 
characterised equally as subordinated: 
(43) - *That John left 
(44) *If John comes 
However, this is a theory-dependent criterion. It embodies the stance that the 
grammar deals with sorting out grammatical sentences rather than giving an 
account of how utterances are processed. In terms of a theory like DS, which 
accounts for the mechanisms by which utterances lead to the construction of 
meaning representations, the strings in (43)-(44) above cannot be 
characterised as ungrammatical since they could occur provided that the 
appropriate context is supplied. For example they could be answers to the 
following questions: 
(45) What did John say? 
(46) Under what circumstances are you thinking of leaving? 
Furthermore this traditional criterion does not distinguish between 
subordination and coordination since, from that point of view, a second 
conjunct cannot appear in isolation either (unless the appropriate context is 
provided): 
(47) *And John came. 
In terms of DS, we can capture the difference in distribution that might be felt 
as underlying the above judgements in terms of the notion of well-formedness 
in context developed in Cann et al (2005: ch. 9). This will give a 
characterisation of the above strings (43)-(44) and (47) as essentially context- 
dependent. However this cannot be taken as a criterion for subordination 
since main clauses containing pronominals and other anaphoric devices 
would also have to be classified in the same way. Therefore the traditional 
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distributional criterion of subordination is not of much use in the present 
context. On the other hand, the facts noted above in (5)-(6) regarding the 
positional flexibility of the if-clause militate against any simple-minded order 
preserving analysis in terms of functor-argument relations, therefore unless 
we invoke some operation of movement or its equivalents strings like if pq 
are not necessarily evidence for a functor followed by its arguments. From a 
distributional perspective, the grammatical properties of a sentential string 
remain the same whether it includes an if-clause or not. There are no verbs 
for example that require their propositional object to be an if... then.. 
sentence60. It is in this sense that if-clauses have been characterised as 
adjuncts, that is, they can be omitted or added freely without loss of 
grammaticality or selection properties. This is partly reflected of course in the 
analysis in (42) above since the type of the complex proposition is the same 
as the types of the two arguments. And presumably the functor encoded by if 
combined with the first clause (the antecedent) would not be expected to 
result in a stand-alone structure since it would still require another argument, 
whether provided by linguistic input or by context. On the other hand, if this is 
the case, then there is no structural reason reflected in the analysis above 
justifying why the two clausal arguments of the function -* should behave any 
differently. In fact claiming that the if-clause provides the functor whereas the 
content of the consequent serves as the argument gives incorrect and 
unintuitive results. As we saw above, there are asymmetries in the syntactic 
behaviour of the main and the if-clause. For instance if-clauses do not allow 
"extraction" whereas the main clause can be extracted from: 
(48) Who if John gets upset will you punish _? (49) *Who if John punished _will you get upset? (50) *Who if John punished _ you will get 
upset? 
Extraction from clausal arguments is generally allowed but if the extracted 
elements in (48)-(50) were related to their base position by only steps of 
dominance relations there would be no explanation for the grammatical 
60 1 am assuming here that indirect questions introduced by if are a distinct category. This is 
by no means obvious. 
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asymmetry. However, like relative clauses and unlike clausal arguments, if- 
clauses are strong-islands. Therefore the propositional content they 
contribute cannot be possibly analysed in DS as belonging to the same 
proposition as the content derived from the consequent unless radical 
revisions to the framework were made (similar considerations motivate the 
Cormack & Smith 2005 analysis). 
Another related indication of the subordinated status of if-clauses is that 
they cannot bear independent speech act indicators, that is, the verb form 
inside the if-clause cannot be in Imperative mood or in question form: 
(51) if come to the partly it will be fun 
(52) *It will be fun if come to the party 
(53) If are you busy you will come to the party? 
In this respect if-clauses resemble subordinated clauses and relatives which 
are also unable to have independent speech act indicators: 
(54) *John asked that did Mary come home? 
(55) *John said that come home 
(56) *John, who did you like, came home 
On the other hand, there are conditional assertions, questions and commands 
and these are indicated by the grammatical form of the consequent which is 
what has motivated the traditional claim that the consequent provides the 
primary structure, not just the argument to another function: 
(57) If you are not busy come to the party. 
(58) If you are not busy are you coming to the party? 
(59) Will you come to the party if you are busy? 
This evidence points to the conclusion that the type of analysis illustrated by 
(42) does not directly account for the syntactic asymmetries between 
antecedent and consequent in conditional sentences. There are ways to 
overcome these difficulties but it involves a lot of processing to derive the 
syntax-semantics mismatch. Boeckx (2003) attempts a solution: Current 
semantic/discourse analyses of conditionals define a notion of subordination 
between antecedent and consequent but the subordination relation is the 
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reverse of what the syntactic evidence indicates (see e. g. Kamp & Reyle 
1993). In these analyses, the content of the antecedent subordinates the 
content of the consequent for purposes of interpretation and anaphora 
resolution. To make the semantic account compatible with the syntactic 
evidence Boeckx (2003) employs the mechanism of reprojection (Hornstein & 
Uriagereka 2002) to reverse the adjunct (if-clause)-main clause (consequent) 
relation on the way from surface syntactic analysis to LF so that an quantified 
antecedent can c-command a donkey pronoun: 





a donkey; if 






a donkey; if' 
if IP X° it; 
The main motivation for such a destructive operation is to account for the 
binding of donkey pronouns like it above which resist the standard syntactic 
analysis in terms of constituency in combination with the assumption that 
bound anaphora requires c-command. The fact that the functor analysis 
necessitates this type of operations militates against it (as is also the case for 
the approach shown in (40) above). We are going to see in a later chapter 
whether a distinct structural analysis of conditionals in combination with the 
190 
standard DS analysis of anaphora can account for the same phenomenon 
with less radical innovations in the grammar. 
The issue of anaphora, involving partly structural and partly semantic 
considerations brings us to the interpretational issues regarding the choice of 
analysis. We will now turn to the question as to whether it is possible to derive 
a conditional interpretation from natural language input that does not have the 
form of an if p, (then) q string. If this is possible we then need to decide 
whether the lexical input provided by if is really encodes content which 
directly derives LOT sentences involving the ---> connective. Or whether, in 
parallel with coordinate/juxtaposed structures and the connective A, the 
conditional meaning is derived by other means. 
3. a. 2. Interpretational evidence against the functor analysis 
One type of evidence that points to the conclusion that natural languages 
can express the LOT connective -> in ways other than the form if p, (then) q 
is the claimed equivalence in meaning between conditionals and certain 
coordinate structures (see e. g. Culicover & Jackendoff 1997, Dancygier & 
Sweetser 2005: ch. 9). The propositional content taken to be explicitly 
encoded by a conditional construction can be expressed in natural language 
by the simple coordination of two clauses: 
(61) You come to me in two years' time and I'll tell you if I was right (NS. WB. 166 cited in 
Dancygier & Sweetser, ibid: 238) 
(62) You pay us a trillion bucks and we'll take you to a Hoosegow. Then you can bargain 
with them. (NS. SC. 50, ibid) 
(63) Kiss my dog and you'll get fleas. (= If you kiss my dog you will get fleas) 
(64) Komm (du) bloß einen Schritt nahrer, und ich schieße German (from Han 2000) 
come (you) only one step closer and I shoot 
Come one step closer and I'll shoot 
(65) Ela pio konda ke tha se pirovoliso Modern Greek 
Come more close and will you shoot 
Come closer and I'll shoot you 
As these structures are reportedly widely attested cross-linguistically (see, 
e. g. Han 2000) one cannot dismiss them as accidental/arbitrary 
idiosyncrasies of English. Therefore there are two options for analysing what 
is going on here: (a) we could conclude that the conditional meaning is not 
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encoded but derived by inference (cf. Clark 1993), or, (b) it is encoded and it 
is a property of UG to generate such meaning-form correspondences. If what 
is grammatically encoded in these structures is A-conjunction then what is 
ultimately derived, i. e. the conditional interpretation, is a weakening of the 
information that had been encoded. Therefore the only solution for a 
monotonic grammatical framework like DS is either to postulate an ambiguity 
of the conjunction and (cf. Culicover & Jackendoff 1997), sometimes A 
sometimes ->, or to leave it to pragmatic processes to derive the conditional 
interpretation in the above. The latter need not upset the operation of the 
grammatical formalism since the non-monotonic nature of the phenomenon 
points directly to the involvement of inference processes (see e. g. Carston 
1998 regarding concept loosening). Since ideally we would like to opt for 
ambiguity only as a last resort we should consider to leave it to pragmatic 
processes to derive the conditional meaning in (61)-(65) above61. Such an 
account will also explain why the construction remains "iconic" in that the 
positional flexibility enjoyed by if-clauses is not available here. In that case, it 
can be claimed that a structure with an if-clause is nothing but a 
grammaticised encoding of the inferentially derived meaning seen in (61)- 
(65), an encoding which being well established allows for positional flexibility, 
and tense/mood patterns not allowed with and-conditionals. Taking and as 
encoding a functor taking two propositional arguments (Cormack & Smith 
2005)62, the analysis of if as encoding a function which takes two type t 
arguments is then the obvious choice since the conditional structure would be 
nothing more than a crystallisation of an enriched meaning available to 
coordinate structures as well. However, there is evidence that the conceptual 
content encoded in if-structures is a conceptual primitive (Wierzbicka 1997) 
61 There is one more option within the context of DS assumptions: as suggested by 
Dancygier & Sweetser (2005) inferential patterns can become encoded over time and and- 
conditional constructions can be seen in those terms. DS offers a formal reconstruction of this 
intuition in terms of routinisation (see Cann et. al. 2005: Ch. 9). We can therefore consider an 
analysis in terms of routinasion which will explain both the "subordination" properties of such 
constructions and their basis on inference patterns. This is an issue for further research in the 
Present context. 
2 In fact they argue that the lexical item and is a "marker" not the actual operator itself which 
is implicit but we simplify here. 
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and therefore there is no need to argue that it is derivative. On the other 
hand, as we saw, such an analysis does not provide a straightforward basis 
to derive the idiosyncratic properties of if-clauses which seem to parallel the 
behaviour of relatives and contrast with that of coordinate structures. The 
challenge now that these considerations present for the current account is to 
capture the syntactic facts that are adduced in favour of if-clauses being 
adverbial subordinate clauses without postulating ad hoc syntactic 
configurations and mechanisms. If there are sui generis syntactic properties 
that characterise if-clauses and other adjuncts the DS assumptions require 
them to be accounted for either in terms of encoded lexical instructions or as 
reflecting the dynamics of processing. We will now turn to examine more 
evidence that support a subordinating analysis of if-clauses as well as the 
syntactic properties that the DS analysis has to account for. 
3. b. Subordination types 
As we said above there are only two options in DS for "subordinating" the 
content of one clause to that of another: either one is the argument of the 
predicate of the other or there is a LINK relation between the nodes of the two 
independent trees. We are going to see now what seems to be contradictory 
diagnostic evidence in that respect in that if-clauses present behaviour that 
bears the characteristics of each type of subordination. 
3. b. 1. The subordinative properties of if-clauses: 
Besides the structural properties of conditional sentences that were presented 
above there are a few more phenomena that any syntactic analysis of 
conditionals has to account for. The behaviour of if-clauses parallels the 
behaviour of another type of clause, relative clauses, pointing to the 
conclusion that a similar analysis should be assigned to them (i. e. an analysis 
in terms of LINKed structures). However the freedom of movement for the if- 
clause shown above in (5)-(7) and elsewhere indicates that there is a 
difference: relative clauses in English can be dislocated as long as they follow 
the argument to which they attach (besides cases of extraposition) and under 
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these circumstances they are never dislocated out of "islands" exactly 
because arguments cannot violate island restrictions. Therefore if we are to 
give a parallel analysis to all such clauses there has to be an argument inside 
the tree representation constructed from the consequent to which the content 
of the if-clause attaches by the LINK relation. Moreover, the presence of then 
in the consequent and the obligatory preverbal position of the if-clause in 
those cases, as well as data from other languages, points to a parallel, noted 
by many researchers previously, between left dislocated if-clauses and 
correlatives. Let's now see the syntactic behaviour that we have to account 
for. 
First of all, besides positional freedom for the if-clause, there is no strict 
adjacency requirement between antecedent and consequent. The 
consequent corresponding to a clause-initial antecedent might be embedded 
as can be seen in the cases below: 
(66) [If John is late again ] Mary believes that Bill will fire him = 
a. Mary believes that if John is late again Bill will fire him 
or 
b. If John is late again then it is the case that Mary has the belief that Bill will fire him. 
However, the distance between antecedent and consequent is not arbitrary. 
Their separation respects what in the linguistic literature are sometimes called 
island restrictions (Iatridou 1991). This means that, for example, the 
antecedent of a conditional cannot be construed as originating inside a 
relative clause or the complement of a noun (Complex NP-constraint, Ross 
1967): 
(67) Mary called the man who will be hired if John leaves. => 
(68) *If John leaves Mary called the man who will be hired. 
(69) [If Bill fails]; John saw the teacher who will be fired 
(70) 0 John saw the teacher who will be fired if Bill fails 
(71) Mary believed the claim that Bill will leave if John stays. 
(72) *If John stays Mary believed the claim that Bill will leave. 
This seems to imply that antecedent and consequent stand in some kind of 
local relation that has to be expressed by the formalism. Another property of 
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such structures that has to be explained is the fact that, like in relative 
clauses, extraction is not allowed from inside an if-clause, i. e., if-clauses are 
themselves islands: 
(73) John saw the man who shot Mary = 
(74) *Who did John see the man who shot? 
(75) John will fire Mary [if she calls John]. 
(76) *Who will John fire Mary if she calls _? (77) [If John sees Mary] he will kiss her. 
(78) *Who [if John sees _] will 
he kiss her? 
As we said earlier, if-clauses lack independent "illocutionary force" 
markers and seem to be included in the speech act performed by use of the 
main clause. This is similar to what is found with relative clauses: 
(79) *John, who do I like, left 
(80) *The table that (you) move is not heavy 
The presence in the main clause of then or its analogue in other 
languages is reminiscent of the correlativisation strategy that many languages 
use in order to form relative clauses (von Fintel 1994; see the Warlpiri and 
Hindi data in Chapter 3). This type of structure has to be accounted for too: 
(81) If he is sick then he stays at home 
(82) Wenn er krank ist, dann bleibt er zu Hause German 
(from Koenig & van der Auwera 1988) 
The correlativisation facts however when taken in their cross-linguistic 
perspective point to the possibility that there might be various degrees of 
subordination that have to be captured by the analysis (as argued by Koenig 
& van der Auwera ibid). In V2 languages like German and Dutch an indication 
of embedding is that the verb occurs clause-finally. For example, in general, 
clauses that appear as the argument of another verb have their own verb in 
final position (there are exceptions concerning some "bridge" verbs and some 
other constructions see, e. g. Koenig & van Auwera ibid, Heycock 2002). In 
contrast, in unembedded clauses the verb occurs as the second constituent, 
following a left-dislocated constituent or the subject (V2). /f-clauses pattern 
invariably with subordinated clauses in that they do not allow for V2. On the 
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other hand, the fact that a conditional relation might be derived inferentially 
between two clauses does not affect verb position. In (83) below there can be 
an inferentially derived conditional meaning; however the word order in the 
two clauses is not affected: 
(83) Du liebst mich, und ich bin glucklich German (from Haiman 1986) 
you love me and I am happy 
(84) Wenn du mich liebst, (dann) bin ich glucklich 
if you love me (then) am I happy 
if you love me I am happy 
This shows that the presence of an element like if in a clause has significance 
not only for its semantic/inferential properties but also for its overall syntax. 
Distinct syntax however does not mean that the meaning encoded by it 
cannot be derived inferentially. In addition certain types of conditional can 
have a paratactic form in that the lack of a complementiser like if or its 
analogues is offset by verb-initial syntax: 
(85) if John had seen Mary ... (86) Had John seen Mary ... (87) Should you wish to go, please let me know 
(88) Wenn Hans kommt dann geht Susanne German (from latridou & Embick 1994) 
if Hans comes then goes Susan 
if Hans comes, Susan goes 
(89) Kommt Hans dann geht Susanne 
comes Hans then goes Susanne 
if Hans comes, Susan goes 
(90) Wäre Hans gekommen, dann wäre Susanne abgefahren 
Had Hans come, then would-have Susanne left 
Had Hans come, then Susanne would have left 
Unlike the paratactic "conditional" in (83) though such structures must be 
interpreted as conditionals. This shows that even though conditional 
interpretations can be derived by inferential processes there is also a cross- 
linguistic tendency for distinctive encoding of such meanings either by a 
selected lexical item or by a particular syntactic form (see Comrie 1986 and 
Bhatt & Pancheva 2005: 642-645 for a survey of means for encoding these 
interpretations). 
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Regarding the behaviour of if-clauses with respect to subordination to 
the consequent, according to Koenig and van der Auwera (1988), there are 
three patterns of if-clause integration in German and Dutch: 
(a) a clause-initial if-clause can be immediately followed by the finite 
verb; in this case it seems that the if-clause can count as the first 
constituent for V2. 
(b) - the if-clause is followed by resumptive element like then in English 
with the finite verb following; in this case the if-clause would seem to 
be a more peripheral element than in the previous structure 
(c) the if-clause precedes another topical constituent and the finite verb 
follows; in this case also the if-clause does not count as the first 
element for V2; therefore it could be seen as peripheral again even 
though there is no overt resumptive element in the main clause. 
In present terms this evidence seems to point to the conclusion that even if 
one pursues an integrational analysis for the content derived by if-clauses the 
possibility of it functioning as a peripheral element has also to be taken into 
account. This is not an unexpected outcome since, according to the DS 
analysis of nominal arguments, any argument inside a clause can be related 
to another peripheral element in the so called Topic structures. We will take 
up the latter issue in the next chapter. Below we will present an analysis for 
fully integrated if-clauses. 
4. A DS analysis of conditionals 
4. a. Introduction of the situation argument 
In the present analysis of conditionals, following much current work in the 
formal semantics literature, we will employ an additional argument for 
propositional representations standing for the situation of evaluation (see 
Heim 1990, von Fintel 1994, Chierchia 1995 a. o. ). Farkas (1997) proposes 
that for each world w we define an extensional model MW = <Sw, UW, VW> 
where SW is a set of situations in w, Uw is the set of individuals in w and VW 
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assigns values to the constants of the language with respect to the situations 
in S. As suggested in Kratzer (1986) we assume that situations are parts of 
worlds, each situation part of a unique world. Truth of a logical form (If) in a 
world w is determined with respect to truth in a situation in w: 
(91) An If is true in w with respect to M if there is a situation s c. S, , such that the If is true in s with respect to M. 
For our purposes the situation argument of a predicate will be explicitly 
represented on the tree and will combine with it by the usual means of 
function application. Crucially for the present analysis, the situation argument 
can be a variable, an epsilon term or a tau term. These terms will appear in 
the scope statement as any other regular argument. Taylor (1985), among 
others, provides motivation for the view that explicit existential quantification 
over situations is involved in the logical form of natural language sentences. 
Simplifying somewhat, the sentence below can be taken as ambiguous 
between the two logical forms displayed below it: 
(92) Henry gracefully ate all the crisps 
(93) Vy. Crisp'(y) -" 3e. Eat'(Henry', y, e) A Graceful'(e) 
(94) 3e. Vy. Crisp'(y) --> Eat'(Henry', y, e) A Graceful'(e) 
In addition Farkas (1997) argues that the situation argument must scopally 
interact with individual quantificational terms in order to derive the range of 
interpretations possible for the following: 
(95) If a boy he likes comes over, Johnny shows him his turtle. 
The indefinite in the above according to Farkas can be interpreted as having 
either wide scope with respect to the situations of evaluation, in which case 
there is a particular boy being mentioned, or it can have narrow scope in 
which case for each situation considered there is potentially a different boy 
involved. The obvious way to deal with these cases in DS is to allow terms 
representing situations to appear in the scope statement and interact freely 
with the variables contributed by the nominal terms. As is standard in DS, we 
assume that indefinites contribute epsilon terms which must necessarily 
depend on some other term in the current tree. In the case above in order to 
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derive the wide scope of the epsilon term derived from the indefinite, we need 
a DS representation in which this term outscopes another term representing 
the range of situations introduced by the conditional. The term derived from 
the indefinite will in turn be outscoped by the world of evaluation which must 
be taken as necessarily the first element in the scope statement. It also 
appears as the argument of the monadic predicate World, decorating the Ty(t) 
node, e.. g. World(wi). Although we will not deal with modality and tense 
issues in the present work we will assume that the world of evaluation w will 
also eventually appear as a label on the formula decorating the root node of a 
propositional tree as is standard in DS. This is because we do not expect that 
there are any scope ambiguities regarding terms and the world of evaluation 
for each proposition. Being the label, the world of evaluation has necessarily 
widest scope and acts as a point of reference for the evaluation of all other 
terms. The Q-Evaluation rule has to be modified now to reflect this view: 





World(w[x, J), Scope(x1<... < x, ), Fo(q [v x tydx]) ,... } } 
{... { Ty(f), 
..., 




where for x occurring free in q and w[x, ]= a world variable x, or w[xl]=vlxltp, 
the values fvnXn ,[ Xn wn/Xnln((P), for ve {e, T, Q} and fý, (cp) are defined by: 
(a) f, x,, ((p) = w[a/x] -> (P[a/x] 
where a=Tx(tp-+ p) 
(b) fE xw (q) = 4i[b/x] A cp[b/x] 
where bcx(y A 
(c) fa ., p ((P) _ (tp[c/x]) ((P[Gx]) 
where c= vax((p)(cp)) 
(d) fw[x, l ((P) = w[x, ]: (P 
The actual world wo is the default world of evaluation. Modals and other 
intensional operators can be seen to optionally introduce new worlds of 
evaluation by existentially or universally quantifying over worlds accessible 
from wo. We will now see how these assumptions will be implemented in the 
DS tree representations. 
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We will add a new type in DTy in order to allow the situation argument to 
be processed. We will call this new type Ty(es). We assume then that the 
values in DTy are sorted with Ty(e) as a general type with subtypes of Ty(es) 
for situations and Ty(ei) for individuals, Ty(ew) for worlds etc. However for 
simplicity of illustration we will continue to notate the type of individuals as 
Ty(e), i. e. we will omit the subscript when no ambiguity arises. Metavariables 
can be specified to take values either of the most general type (Ty(e)) or the 
more specific types (Ty(e; ), Ty(es) etc. ). 
There are two ways to introduce the situation argument in the 
representation. (a) The content assigned to verbs (and predicates in general 
but we omit discussion of this issue here) comes from the lexicon with an 
additional situation argument. This argument is the last to combine with the 
predicate. For instance, the Formula value produced by processing an 
intransitive verb like run will now be Ax. At. Run'(x)(t). The tree resulting from 
the parsing of a string like John runs will now be as follows63: 
(97) Tn(X), Ty(t), World(wo), Fo(wo: Run'(John)(s)) 
Tn(XO), Ty(e3), Fo(s) Tn(X1), Ty(es -" t), Fo(At. Run'(John')(t)) 
Tn(X10), Ty(e), Tn(X11), Ty(e -->(es --"t)), 
Fo(John') Fo(Ax., \t. Runxt) 
(b) The second option would be to introduce the situation argument as an 
optional addition to the representation in case it is needed (as e. g. in the case 
of a conditional structure). This follows suggestions in Recanati (2004) 
regarding optional arguments. In the present context Recanati's suggestion 
can be implemented as follows. We maintain that the encoded content of a 
simple sentence like "John runs" is given as usual with the following 
representation (omitting tense): 
63 We will omit brackets as much as possible when there is no risk of misunderstanding. 
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(98) Tn(X), Ty(t) Fo(Run'John) 
Tn(XO), Ty(e), Tn(X1), Ty(e -"t), 
Fo(John') Fo(Ax. Run'x) . 
In order to accommodate the presence of a situation argument but without 
attributing its presence to any linguistic input we can assume a computational 
rule which introduces the situation argument explicitly to the minimal tree 
consisting of a requirement for establishing a structure of type t (the Axiom): 
(99) Situation Argument Introduction Rule 
{ ... {Tn(n), ? Ty(t),..., 0}... } {... {Tn(n), ? Ty(t), 
..., 
0), 
{<ir><lo>Tn(n), Ty(t -, (es -, t)), Fo(Ap. At. p(t)) 
{<J. o>Tn(n), ? Ty(es -t)}, 
{<to><l>><lo>Tn(n), Ty(e3), Fo(S), ? 3x. Fo(x)}, ... } 
By application of this rule, the structure in (100) below will be transformed as 
shown in (101): 
(100) Tn(n), ? Ty(t), 0 
Situation Argument Introduction 
(101) 
Tn(X), ? Ty(t) 
Tn(X0), Ty(e, ), Fo(S), ? 3x. Fo(x) Tn(X1), ? Ty(es -. t) 
Tn(X10), ? Ty(t) Tn(X11), Ty(t --+(e3 --*t)), Fo(Ap. At. p(t)), 0 
Unless a specification of the situation argument is given by linguistic input 
(e. g. by means of an if-clause sentence initially), the usual rules of parsing will 
construct the lower propositional tree and the pointer will end up at the Ty(t) 
node: 
(102) 
Tn(X), ? Ty(t) 
Tn(X0), Ty(es), Fo(S), ? 3x. Fo(x) Tn(X1), ? Ty(es -"t) 
Tn(X10), Ty(t), Fo(Run'John'), 0 Tn(X11), Ty(t--*(e3 -+t)), Fo(Ap. At. p(t)) 
Tn(X100), Ty(e), Tn(X101), Ty(e -+t), 
Fo(John') Fo(Ax. Run'x) 
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From here the usual rules will also construct the Ty(es -'t) node and move the 
pointer to the situation node bearing the metavariable. At this point a value for 
this argument must be provided from context in order for the requirement to 
be satisfied (it is shown as a free variable below but an epsilon or tau term 
can also be substituted if available). Once this is achieved the entire structure 
can be completed by the usual means: 
(103) 
Tn(X), Ty(t), Fo(Run'(John's), 0 
Tn(XO), Ty(es), Fo(s), ? Fo(x) Tn(X1), Ty(e3 -*t), Fo(At. Run'John't) 
Tn(X10), Ty t), Fo(RunJohn') Tn(X11), Ty(t --"(es -+t)), Fo(? p. At. p(t)) 
Tn(X100), Ty(e), Tn(X101), Ty(e -1t), 
Fo(John') Fo(Ax. Run'x) 
Since all computational rules are optional the above method constitutes an 
implementation of the idea that the situation argument is an optional 
constituent of the proposition expressed, not explicitly encoded in the 
linguistic input. Other optional constituents can be introduced in a similar way. 
Although we believe that this method is probably the correct one, for simplicity 
of illustration in what follows we will use the previous method, option (a), 
according to which verbs come from the lexicon equipped with a situation 
argument. We will now illustrate this method more extensively. 
In order for the situation argument to be processed by the usual DS 
processing apparatus, the rules of Introduction and Prediction will be 
employed to provide for a further ? Ty(e) position. Introduction and Prediction 
starting from the usual ? Ty(t) axiom induce two additional nodes: a node with 
a requirement for Ty(es) and its sister ? Ty(es -> t). (the scope statement 
includes the world of evaluation which we have assumed to be wo, the actual 
world as a default (see Papafragou (1996: 186-187), 2000 for justification in 
the context of a pragmatic theory): 
(104) Tn(X), ? Ty(t), World(wo), Scope(wo < S), ? 3x. Scope(wo < x), 0 
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Introduction and Prediction 
(105) Tn(X), ? Ty(t), World(wq), Scope(wo < S), ? rx. Scope(w0 < x) 
Tn(XO), ? Ty(es), 0 Tn(X1), ? Ty(e3 --, t) 
The situation argument will always be initially introduced as a metavariable Si, 
Si, Sk etc. since it is possible to supply a value for it from the context (as a 
instance of saturation). Any quantificational terms introduced subsequently 
will also be able to depend on this metavariable. In the tree above, with the 
pointer at the type e3 node the metavariable will be inserted by a 
computational rule64: 
(106) Situation Metavariable Insertion Rule 
{... {Tn(n), ? Ty(t), ... }, { <To>Tn(n), ? Ty(es) , 0), {<r, >Tn(n), ? Ty(es -+ t) } ... } {.. {Tn(n),? Ty(t),.., 0}, {<To>Tn(n), Ty(e3), Fo(S), ? Sc(S), ? 3x. Fo(x) }, {< 1>Tn(n),? Ty(e, -, t))... } 
A requirement for the term substituting for the metavariable to participate in 
some statement is also inserted (? Sc(S)). We will now slightly modify the 
definition of the monadic predicate Sc in order to make it compatible with the 
presence of the situation argument which might be a variable, an epsilon, tau 
or other quantificational term: 
(107) Sc(v1, I) =df 
[ vj. ] = q, x, cpx where q= E/T/Q65 v v[, ] =xjn 
<T. >( Ty(t) A ay [Scope(x < y) v Scope(y < x)] ) 
In the new definition the predicate Sc takes as its argument a term (e. g. 
epsilon or tau term) or a variable and it is satisfied if the variable included in 
that term participates in a scope statement. We also need a scope action for 
situation arguments: 
64 Note that Anticipation can move the pointer downwards if the situation argument is to be 
developed immediately afterwards. 
65 Q stands for any other quantificational binder like those contributed by expressions like 
most, few etc. (see Kempson et al. 2001) 
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(108) Scope action for situation arguments: 
IF { Ty(es), ? Sc(v1, ]) } 
THEN gofirst, (? Ty(t) ); 
put(Scope(U < x), 
? 3y(DOM(y) A Scope(y < x) n Vr(Scope(y <r )-" Scope(x < r)))) 
ELSE abort 
We also need to modify the definition of DOM to take into account the 
variables inside situation arguments and the world argument: 
(109) Tn l=m DOM(a)66 
Tn km ? Ty(t) A 
(11 [Ty(e) A <jo> <lo> Fo(a)l) v World(v[a]) v <lp> Fo(v[a]) 1 
where v[a] = (q, a, (pa where q= e/r/Q67) v (vla] = a) 
According to the rule in (106) after insertion of the metavariable on the 
situation node, the pointer is moved to the root. Suppose that the value for 
the metavariable S can be given by an accessible epsilon term in the context: 
E, s, ps, for p some salient (potentially complex) proposition. Then the 
metavariable can be substituted immediately by movement of the pointer to 
the type es node by Anticipation, the rule that moves the pointer from mother 
to daughter if there is an outstanding requirement. The scope action rule can 
also apply. This will satisfy the requirements so that Completion can move the 
pointer back to the root: 
(110) Tn(X), ? Ty(t), Scope(wo< s),? x. Scope(wa ), 
0 
Tn(X0), 2T-y(es) Tn(X1), ? Ty(es -), t) 
Ty(e) Fo(e s ps), ? 3x FO(X) ? Sc(c ps) 
However if there is no appropriate value available for the metavariable at the 
present moment the underspecified value and requirements can be left to 
66 In Kempson et al (2001) where the situation argument is treated as a label there is a 
slightly different definition of the predicate DOM. 
67 Q stands for any other quantificational binder like those contributed by expressions like 
most, few etc. (see Kempson et al. 2001) 
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await resolution until the latter stages of the parse. In either case, the rest of 
the parsing rules remain as usual. The ? Ty(es -* t) node (which is equivalent 
to the ? Ty(t) node in the standard presentations of DS) can now be expanded 
with Introduction and Prediction to accommodate the subject and the 
predicate: 
(111) Introduction and Prediction 
Tn(X), Scope(wo< s),? Ty(t) 
Tn(XO), Fo(E, s, ps) Tn(X1), ? Ty(es t) 
Tn(X10), ? Ty(e), 0 Tn(X11), ? Ty(e --+ (es -+ t)) 
The lexical input provided by John can now be processed and this will 
decorate the type e node. Completion and Anticipation move the pointer to 
the predicate node where the verb can be parsed. The modified lexical entry 
for an intransitive verb like run is shown below (tense and mood will not be 
discussed here): 
(112) run 
IF ? Ty(e - (es --+ t)), 0 
THEN put(Fo(Ax. As. Run (x)(s)), Ty(e --. (e., --> t)) ) 
ELSE abort 
The transformation of the tree is now as follows after all the usual rules have 
applied: 
(113) 
Tn(X), ? Ty(t), Ty(t), Scope(wo< s), Fo(Run'(John')(e, s, ps)), 0 
Tn(X0), Fo(E, s, ps) Tn(X1), ? Ty(es-* ¬} 
Ty(es --"t), Fo(At. Run'(John't) 
Tn(X10), ? T-y(e) Tn(X11), ? Ty(e-"-(es-- 0) 
Ty(e), Fo(John') Ty(e -"(e8 -*t)), Fo(Äx. ht. Run'xt) 
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By means of the Q-Evaluation Rule the formula on the root node will be 
converted to: wo: p(a) A Run'(John')(a) where a=E, s, p(s) A Run'(John')(s). 
We now have most of what is needed to allow the processing of conditional 
sentences. Let's see what more needs to be added. 
4. b. Conditionals 
4. b. 1. Logical form 
Under the present analysis sentences containing if-clauses will be assumed 
to give rise to two LINKed trees: processing of the main clause, the 
consequent, results in one tree, let's call it the main tree from now on, while 
processing of the antecedent results in another. The latter appears connected 
to the situation node of the main tree by the LINK relation. The establishment 
of this relation will also effect a unification of values between two nodes of the 
joined trees in the following way: the final result of processing the antecedent 
of a conditional will produce a tau term (T-term) as the root of that tree 
(highlighted in (114) below) 68: 
(114) The tree derived by processing if p from the string if p, q: 
` consequent 
', ýTy(e5) ? TY(e5-+ f), 
LINK 
Ty(es), Fo( T, s, ps ) 
antecedent 
This term once derived will be copied in the main tree in order to serve as the 
Formula value of its situation node: 
68 We omit reference to the world of evaluation when it is not relevant to the discussion from 
now on. We also omit the scope statements. 
206 
(115) ? Ty(t) 
Ty(es), Fo(T, s, ps) ? Ty(e,, t), 
LINK 
Ty(es), Fo( T, s, ps ) 
The newly introduced T-term in the main tree, being an ordinary argument of 
the predicate, will be incorporated in the proposition derived at the root 
through the usual function-application process: 
(116) The global tree derived by processing if P, Q: 
Ty(t), Fo( q(T, s, ps) ) 
Ty (es , Fo(T, s, ps) Ty(e, -* t), Fo(At. gt) 
LINK 
Ty(e3), Fo( T, s, ps ) 
Since the shared term is a quantificational r-term, it will contribute to the 
Scope Statement of the main tree. The DS rules for processing quantification 
structures will apply at the end of the parse and yield a propositional structure 
at the root node: 
(117) Initial Formula derived by parsing if p, q: q(r, s, ps) 
Formula that results after application of Q-Evaluation Rule: 
p(a) -+ q(a) where a=T, s, (ps --" qs) 
We thus derive a proposition where the content of the consequent (q, above) 
is construed as a property of situations. What is asserted is that this property 
q is true of all the situations that satisfy the description p provided by the 
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content of the if-clause (q(r, s, ps)). That is, the content of the if-clause, p, 
becomes the Restrictor in a universal quantification over situations (r, s, ps) 
whereas q becomes the Nuclear Scope. By the quantificational restructuring 
rules we also derive a term (a above) which can serve as the situation 
argument for another proposition or as the replacement for the metavariable 
contributed by a pronominal. 
Since we want to capture the contextual dependency of situational 
quantification as an instance of saturation (modelling e. g. Lycan's 2001 
"envisaged" and "real" possibilities) we will assume that the Restrictor itself 
includes a metavariable that has to be substituted by appealing to the context 
of utterance. This means that only situations that are considered "relevant" 
will be included in the set of situations making up the Restrictor. Although we 
will not include it in the tree representations for simplicity, we assume 
therefore that the Restrictor includes a metavariable that has to be substituted 
by the context of utterance: T, s, ps n Rs. R is a metavariable that has to be 
substituted by a predicate of situations (a complex proposition) expressing 
"what is expected" or "envisaged" given the propositions in the Discourse 
Context (note that the Discourse Context is not assumed to contain only 
information that has been made available by processing linguistic input; in 
fact it can be extended by means of inference as long as the principle of 
relevance is satisfied). This will allow us to derive the distinct flavours 
associated with the meaning of types of conditionals that have been 
discussed in the literature without having to make syntactic distinctions 
encoding those differentiations (this assumption is very close to von Fintel's 
1994 implementation which also involves propositions seen as sets of 
situations and intersecting the content of the if-clause with the discourse 
context). For example, Noh (1996) analyses "meta representational" 
conditionals in terms of relevance theory assumptions. Consider the following 
dialogue which shows a pattern problematic for standard truth-functional 
accounts of natural language conditionals: 
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(118) A: Two and eleven makes thirty 
B: If two and eleven makes thirty, you need more work on maths 
Noh (ibid: 20) 
As Noh argues such cases (and many others) can be accommodated if we 
assume that the antecedent of the conditional is (meta) representing the 
proposition expressed by the previous utterance as well as the higher-level 
explicature associated with it. So the proposition expressed by the antecedent 
is not simply "two and eleven makes thirty" but rather "if you say/believe that 
two and eleven makes thirty". For present purposes we can assume that this 
is a case of saturation: the value given to the metavariable R will 
accommodate the content of this higher level explicature plus any other 
contextually relevant assumptions. In that respect the proposition expressed 
by B's utterance above will be: "All situations in which you believe/say that 
two and eleven makes thirty ... are situations in which you need more work 
on maths". 
In more concrete terms, let's look at the completed tree derived for the 
string if John cries, Mary laughs. The diagram is shown below: 
(119) If John cries, Mary laughs. 
(120) Ty(t), Fo(Laugh'(Mary', (i, s, Cry'(John')(s)) ) 
Ty(e5), 
Fo(r, s, Cry'(John')(s)), 
INK 
Ty(es), Fo(i, s, Cry'(John')(s) ) 
Ty(es-' t), 
Fo(At. Laugh'(Mary')(t) ) 
Ty(cn3), Ty(cns --f e3), 
Fo( s, Cry'(John')(s)) Fo(AP. T, P) 
Ty(t), Ty(t , cn, ), 
Fo(Cry'(John')(s)) Fo( AR. s, R) 
It can be seen that the proposition derived by the processing of the 
antecedent, Cry'(John)(s), becomes the argument of a function that copies its 
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situation argument (which must be a free variable) and creates a Restrictor in 
the appropriate format required for the construction of a r-term (s, 
Cry'(John')(s) ). The r-binder is then applied to the Restrictor by means of 
function application and the T-term is eventually derived (r, s, Cry'(John)(s)). 
This term is subsequently copied at the situation node of the main tree and 
serves as the situation argument there. The proposition decorating the root 
node of the global tree, Laugh'( Mary', (r, s, Cry'(John')(s)) ), can be interpreted 
as: Mary laughs in all situations that John cries or: All situations in which John 
cries are situations in which Mary laughs. The role of the content of the if- 
clause here is simply to provide the restrictor of the r-term that ensues by 
processing the lexical item if and the protasis. In that respect there is no 
separate assertion of the proposition John cries which is as it should be 
according to the desired truth conditions. The formula will be transformed by 
the quantifier evaluation (Q-Evaluation) rules to: 
Cry'(John')(a) -> Laugh'(Mary')(a) 
where a=r, s, Cry'(John')(s) -+ Laugh(Mary) (s) 
In this configuration a LOT sentence containing the connective --> is derived 
at the root node of the main tree without any explicit encoding of it by any 
natural language lexical item. This connective is the same as the one derived 
by the parsing of universally quantifying expressions like every man and 
appears in the logical form by similar means (i. e. we assume that material 
implication is only part of the encoded meaning of if, the residue is the 
quantification over situations, so the analysis is richer but not incompatible 
with the standard material implication interpretations). In the same way as 
conjoined propositions are derived by linguistic input containing relative 
clauses it will be seen below that it is the combination of the lexical and 
computational actions associated with the parsing of a conditional that derive 
such universally quantified implicational structures. Indeed, under this 
analysis, conditional sentences are assumed to derive representations of a 
similar form as nominal relative clauses, in that a term is shared between the 
two trees. However, although the main tree in nominal relative constructions 
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provides itself the term to be copied and the LINKed tree provides additional 
predicative content on that term, here the "relative", the if-clause input, leads 
to the construction of a term newly introduced to the main structure. In that 
respect the processing of if-clauses resembles, in the nominal domain, 
headless relatives in English and other languages like the following: 
(121) John eats [what(ever) he likes] 
(122) [What(ever) John eats] harms the environment 
(123) John will arrest [whoever called] 
(124) o Giannis xeretise [opion irthe] Modern Greek 
the John greeted [who came] 
John greeted [whoever came] 
In both type of cases, a term is derived from a secondary tree that is being 
developed in parallel to the main one. This term is copied to the main tree so 
as to serve the role of an argument of the predicate in that proposition. As we 
will see later, the presence of this secondary tree, its attachment to the main 
structure by the LINK relation and the incorporation of its informational 
content to the main tree is what explains the subordination features exhibited 
by if-clauses. 
We now turn to see the dynamic process that puts all the information 
together so as to derive the above structures. 
4. b. 2. Dynamics 
4. b. 2. a. The lexical entry for if 
We now have to define the precise route to be followed by the parser in order 
to accomplish the construction of the above structure from an input string in 
the form of a conditional sentence. We start with the instructions stored into 
the lexical entry for if. These are responsible for initiating the building of a new 
LINKed tree which is going to accommodate the lexical input from the 
protasis. Because the result of processing the antecedent must be a r-term of 
type es the rules in the lexical entry for if also initiate additional structure 
above the linked tree which is going to derive the required term by the usual 
structure-building means of DS, i. e., type deduction in parallel with function 
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application. The following is the lexical entry triggered by the parsing of the 
particle if. 
(125) if 
M. IF ? Ty(es) 
(2). THEN put(? 3x. (Fo(x) A <L>Fo(x))ss ); 
(3). make(<L>); go(<L>); put(? Ty(e5)); 
(4). make(<11>); go(<11>); put(Ty(ens -s e3), Fo(AP. T, P); go(<7i>); 
(5). make(<do> ); go(<lo>); put(? Ty(cns) ); 
(6). make(<J 1>); put(Ty(t -* cns)), freshput(s, Fo(AR. s, R) ); go(<j1>); 
(7). make(<Io>); go(<[o>): put(? Ty(t)); 
(8). make(<Io>); go(<Io>); put(Ty(e5); Fo(s); go(<To>) 
(9). ELSE abort 
We will illustrate the effect of parsing the lexical item if by going through the 
parsing steps that it induces. Let's start with the parsing of the string If John 
cries Mary laughs. Assuming, as above, that Introduction and Prediction have 
created the two. nodes lying under the ? Ty(t) root node the pointer now 
appears at the left argument daughter where there is a requirement for a 
node of type es to be derived (? Ty(es)). With this being the case, the 
condition at line (1) at the lexical entry of if above (IF ? Ty(es)) is satisfied 
and the actions specified in the following lines can take place. By line (2) the 
requirement for a shared formula with a linked node is now inserted here: 
? 3x. (Fo(x) A <L>Fo(x)). The first conjunct of this requirement can only be 
satisfied by a proper Formula value from the domain DFO, appearing on the 
node, i. e., not a metavariable but a proper term. The second conjunct will be 
satisfied only when the same Formula value appears at a node LINKed to the 
present one. In combination with the rest of the processing rules this second 
part of the requirement will narrow down the choice for a Formula value to just 
a quantificational term newly derived in the LINKed structure. By the 
69 As Ronnie Cann (pc. ) has suggested this complex requirement is redundant given the 
LINK Evaluation Rule which is the only way to move the pointer back to the main tree. We 
retain it for illustration purposes. 
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instructions in line (3) (make(<L>); go(<L>); put(? Ty(es)) )a new node 
connected with the LINK relation to the current one is built and a requirement 
to derive a term of type es is introduced there: 
(126) parsing if 
(127) ? Ty(t) 
0 
? Ty(e5) ? Ty(e5 --pt) 
? ax. (Fo(x) A <L> Fo(x)) 
L 
? Ty(es), 0 
This is the node where the derived T-term of type es will eventually appear. 
Line (4) (make(<J. j>); go(<J, j> ); put(? Ty(cns --} es), Fo(AP. T, P)), instructs the 
parser to construct the functor daughter of this node. This is the node where 
the functor that introduces the T-binder appears. The sister of this node will 
provide an argument of Ty(cns), the restrictor for the r-term. The pointer 
moves upwards. By line (5), make(<jo> ); go(<. lo>); Put(? Ty(cns) ), the node 
that will accommodate the restrictor for the i-term is built and a requirement 
for the appropriate type, a set of situations, is inserted. The structure that is 
being created is completely equivalent to a nominal quantificational term even 
though the types are sorted to range over situations: 
(128) ? Ty(t) 
? Ty(e5) ? Ty(es -'t) 
? 3x. (Fo(x) .: <L> Fo(x)) 
L 
? Ty(e=) 
? Ty(cns), 0 Ty(cn, --e3), Fo(AP. T, P)) 
At line (6) the parser is instructed to introduce another functor daughter 
this time underneath the current ? Ty(cns) node: make(<j1>); go(<j>>); 
put(Ty(t --*cns)). This daughter takes as its argument a proposition of type t 
with a free variable situation argument. The formula value on this node is 
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introduced as follows: freshput(s, Fo(AR. s, R) ). The action freshput 
selects and inserts as a Formula value for a node the first available variable 
that has not appeared earlier in the global tree being constructed. Therefore it 
ensures that a fresh variable is always introduced. The variable introduced 
here by the action freshput will be identical to the one introduced as the 
situation argument of the propositional tree built out of processing the protasis 
(this is ensured by the employment of bold, lower case variables). The 
Formula value on this node will bind that variable in order to create a 
Restrictor of the appropriate shape for the r-binder at the next level up. The 
pointer returns to the mother node by the action: go(<Ti>). By line (7) the 
propositional tree for the content derived from the antecedent is initiated; this 
node will eventually be decorated by a formula of type t and will provide the 
set of situations quantified over: 
(129) ? Ty(t) 
? Ty(e, ) ? Ty(es -t) 
? ax. (Fo(x),,. <L> Fo(x)) 
L 
? Ty(eg) 
? Ty(cn3)Ty(cn5 -> e5), Fo(AP. r, P) 
o 
? Ty(t), 0 Ty(t ->cns), Fo(AR. s, R) 
In all respects the tree derived by the antecedent will be a simple predicate- 
argument structure of type t. The only differentiation will be that its situation 
argument will be a free variable instead of the usual situation arguments 
which are taken to be quantificational terms. The fact that a variable appears 
there will allow the structure derived to be interpreted as the representation of 
a set of situations and thus to serve as the restrictor for a quantificational 
term. We need to make sure that the particular fresh variable selected earlier 
is indeed the situation argument of the ? Ty(t) structure so that it can be bound 
inside the Restrictor for the r-term. Line (8) of the lexical rule above 
(make(<Jo>); go(<10>); put(Ty(es), Fo(s)) builds the situation argument 
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daughter of the ? Ty(t) node and inserts the variable selected by freshput 
previously. Additionally the type specification for the node is inserted and the 
pointer is moved to the mother ? Ty(t) node: 
(130) ? Ty(t) 
? Ty(e5) ? Ty(es --°t) 
? 3x. (Fo(x) i. <L> Fo(x)) 
L 
? Ty(es) 
? Ty(cn; )Ty(cns -> e3), Fo(AP. T, P) 
), 0 Ty(t --+cns), Fo(? R. s, R) 
Ty(e3), Fo(s) 
At this point the contribution of the lexical input contributed by if has been 
completed. It has initiated an otherwise ordinary ? Ty(t) structure with a fresh 
free variable as its situation argument. Now the regular parsing processes 
can take over and continue the processing of the antecedent (the fact that the 
situation accommodating daughter has already been introduced does not 
affect the operation of Introduction and Prediction). Let's see the structure 
derived by parsing the string if John cries: 
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(131) processing John cries : 
(132) ? Ty(t) 
? Ty(es) ? Ty(es -4) 
? -x. (Fo(x) A <L> Fo(x)) 
L 
? Ty(es) 
? Ty(cits) Ty(cns -> es), Fo(AP. T, P) 
Ty(t), Ty(t -+cns), Fo(AR. s, R) 
Fo(Cry'(John')(s)), 0 
Ty(es), Ty(es -. t) 
Fo(s) Fo(Au. Cry'(John')(u) ) 
Ty(e), Fo(John') Ty(e -->(es -'t)) 
Fo(Ax. Au. Cry'(John')(u)) 
At the stage of the parsing shown above the parsing of the antecedent has 
been successfully completed although in terms of interpretation the 
representation at the type t node is that of a set of situations, not truth- 
evaluable as a proposition without further ado. There is also incomplete 
structure on top of this type t node which connects it with the main tree 
through a series of daughter and LINK relations. Therefore we now need to 
finish off the internal nodes so that we can achieve the construction of the 
required r-term. The usual rules of function application and type deduction 
can apply to complete the nodes up to the level at which the LINK relation 
terminates: 
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(133) ? Ty(t) 
? Ty(es) ? Ty(es -mot) 
? ix. (Fo(x) r. <L> Fo(x)) 
L 
Ty(es), Fo( , s, Cry'(John')(s)) 
Ty(cns), Fo(s, Cry'(John')(s)) Ty(cns --> es), Fo(AP. T, P) 
Ty(t), Ty(t --ýcns), Fo(AR. s, R) 
Fo(Cry'(John')(s)), 0 
Ty(e5), Ty(es , t) 
Fo(s) Fo(Au. Cry'(John')(u) ) 
Ty(e), Fo(John') Ty(e -. (ey --. t)) 
Fo(Ax. Au. Cry'(John')(u)) 
The newly introduced T-term has as its restrictor the propositional content 
derived by parsing the string John leaves under the assumption that a free 
variable was selected as its situation argument. We now proceed to copy this 
term to the main tree. 
4. b. 2. b. Link Evaluation for conditionals 
With the required T-term having been derived we can now continue the 
processing of the structure. At this point the pointer appears at the top node 
of the r-term's subtree. In order to be able to move the pointer back to the 
main tree and copy the term to its situation node a rule of Evaluation is 
required. The rule proposed below belongs to the family of rules 
characterised as LINK Evaluation rules. It very simply copies the formula from 
one node to another one which is related to it by means of the LINK relation; it 
simultaneously moves the pointer there. In our case the LINK Evaluation rule 
will also introduce a requirement for scope resolution concerning the T-term 
(? Sc(x)) and an underspecified scope statement at the root node 
(Scope(U<x)): 
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(134) LINK Evaluation Rule: Conditionals: 
{ {Tn(X), Ty(t),... }, 
{<1o>Tn(X), ? Ty(es), ? 3x. Fo(x)... }, {<L1><Io> Tn(X), Ty(e3) Fo(atxl)...., 0 }... }} 
{ {Tn(X), Ty(t),..., Scope(U<x) }, 
{<1o>Tn(X), ? Ty(es), ? Jx. Fo(x)...,? Sc(x), Fo(a[x]), 4}, {<L'><jo> Tn(X), Ty(es) Fo(ai. ]),... }... }} 
Application of this rule to the tree above will result in the appropriate copying 
and the requirement at the situation node can now be satisfied: 
(135) ? Ty(t) 
Ty(es), ? Sc(s) ? Ty(es -, t) 
? a.. (Fo(x) <i > Fo(x) 
Fo(T, S, Cry'(John')(s)), 0 
L 
Ty(eg), Fo(T, s, Cry'(John')(s) ) 
Ty(cns), Ty(cn, -e, ) 
Fo(s, Cry'(John')(s)) Fo(AP. T, P) 
Ty(t), Ty(t --> cns), 
Fo(Cry'(John')(s)) Fo(AP, s, P) 
Ty(es), Ty(es -, t) 
Fo(s) Fo(Au. Cry'(John')(u) ) 
Ty(e), Fo(John') Ty(e ý(es -t)) 
Fo(Ax. Au. Cry'(John')(u)) 
The parsing of the consequent can now go on as usual. The final formula 
derived at the top node of the global tree will be a universal quantification 
ranging over (contextually restricted) situations at which John cried. For 
completeness we repeat the tree derived by processing of our example 
sentence below: 
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(136) If John cries, Mary laughs. 
(137) Ty(t), Fo(Laugh'(Mary', (r, s, Cry'(John')(s)) ) 
Fo( Cry'(John')(a) --+ Laugh'(Mary')(a) 
where a=T, s, Cry'(John')(s)-->Laugh'(Mary')(s) ) 
Ty(es), Ty(e3-- t), 
Fo(T, s, Cry'(John')(s)), Fo(At. Laugh'(Mary')(t) ) 
INK 
Ty(es), Fo( T, s, Cry'(John')(s) ) 
Ty(cn3), Ty(cns -º es), 
Fo( s, Cry'(John')(s)) Fo(AP. T, P) 
Ty(t), Ty(t --* cnn ), 
Fo(Cry'(John')(s)) Fo(AR. s, R) 
4. b. 2. c. The absence of low construals 
The parallel properties of if-clauses and nominal relatives have led several 
researchers to the assumption, which is also adopted here, that if-clauses are 
a type of relative clause in the same way that when-clauses and where- 
clauses can be taken as relatives over implicit time or location specifications 
(see e. g. Geis 1985, Bhatt & Pancheva 2001/2005). Nevertheless there is 
one difference between these clauses and if-clauses. Consider the following: 
(138) John left when Mary claimed that Bill left 
The above is ambiguous between the following two interpretations: 
(139) John left at the time at which, according to Mary, Bill left 
(140) John left at the time at which Mary made the following claim: "Bill left" 
Unlike when-clauses, if-clauses are not ambiguous in that respect: 
(141) John left if Mary claimed that Bill left. 
(142) In any case that is such that Mary made the claim: "Bill left", John left (in that case) 
(143) # John left in any one of the circumstances that Bill left according to Mary's claims 
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This is captured in the present analysis because the initiation of the LINKed 
tree has been assigned to the actions associated with the word if. So it can be 
seen that the situation argument is created immediately as a fixed node on 
the new tree. In contrast, for when-clauses/where-clauses, as in nominal 
relatives, we can assume that the situation argument is constructed as initially 
unfixed, hence the low construals. 
We now turn to examine how the other syntactic properties of 
conditional sentences are accounted for under this analysis. 
4. b. 3. Linear order 
In this section we discuss the two main linear positions where an if-clause can 
appear: (i) sentence-initially, and, (ii) sentence-finally. Both these positions 
can be accounted for without further ado with the rules postulated and the 
usual processing machinery afforded by DS. 
First of all we have to account for the fact that an antecedent may be 
related long-distance to its consequent: 
(144) If Mary is late again John believes/said/has requested that we should fire her 
(145) If she wins the lottery Mary has promised John that she will buy him a present 
In order to process such structures we need to assume that the content of an 
if-clause can be developed at an unfixed node. On the other hand an if-clause 
can appear post-verbally: 
(146) John believes/said/has requested that we should fire Mary if she is late again 
We can account for both structures with the current rules if we assume that 
both types of position indicate that the if-clause can be parsed as an unfixed 
node introduced either by *-Adjunction or by Late *-Adjunction. Let's see how 
this will work. 
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4. b. 3. a. Case 1. Sentence-initial if-clause 
In these cases we can assume that the ? Ty(t) node introduced as the Axiom 
bears the pointer. If the antecedent occurs sentence-initially the rule of 
*Adjunction, can apply and introduce an unfixed node of type es (? Ty(es))70 
(147) * Adjunction 
{ {Tn(X), ? Ty(f), 0) } 
{ {<1 >Ty(X), ? 3x. Tn(x), ? Ty(es), 01, {Tn(X), ? Ty(t)} } 
Diagrammatically we can see the creation of the unfixed node in the following 
tree which is the initial point of parsing without any lexical input: 
(148) 
Tn(a), ? Ty(t) 
<r>Tn(a),? Ty(es), ? ax. Tn(x) 
As soon as this happens, we are ready to process lexical input since the 
pointer is in an environment matching what is required for application of the 
instructions in the if lexical entry (see line (1) in (125) above repeated below): 
(149) if 
(1). IF ? Ty(e3) 
(2). THEN put( ? 3x. (Fo(x) A <L> Fo(x)) ); 
(3). make(<L>); go(<L>); put(? Ty(e3)); 
(4). make(<11>); go(<11>); put(Ty(cn3 -+ e5), Fo(AP. T, P); go(<? t>); 
(5). make(<lo> ); 9o(<lo>); put(? TY(cn3) ); 
(6). make(<, 1>); put(Ty(t --* cns)), 
freshput(s, Fo(AR. S, R) ); go(<j, >); 
(7). make(<Io>); 9o(<l0>); put(? Ty(t)); 
(8). make(<lo>); go(<lo>); put(TY(es); Fo(s); go(<To>) 
(9). ELSE abort 
70 Remember that we have defined the type e as being the more general category covering 
both individual entities and situations. 
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Since the condition is met the instructions can apply at this point. A 
requirement will be inserted at the unfixed node that a formula value for it 
must be found at the root of a LINKed tree. The construction of the new 
LINKed tree will also be initiated and completed up to a point where the 
standard procedures can take over. A fresh variable ranging over situations 
will be introduced and will eventually end up bound by the i-binder. The 
antecedent can then be processed and the LINKed tree will be completed as 
was shown above. The completed structure before processing of the main 
tree resumes is shown below: 
(150) If John cries = 
Tn(a), ? Ty(t) 
<T. >Tn(a),? Ty(es) ? ax. Tn(x), 
Ty(e3), Fo(i, s, Cry'(John')(s)), ? Bx. (Fo(x) A <L>Fo(x)) 
L 
Ty(es), Fo( T, s, Cry'(John')(s) ), 0 
Ty(cns), Fo(s, Cry'(John')(s)) Ty(cn3 e3), Fo(AP. T, P) 
Ty(t), Fo(Cry'(John')(s)) Fo(AR. s, R(s) ), Ty( t -" cn3 ) 
At this point the rule of Completion will move the pointer to the ? Ty(t) node 
and Introduction and Prediction will construct a situation node and its sister. 




Tn(a), ? Ty(t) 
? Ty(e5) ? Ty(es --pr) 
<T. >Tn(a), Ty(es) 
? 3x. Tn(x), Fo(T, S, Cry'(John')(s)) 
Ty(e3), Fo( T, s, Cry'(John', s) ) 
Ty(cn, ), Fo(s, Cry'(John', s)) Ty(cn, - ei), Fo(AP. -r, P) 
Ty(f), Fo(Cry'(John')(s)) Fo( AR. s, R(s) ), Ty( (t--* cns ) 
Ty(es), Fo(s) Ty(es -t), Fo(At. Cry'(John')(t) ) 
Merge 
Tn(a), ? Ty(t) 
2TW--. 3 ? Ty(e5 -. t) 
<T. >Tn(a), Ty(e3) 
? 3x Tn(x), Fo(i, S, Cry'(John')(s)) 
Ty(e, ), Fo( r, s, Cry'(John', s) ) 
Ty(cn, ), Fo(s, Cry'(John', s)) Ty(cn, -> e, ), Fo(AP. T, P) 
Ty(t), Fo(Cry'(John')(s)) Fo( AR. s, R(s) ), Ty( (t-> cns ) 
Ty(es), Fo(s) Ty(es -+t), Fo(At. Cry'(John')(t) ) 
Alternatively, Merge, which is an optional operation will not apply at this node 
and the unfixed node will be progressively carried down the tree and merge 
with the situation node of an embedded structure. The tree shown below 
displays the stage just before Merge has applied: 
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(152) If John cries, Mary believes that 
Tn(a), ? Ty(t) 
Ty(es), Fo(S) ? Ty(es ->t) 
Ty(e), Fo(Mary') ? Ty(e ->(es --t)) 
? Ty(t) ? Ty(t --+( e -+(es ->t))) 
Fo(AP. Ax. As. Believe'(P)(x)(s)) 
? Ty(es) ? Ty(es -+t) 
<j. >Tn(a), Ty(e3) 
? 3x. Tn(x), (T, s, Cry'(John')(s)) 
L 
Ty(es), Fo( T, 
_s, 
Cry'(John')(s) ) 
Ty(cns), Fo(s, Cry'(John')(s)) Ty(cns -" e; ), Fo(AP. T, P) 
Ty(t), Fo(Cry'(John')(s)) Fo( AR. s, R(s) ), Ty( (f-. cn, ) 
Ty(es), Fo(s) Ty(es ->t), Fo(At. Cry'(John')(t) ) 
After Merge has occurred this is the structure that will ensue: 
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(153) Merge 
Tn(a), ? Ty(t) 
Ty(e. ), Fo(S) ? Ty(e. -4) 
Ty(e), Fo(Mary') ? Ty(e -ý(e. -. t)) 
? Ty(t) ? Ty(t --. ( e -. (e5 -it))) 
Fo(AP. Xx. As. Believe'(P)(x)(s)) 
? ß{e6} ? TY(es -. t) 
<j. >Tn(a), Ty(es) 
? : Tn(x), Fo(T, s, Cry'(John')(s)) 
L 
Ty(e, ), Fo( i, s, Cry'(John')(s) ) 
Ty(cns), Fo(s, Cry'(John')(s)) Ty(cns -> os), Fo(AP. r, P) 
Ty(t), Fo(Cry'(John')(s)) Fo( AR. s, R(s) ), Ty( (t-. co, ) 
Ty(es), Fo(s) Ty(e, -. t), Fo(At. Cry'(John')(t) ) 
The procedures defined here explain why the processing of strings like below 
might result in two distinct readings, represented by two distinct trees: 
(154) If John cries Sue believes that he just pretends. 
The string above is ambiguous. It has at least the following two readings: 
(a) Sue has the following belief: all situations where John cries are 
situations where he just pretends, or 
(b) all situations where John cries are situations where Sue has the belief 
that he just pretends. 
The two readings are derived in our analysis by assigning to the processing of 
the sentence two distinct structures. The first reading results when the unfixed 
situation node that has been created initially and which carries the LINK 
structure along with it merges with the situation node of the tree created by 
the processing of the clause which is the object of the verb believe (see 
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(153)). The second reading is derived if the unfixed situation node is merged 
with the situation node of the tree derived by the processing of the matrix 
clause (see (151) ). 
4. b. 3. b. Case 2. Post-verbal if-clause 
If the antecedent appears post verbally as in (155) below 
(155) John cries if he is upset 
then the main tree will have been completed up to the node Ty(eS--*t) before 
processing of the if-clause starts: 
(156) John cries = 
(157) ? Ty(t), 0 
Ty(e3), Fo(S), ? 3x. Fo(x Ty(es-+ t), Fo(As. Cry'(John')(s) ) 
Ty(e), Fo(John') Ty(e --*(es ->t)) 
Fo(Ax. As. Cry'(John')(s)) 
With the pointer at the ? Ty(t) node Anticipation can apply since there is a 
requirement for a proper formula value at Ty(es) daughter right below. Once 
the pointer is at the Ty(es) daughter the rule of Late *Adjunction, repeated in 
(158) below, creates a locally unfixed copy of the Ty(es) node: 
(158) Late *Adjunction 
{... {Tn(X), Ty(x), 0} } 
{ {<? >Ty(X), ? Bx. Tn(x), ? Ty(x), 0), {Tn(X), Ty(x))... } 
(159) Late *Adjunction ?T (t) 
Ty(e3), Fo(S), ? 3x. Fo(x) Ty(o - t), Fo(As. cry'(John')(s) ) 
Ty(e), Fo(John') Ty(e -. (es -t)) 
? Ty(es),? 3x. Tn(x), 0 Fo(Ax. As. Cry'(John')(s)) 
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After application of this rule again we have created an appropriate context 
matching what is required for the processing of the word if in (125). As above, 
a LINKed tree is constructed from this node and the process and outcome are 
exactly the same as in the previous cases. The only difference will be that the 
unfixed node is constructed locally, so that it becomes completed and merges 
with its mother before any processing of the main tree resumes. Below is the 
state of the tree after processing of the if-clause but before Merge has 
occurred. As we can see the tree is identical to the one in (151) except for the 
fact that the nodes decorated with the subject and the predicate of the main 
tree have been completed: 
(160) ? Ty(t) 
Ty(es), Fo(S), ? 3x. Fo(x) Ty(e.,, t), Fo(As. cry'(John')(s) ) 
* Ty(e), Fo(John') Ty(e -->(es -*t)), 
Fo(Ax. At. cry'(x)(t)) 
? Ty(es),? 3x. Tn(x), 0 
Fo(T, s, Upset'(John')(s)) 
Ty(es), Fo( T, s, Upset'(John')(s) ) 
Ty(cn, ), Fo(s, Upset'(John')(s)) Ty(cns -" es), Fo(AP. T, P) 
Ty(t), Fo(Upset'(John')(s)) Fo(AR. s, R(s) ), Ty(t--r cn, ) 
Merge can now occur so that both the requirements at the unfixed node and 
at the fixed node can be satisfied: 
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(161) Merge ?T (t) 
Ty(es), Fo(S), ? 3x_¬o(x) Ty(e5 - 1), 
? ly(e3),? 3x. Tn(x), Fo(As. Cry'(John')(s) ) 
Fo(T, s, Upset'(John')(s)), 0 
L Ty(e), Fo(John') Ty(e ---*(es -t)), 
Fo(Ax, At. Cry'(x)(t)) 
Ty(es), Fo( r, s, Upset'(John')(s) ) 
Ty(cn, ), Fo(s, Upset'(John')(s)) Ty(cns - es), Fo(AP. i, P) 
Ty(t), Fo(Upset'(John')(s)) Fo( AR. s, R(s) ), Ty(t- co, ) 
After Merge Completion and Evaluation will finish the main tree and the result 
will be indistinguishable to the tree derived by processing a preverbal if- 
clause like ff John is upset John cries. Thus, even with post-verbal if-clauses, 
the processing and completion of the tree derived from the antecedent will 
have been finished before completion of the tree derived from the 
consequent. This is as it should be as it is assumed that the antecedent 
provides a restriction for the situation argument for the main proposition which 
therefore cannot be completed until that argument is provided. The lexical 
entry for if derives this outcome by allowing the if-clause to be processed, if 
not sentence-initial, only when the pointer is located at the situation argument 
node of the main tree just before its completion. An additional effect that will 
be discussed in a later chapter is that this method of processing will provide 
an explanation for the anaphoric links associated with the processing of 
antecedent and consequent. 
4. b. 3. c. Parenthetical if-clauses 
Another issue that needs to be addressed now is what kind of connection 
there is between the consequent and a parenthetical if-clause. 
(162) If John shouts, Mary gets extremely upset. 
(163) Mary gets extremely upset if John shouts. 
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(164) Mary, if John shouts, gets extremely upset 
(165) If Sue raises, Bill will call". from Abbot (2005: 9) 
(166) Bill will call, if Sue raises. (ibid) 
(167) Bill, if Sue raises, will call. (ibid) 
(168) Bill will, if Sue raises, call. (ibid) 
It seems that such if-clauses, like other parentheticals, can appear in different 
positions within the clause72. Since such if-clauses are assumed to modify a 
distinguished argument in the proposition they are processed in parallel with 
we can allow them to exploit the same Late *Adjunction option as post-verbal 
if-clauses. To implement this first we need to introduce a rule which will move 
the pointer from a predicate node to the node hosting the (still incomplete) 
situation argument: 
(169) Parenthetical Structure Pointer Movement Rule73 
IF ? Ty(e -->(e* -mot)) 
THEN IF <j, -><J >Ty(es), ? 3x. Fo(x) 
THEN go-first(? Ty(t)); go(<jo>) 
ELSE abort 
ELSE abort 
The input to such a rule could be the schematic tree constructed after parsing 
the initial constituent of (164): 
(170) Mary r 
?Tt 
Ty(es), Fo(S), ? 3x. Fo(x) ? Ty(e5-+ t), 0 
Ty(e), Fo(Mary') ? Ty(e --" (es -+ t)) 0 
71 "raise" and "call" should be taken here as poker terms (R. Cann pc. ) 
72 The position intervening between the direct object and the verb seems to be excluded 
unless the object is "heavy": 
John will buy, if he has enough money, that nice painting at the exhibition. 
Remember that the vocabulary of lexical actions and computational rules is exactly the 
same and it is only for presentation purposes that computational rules are sometimes given 
as input-output clauses. The notation e* exploits the Kleene star operator to refer to a 
predicate with an underspecified number of arguments (cf. Marten 1999). Remember also 
that we use e as a super-type covering all types of arguments, individuals and situations. 
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Wherever the pointer appears, after application of the rule it will move to the 
situation argument node: 
(171) 
? Ty(t) 
Ty(es), Fo(S), ? 3x. Fo(x), 0 ? Ty(e3-> t) 
Ty(e), Fo(Mary') ? Ty(e -->(e, -+ f)) 
The context where the pointer appears now is appropriate for Late 
*Adjunction to apply: 
(172) Late *Adjunction 
{... {Tn(X), Ty(x), 0) } 
{ {<T. >Ty(X), ? 3x. Tn(x), ? Ty(x), 01, {Tn(X), Ty(x)}... } 
The locally unfixed node can be built and the instructions included in the 
lexical entry for if can be executed. The if-clause can then be processed to 
derive the T-term through the familiar mechanisms: 
(173) 
?T t) 
Ty(eg), Fo(S), ? 3x. Fo(x) ? Ty(e, --+ t) 
Ty(e), Fo(Mary') ? Ty(e -+( es--> t)) 
Ty(es),? 3x. Tn(x), 0 
Fo(T, s, Shout'(John')(s)) 
Ty(es), Fo( T, S, Shout'(John')(s) ) 
Ty(cn, ), Fo(s, Shout'(John')(s)) Ty(cn, e3), Fo(? P. t, P) 
Ty(t), Fo(Shout'(John')(s)) Fo( ISR. s, R(s) ), Ty(t-+ cns ) 
Completion will move the pointer to the higher Ty(es) node where Merge can 
occur. Now with the requirement for a Formula value for the Ty(es) node 
satisfied the pointer can return to the continuation of the processing of the 
apodosis by means of Completion and Anticipation: 
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(174) ?T t) 
Ty(es), Fo( T, s, Shout'(John')(s)) ? Ty(es-+t), 0 
Fo(S), ? 3x. Fo(x) 
Ty(e), Fo(Mary') ? Ty(es_* t) 
Ty(e3), Fo(T, S, Shout'(John')(s) ) 
Ty(cns), Fo(s, Shout'(John')(s)) Ty(cns -+ e3), Fo(AP. T, P) 
Ty(t), Fo(Shout'(John')(s)) Fo( AR. s, R(s) ), Ty( (t-> cns ) 
After all the information has been compiled on the nodes the resulting logical 
form will have exactly the same truth conditions as the one derived by all the 
following strings: 
(175) If John shouts, Mary gets extremely upset. 
(176) Mary gets extremely upset if John shouts. 
(177) Mary, if John shouts, gets extremely upset. 
(178) Mary gets, if John shouts, extremely upset. 
We have now provided ways of processing preverbal, postverbal and 
sentence-medial if-clauses by utilising a single lexical entry for if and without 
introducing any new processing methods to the DS toolbox except the 
assumption that the situation of evaluation can be processed as a regular 
(potentially optional) type e argument. We will now turn to examine whether 
the rest of the apparatus utilised by DS for the processing of arguments 
contributed by nominals can be also employed for the processing of 
conditionals and whether we need any extensions or additions to it or our 
current assumptions about the lexical contribution of if. 
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CHAPTER 6 
IF-CLAUSES AS TOPICS 
1. Haegeman (2001), (2003): 
Event Conditionals vs. Premise Conditionals 
Haegeman (ibid) distinguishes between two types of conditionals: (a) event 
conditionals in which the if-clause modifies the event denoted by the main 
clause and (b) premise conditionals in which the if-clause contributes a 
proposition which has to be taken as "the privileged context" for the 
processing of the apodosis (the latter has commonalities with latridou's 1991 
factual conditionals, epistemic conditionals in Sweetser 1990 and conditionals 
with metarepresentational antecedents in Noh 1996): 
(1) event conditional: (Haegeman ibid) 
If it rains we will all get terribly wet and miserable 
(2) premise conditional: 
If (as you say) it is going to rain, why don't we just stay at home and watch a video? 
She argues that the protasis in an event conditional provides a "cause" 
leading to the "effect" denoted by the content of the main clause. Premise 
conditionals, on the other hand, are usually "echoic" and have their own 
illocutionary force/anchoring to the speaker in contrast to event conditionals 
which are fully integrated in the syntactically encoded speech act of the main 
clause. She argues that this semantic difference between the two types of 
conditional has a syntactic basis. Although she characterises both types of 
protases as 'subordinated', in event conditionals the subordination is more 
evident and syntactically potent. Haegeman employs the separation of the 
sentence structure to the domain of the predicate, VP, the domain of 
modality/tense/mood etc., IP, and the domain of "the interface between the 
clause and its context", CP. /f-clauses in event conditionals are merged inside 
the VP/IP domain whereas premise-protases are located in the CP domain 
(therefore the two types exhibit distinct external syntax). Haegeman also 
assigns distinct internal syntactic articulation to each type of if-clause (their 
internal syntax). She employs a modified version of Rizzi's (1997) mapping of 
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the CP domain into distinct phrases headed by functional elements encoding 
discourse-related and subordinating functions: 
(3) The Split CP: 
Sub(ordination) > Force > Top(ic)* > Foc(us) > Top(ic)* > Fin(itiness) 
Event conditionals according to Haegeman are reduced clauses in that they 
lack the Force, Foc and Top heads while premise conditionals are intact in 
that they contain the same CP structure as main clauses (except 
subordination indicators). Her main evidence for these claims is as follows: 
a. Event conditional protases fall inside the scope of operators like tense, 
mood, negation, focus operators and quantificational adverbs in the main 
clause. For example, present tense inside an if-clause is interpreted as 
referring to a future time if the consequent has future tense. 
b. Premise conditionals have their own illocutionary force as opposed to 
event conditionals. Premise conditionals really encode two propositions 
with potentially distinct illocutionary forces. 
c. Main Clause phenomena (e. g. dislocation of arguments) only occur in 
sentences with a full CP, therefore, they do not occur in event conditional 
protases, whereas they occur in premise conditionals. 
d. Binding of pronouns in the protasis by a quantificational expression in the 
apodosis is only possible in event conditionals. 
e. (As a result), the semantic interpretation of the two types of clauses is 
distinct. 
If true, the DS analysis presented earlier would not immediately 
accommodate these claims as we did not make any distinction between two 
types of conditionals. Therefore acceptance of Haegeman's evidence would 
lead us to consider an augmentation of the DS analysis to parallel hers. We 
will first examine the possibility of postulating two distinct structures to the 
propositional content generated by the processing of if-clauses (their "internal 
syntax") below. 
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I. a. An alternative DS analysis? 
Within DS assumptions, Haegeman's observations regarding the distinct 
content provided by event and premise conditionals and their presumed 
distinct internal structure can be taken into account by assigning two distinct 
structural analyses to be provided by each type of string. Since DS is a 
lexicalised-procedural framework, the two distinct structures could be seen as 
resulting from two distinct sets of lexical actions associated with the word if 
(this would capture the distinct internal syntax of the two types). Notice that 
this means that the word if is ambiguous as between generating an event or 
premise interpretation. This can be further enriched by the assumption that 
each of the distinct sets of actions assigned to the lexical item if is executed 
according to whether the pointer appears on a LINK structure or an unfixed 
node (this would be intended to capture the distinct external syntax 
properties, we will discuss this further below). While the case of a protasis 
processed as a LINK structure can remain as already defined, embodying the 
analysis of premise conditionals, we could propose the following entry for the 
unfixed cases, implementing the analysis of event conditionals: 
(4) i74 
(1). IF ? Ty(es), ? 3x. Tn(x) 
(2). THEN put( ? 3x. (Fo(x) A <L> Fo(x)) ); 
(3). make(<L>); go(<L>); put(? Ty(e3)); 
(4). make(<l1>); go(<l>>); put(Ty(cns -* es), Fo(AP. T, P); go(<T1>); 
(5). make(<lo> ); go(<lo>); Put(? Ty(cn3) ) 
(6). make(<l>>); put( ? Ty((es --'t) - cn3); 
(7). make(<lo>); go(<lo>); put(Ty(es); freshput(S, Fo(s)); go(<jo>) 
(8). make(<l>>); go(<l>>; put(Ty(es --> ((e3 -4) --> cn., )); Fo(, \t. AR. t, R(t)); 
(9). go(<T1> <Ii>); make(<lo>); go(<lo>); put(? Ty(es -> t)) 
(10). ELSE abort 
74 1 am grateful to Ronnie Cann (pc. ) for a suggestion of how to simplify this lexical entry. 
234 
This set of actions provides a reduced structure for the tree generated by the 
if-clause in that there is no independent situation argument ever assigned in 
the propositional tree constructed from its input. Instead the reduced structure 
to accommodate the input of the protasis is introduced by the processing of if 
with an external situation argument which is eventually absorbed in the 
binding structure created for the quantificational binder. The following depicts 
the result of application of the rule in the case of processing an event 
conditional: 
(5) If John cries, Mary laughs. 
(6) Ty(t), Fo(Laugh' (Mary') (T, S, Cry'(John')(s)) ) 
Ty(es) Ty(es-* t), 
Fo(r, s, Cry'(John')(s)), Fo(At. Laugh'(Mary')(t) ) 
L 
Ty(e3), Fo( T, S, Cry'(John')(s) ) 
Ty(cn, --, es), Ty(cn5), 
Fo(AP. T, P) Fo(s, Cry'(John')(s) ) 
. Ty(es--+ t), Ty( (e5 mot) cn3 ), 
Fo(Ae. Cry'(John')(e)) Fo(AR. s, R(s) ) 
Ty(e) Ty(e ---, (es -+t)) Ty(es), Ty( e3 -- ((es -pt) --ý cns)), 
Fo(John') Fo(Ax. Ae. Cry'(John')(e)), ý* Fo(s) Fo (Ae. AR. e, R(e) ) 
With a few additional assumptions regarding the representation of the input 
provided by operators like tense, modals and speech act indicators this type 
of analysis will capture the tense subordination properties observed by 
Haegeman as well as her claimed impossibility of root transformations in the 
protasis. This is because the rule of *Adjunction will not be able to operate 
since there is no structure of type t constructed by the if-clause (see encircled 
area). However, although this is a possible analysis within DS it has to be 
rejected firstly on empirical and secondly on conceptual grounds having to do 
with the postulation of lexical ambiguity where the distinct interpretations can 
be accounted for by pragmatic and/or processing means. We will deal with 
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the latter consideration later. As concerns empirical validity, there are reasons 
to think that, at least in English and similar languages, there is no syntactic 
evidence disambiguating the two interpretations identified by Haegeman. 
Therefore for the reasons that we will see immediately below it seems 
preferable to uniformly maintain the lexical entry presented in the previous 
chapter (although we are going to see that some inferentially derived 
interpretational differences can be accounted for by allowing the 
underspecified content provided by if-clauses to be incorporated at distinct 
points in a processing cycle). 
1. a. 1. Temporal subordination 
Haegeman claims that in event conditionals the tense of the if-clause is 
subordinated to that of the main clause witness that, for example, a 
morphological present tense in the antecedent can be interpreted as referring 
to a future event. Notice that, even though Haegeman does not mention it, 
this is not a peculiarity arising solely with if-clauses. In the following relative 
clauses a present tense can be interpreted as referring to the future: 
(7) Every child who sees John will call his mother 
(8) Whoever sees John must call their mother 
Haegeman explains this phenomenon in if-clauses as arising out of the 
subordination of the time indicators in the if-clause to the tense operator in the 
consequent, the latter indicated by the morphological future tense: 
(9) If your back-supporting muscles tire, you will be at increased risk of lower-back pain 
In contrast, she claims, in premise conditionals like the following, future tense 
is interpreted independently of the consequent: 
(10) If I'm no longer going to be arrested for possessing cannabis ... shouldn't I be able to 
grow my own? 
Although it might be true that there is a tense dependency between the 
antecedent and the consequent (as there could be in independent clauses 
too, see Partee 1984a) it is not necessary that if-clauses containing future 
tensed verbs should be necessarily characterised as bearing the properties 
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that Haegeman attributes to "premise conditionals". The following attested 
examples show that the presence of future (going to) tense in the antecedent 
does not exclusively lead to an interpretation as a "premise conditional": 
(11) AEDs are now used in GP surgeries and by ambulance services. An increasing 
amount of AEDs are becoming available in busy public places like airports, railway 
stations and shopping centres. If you are going to operate a defibrillator, you need to 
have had thorough and recent defibrillator training and appropriate training update 
sessions. You also need to know basic life support. The British Heart Foundation (BHF) 
encourages training in emergency life support skills and the wider use of defibrillators. 
http: //www. bhf. org. uk/questions/index. asp? secondlevel=1154&thirdlevel=1193 as 
retrieved on 4 Apr 2005 14: 38: 52 GMT. 
(12) Email and absence from Brookes (staff only): 
If you are going to be away from Brookes, you can manage your email in three 
different ways: 
1. You can set up an autoreply so anyone sending you an email gets a standard reply; 
2. You can forward mail to another email address; 
3. You can deal with it by using Webmail. 
4. Once you return to work you can turn off the autoreply feature. 
http: //www. brookes. ac. uk/services/cs/email_issues/absence. html as retrieved on 23 Aug 
2005 20: 09: 51 GMT. 
(13) Of course, if you are going to use functions, then you have to make sure that you 
load the definition of the function before you call it for use. 
http: //www. injunea. demon. co. uk/pages/page207. htm as retrieved on 16 Aug 2005 
01: 09: 56 GMT. 
There is no motivation in the above pieces of text to necessarily attribute an 
"echoic" or argumentative interpretation to the if-clause. In fact, as Edgington 
(2003) argues, there is no necessary correlation between a future 
interpretation of the present tense in the antecedent and a "causal" rather 
than a "premise" interpretation. All Haegeman's event-conditional examples, 
given an adequate context, can be interpreted as premise-conditionals. 
Additionally, the purported tense dependency does not seem to arise in any 
other case except in the pattern: if + present, future. The tenses in the if- 
clauses of the following have their usual interpretations and their 
interpretation is not dependent on the consequent's tense: 
(14) If they caught the noon train, they will arrive at two. 
(past tense, past interpretation in the antecedent despite will in consequent) 
(15) If they caught the 10 a. m. train, they arrive/arrived/will have arrived at noon. 
(past tense, past interpretation in the antecedent) 
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As for the phenomenon that Edgington terms the "tense oddity" of the 
interpretation of the present tense in the protasis of conditionals like the 
following: 
(16) If they catch the two o'clock train, they will arrive at four 
she points out that it is not specific to conditional contexts. The future tense 
has two functions which can be dissociated: besides referring to future time it 
also indicates 'prediction' or 'inference'. For example, in the following, use of 
will does not refer to a future time but rather indicates an inferred conclusion 
or prediction regarding John's whereabouts: 
(17) John will be at home now 
On the other hand the present tense can be used to indicate the future when 
an event is presented as completely certain: 
(18) The sun sets at 7.03 tomorrow 
According to Edgington, inside an if-clause a future tense would be 
interpreted as 'prediction' or 'inference' and therefore, in most cases, it 
contrasts with the 'suppositional' meaning of the protasis. In fact, Edgington 
argues that Haegeman's characterisation of event conditionals as "causal" 
makes them too "factive". In Edgington's view, a conditional structure, of any 
type, involves an assertion of the consequent within the supposition 
expressed by the if-clause. The basis for this assertion within the scope of a 
supposition can be pragmatically enriched to any causal or inferential relation. 
From this point of view all conditionals can be characterised as "premise 
conditionals". 
1. a. 2. Root transformations 
Haegeman claims that, because of their structural deficiency, event 
conditionals do not tolerate phenomena that appear solely in main clauses 
e. g. topicalisation (the judgement below is Haegeman's): 
(19) *If these exams you don't pass _ you won't get a 
degree 
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This is because event conditionals lack some of the internal structure 
postulated for main clauses, i. e. they do not contain the projection of the 
heads Foc(us) and Top(ic) which are the syntactic positions hosting moved 
arguments. On the other hand, she claims that argument-fronting is 
(marginally) possible in adverbial clauses with root-like properties, i. e., 
premise conditionals: 
(20) If these problems we cannot solve _, 
there are many others that we can tackle 
immediately 
It is not clear why (20) above should be necessarily construed as a "premise 
conditional". As Edgington (2003) has shown we can always construct a 
context that will make any such conditional to be interpreted as "causal" and 
its syntactic form does not have to be changed. Moreover, as Shaer (2003) 
points out, there are parallel examples with dislocation occurring in what 
Haegeman would characterise as clearly "event conditionals": 
(21) If these books you don't read _ you won't pass 
the exam! 
Therefore it seems that this type of "root transformation" is possible after all in 
such clauses. An analysis which precluded utterances like the above as a 
matter of syntactic constraints would not make the correct predictions. 
Moreover Hageman's analysis of a reduced CP for event conditionals is 
supposed to account for the fact that they are fully syntactically integrated 
clauses whereas premise conditionals are not. However, the V2 
phenomenon, a sign of subordination in the Germanic languages which will 
be discussed below, does not seem to distinguish between premise and 
event conditionals either: on the one hand, V2 in general is impossible inside 
any type of if-clause ("internal syntax"); on the other hand, the two types of 
conditional postulated do not predict which kinds of protases can count as the 
first element for V2 (an issue of "external syntax"). Consider the following: 
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Afrikaans (modelled on an English example from Haegeman 2003) 
(22) As John in Rome bly, gebruik by moontlik nooit sy fiets nie. 
if John in Rome lives uses he probably never his bike not 
If John lives in Rome, he probably never uses his bike. 
Even though this is a "premise" conditional according to Haegeman, it is fully 
integrated in the main clause in that it counts as the first constituent for V2. 
Moreover, in the following the conditionals present "echoic" antecedents or 
consequents but full integration is still possible: 
Afrikaans (modelled on English examples from Noh 1996) 
(23) A: Twee en elf maak dertig. 
two and eleven makes thirty 
B: As twee en elf dertig maak, het jou wiskunde meer werk nodig. 
if two and eleven thirty makes, has your maths more work necessary 
if two and eleven makes thirty your maths needs more work 
(24) Context: the phone is ringing and B is going to pick it up: 
A to B: As dit John is, ek is weg 'n uur gelede 
if it John is, I am away an hour ago 
As dit John is, is ek weg 'n uur gelede 
if it John is, am I away an hour ago 
If it's John, I've left an hour ago 
It seems therefore there is no string related syntactic indication of the 
postulated semantic ambiguity (and in any case the existence of distinct 
semantic types is also in doubt as Edgington 2003 argues). Although the 
above are not necessarily counterexamples for Haegeman's analysis with the 
plethora of functional projections and features postulated, from the current 
perspective, the sparser logical form structure assumed by DS does not allow 
us to maintain any encoded syntactic distinction between premise and event 
conditionals. Consequently, considering all the syntactic evidence presented 
above, we have to reject the purported Haegeman-style DS analysis of if as 
inducing distinct propositional structures. For more arguments against 
Haegeman's view regarding the syntactic dichotomy between "event" and 
"premise" conditionals the reader is referred to Edgington (2003) and Shaer 
(2003). We now turn to the interpretational differences that are claimed to 
distinguish the two types and which Haegeman's analysis is designed to 
capture. 
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1. a. 3. Interpretational evidence 
While it seems that there are no evident syntactic differences that distinguish 
the two "types" of conditionals in English (apart from intonational clues which, 
we assume, are not discreetly encoded in the signal) it is true that different 
types of interpretations and inferential effects can be associated with if- 
clauses, effects roughly captured by each of the presumed types Haegeman 
postulates. It is widely accepted in the syntactic literature on conditionals that 
there is a distinction between what are called Factual and Hypothetical 
Conditionals. The latter type corresponds roughly to Haegeman's category of 
event conditionals. Premise conditionals seem to have features of the 
category of other authors' Factual Conditionals (latridou 1991, Bhatt & 
Pancheva 2001/2005, metarepresentational conditionals in Noh 1996). 
Additionally, another type of conditional has been distinguished in literature: 
the relevance or speech act conditionals, illustrated below: 
(25) If you are thirsty, there is beer in the fridge. 
According to latridou (1991), in Relevance Conditionals the antecedent is not 
used to single out the cases in which the proposition in the apodosis is 
claimed to hold. This is because that proposition is asserted to be true 
unconditionally. In those cases, instead, the antecedent is taken to specify the 
circumstances in which it is relevant to perform the speech act of informing 
the addressee of the truth of the proposition expressed by the consequent. It 
has been argued that in such structures there is an implicit performative verb 
in the main clause which explains the truth conditions. For the example in (25) 
above the underlying structure is claimed to be: 
(26) If you are thirsty, then [it is relevant forme to tell you that] there is beer in the fridge. 
Dancygier (1998), following Sweetser (1990) distinguishes between 
interpretations of conditionals in the content, the epistemic and the speech- 
act domains. The first type of interpretation roughly corresponds to event 
conditionals, the second to premise conditionals and the third to relevance 
conditionals. However, although Dancygier herself argues for a 
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"constructional approach" to the explication of the structure and meaning of 
conditionals she also presumes that the relation between the three domains is 
based on metaphorical transfer. This means that under the DS and RT 
assumptions made here, an appropriate pragmatic theory should be more 
suitable to derive the distinct types of interpretation associated with the 
processing of conditional structures in context without the semantic 
representation explicitly encoding every type of interpretation (which might 
very well be an open-ended number cf. Decklerk and Reed 2001). 
Nonetheless, one should note that the distinction between relevance and 
other conditionals, in contrast to the other distinctions that can be accounted 
for by purely pragmatic means (see e. g. Noh 1996), has some syntactic 
basis. In V2 languages like Afrikaans, according to the native speakers' 
judgements it is impossible to sustain the same interpretation between the 
two conditionals below; this is because if the protasis appears as the first 
element before the verb as in (28) then it cannot be assigned a "relevance" 
interpretation (although it can be assigned a "factual", metarepresentational 
or echoic interpretation, see (22)-(23) above): 
(27) As jy my nodig het, ek is by die kantoor Afrikaans 
if you me need has, I am at the office 
If you need me I am at the office 
(28) #As jy my nodig het, is ek by die kantoor 
if you me need has, am I at the office 
If you need me I am at the office 
We will see whether we can capture this distinction below. 
2. The DS Topic Analysis of if-clauses 
Considerations of syntactic evidence led us to question the structural 
encoding of any rigid differentiation between types of conditionals based on 
the structure of the if-clause. For this reason we rejected the purported 
ambiguity-of-if DS analysis presented above. However, although there is no 
evidence for a structural ambiguity as regards the structure of the if-clause 
itself (in our terms the structure of the proposition derived by processing an if- 
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clause), there is evidence that conditional structures can be put to distinct 
uses. This is shown by the different interpretations for if-clauses identified in 
the literature. It is widely accepted that a sentence-initial if-clause somehow 
provides the context for the processing of the consequent. We can give 
formal substance to this intuition in two ways within DS. Without attributing 
any ambiguity to the encoded content of the if-clause itself, as with the 
processing of nominal phrases, we can assume that if-clauses too can be 
processed either as LINKed structures occupying independent subtrees or as 
providing content occupying structurally underspecified nodes. And it is not 
unreasonable to expect that, as is the case with free word order languages 
and dislocation phenomena in English, distinct parsing routes will be exploited 
for contextual effects facilitating one type of interpretation over another (see, 
e. g. the distinction between "focus" and "topic" interpretations postulated for 
English and other languages, Cann et al. 2005). Although evidence for such 
distinct parsing strategies for if-clauses is not readily available in English 
(apart from intonation), in languages with V2 we find two distinct ways of 
associating the if-clause with the apodosis. We will try to capture this type of 
evidence for two distinct ways of parsing if-clauses within an appropriate DS 
analysis below. 
2. a. If-clauses and Nominals 
The decision to analyse the antecedents of conditionals as contributing 
situation arguments leads us to expect that all the structural options available 
to the processing of nominals contributing terms are also available to the 
processing of conditionals. This conclusion is in line with Schlenker's (2004) 
view regarding the fundamental symmetry that underlies linguistic reference 
in ontological domains like individuals, times and worlds despite the 
apparently variable syntactic means employed in individual languages. In the 
present context though this notion of symmetry will be assumed to hold at the 
level of the parsing procedures and LOT representations rather than in terms 
of surface-syntactic or external-semantic constructs. Terms of type e in DS 
can be processed by utilising two more strategies besides processing in the 
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usual argument positions: either as unfixed nodes initially in the parse or on 
their own individual subtrees which must be linked to another tree of type t. 
Below we discuss briefly these structures for the nominal domain (see Cann 
et al. 2005 for details). 
2. b. Left-Dislocation, Topicalisation, Hanging-Topic-Left Dislocation 
In English the term topicalisation refers to the phenomenon of a left-peripheral 
DP associated with some position more deeply embedded in the following 
structure. 
(29) John Mary dislikes 
_ (30) John Mary said Bill dislikes 
The fact that an argument position remains unoccupied as well as several 
connectivity effects like island-sensitivity indicate that the left dislocated 
phrase in these cases has to be construed as belonging to the following 
structure. In generative frameworks this is analysed as a movement 
dependency. In DS the rule of *Adjunction allows for the initial processing of 
such left-dislocated DPs as unfixed nodes and the rule of Merge for their 
eventual incorporation in the tree: 
(31) *Adjuncdon 
{ ... {{Tn(a), ... ? Ty(t), 
0}} ... } { 
... { {Tn(a), ... 
? Ty(t)}, {<r*>Tn(a), ? 3x. Tn(x),..., ? Ty(e), 0} } ... } 
(32) ? Ty(t) 
? Ty(e), Fo(John'), ? 3x. Tn(x) 
The tree constructed by this rule only temporarily records the fact that the 
dislocated DP was processed away from its eventual position since, after 
Merge, in the eventual structure, no record is retained of the initial structural 
underspecification: 
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(33) ? Ty(t) 
Ty(e), Fo(Mary') ? Ty(e -+t) 
? Ty(e), 0 Ty(e -+(e --*t)), 
Fo(, ky. Ax. Dislike'(y)(x)) 
? 3x. Tn(x), Ty(e), Fo(John') 
Merge 
(34) ? Ty(f) 
Ty(e), Fo(Mary') Ty(e ->t), Fo(Ax. Dislike'(John')(x)), 0 
Ty(e), Fo(John') Ty(e -->(e ->t)), 
? x-Tn(x), (o) Fo(hy. Ax. Dislike'(y)(x)) 
The movement analyses of such constructions in the literature contrasts 
with constructions which involve (obligatory) anaphoric-like dependencies 
between left-dislocated phrases and an argument position inside the following 
structure: 
(35) That woman you dislike, I saw her leaving 
(36) (As for) John, I'll deal with him later 
The standard diagnostics for such analyses cross-linguistically are the 
presence of a pronominal in the argument position and the lack of such 
connectivity effects as island sensitivity: 
(37) (As for) John, I'll deal with the man who insulted him later 
DS analyses such structures by means of the construction of two independent 
subtrees nodes of which are connected with the LINK relation. Here there is 
only an obligatory anaphoric relation between the two trees and no merging of 
nodes. Processing of the left-dislocated phrase is achieved by the following 
Topic Introduction Rule: 
(38) Topic Structure Introduction Rule 
{ ... { {Tn(a), ... ? Ty(t), 0}} ... } { ... {{Tn(a), ... ? Ty(t)}, 
{<L>Tn(a),? Ty(e), 0} } ... } 
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From the Axiom, the rule allows for the building of a new node required to be 
of type e and moves the pointer there. The new node is linked to the main 
tree in a sense analogous to it providing the head of a relative clause. This 
means that the LINK relation originates from the newly constructed ? Ty(e) 
node which reconstructs the intuition that such peripheral constituents provide 
the context for the parsing of the following string. After processing of the left- 
peripheral element has been completed a specialised rule is employed to 
move the pointer to the ? Ty(t) node and simultaneously introduce a 
requirement that a copy of the Formula value appearing at the linked Ty(e) 
node must be found in some subordinate position (<D>) in the main tree: 
(39) Topic Structure Requirement Introduction Rule 
{ ... { {Tn(a), ... ? Ty(t) }, {<L>Tn(a), Ty(e), Fo(a), 0} } ,.. } { ... { {Tn(a), ... ? Ty(t), ? <D>Fo(a), 0}, {<L>Tn(a), Ty(e), Fo(a) }}... } 
For illustration consider the tree derived by the processing of such a string: 
(40) (As for) John, Mary dislikes him 
(41) Ty(t), ? <D>Fo(John'), Fo(Dislike'(John')(Mary')) 
Ty(e), Fo(Mary') Ty(e -+t), Fo(Ax. Dislike'(John')(x)) 
Ty(e), Fo(John') Ty(e), Ty(e --*(e -"t)) 
Fo(John') Fo(Ay. Ax. Dislike'(y)(x)) 
It can be seen that unlike what was the case with the processing of unfixed 
nodes, here the final representation retains a record of the partial 
independence of the left-dislocated phrase since the latter provides input that 
appears on its own separate tree. The main tree obligatorily contains a copy 
of the formula derived by processing the left dislocated phrase as a result of 
the modal requirement, ? <D>Fo(a), introduced by the Topic Structure 
Requirement Introduction Rule. 
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We saw in the previous chapter that we can use the rule of *Adjunction 
to account for many of the syntactic properties of if-clauses. We will now 
consider their processing as topic structures. 
2. c. Topic structures and Conditionals 
2. c. 1. Clause-initial Link Introduction 
Since the present analysis assumes that processing of the protasis results in 
the construction of a term of type e it is natural to assume that the above 
Topic Introduction Rule should be able to apply for the processing of if- 
clauses too. We can indeed assume that conditionals can be processed in 
two distinct ways. On the one hand, as it was shown earlier, the situation 
argument carrying the LINKed tree accommodating the content of the protasis 
might be processed as initially unfixed. This argument, whether processed 
sentence-initially or sentence-finally, will be required to Merge with the rest of 
the tree otherwise the structure will not be complete. On the other hand, there 
is another way for the content of the antecedent to be integrated in the tree 
representing the content of the consequent: a situation argument might be 
constructed independently and a requirement for its Formula value to appear 
inside the tree representing the consequent can be imposed. In that case, by 
anaphoric means, the situation argument of the tree representing the content 
of the apodosis will have the same Formula value as the top node of the 
LINKed subtree. An illustration of how such a tree would look like is below: 
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(42) If John cries Mary laughs 
(43) Ty(t), Fo(Laugh'(Mary')(T, s, Cry'(John')(s)), 
Fo( Laugh'(Mary')(a), where a=r, s, Cry'(John')(s) --"Laugh'(Mary')(s) 0 
Ty(es), Ty(es--+t), 
L Fo(T, s, Cry'(John')(s)) Fo(Av. Laugh'(Mary')(v)) 
Ty(e) Ty(e -(eg --. t)) Fo(Mary') Fo(Ax. Av. Laugh'(x)(v)) 
Ty(es), Fo(r, s, Cry'(John')(s) ) 
Ty(es), Fo(T, s, Cry'(John')(s) ) 
? Ty(cn3) Ty(cn3 -*es) 
Fo(s, Cry'(John')(s)) Fo(AP, T, P) 
Ty(t), Ty(t -- cns ), 
Fo(Cry'(John')(s)) Fo(AR. s, R(s) ) 
Ty(es), Ty(es ->t) 
Fo(s) Fo(Av. Cry'(John')(v) 
Ty(e) Ty(e -> (eg -'t)) 
Fo(John') \x. Av. Cry'(John')(v) 
We now need to illustrate the processing strategy that will derive such 
structures. 
2. d. Sample derivation of a conditional-topic structure 
We start with the usual Axiom75. The pointer appears at the root node with a 
requirement to derive a tree of type t: 
(44) Tn(a), ? Ty(t), 0 
At this point the rule that constructs a node which will have the type t derived 
subtree LINKed to it can apply and create the LINK relation: 
75 We simplify illustrations here by omitting decorations that are not relevant. 
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(45) Topic Structure Introduction Rule 
{ ... { {Tn(a), ... ? Ty(t), 0}}... } { ... {{Tn(a), ... ? Ty(t)}, {<L>Tn(a),? Ty(es), 0} } ... } 
The rule transforms the Axiom as follows: 
(46) L Tn(a), ? Ty(t) 
<L>Tn(a), ? Ty(eg), 0 
The pointer is now at a node with a requirement for a type e3 subtree. This is 
a context that matches the description in the condition for the rule associated 
with the lexical item if , given in the previous chapter, to apply. The rule is 
repeated below: 
(47) if 
(1). IF ? Ty(es) 
(2). THEN put( ? 3x. (Fo(x) A <L> Fo(x)) ); 
(3). make(<L>); go(<L>); put( ? Ty(e3)); 
(4). make(<11>); go(<11>); put(Ty(cns --, es), Fo(AP. T, P); go(<11>); 
(5). make(<lo> ); go(<lo>); put(? TY(cn3) ); 
(6). make(<J 1>); put(Ty(t -+ cn )), freshput(s, Fo(AR. s, R) ); go(<1>>); 
(7). make(<lo>); go(<lo>); put(? Ty(t)); 
(8). make(<lo>); go(<lo>); put(TY(es); Fo(s); go(<1o>) 
(9). ELSE abort 
By the actions included in the lexical entry for if another LINK relation is 
initiated this time originating from the ? Ty(es) node. A partial structure is built 
and a new ? Ty(t) tree is introduced. Its situation node is a fresh variable s 
which also appears ready to be bound inside the Formula value of the type (t 
-> cns) which will derive the restrictor for the T-term to be constructed out of 
processing the protasis. The following depicts the effect application of the 




Tn(a), ? Ty(t) 
<L>Tn(a), ? Ty(e), ? (3x(Fo(x) A <L> Fo(x) ) 
? Ty/ 
? Ty(cns) Ty(cns -+ es), Fo()\P, T, P) 
? T(t)ßTy(t -* cns), Fo(AR. s, R) 
Ty(es), Fo(s) 
The usual parsing processes can now take over and construct the 
propositional tree derived by parsing the antecedent string: (if) John cries. 
The output of these processes is shown below: 
(49) 
_____-__ 
Tj(a), ? Ty(t) 
<L>Tn(a), ? Ty(e), ? (-' x(Fo(x) A <L> Fo(x) ) 
? Ty/ 
\ 
? Ty(cn3) Ty(cns --+ es), Fo(, \P, T, P) 
Ty(t), 0 Ty(t --> cns), 
Fo(Cry'(John')(s) Fo(AR. s, R) 
Ty(e5), Ty(es --'t) 
Ty(e) Ty(e --" (e5 --*t)) 
Fo(John') Fo(Ax. Av. Cry'(John')(v)) 
This structure can now be completed by the usual Completion and Evaluation 
processes to derive a tau term over situations at the top node of the lowest 
LINKed tree: 
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(50) Tn(a), ? Ty(t) 
L 
<L>Tn(a), ? Ty(e), ? (Ex(Fo(x) A <L> Fo(x) ) 
Ty(es), Fo(T s, Cry'(John')(s) ), 0 
? Ty(cns) Ty(cn3 -*ee) 
Fo(s, Cry ohn')(s Fo(AP. T, P) 
ffý 
ý 
Ty(t), Ty(t --" cns ), 
Fo(Cry'(John')(s)) Fo(AR. s, R(s) ) 
TY(es), TY(es -+t) 
Fo(s) Fo(Mv. Cry'(John')(v) 
Ty(e) Ty(e - (e5 -1)) 
Fo(John') Ax. Av. Cry'(John')(v) 
Now the Link Evaluation Rule for conditionals can copy the formula value 
from the node where the pointer is located to the node from which the first 
LINK relation originates: 
(51) LINK Evaluation Rule: Conditionals: 
{ {Tn(X), Ty(t),... }, 
{<? o>Tn(X), ? Ty(es), ? 3x. Fo(x)... }, {<L' ><To> Tn(X), Ty(e5) Fo(a( ]), ..., 0 }... }} 
{ {Tn(X), Ty(t),..., Scope(U<x) 
{<1o>Tn(X), ? Ty(es), ? 3x. Fo(x)...,? Sc(x), Fo(a1,1), 0}, {<L'><1o> Tn(X), Ty(es) Fo(a; Xý),... }... }} 
The tree derived is now as follows (scope details are omitted at present): 
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(52) Tn(a), ? Ty(t) 
<L>Tn(a), 2T-y(e), 
? 3x (Fc(x) . <L> Fe(x) ) 
Ty(es), Fo(T, s, Cry'(John')(s) ), 0 
Ty(es), Fo(T, s, Cry'(John')(s) ) 
? Ty(cn3) Ty(cns -ýe. ) 
Fo(s, Cry'(John')(s) Fo(AP. T, P) 
Ty(t), Ty(t --> cns ), 
Fo(Cry'(John')(s)) Fo( AR. s, R(s) ) 
TY(es), TY(es -at) 
Ty(e) Ty(e --. (es -t)) 
Fo(John') Fo(Ax. hv. Cry'(John')(v)) 
We now need to be able to move back to the propositional tree that will 
accommodate the content derived by processing the apodosis. The Topic 
Structure Requirement Rule can now apply in order to introduce a 
requirement that the term derived from the if-clause must appear somewhere 
inside the structure derived from the apodosis. The pointer will also move to 
the original type t tree from where we started the processing (note that this 
rule is able to apply in this case because we have assumed that Ty(e) is now 
a general type label encompassing both terms ranging over individuals and 
terms over situations): 
(53) Topic Structure Requirement Introduction Rule 
{ ... 
{ {Tn(a), ... ? Ty(t) }, 




? Ty(t), ? <D>Fo(a), 0), {<L>Tn(a), Ty(e), Fo(a) }}... } 
The output of the rule after application to the tree above is as follows: 
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(54) Tn(a), ? Ty(t), ? <D> Fo(T, s, Cry'(John')(s) ), 0 
Ty(es), Fo(U) ? Ty(es->t) 
<L>Tn(a), 24y(-e), 
?x (Fo(x) 41=> Fo(x) ) 
Ty(es), Fo(T, s, Cry'(John')(s) ) 
Ty(es), Fo(T, s, Cry'(John')(s) ) 
? Ty(crns) Ty(cn --. es) 
Fo(s, Cry'(John')(s) Fo(AP. T, P) 
Ty(t), Ty(t -; cns ), 
Fo(Cry'(John')(s)) Fo(AR. s, R(s) ) 
Ty(e5), Ty(e5 ->t), 
Fo(s) Fo(Av. Cry'(John')(v)) 
Ty(e) Ty(e -* (eS >t)) 
Fo(John') Fo(Ax. Av. Cry'(John')(v)) 
If we take the above as a representation of the content of a sentence like if 
John cries, Mary laughs then the situation metavariable of the highest 
propositional tree must be replaced with the T-term derived on the LINKed 
nodes otherwise the requirement ? <D>Fo(T, s, Cry'(John')(s)) will not be 
satisfied. Another alternative is illustrated by cases where the situation 
argument constructed out of the protasis is associated with an embedded 
clause: 
(55) If John cries Mary heard Sue laughs. 
A possible interpretation for the above could be that "Mary heard that in all 
situations where John cries Sue laughs". This interpretation is captured by 
allowing the situation argument for the embedded proposition to be replaced 
by the T-term derived from the protasis. Another possible (although admittedly 
slightly more difficult) permitted association of the situation argument with a 
proposition would be the following: 
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(56) If John cries, Mary knows a woman who would reassure him 
This could be given the interpretation "Mary knows a woman who in all 
situations in which John cries will reassure him". This association of the 
situation argument is predicted to exist because of the modality <D> 
employed in the requirement introduced by the Topic Structure Requirement 
Introduction Rule. This modality allows the requirement to be satisfied even if 
the situation argument appears inside the proposition derived from a relative 
clause. We will allow this association here. However, if the above 
interpretation seems to be excluded we will just have to have a separate, 
more restrictive, Topic Structure Requirement Introduction Rule for situation 
arguments. Alternatively we could assume that the connection between the 
situation argument appearing on the LINKed type e node and the content of 
the relative clause in the above is captured by means of the anaphoricity of 
the modal would and similar operators (see e. g. Stone 1997). In that case we 
will have to modify the requirement introduced by the Topic Structure 
Requirement Introduction Rule to allow that the term is not necessarily 
located at an argument node but is generally part of the formula derived. In 
this case we will notate the requirement ? <D>Fo(a) as ? <D>Fo((p[a]). We will 
leave the choice among these options open. 
The processing of if-clauses as contributing content appearing on 
LINKed nodes allows us to account for certain phenomena that we were 
unable to handle previously. Firstly there are theory-internal technical reasons 
for requiring two strategies of processing sentence-initial if-clauses. Since 
only one unfixed node introduced by *Adjunction is allowed per structure, the 
following would not be able to processed unless we assume that the if-clause 
occupies a LINKed tree: 
(57) If John comes, who will Mary fire? 
But there are also other reasons for such as a second strategy to be 
available. We examine those briefly below. 
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2. e. Pronominalisation of the if-clause by it 
According to Emonds (1985), if/when-clauses seem to be the only adverbial 
subordinate clause which can serve as the antecedent for the anaphoric 
impersonal argument it of certain verbs. In this, according to Emonds, they 
are parallel to the right and left dislocated NPs in (59) studied by Ross 
(1967)76: 
(58) [If John sings arias]; it; bothers me/ I dislike it; a lot/I don't talk about it; to anyone 
(59) Those arias;, they; bother me/I dislike them/1 don't talk about them; to anyone 
(60) *[Although/Because/After John sings arias]; it; bothers me/I dislike it; a lot/I don't talk 
about it; to anyone 
However, notice that if-clauses cannot be themselves the subject of such 
verbs: 
(61) *If you did that bothers me. 
(62) *If you did that would be nice. 
(63) If you did that it would be nice. 
(64) It would be nice if you did that. 
(65) For you to do that would be nice. 
Under the present analysis, processing of the if-clause contributes a r-term of 
type es in the representation which stands for the set of situations indicated by 
the content of the if-clause. To account for the impossibility of (61) we can 
assume that verbs like bother require an argument of type e; the type of 
individuals, which is a more specific subtype of type e (cf. 'John bothers me a 
lot')". Therefore an argument of type es, the type of argument derived from 
the if-clause, is not directly a suitable argument in such cases, therefore a 
process of Merge is necessarily excluded. On the other hand, since the 
lexical item it is anaphoric and therefore contributes a metavariable in the 
76 If this parallel is accurate, then it is more directly reflected in Schlenker's (2001) analysis of 
conditionals as (plural) definite descriptions of worlds or Schein's (2001) analysis of if-clauses 
as (plural) definite descriptions of events. Since definites in DS are analysed as anaphoric (or 
sometimes cataphoric) elements this type of analysis is not available for us here. We will 
provide data later that show that r-terms, similarly to definites, are not excluded from 
appearing on LINKed structures. 77 Such verbs are also compatible with type t subjects. We can either allow that as a separate 
option (see Cann et. al. 2005) or utilise the epsilon term derived, according to the present 
analysis, from type t structures (analysed as LINKed to the term) to provide the replacement 
for the metavariable contributed by it (for the appropriate rules see Gregoromichelaki 2003). 
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representation we can assume that it can pick up a Formula value available in 
a local LINKed structure which by some process of "coercion" (not modelled 
here) is assigned the type appropriate for the argument of such verbs. Since 
the requirement introduced by the Topic Requirement Introduction Rule only 
requires the Formula value (and not the type) to appear somewhere in the 
main tree the requirement will be satisfied in such cases. 
2. f. Correlatives and then 
It has been observed by many researchers that in many languages if-clauses 
and nominal relative clauses have the same structure and even utilize the 
same lexical devices. The following data comes from Bhatt & Pancheva 
(2001): 
Marathi 
(66) (dzar) tyane abhyas kela tar to pa ho}r1 
if he studying do. Pst. 3MSg then he pass be. Ft. 3S 
If he studies, he will pass (the exam). 
(67) dzo manus tudzhya" sedzary" rahto to manus Iekhak ahe 
which man your neighborhood-in live-PrS. 3MSa that man writer is 
The man who lives in your neighborhood is a writer. 
(Lit. Which man lives in your neighborhood, that man is a writer. ') 
Additionally in many languages the interpretation of structures is ambiguous 
between a reading that involves sharing of an individual term or a term 
ranging over worlds/times/situations. Below the correlative clause which 
contains the complementiser kaji, introduces a term which is resumed in the 
following main clause by the demonstrative pronoun ngula-ju. On the first 
reading (A) the term picked up is an individual, a dog, whereas on reading 
(B), a possible situation (or set of situations, for discussion see Bittner 2001): 
(68) Waripiri (from Hale 1976) 
Maliki-rh kaji-ngki yarlki-rni nyuntu 
dog-ERG COMP-3SG. 2SG bite-NPST YOU 
ngula-ju kapi-rna luwa-rni ngajulu-r(u. 
DEM-TOP FUT-1SG. 3SG shoot-NPST me-ERG 
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A. 'As for the dog that bites you, I'll shoot it. ' 
B. 'If a dog bites you, then I'll shoot it. ' 
For English, Geis (1985) and others since then have pointed out that the 
lexical item then can be characterized as a resumptive pronoun and the 
structure if p then q as a correlative structure (see also von Fintel 1994). In 
the present approach, concurring with such analyses, we can take the lexical 
item then appearing in conditionals as contributing a meta-variable in the 
representation. This metavariable decorates the situation argument of the 
main tree and it can be seen as a lexical instantiation of the Situation 
Metavariable Introduction rule seen in the previous chapter. The proposed 
lexical entry would be as follows: 
(69) then 
IF ? Ty(es) 
THEN put(Ty(eg), Fo(S), [111); go(<ro>) 
ELSE abort 
Application of these instructions will then prevent the processing of an if- 
clause as an unfixed node because the condition in the lexical entry for if 
requires the presence of the pointer at a ? Ty(es) node. Additionally the bottom 
restriction ([ß. ]1) in the lexical entry will exclude Late *Adjunction too. 
Therefore the only option for processing an if p then q sentence will be as a 
LINK structure where the if-clause contributes its content to a subtree 
separate from the main tree hosting the content of the consequent. This 
accounts for the necessary preverbal presence of the if-clause in such 
structures: 
(70) *Then I will leave if Mary comes 
An alternative to the bottom restriction to account for the ungrammaticality of 
the above would be to take it as arising from the constraints on Substitution 
that exclude the following: 
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(71) *He; saw John; 
In this case we will be able to maintain an analysis for if-then structures as 
also involving unfixed situation arguments. In that case, the analysis would be 
modelling the bleaching effect usually associated with expletive pronouns 
(see Cann et al. 2005). We will leave both options open here. Moreover, as 
with all pronominals in DS, the replacement for the metavariable inserted by 
then can-be provided by a term available in the Discourse Context. If an if- 
clause is not used to provide such a replacement other types of linguistic or 
non-linguistic means can provide it: 
(72) A: Mary will come. 
(73) B: Then I will leave. 
2. g. Recapitulation 
Dancygier & Sweetser (2005: 174) observe that if-clauses (P-clauses in their 
terminology) appear in the following formal patterns (excluding parenthetical 
uses) which they assume contrast in terms of interpretations: 
(74) if P, Q: If the home computer breaks down, I'll work in my office. 
(75) If P Q: If the home computer breaks down I'll work in my office. 
(76) Q if P: I'll work in my office if the home computer breaks down. 
(77) Q, if P: I'll work in my office, if the home computer breaks down. 
We have now provided an analysis that could underlie the intuitions 
discriminating the first three patterns. Although we do not agree that there is 
an strict, encoded form-function mapping especially relying on intonational 
phrasing which is known to be susceptible to a multitude of factors besides 
indication of inferential and structural aspects of interpretation, we can 
provide a formal basis for the intuition that the fourth pattern can be used to 
indicate that the Q-clause relies on prior contextual justification for its 
introduction: "The Q-clause is then followed (after a comma/pause) by P, 
which either further restricts the context in which the assertion of Q is valid, or 
justifies the communication of Q as appropriate (this may involve conditions 
on speech acts and metalinguistic conditions)" (Dancygier & Sweetser ibid: 
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175). In DS a similar pattern as regards nominals has been identified (Cann 
et al 2005, Ch. 5): 
(78) She's a fool, my mother 
(79) He talks too fast, Bill 
A right peripheral nominal expression can be presented with an anaphoric 
expression inside the main clause necessarily identified as co-referential with 
it. The right peripheral expression is necessarily optional and definite. The DS 
rule that handles this pattern is the rule of Recapitulation: 
(80) Recapitulation 
{ ..., {Tn(0), ..., Ty(t), Fo(cp), ..., 












{<L 1>Tn(0), ? Ty(e), ? Fo(a), 0} 
Following the completion of a propositional type t structure, the rule initiates a 
LINKed tree which bears the requirement to include a formula value identical 
to one appearing inside the tree from which the LINK relation originates. 
Since the latter has necessarily been completed prior to the application of the 
rule, the formula value that needs to be copied must have been provided 
contextually if it was introduced by a pronominal expression. As an illustration 
consider the (schematic) tree that will be derived for the string in (79) (where 
the bold arrow indicates Substitution of a metavariable formula value on a 
treenode by a contextually provided value): 
(81) 
Tn(O), Ty(t) 
Fo(Ta Ik-fast'(B ill')) <L'> Tn(O), ? Ty(e), 
? Fo(Bill'), 0 
Ty(e), Fo(U) Ty(e -->t), 
Fo(Talk-fast') 
Fo(Bill') 
We can give a parallel analysis for the pattern in (77). The right peripheral if- 
clause can provide justification for the selection of the contextually derived 
situation term by the hearer or further restrict it by means of providing 
additional clues for the value of the metavariable R, the contextual restriction 
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always included in such terms (see Chapter 5: 4. b. 1). As an illustration 
consider the tree derived from the Q-clause in (77) just before parsing the of 
the P-clause and after application of the Recapitulation rule (now taking the 
type e mentioned in the previous rule as the general supertype): 
(82) 
L <L'> Tn(O),? Ty(e5), 
? Fo(i, s, Break-down'(Computer)(s)), 0 
Tn(O), Ty(t) 
Fo(Work'-in-office'(Eleni')(r, s, Break-down'(Computer'(s)) ) 
? Ty(e5), Fo(S) Ty(es --*t), 
Fo(Xv. Work-in o i=Eleni')(v)) 
Fo(i, s, Break-down'(Computer')(s)) 
The above illustrates the contextual provision of a value for the metavariable 
at the situation argument node and the requirement for it to appear again in 
the new ? Ty(es) tree initiated. Parsing of the if-clause can then provide the 
required value. After processing of the P-clause has been finalised the 
(schematic) structure that ensues for (77) above is as follows: 
(83) 
L' <L''> Tn(0),? Ty(es), Ty(es), 
' ,0 Fo(r, s, Break-down'(Computer')(s)) 
Tn(O), Ty(t) 
Fo(Work'-in-office'(Eleni')(T, s, Break-down'(Computer'(s) L 
? Ty(es), Fo(S) Ty(es --it), 
Fo(T, s, Break-down'(Computer)(s)) Fo(Av. Work-in-office'(Eleni')(v)) 
Ty(es), Fo(T, s, Break-down'(Computer')(s)) 
Ty(cns), Fo(s, Break-down'(Computer')(s)) Ty(cn3 --+es), Fo(AP. r, P) 
Ty(t), Fo(Break-down'(Computer')(s)) Ty(t -cns), Fo(l\P. s, P(s)) 
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2. h. Linear Order and Context-building 
With the introduction of LINK analyses we now have two general ways of 
processing the input provided by if-clauses: either as attached to an unfixed 
node which merges with the situation argument of the main structure or as 
attached to a situation argument related by LINK to the main tree. This 
assumption will lead us to expect an ambiguity as regards the processing of a 
conditional structure since there is no necessary anaphoric element 
appearing in the consequent and disambiguating which structure is intended 
(especially in cases where there is no then). This attributed ambiguity to 
strings might seem an artefact of the analytic choices made here but, as we 
will now see, receives support from cross-linguistic and information structure 
considerations. 
Firstly, it must be noted that, according to the analyses presented here, 
the linear order of if-clause and consequent does not disambiguate among 
the LINK or unfixed node structural options. We believe that this is as it 
should be because linear order, or order of processing in our terms, is not the 
only factor that determines the status of the if-clause. According to Geis 
(1985), although logicians and philosophers normally cite conditional 
sentences with preposed protases, syntacticians are likely to take a 
conditional with a postverbal antecedent to be "more natural" because in such 
structures the if-clause occurs in the "normal" adverbial position. He states 
moreover that not all languages have even the capacity to place the 
antecedent clause in sentence-initial position. This contradicts Greenberg 
(1963, cited in Bhatt & Pancheva 2005) who provides the following universal 
concerning the linear order between protasis and apodosis: 
(84) Universal of Word Order 14: In conditional statements, the conditional clause 
precedes the conclusion as the normal order in all languages. 
Comrie (1986) claims that there are also rigidly verb-final languages where 
the possibility of a protasis occurring clause-finally is not available. Bhatt & 
Pancheva (2001) state that they have not been able to verify this claim and 
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that in fact, Turkish, which is one of the languages that Comrie cites, seems 
to allow clause-final antecedents. In terms of the relative frequency of 
occurrence of clause-final and clause-initial conditional antecedents the 
evidence is also non-conclusive. Corpus studies reported in Dancygier 
(1998)78 have found a preponderance of clause-initial if-clauses. On the other 
hand, Renmans & van Belle (2003) report almost equal distribution of 
preposed and postposed protases in Dutch (even though the study included 
constructions including then). Auer (2000) reports that corpus studies 
regarding written discourse in German shows an overwhelming preference for 
"postpositioning" of wenn-clauses79. From the present perspective, this shows 
that when conditional structures are marked as such (i. e. in contrast to 
coordinate structures with conditional interpretations), order of presentation 
can be employed for information structuring purposes and the structures can 
be disambiguated only in conjunction with the context of utterance. We can 
make a parallel here with the case of argument pro-drop languages. In such 
languages when an overt NP providing an argument that could have been 
dropped appears on the string it usually enjoys relative positional freedom. 
This is because, according to the DS analysis, such phrases have to be 
analysed as decorating an unfixed node or LINK structure since there is no 
need for overt provision of such an argument in case the context of utterance 
can contribute a substitution for the metavariable introduced by the verb; so 
the provision of this overt argument can be employed for various information 
structural purposes, hence the positional freedom. In the same way we can 
assume that when the implicit situation argument is provided explicitly, as e. g. 
with if-clauses, then it can be introduced in accordance with information 
structure needs. The choice between having it decorate a LINKed or unfixed 
node is then controlled by such considerations and the intended construal 
cannot be determined but by taking into account the specific context of 
utterance (i. e. there is no structural encoding of Topic or Focus features or 
78 Ford (1989) and her own. 
79 Even when the data have only included unambiguously conditional, rather than temporal, 
interpretations. 
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interpretations). So in the same way that the specific informational status of a 
pre- or post-posed subject in a pro-drop language like Modern Greek cannot 
be determined outside the context of processing we can presume that in 
languages like English both post-posed and pre-posed if-clauses can 
decorate either unfixed nodes or LINK structures, with disambiguation a 
matter of the specific context of utterance. However this claim seems to 
contradict the widespread assumption that if-clauses behave as "topics". 
2. h. 1. If-clauses as topics 
Examining cross-linguistic distributional evidence Haiman (1978) and Haiman 
(1993) have claimed that if-clauses are generally topics. From the present 
perspective, this claim is contradicted by the fact that if-clauses can occur 
post-verbally without any necessary indication of a revision, afterthought 
construal or recapitulation effect. Notice also that such postverbal if-clauses 
can accommodate anaphoric elements which depend for their content on the 
previous clause and contributing to the complex predicate predicated of the 
subject: 
(85) Every student will succeed if he is not lazy 
If protases were consistently "topics", i. e. introducing background or given 
information, such dependencies are not easily explained. Moreover, although 
it has been claimed (Rooth 1985) that if-clauses, unlike when-clauses, cannot 
be focussed, von Fintel (1994) and Bhatt (1996) show that if-clauses can both 
be the new information conveyed by an answer to a question and bear 
nuclear accent: 
(86) A: What would motivate John to shave? 
B: John always shaves, [if his MOTHER is coming to visit]F 
Even though this data is problematic for the conditionals-as-topics thesis (and 
therefore for a single LINK dislocation analysis from our perspective) it is not 
problematic for the analysis of if-clauses as contributing restrictors to 
quantificational terms. As von Fintel (1994) shows restrictors in nominal terms 
can also be focused: 
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(87) A: Who here is clever enough to solve this problem? 
B: Well, most of the [GRAD STUDENTS]F should be able to help you. 
For the present analysis of if-clauses as relatives we can observe that 
elements in a relative clause can also be focused: 
(88) A: Did you see the man that John dislikes? 
B: No, but I saw the woman that John [ADORESIF 
(89) A: Who did John hit? 
B: John hit whoever APPROACHED 
We take these as justification for postulating two structural types of analysis 
underlying conditional sentences. From this point of view, if-clauses can be 
seen as providing the context for the processing of the consequent but in the 
sense of providing explicitly the situation argument and the domain of 
quantification. In such cases if-clauses can convey new information and we 
assume that the analysis as decorating unfixed nodes is more appropriate: 
(90) A: Under what conditions are you prepared to surrender? 
B: [(Only) If JOHN surrenders]F I might do. 
(91) A: Are you going to play soccer on Sunday? (von Fintel 1994: 82) 
B: We'll play [if the SUN shines]F 
On the other hand, we assume that the specific interpretation usually 
characterised in the literature as topic, i. e. "given" or "background" 
information, is only available at the left-periphery under a construal in which a 
left-peripheral if-clause is processed as the head, the point from which the 
LINK relation originates. This is a natural characterisation since only in this 
structure can we assume that what is provided initially is given explicitly as 
the context for processing the following assertion. For cases of LINKed 
subtrees contributed by right-peripheral if-clauses we saw that they provide 
confirmation for the choice of an already contextually given element. 
In any case we assume that interaction with the context of utterance is 
essential not only for enriching the underspecified content provided by 
linguistic means (see e. g. Noh 1996) but also for determining which particular 
structural option was intended. Nevertheless, as expected, there are 
languages where we can see that "grammaticised" encoded indications of 
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which of the two structural options is intended exist at least as far as the left 
periphery of the clause is concerned (as, for example, there are languages 
like Japanese where there is explicit encoding of a LINK construal by means 
of a topic marker like wa see Cann et al. 2005: Ch. 6). These languages are 
the V2 Germanic languages to which we turn next. 
2. h. 2. V2 in German, Dutch, Afrikaans 
As we saw in the previous chapter, some V2 Germanic languages allow 
conditional antecedents in the left periphery to appear in three distinct 
syntactic patterns80,81: 
(a) the protasis occurs clause-initially and is immediately followed by the 
finite verb in the apodosis: 
(92) German (from Koenig & van der Auwera 1988) 
[Wenn er krank ist] bleibt er zu Haus 
if he sick is, stays he at the house 
If he is sick he stays at home 
(93) [As by siek is] bly by by die huis Afrikaans 
if he sick is stays he at the home 
if he is sick then he stays in the house 
(b) the if-clause precedes another constituent and the finite verb follows: 
(94) [Wenn du mitkommen willst], ich habe nichts dagegen German (ibid) 
if you come-along want, I have nothing there-against 
If you want to come along, I don't mind. 
(95) [As jy wil saamkom], ek gee nie om nie Afrikaans 
if you want come-along, I give not about not 
If you want to come along, I don't mind 
(c) the clause-initial if-clause is followed by the resumptive element dann 
with the finite verb following: 
(96) [Wenn er krank ist], dann bleibt er zu Haus German (ibid) 
if he sick is, then stays he at the house 
If he is sick he stays at home 
80 We use Afrikaans data to illustrate points here because this is the language to which we 
had native speaker access and so did not rely only on examples found in the literature. 
81 The protasis can also appear postverbally but we will ignore this option here as we do not 
assume that its analysis differs from English: 
(1) German (from Auer 2000) 
Sie mussen n bisschen auf Punkt kommen wenn sie job haben wollen 
you need to get down to the point if you want to have a job. 
(2) by bly by die huis, as by siek is Afrikaans 
he stays at the house, if he sick is 
He stays at home if he is sick 
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(97) [As by siek is] dan bly by by die huisAfiikaans 
if he sick is then stays he at the home 
if he is sick then he stays in the house 
In these languages the phenomenon traditionally termed V2 refers to the 
requirement that the finite verb occurs in second position after a constituent 
perceived to be in some way distinguished. Note that, as seen above in (94), 
the requirement is not that the finite verb must literally always be the second 
constituent since topical elements can appear sentence-initially (usually with 
an intonational break separating them from the rest of the structure). 
Kempson et at. (2001: 173) analyse the V2 requirement in German as the 
obligatory presence of an unfixed node initially before the verb is processed. 
The verb which is then taken as locally unfixed, i. e., as unfixed within a single 
propositional tree, can decorate a separate node82. The first distributional 
pattern observed above in (92) shows that the protasis can count as the first 
constituent for V2. This necessitates an analysis of such clauses as providing 
initially unfixed nodes as this is the only compatible option with the DS 
analysis of the V2 phenomenon. On the other hand, the next two patterns 
show that the protasis can be more "peripheral" in the sense that another 
constituent that follows it can assume the role of the first element for the 
satisfaction of the V2 requirement. If the latter is to be analysed as providing 
the unfixed node required for V2 then the only other option remaining for the 
analysis of the if-clause is as providing content which appears on a node 
LINKed to the main tree83. Thus the reported topical character of such 
elements and the intonational break characterising them can be given formal 
characterisation by the grammar. However, the fact that such externalised 
elements are processed independently but in parallel with the apodosis does 
not make it necessary that they have to be taken as, somehow, embedded 
constituents with an encoded determinate semantic contribution to the overall 
82 Though in the shift from Kempson et at (2001) to Cann et at (2005), this account would not 
be sustained, preferring rather to analyse German along lines similar to Irish, with a full 
propositional template induced by a verb from a requirement ? Ty(t). 3 This factor may reflect a lexical specification of the verb following not the Kempson et al. 
(2001) pattern proposed for German, but rather following Irish, as triggered by the pointer 
being at a node decorated with ? Ty(t) (see Cann et al 2005). 
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interpretation of the structure (i. e. we do not have to define any projection with 
an encoded semantics, e. g. Topic, of the main clause in order to integrate 
their processing). The option of using the LINK connection that DS provides 
can account for a looser correlation, providing the context for the processing 
of the following string, which can be pragmatically enriched depending on the 
context of processing. 
For our purposes here, it must be taken into account that DS is not a 
"syntactic" framework in the traditional sense where only 
distributional/structural criteria justify a proposed analysis. In contrast, since 
DS is modelling the processing mechanism and its interaction with context, 
both what have traditionally been called "semantic" and/or "pragmatic" 
evidence provide justification for any proposed analysis. In that respect, the 
distinct interpretations associated with protases according to their left- 
peripheral position in V2 languages gives us clues for distinct structural 
analyses. The clearest indication that non-integrated protases are interpreted 
differently comes from the interpretation of what has been characterised 
"relevance conditionals" (see abovel. a. 3). Bhatt & Pancheva (2001) report 
that in Dutch and some other V2 languages the protasis of a relevance 
conditional never counts as the first element for V2. This seems to be 
supported by native speakers' intuitions. Consider the Afrikaans examples 
below: 
(98) As jy my nodig het, ek is by die kantoor Afrikaans 
if you me need has, I am at the office 
If you need me I am at the office 
(99) #As jy my nodig het, is ek by die kantoor 
if you me need has, am I at the office 
If you need me I am at the office 
(100) As iemand my soek, ek is in die biblioteek 
if someone me seek, I am in the library 
If someone looks for me I am in the library 
(101) #As jemand my soek, is ek in die biblioteek 
if someone me seek, am I in the library 
If someone looks for me I am in the library 
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(102) As jy honger is, ek het aartappels gekook 
if you hungry is, I have cooked potatoes 
If you are hungry I've cooked potatoes 
(103) #As jy honger is, het ek aartappels gekook 
if you hungry is, have I cooked potatoes 
If you are hungry I've cooked potatoes 
According to native speakers' judgements, it is not the case that (99), (101) 
and (103) are ungrammatical as strings. However when these strings are 
interpreted it is reported that there are strong intuitions that what is asserted 
is that there is some particular "causal-consequential" relation relating the two 
situations described in the two clauses. For example in (103), there must be 
some cause-effect connection between the addressee's being hungry and the 
speaker's having cooked potatoes (this can be paraphrased in English as if 
you are hungry THEN I have cooked potatoes). Since this interpretation is not 
readily available out of context the examples are judged as weird or 
unacceptable. On the other hand, speakers report structures like those below 
as completely unacceptable when if-clauses do not appear immediately 
preceding the finite verb. This is presumably because it is difficult for such 
structures to be interpreted as not indicating a strong connection between the 
two clauses: 
(104) As by siek is, bly by by die huis Afrikaans 
if he sick is, stays he at the house 
If he is sick he stays at home 
(105) *As by siek is, by bly by die huis 
if he sick is he stays at the house 
If he is sick he stays at home 
So we can assume that in a language like Dutch or Afrikaans the distinction 
between taking the protasis as decorating a LINKed ("unintegrated") or 
unfixed node ("integrated") is indicated by examining the position of the 
verb84. However, this is not to say that there is a particular semantics 
associated with such differentiation. Remember that, as we saw earlier in 
(22)-(24), degree of integration does not differentiate between Haegeman's 
84 This is not the case for German or Scandinavian V2 languages which exhibit different 
patterns. 
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(2003) "event" or "premise" conditionals, both of these types can appear as 
integrated: 
(106) A: Die wynbottel is halfleeg Afrikaans (English examples from Noh 1996) 
the wine-bottle is half-empty 
the wine bottle is half-empty 
B: As dit halfleeg is, is jy 'n pessimis 
if it half-empty is, are you an pessimist 
If it is half-empty, you are a pessimist 
And, as predicted by the relevance-theoretic analysis of Noh (1996) there is 
no strictly syntactically/semantically definable category of "relevance" or 
"speech-act" conditionals in the sense of conditionals with protases providing 
conditions for the execution of the following speech act. The following can be 
interpreted neither as an "event-" nor a "premise" conditional: 
(107) (Son to Mother going out): (from Noh 1996: 28) 
Mum, don't worry. If I'm hungry, there's a sandwich in the fridge. 
On the other hand, although it seems similar in interpretation to a "relevance" 
or "speech-act -" conditional, the left-peripheral if-clause cannot be interpreted 
as providing a felicity condition for the speech act of informing the mother that 
there is a sandwich in the fridge. Nevertheless, notice that such conditionals 
are preferably processed as non-integrated in Afrikaans: 
(Son to Mother who is going out: ) 
Ma, moenie bekommerd wees nie. Afrikaans 
Mom must-not worry be not. 
Mum don't worry... 
(108) ... As ek honger is, daaris'n toebroodjie in die yskas. 
... If I hungry is, there is a sandwich in the fridge. 
... If I am hungry, there is a sandwich in the fridge. (109) ... #As ek honger is, is daar'n toebroodjie in die yskas. 
... If I hungry is, is there a sandwich in the fridge. 
... If I am hungry, there is a sandwich in the fridge. (110) ... As ek dors is, Pa het lemonade gekoop. 
... if I thirsty is, dad has lemonade bought. 
... I am thirsty, dad has bought lemonade. (111) ... #As ek dors is, het Pa lemonade gekoop. 
... If I thirsty is, has dad lemonade bought. 
... I am thirsty, dad has bought lemonade. (112) ... As ek honger is, die aartappels is reg 
... if I hungry is, the potatoes are ready 
... 
If I am hungry, the potatoes are ready 
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(113) ... #As ek honger is, is die aartappels reg 
... if I hungry is, are the potatoes ready 
... If I am hungry the potatoes are ready 
This is means that there is no well-defined class by either semantic or 
syntactic criteria that can be termed "relevance" or "speech-act" conditionals. 
There is a syntactic distinction between integrative or non-integrative 
processing and this can be exploited for the derivation of many types of 
contextual effects. Therefore, contrary to widespread assumptions, we cannot 
accept any syntactically encoded semantic differentiation between types of 
conditionals. What we can assume is that the distinct ways defined by DS of 
processing the underspecified input provided by the protasis can be the basis 
for distinct types of contextual effects as predicted by relevance-theoretic 
assumptions. 
To sum up, the review of the data above leads to the conclusion that 
even though English does not provide the appropriate explicit syntactic 
evidence, there is in fact a distinction between peripheral and more integrated 
protases, a fact reflected in their analysis as either decorating a LINKed 
subtree or an unfixed node. However, we cannot take these evidence to 
necessitate an account where types of if-clauses are syntactically marked as 
internally deficient or not and accordingly associated with a specific 
interpretation because as we saw which of the two structures is intended in 
each occasion is disambiguated by the specific context of occurrence 
according to relevance-theoretic assumptions. 
2.1. Universal Quantifiers and LINK 
One last objection that might be raised against the LINK analysis above might 
be that the NPs in English whose processing results in T-terms (unlike 
indefinites and proper names) do not have a use where they can be analysed 
as providing the head in a LINK structure: 
(114) *Every student, he left 
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However NPs with the universal determiner all, which must also be analysed 
as contributing T-terms, seem to be able to appear in such structures: 
(115) All of my friends, they abandoned me. 
Moreover universal determiners in other languages are not excluded from 
these structures. In languages with clitic doubling, universal determiners, 
even of the every kind, can appear in CLLD constructions: 
(116) Kathe fititi ton ida na fevgi Modern Greek 
Every student him-saw-me to leave 
I saw every student leaving 
(117) Ton kathe fititi ton ida na fevgi 
the each student him-saw-me to leave 
I saw each student leaving 
(118) Kathena fititi ton ida na perni tin tsanta tou ke na fevgi 
each student him-saw-me to take the bag his and to leave 
I saw each student taking his bag and leaving 
Romanian from Alboiu (2002) 
(119) Pe fiecare elev, cu ocazia olimpiadelor, I-a felicitat profesorul. 
PE each student with occasion contests-the-DAT him-AUX congratulated teacher-the 
'The teacher congratulated each student on the contests. ' 
(120) cu ocazia olimpiadelor, pe fiecare elev I-a felicitat profesorul. 
with occasion contests-the. DAT, PE each student him-AUX congratulated teacher-the 
'The teacher congratulated each student on the contests. ' 
(121) Pentru fiecare elev, fiecare profesor a pus o vorbä bunä. 
for each student each teacher AUX. him put a saying good 
'Each teacher put in a good word for each student. ' 
(122) Fiecare profesor pentru fiecare elev a pus o vorbä bunä. 
each teacher for each student AUX. him put a saying good 
'Each teacher put in a good word for each student. ' 
Romanian (data provided by Udo Klein (pc. )) 
(123) Pe fiecare student I-am vazut cautind ceva si apoi plecind. 
Pe every student him-have seen looking-for something and then leaving 
Every student I saw him looking for something and then leaving 
Spanish from Zubizarefta (1996) 
(124) A cada nino, (estoy segura que) su padre lo acompanara el primer dia de escuela 
ACC each child, (I-am sure that) his father-ACC him will-accompany on the first day of 
school 
Each child, (I am sure that) his father must accompany the first day of school 
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(125) A cada uno de sus amigos, Pedro lo invito a cenar 
ACC each one of his friends, Pedro him invited to dinner 
Each one of his friends Pedro invited for dinner 
Spanish from Arregi (2003): 
(126) Cada libro, *(Io) ley6 Juan, y cada revista *(la) leyb Pedro. 
each book *(it) read Juan and each magazine *(it) read Pedro 
Each book, Juan read, and each magazine, Pedro read. 
(127) Cada libro, lo leyeron menos de tres estudiantes. 
each book it read less than three students 
Each book was read by less than three students 
Catalan (from Vallduvi 1990: 153, fn. 91) 
(128) A tots els estudiants; eis; donen un carnet t; 
to all students them give an ID 
To all the students they give them an ID 
(129) A tothom; no el; tracten igual 
everybody; not him; treat equal 
Everybody they don't treat the same 
In the Romance languages cited and Greek, one might analyse these 
structures as involving a metavariable projected by the clitic with no bottom 
restriction (see chapter 2 and Cann et al. 2005), hence compatible with Merge 
of an unfixed node decorated by the quantifying expression; but this does not 
match the dative-object asymmetry displayed in Romanian (in which only the 
dative allows free doubling by all forms of NP expression with no specificity 
effect). 
Furthermore, in Hungarian universal quantifiers can appear to the left of 
the VM position, and also to the left of preverbal focus. If focalised 
constituents are analysed as unfixed nodes in this language then we have to 
assume that the universals decorate LINK structures. 
(130) Minden verset fel olvasott Janos Hungarian 
every poem-acc up read J. -nom 
John read out every poem' 
(131) Minden verset JANOS olvasott fel 
every poem-acc J. -nom read up 
For every poem, it's John who read it out 
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But even in English left dislocation of universal quantifiers is possible as the 
following pieces of text from the web seem to indicate (see Appendix 2 for 
sources and context): 
(132) Every person who crosses his path, he affects them in a positive way 
(133) Mr. Harris made contact with Pacific residents in all three wards. He stood out in 
front of stores, the post office and other locations around the city. Each person who he 
contacted, he asked their opinion on this issue. Not once did Mr. Harris find a resident 
who was in favor for an appointed chief of police. This gave me hope for the residents of 
Ward 3 because Alderman Harris does care for your opinion. 
(134) As for everyone who keeps imagining what they would have done, how they would 
have reacted, etc, the thing you are all forgetting is that you probably don't have the 
training and resources that the President of the United States has. 
We conclude therefore that there is no inherent restriction banning the 
presence of T-terms as heads in LINK structures. However such terms, like 
the epsilon terms derived by indefinites must be, in some sense to be 
explained by a pragmatic theory, "given" or "topical". Given the context- 
dependency of conditional interpretations it does not seem unreasonable to 




ANAPHORA AND THE PROCESSING OF CONDITIONALS 
1. Conditionals and Anaphora: the static view vs. the 
dynamic analysis 
Transformational accounts attribute multiple structural ambiguities to 
conditional sentences (see e. g. Iatridou 1991, Bhatt & Pancheva 2001/2005; 
Chierchia 1995). Not only are there different structural positions assigned to 
preverbal and postverbal if-clauses, it is also the case that preverbal if- 
clauses are ambiguous between base-generation in that position and 
movement from a more deeply embedded position. Moreover the final LF 
position of such an if-clause might involve movement back to its base position 
(reconstruction). The main evidence for such multiple structural analyses is 
provided by the anaphoric relations permitted among nominal arguments 
inside a sentential domain (Binding Theory) and quantifier-variable binding. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the present account also assumes 
that, as in structures involving nominals (e. g. Left Dislocation and 
Topicalisation), conditional structures present an ambiguity with respect to the 
representations achieved: either the eventual propositional logical form 
includes a situation argument to which a LINKed tree is attached, or, as in 
Left Dislocation structures, the if-clause content appears at an independent 
type e tree to which the input from the main clause is LINKed. This ambiguity 
is a minimal one, more or less necessitated by the assumed symmetry as 
regards the conceptual structures generated by the parsing of nominal and 
conditional structures and the parallel means provided for processing such 
strings. Beyond this minimal ambiguity there will be no reason to postulate 
multiple structural ambiguities and movement processes. In contrast to 
transformational accounts, the phenomena that have been taken to require 
the postulation of multiple ambiguities will be dealt with in terms of the 
procedures invoked in order to parse conditional sentences. The challenge for 
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the present approach is therefore to replace the transformational accounts, 
which exploit multiple structural levels related by movement, with procedural 
explanations of the same phenomena. As a primary instantiation of this 
challenge, in this chapter, we have to show that the alleged evidence 
provided by Binding Theory results do not support the postulation of multiple 
structural analyses. This will be achieved by showing that when the 
dichotomy between syntactic and discourse accounts of anaphoric 
phenomena is removed in favour of an underspecification account of 
anaphora we can provide non-structural solutions for several binding 
problems in the intra-sentential domain. Obviously, we cannot possibly hope 
to provide here a complete theory covering all the phenomena involving 
anaphora resolution which have occupied linguists since the sixties. For 
example, "picture reflexives" will not be considered since they have been 
argued to solely involve `point of view' and other pragmatic considerations 
(see e. g. Sag & Pollard 1992, Sag et. al. 2003, Reinhart & Reuland 1993) and 
since they do not interact significantly with the processing of conditionals; we 
address cataphoric effects but only in the limited intra-sentential domain'. All 
in all, we will only attempt to provide an explanation for phenomena that 
interact with our modelling of the processing of conditionals and examine 
whether they justify the syntactic analyses that have been proposed to 
account for them or whether the present DS account provides adequate 
alternative explanations. If the latter is the case then we will have achieved an 
overall simplification in the analysis of conditionals since we avoid the 
unnecessary postulation of linguistic ambiguities by exploiting the dynamics of 
processing and underspecification of content. 
1 There are many other cases of cataphoric effects (see, e. g. Carden 1982, van Hoek 1996) 
which might require a treatment similar to the one provided by van Deemter (1991). In 
present terms this will involve the establishment of a weak epsilon term to be fully identified 
later on. We believe this to be compatible with the approach presented here but we take the 
view that this is a separate phenomenon from the intrasentential cases discussed later. 
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2. The Problem: Patterns of Anaphora with Conditionals 
The resolution of anaphoric relations between nominals is an issue that has 
attracted a lot of interest in the linguistic literature. There is an on-going 
debate regarding which is the most appropriate domain for understanding 
how resolution of anaphora operates. The pertinent question seems to be 
how the -labour is divided between the grammar and discourse/pragmatic 
considerations. If discourse requirements are taken to determine linguistic 
structure then the linear order of nominals in a piece of discourse is a crucial 
factor for anaphora resolution. This perspective will lead us to expect that a 
pronominal must necessarily follow the nominal it is associated with (its 
antecedent): 
(1) John; left. He; was tired 
(2) ? He; was tired. John; left 
(3) A man; came in. He; was tired 
(4) #He; was tired. A man; came in. 
Considering the acceptability patterns in the above sentences we are led to 
the conclusion that even if it might be marginally possible to have a proper 
name following a coreferential pronoun in a separate sentence ((1)-(2)), when 
a quantified expression is used this pattern becomes completely 
unacceptable. The natural explanation for this situation is that a 
"quantificational" term, such as an indefinite noun phrase, is normally used to 
introduce a new individual in the discourse context (see e. g. Kamp & Reyle 
1993, Heim 1982 a. o. ). Since discourse is processed sequentially, reference 
to a newly introduced entity by a pronominal cannot be feasible prior to its 
introduction by a full NP (unless delaying strategies are employed). The same 
pattern seems to appear within the boundaries of one sentence which might 
lead to the conclusion that there is nothing more to be said about anaphora 
either at the grammatical (intra-sententially) or the discourse level (inter- 
sententially): 
(5) John left and he was tired 
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(6) ? He was tired and John left2. 
(cf. He looks at me and John, goes out of his mind. Bolinger 1979: 304) 
(7) A man; came in and he, was tired 
(8) #He; was tired and a man; came in. 
(9) *He; said that John; is hungry. 
(10) *He; said that a man; is hungry 
However, conditional constructions are one of the main domains that seem to 
cause complications for such a common sense theory of anaphora. If there is 
a discourse requirement that pronouns must follow their antecedents then it 
seems to be violated in the following cases: 
(11) If he; is happy, John; smiles. 
(12) If John; is happy, he; smiles. 
(13) If he, is happy, a friend of mine; smiles. 
(14) Every mother; is upset if her; child is late from school (from Iatridou 1991) 
(15) If her; child is late from school every mother; is upset 
(16) If he; is late a man; will start making excuses 
(17) If he considers it too difficult, a teacher won't adopt a textbook 
(from Chierchia 1995) 3 
(18) If he lies to a student, a teacher loses his trust (ibid) 
Comparing the situation displayed above with the pattern in (9) (*He; said that 
John is hungry), it seems that in the case of clause-initial conditional protases 
the putative discourse rule regarding the obligatory antecedent-pronominal 
order is violated. We will now see how this issue has been addressed in the 
literature. 
2 Other counterexamples to the general ungrammaticality of the pattern in (6) include: 
(i) I haven't seen him; yet but John is back. (Mittwoch 1983: 131) 
(ii) He; hasn't contacted me, but I'm sure John; is back. (Reinhart 1983: 55) 
(iii) Mary hugged him; and Nancy kissed John;. (McCray 1980: 335) 
(iv) She; s almost sixty-five, and therefore Mary; won't be hired by anyone. 
(McCray 1980: 336) 
3 The native speakers we have consulted disagree with Chierchia's data regarding the 
'paradigm of backwards donkey dependencies" (Chierchia 1995: 129-133) especially when 
more data sentences are considered. The general view is that crossing dependencies are 
difficult to process in any case and that there is no clear-cut pattern concerning acceptability 
judgements. Therefore we will have nothing to say about such data. 
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3. The syntactic solution: Binding Theory 
The fact that there are contrasting acceptability judgements concerning (9)- 
(10) and (11)-(16) above has led to the proposal that there are separate intra- 
sentential syntactic constraints which determine permitted patterns of 
anaphora. This seems to be a justified move in the case of specialised 
pronominals, reflexive pronouns, which must be licensed by an antecedent in 
the same sentence: 
(19) John; left. Mary insulted himself; 
(20) *John; said that Mary hated himself; 
Moreover, in contrast to the above distribution, the ordinary type of 
pronominals seem to not to be able to appear in a domain that is too local to 
their antecedent. Such domains seem to be defined by finite clauses again: 
(21) *John; likes him; 
In addition, there is also an assumption that referential expressions like 
proper names cannot appear in positions that bear specific structural relations 
to coreferential pronouns: 
(22) *He; likes John; 
This view of the data seems to suggest that such anaphoric relations can be 
treated as syntactic dependencies in a local sentential domain and that we 
should be able to determine syntactic principles that govern permitted and 
disallowed coreference relations between nominals in sentences. One issue 
that immediately arises in such an approach is how to define the appropriate 
relation between such pronominals and their antecedents. It has been 
proposed that the relevant relations are determined inside an individual 
syntactic tree and a domain that is defined by a tree node's sister and the 
sister's descendants (the c-command domain). The (simplified) c-command 
relation between tree nodes is defined as follows: 
(23) A c-commands B if neither dominates the other and the first branching node dominating 
A also dominates B. (adapted from Reinhart 1983) 
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The c-command constraint on syntactic dependencies has been seen as a 
major structural relation involved in many syntactic explanations like wh- 
movement, quantifier scope, negative polarity licensing etc. If we now assume 
that the reference of an NP is determined, or at least restricted, by a 
syntactically assigned index we can then construct conditions that allow or 
disallow co-indexing between the nominals occupying nodes on the tree. 
These indexings can be seen as constraining coreference relations among 
the nominals in a sentence4. A nominal co-indexed with a c-commanding NP 
is said to be bound by that NP. Now we can define a syntactic theory 
regulating the binding relations between antecedents and pronominals. This 
theory is called Binding Theory and it concerns conditions on indexing. The 
main postulate of Binding theory is that binding is subject to c-command and 
that different types of NPs have distinct binding restrictions. These are 
determined as follows5: 
(24) Binding conditions: 
Condition A: An anaphor must be bound in its local domain. 
Condition B: A pronoun must be free in its local domain. 
Condition C: An R-expression must be free everywhere 
lt is assumed that R-expressions (i. e. referential expressions like the proper 
names John or Mary) c-commanded by a coindexed antecedent will yield 
ungrammaticality. On the other hand, anaphors (e. g. reflexive pronouns like 
himself) need a c-commanding coindexed antecedent inside a local domain 
roughly defined by a single verb and its nominal arguments6. Pronouns can 
take a coindexed antecedent as long as it does not appear in a local domain 
4 There are many interpretations of what indexing actually does and what it refers to, see e. g. 
Higginbotham (1983), Chomsky (1981), Evans (1980), Reinhart (1983), Reinhart (2002), 
Heim (1998). We are only presenting a general simplified view here compatible with the three 
transformational analyses of conditionals that we will address. 
5 One should note here that with the advent of the Minimalist Program (Chomsky 1995) the 
coindexing mechanism which provided the basis for the expression of binding-theoretic 
constraints has become untenable and reformulations have been sought (see e. g. Reuland 
2001). However since the relevant works concerning conditionals presuppose the GB version 
of Binding Theory (apparently even Bhatt & Pancheva 2001 who rely on latridou 1991) we 
have to address binding theoretic restrictions in this format. 
6 For the definition of a "local domain" (as a minimal governing category/minimal complete 
functional complex) utilised in the accounts presented see Chomsky (1980), Chomsky 
(1981), Chomsky (1986: 169). 
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roughly equivalent to the domain determining the dependency between an 
anaphor and its antecedent. After a suitable definition of what a local domain 
consists in, Binding Theory can explain the co-indexing possibilities observed 
above in (19)-(22). And because the c-command relation on which it is based 
is a structural relation concerning trees and the relative position of their 
nodes, Binding Theory results are widely used as diagnostic tests for 
revealing the constituency structure of various linguistic constructions. We 
now turn to how these tests have been used in the domain of conditional 
analyses. 
3. a. Binding Theory and Conditionals 
3. a. 1. The Transformational Account of Conditionals: 
latridou (1999), Bhatt & Pancheva (2001), Chierchia (1995) 
In transformational analyses, possible anaphoric relations between nominals 
are taken as a diagnostic for hierarchical structure and movement. This is 
because it is assumed that anaphoric possibilities are governed by principles 
making reference to the c-command domains of nodes in the tree structure. 
However, when the anaphora results do not correspond with otherwise 
justified structural representations, modifications of the tree structure are 
employed in order to make the c-command requirement compatible with the 
data. This type of incongruity is also observed when the anaphoric relations 
between terms in the protases and the apodoses of conditional constructions 
are examined. For this reason multiple structural representations, either 
related to each other by movement or not, have been employed in the 
literature. We will examine two such proposals in detail now. 
The main diagnostic that has been used in these accounts is Principle 
C of Binding Theory above: Full NPs (R-expressions) are restricted in that 
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they cannot be c-commanded by coreferential pronouns (see Chomsky 
1981)7: 
(25) *He; said that John; is tired 
(26) John; said that he; is tired 
Principle C is the main diagnostic utilised by Iatridou (1991) and Bhatt & 
Pancheva (2001) in defining the syntactic structure that should be assigned to 
conditional sentences (Chierchia 1995 accepts most of these results). We will 
see now what kind of structures for conditionals this criterion leads those 
accounts to postulate. 
3. a. 1. a. Preverbal if-clauses 
As evidence that the linear order of nominals is not decisive for their 
coreference possibilities sentences like the following are usually presented: 
(27) [If she; is hungry], Mary; yells at Bill. 
Instead of linear order, what is deemed relevant for the possible coreference 
relation seen above is the c-command relations among nodes and the 
stipulation that a pronoun should not c-command its antecedent, or, in other 
words, that a full NP should not be bound by a c-commanding pronoun 
(Principle C). Assuming that a preverbal if-clause is adjoined to IP, by most 
definitions of c-command, the subject of the if-clause cannot c-command the 
main clause subject since the if-clause's sentential node (CP or IP) must 
count as the first branching node above the subject: 
7 An alternative formulation is that there is a pragmatic principle mandating that where a 
bound variable situation could be used a speaker will only avoid it if coreference between the 
nominals is not intended (see Reinhart 1983, cf. Reinhart 2000). This however does not 




.................. SUBJ1 VP SUBJ2 VP 
V DIRECT 
OBJECT 
Therefore a pronoun in the if-clause subject position (SUBJ1) can be 
coreferential with a constituent in the main clause (e. g. SUBJ2) without any 
grammatical violation given that no c-command relation between the two 
positions obtains. In the transformational account this is what explains the 
cataphoric effects with preposed if-clauses: 
(29) If she; 's late again Mary; will be punished 
(30) If she; s late again we will punish Mary; 
On the other hand, we have to assume that a sentence-initial if-clause is not 
c-commanded by the subject of the main clause (SUBJ2 see the diagram 
above). This conclusion is drawn because a full NP subject in the if-clause 
can be coreferential with the main clause pronominal subject, cf. (31). If the 
subject of the main clause were able to c-command the subject of the protasis 
ungrammaticality should ensue in a similar way as in the case indicated in 
(32) where she clearly c-commands Mary: 
v-"°no-c-command ...... 
(31) [If Mary; is hungry], she; yells at Bill. 
(32) *She; said that Mary; is hungry. 
'""" c-commands...... 
This can be taken to indicate that the sentence-initial if-clause is attached 
higher than the subject position in the apodosis (SUBJ2 in SpeciP above). In 
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that respect, if-clauses are assumed to contrast with preposed VP-adverbs 
which do not allow coreference in the same circumstances8: 
(33) If Dan; was here he; would see a snake 




3. a. 1. b. C-command relations in sentences with postverbal if- 
clauses 
According to the c-command tests, which disregard linear order restrictions, 
sentence-final if-clauses could not be (right-) adjoined to the main clause in a 
position higher than its subject. That is, the structural analysis shown below 
must be excluded: 
(35) *IP 
IP CP(if-clause) 
SUBJ2 VP SUBJi .... ..................................... 
ý=ý V DIRECT OBJECT 
Firstly, note that as expected the subject of the if-clause (SUBJ1) can be a 
pronoun coreferential with the main clause subject: 
(36) Mary; yells at Bill [if she; is hungry]. 
A 
'........... no c-command... _. 
In this framework this is possible only if there is no c-command relation from 
the subject position in the protasis (SUBJ1) to the subject position of the 
consequent (SUBJ2). This is what allows the coreference pattern in (36) (and 
not linear order). This however cannot determine the height of attachment of 
the if-clause because its constituents are restricted in c-commanding 
8 These data do not really show what is claimed; it seems that it is simply the contiguity of the 
two elements that causes some perceived awkwardness and 'point of view' considerations 
that are not syntactically encoded: 
(i) Near the house where Dan; lives he; saw a snake 
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elements only inside their own clause. What counts against the structure 
shown in (35) is strings like the one shown below: 
(37) *She; yells at Bill [if Mary; is hungry]. 
s........ c-commands ........ _ 
If there is a c-command relation from the main clause subject position 
(SUBJ2) into the if-clause, then a pronoun in the main clause subject position 
is predicted by Principle C to not be able to corefer with a constituent in the if- 
clause. As this seems to be confirmed with the presumed ungrammaticality of 
the string above, the test can be taken to indicate that there is a c-command 
relation between the two subjects. In a binary branching framework, this 
indicates that post-verbal if-clauses are c-commanded and therefore must be 
attached lower than the main clause subject (again the fact that the pronoun 
linearly precedes its antecedent is not taken here as the critical factor 
determining the acceptability or not of the string). Having determined that the 
if-clause is lower than the subject in such frameworks we need to examine 
what its position is with respect to the Object. 
A direct object full NP in the main clause can co-refer freely with a 
pronominal in an if-clause whatever the linear order between the two clauses 
is: 
(38) If she; is ill, John visits Mary; 
(39) John visits Mary; if she; is ill 
As we said the nominals inside an if-clause can never c-command anything 
inside the main clause since at least the CP node intervenes. Therefore both 
the two patterns above are allowed by the grammar and any reduced 
acceptability must be attributed to other factors. On the other hand, if the 
protasis were attached lower than the Direct Object position in the apodosis 
then a full NP in the if-clause would not be able to corefer with a pronominal 
Direct Object. Nevertheless, coreference seems to be allowed in these cases: 
(40) Bill visits her; if Mary; is sick. 
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The same situation obtains if the if-clause is sentence-initial (remember that 
linear order considerations are excluded from these explanations): 
(41) If Mary; is sick, Bill visits her;. 
This is taken to show that an if-clause is never attached lower than the Direct 
Object in the consequent. 
3. a. 2. latridou's (1991) structural explanation 
Iatridou (1991) concludes from the c-command tests presented above (and 
some others) that preverbal if-clauses are adjoined to the IP node higher than 
the main clause subject: 
(42) IP 
CP(if-clause) IP 
SUBJ, VP SUBJ2 VP 
V DIRECT OBJECT 
They can also be adjoined to the CP so that sentences like the ones in (44)- 







(44) If it rains, what shall we do? 
(45) If it rains, are we going to leave? 
(46) If he is right, what a fool I've been! 
latridou argues that the post verbal if-clause must be attached lower than 
SpeclP, the canonical subject position, i. e., it must be adjoined on or included 
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in the VP. Since the Direct Object does not c-command inside a postverbal if- 
clause in a binary branching framework the if-clause would be attached 







For sentence-final if-clauses it also is assumed that they can adjoin below or 
higher than negation to account for scopal interaction. 
3. a. 3. Movement of the if-clause 
In a transformational framework it is a legitimate question to ask whether the 
clause-initial and post-verbal positions for if-clauses shown above are also 
related by movement, that is, if strings like (48) have underlying 
representations in which they are derived from (49): 
(48) If it rains, Peter takes the dog out. 
(49) Peter takes the dog out if it rains. 
According to Bhatt & Pancheva, latridou and Chierchia (1995), some 
sentence-initial if-clauses seem to have moved to their surface position from 
some lower position. The interpretation of sentences like (51) provide the 
relevant evidence: 
(50) John promised that [if you leave] he will leave. 
(51) [If you leave], John promised that he will leave. 
(51) can mean the same as (50), that is, that John promised that he will leave 
in case the hearer leaves. Iatridou and Bhatt & Pancheva argue that this 
shows that there is movement of the if-clause in a sentence-initial position 
and obligatory reconstruction to its base position for interpretive purposes. 
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Moreover, it is claimed that reconstruction is obligatory because a Principle C 
violation explains the presumed ungrammaticality of the following: 
(52) If John, is sick, he; thinks that Bill will visit. 
However, along with evidence that certain sentence-initial if-clauses 
involve fronting from a lower position, Bhatt and Pancheva and latridou claim 
that there is also evidence that not all sentence-initial if-clauses have been 
moved to their surface structure position. This presumed evidence comes 
from other reconstruction data. It relies on the claim that surface structure 
evidence fail to account for claimed Condition C violations observed in data 
like the following: 
(53) *[ Take Peter; s dog out ] though he, may t ... 
(54) *[Which friend of Peter; s] does he; like t? 
(55) *[ Tell Mary that Peter, is ill ] though he; may t... 
If one accepts that these sentences are ungrammatical then it can be 
observed that in the surface structure there is no indication that the pronoun 
c-commands the coreferential full NP inside the moved constituent. Therefore 
the presumed ungrammaticality of the above is unexplained unless one 
assumes that the moved phrases must obligatorily reconstruct in their base 
position at some point in the derivation. When this reconstruction movement 
is performed, a condition C violation ensues because now the pronoun will c- 
command the coreferential full NP. 
According to this assumption, if all preverbal if-. clauses were moved to 
their surface structure position and if they were obligatorily to reconstruct then 
one would expect that examples like (56) should have the same 
grammaticality status as (53)-(55) since after reconstruction they should be 
identical to (57): 
(56) [If Mary; is hungry], she; yells at Bill. 
(57) *She; yells at Bill [if Mary; is hungry]. 
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If the sentence-initial if-clause had moved to the sentence-initial position and 
if it was obligatory to reconstruct it back to that position a condition C violation 
should ensue in (56) in parallel with (57). To explain these data Bhatt and 
Pancheva claim that since if-clauses are adjuncts reconstruction is either not 
obligatory or not necessary (cf. Lebeaux 1990), which from a minimalist point 
of view introduces an optionality undesirable in the grammar. In any case, in 
their view, this accounts for the absence of a condition C violation in (56) in 
contrast to (57). According to latridou, who takes reconstruction as obligatory, 
the explanation would be that the if-clause can be base-generated in its 
surface structure sentence-initial position and therefore it does not have to 
reconstruct. As we said above latridou claims that reconstruction of a moved 
if-clause is also obligatory in the cases seen above which involve long- 
distance movement of the if-clause from an embedded clause to the matrix. 
latridou also presents evidence that purport to show that reconstruction to a 
position lower than the subject of the consequent is possible: 
(58) John; will be happy [if pictures of himself; are on sale]. 
(59) [If pictures of himself, are on sale], John; will be happy. 
In (58) it is assumed that binding between John and himself is licensed 
because John c-commands the VP-adjoined if-clause. Since the same 
licensing obtains in (59) where there is no c-command of himself by John in 
surface structure we have to assume in this framework that there is covert 
movement of the preposed if-clause back to a position where it would be c- 
commanded by the main clause subject John. However notice that despite 
latridou's claims c-command does not seem to be relevant in the following 
cases: 
(60) Pictures of himself; in the garden cost John; a lot. 
(61) Pictures of himself; in the garden upset John;. 
Therefore it is not certain that what is involved in the licensing of (58)-(59) is 
Binding Theory postulates. latridou also argues for a reconstruction analysis 
to account for the binding of a pronoun interpreted as a variable by a 
quantifier: 
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(62) Every mother, is upset [if her, child is late from school]. 
(63) [If her, child is late from school], every mother, is upset. 
In this framework it is assumed that c-command has to obtain at some point 
in the derivation in order for variable binding to be possible. In (62), the 
quantificational binder every mother c-commands in the surface structure the 
pronoun herwhich can then be interpreted as a bound variable. In the surface 
structure' of (63) though the quantificational binder does not c-command the 
bound variable pronoun her and yet a binding relationship is still possible. 
This is taken as evidence that there must be a point in the derivation where 
the sentence-initial if-clause comes into the c-command domain of the binder 
every mother. 
We will now turn to see whether a different explanation of the data 
analysed by latridou and Bhatt and Pancheva can be provided by taking a 
more processing-oriented point of view and presenting a different account of 
how anaphora relations are licensed. We will examine first the reconstruction 
of the Binding Theory conditions proposed in Kempson et al. (2001) and 
Cann et al. (2005). 
4. Binding Theory and DS 
4. a. Anaphora and DS 
We saw above that standard syntactic accounts of anaphora assume that, in 
analogy with anaphors, other types of nominals are also subject to restrictions 
regarding syntactic locality. Moreover, in these approaches, binding theoretic 
principles place restrictions on coreference relations between expressions. As 
such accounts are only concerned with intra-sentential, grammatically 
determined restrictions, separate discourse processes that account for 
coreference in larger domains have to be assumed. Therefore the 
phenomenon of anaphora is split across discourse and syntactic explanations 
with no necessary correlation among them. In contrast to this approach, DS 
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seeks to define conditions on anaphoric relations that have general discourse 
and processing justification. Instead of anaphoric relations being viewed as 
syntactic restrictions on coreference relations among linguistic expressions, 
DS assumes that the basis of anaphora is given by the parser's ability to re- 
use representations available in context. From this point of view, pronouns 
are not taken as belonging to distinct categories, according to the syntactic or 
discourse. -semantic restrictions that regulate their distribution (e. g. interpreted 
as free variables, bound variables, or E-type). Instead, all pronominals are 
analysed as providing temporary place-holders which must eventually be 
replaced by some suitable conceptual (LOT) representation provided by the 
linguistic or non-linguistic context. In that respect, antecedents for 
pronominals cannot be taken to be syntactic elements/words in a natural 
language (although words, among other resources, are taken to provide 
antecedents indirectly by introducing terms in the LOT representation). 
Under this view, pronominal elements are the par excellence 
underspecified and context-dependent type of expression. Their sole 
conceptual content is presuppositional number and gender features which 
guide the parser to an appropriate substitution for the metavariable that is 
inserted at the tree node at which the pronominal is processed. In that 
respect, use of pronouns presupposes that there is an appropriate LOT 
expression/concept in context which can serve as the necessary replacement 
for the metavariable. Under relevance theoretic assumptions, the use of a 
pronoun or a definite indicates to the hearer that a representation of the 
appropriate type is immediately accessible. If there is no such representation 
provided by the explicit content of the utterance or the speech situation then 
the hearer will be induced to construct such a representation by exploiting the 
resources that context makes available. If this is not possible then 
communication breakdown will occur, in DS terms, parsing of the relevant 
string will have to be aborted. 
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We will now see how DS meets the challenge of providing an 
explanation for the constraints on anaphoric relations in the domain of the 
sentence for which Binding Theory was devised. 
4. b. C-command vs. time-linear processing 
Since DS assumes that there is a tree structure resulting from the parsing of 
any grammatical linguistic string, in principle, the relation of c-command is 
available as an explanatory tool. All the sentence-syntactic explanations 
developed in configurational frameworks could, in principle, be transferred to 
act as restrictions on the LOT representations appearing on DS tree nodes. 
However, this would not be an analytic solution compatible with other DS 
assumptions. As DS relies on Substitution as the method of anaphoric 
resolution, the formulation of the principles in (24) above does not provide an 
account of binding constraints. Consider why that is: Those principles are 
concerned with statically specifying conditions regarding the coindexing of 
linguistic expressions. But, at the level at which DS trees are constructed, the 
information as to which lexical items gave rise to the conceptual content 
decorating the tree nodes is not recoverable9. And the c-command domain of 
a node cannot possibly restrict co-occurrence of identical conceptual 
representations because such a restriction is not empirically valid. For 
example, we could not, and would not like to, provide an explanation for the 
following ungrammatical string by examining c-command relations and 
identity of content at the level of the DS semantic tree: 
(64) John; likes him; 
This is because, at that level, there is no restriction prohibiting two identical 
conceptual representations from c-commanding each other. The tree below in 
(66) is the one that will result both by the processing of the ungrammatical 
string above and by the processing of the well-formed string (65) below. This 
9 Although it is assumed that the lexical actions induced by the processing of words are 
retained temporarily (see Purver et al. 2005). 
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is a perfectly wellformed semantic representation and therefore cannot 
differentiate the two strings as far as successful anaphoric relations are 
concerned: 
(65) John; likes himself; 
(66) Ty(t), Fo(Like'(John')(John')) 
Ty(e), Fo(John') Ty(e --t), Fo(Ax. Like'(John')(x)) 
Ty(e), Ty(e -->(e --*t)), 
Fo(John') Fo(Ay. Ax. Like'(y)(x)) 
We conclude therefore that the Binding Theory conditions which are based on 
syntactic c-command are not appropriate notions for a DS binding theory. In 
many alternatives to the transformational account of anaphora, the structural 
explanation of c-command is replaced by a characterisation of permitted 
anaphoric relations in terms of an obliqueness hierarchy ordering of the 
arguments of the verb (see e. g. Pollard & Sag 1992, Sag et at. 2003). In 
principle, this is also an available means of explanation for DS since the 
resulting representations are semantic structured formulas which can be 
exploited to provide constraints on the natural language-semantic 
representation mapping. However, these types of explanation are usually 
formulated in terms of a static vocabulary which takes an all-at-once overall 
view of the natural language-semantics mapping. This type of approach, 
although in principle available to DS at the final stage of the parse, goes 
against the time-linear methodology of the account and the desired dynamic 
interaction with context. The alternative that remains is to embed the 
explanation for permitted patterns of anaphoric resolution in the dynamics of 
processing defined by the DS formalism. Indeed this is the route taken in 
Kempson et al. (2001), Cann et al. (2005). 
4. c. The time-linear resolution of anaphora 
As we saw above the processing of pronominals according to DS provides a 
metavariable as the Formula value for the node at which the pronoun is 
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processed. Additionally a requirement that it must be replaced by a proper 
Formula value accompanies the metavariable inserted. The presence of this 
requirement will cause a derivation to abort unless it is satisfied. A sample 
lexical entry for the pronoun he is shown below (it includes the specification 
associated with nominative case, ? <? o>Ty(t), and the bottom restriction, [flJ , 
indicating that the node being decorated must remain a terminal one): 
(67) he 
IF ? Ty(e) 
THEN put( Fo(U), ? <jo>Ty(t), ? Bx. Fo(x), [1]l ) 
ELSE abort 
After the set of actions specified above has been executed, the process of 
Substitution which is responsible for replacing metavariables will select a 
Formula value from the Discourse Context and insert it at the node. The 
operation of this process is not strictly part of the parser in that the selection 
of a substituend is not defined by the computational mechanism which 
processes lexical input and builds structure10. Instead selection of a 
replacement for a given metavariable is determined by pragmatic processes 
which do not operate in the same (monotonic/incremental) way that the 
parser functions. However, since Substitution operates in tandem with the 
parsing process, there are constraints that can be imposed on its selection 
task by the parser. These constraints can be exploited to provide the basis for 
reconstructing the effects that Binding Theory was designed to capture. Let's 
see first how the strings in (64) (*John; likes him; ) and (65) (John; likes 
himself; ) are dealt with in Kempson et al. (2001) and Cann et al. (2005). 
'° Recently a process of Local Substitution has been defined in conjunction with the 
modelling of the operation of the parser in a context (Purver et al. 2005). This variant of 
Substitution is designed to record the tree path along which a replacement for a metavariable 
has been found. This stored information then becomes part of the context and can be reused 
for cases like the resolution of sloppy readings in ellipsis. This modelling therefore provides a 
formal explication of the notion of "linguistic antecedent" for such cases. However as it is not 
directly relevant to the data discussed here we will omit reference to it in the main text. 
293 
4. d. Anaphors 
As we said earlier the restriction that governs the distribution of reflexives is 
defined by Principle A of the Binding Theory. The restriction consists in a 
requirement that the antecedent must locally c-command the reflexive. In DS 
terms, such a restriction can be given a procedural definition by a lexically 
induced obligatory copying of an already present Formula value that appears 
at an argument node in the propositional tree under construction. In these 
cases the freely operating rule of Substitution is circumvented by including the 
appropriate actions for finding a formula value in the lexical entry of these 
specialised pronominal anaphors, reflexives and reciprocals. Below is the 
lexical entry for the reflexive pronoun himself": 
(68) himself 
IF ? Ty(e) (1) 
THEN IF <To>? Ty(t) (2) 
THEN abort (3) 
ELSE IF <1o><1> Flo>Fo(a) (4) 
THEN put(Ty(e), Fo(a), [1]l) (5) 
ELSE abort (6) 
ELSE abort (7) 
Since such pronominals are marked with accusative case (him-), they cannot 
be processed while the pointer resides at a subject node. This is captured by 
the actions in lines (2)-(3) which abort the processing in case the point where 
the pointer currently resides is the argument daughter of the ? Ty(t) node. Line 
(4) instructs the parser to seek a formula value at another argument node of 
the predicate-argument structure currently being processed. This is achieved 
by the underspecified modal specification: <ro><T*l ><Io>. This specification 
11 This lexical specification does not allow for the processing of strings like Himselfi John 
dislikes,., Himself Mary said that John will hate;. If these are strings are taken to be 
acceptable, then they can be handled in a similar way as with the Japanese reflexive 
zibunzisin in Cann et al. (2005), i. e. by the reflexives introducing specialised metavariables 
which have to find a replacement at a very local propositional domain at some point after the 
initial parsing of the pronoun. 
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describes a path along the tree which allows the parser to take into account 
any co-arguments belonging to the proposition being developed. Consider the 
schematic tree below: 
(69) ? Ty(t) 
01 
Ty(e), Fo(c) Ty(e --pt) 
01 
Ty(e), Fo(b) Ty(e -"(e --+t)) 
01 
.? 
Ty(e), Fo(a), 0 ? Ty(e --"(e --"(e --*t))) 
With the pointer at the lowest ? Ty(e) node the route described by <To><Ti > 
<to> allows the parser to seek a formula value at any of the shaded nodes. 
One step upwards to the mother node (<To>) and then another step upwards 
(<Ii>) followed by a step downwards (<Io>) realises the specification: 
<To><Ti><to> which takes us to the node with Formula b. This path is 
included in the underspecified description <To><q>><to> appearing in the 
lexical entry because of the Kleene star attached to the operator <T>> which 
can be interpreted as zero or more repetitions of this step. Alternatively, one 
step upwards to the mother node (<to>) and then two steps upwards 
(<T>><T>>) followed by a step downwards (<Io>) again realises the 
description: <To><T, ><T, ><to> which is a route also included in the 
underspecified definition <To><t><to> in the lexical entry (again because of 
the Kleene star). This will take us to the shaded node with Formula c which 
could also be copied at the ? Ty(e) node. In fact, the Kleene star in the path 
description <To><Tj ><1o> allows it to also be interpreted as <To><to> which 
means that the parser could conceivably copy a formula value already 
present on the node (Formula (a) above in the diagram)12. This option will not 
12 In Cann et al. (2005) this route specification prevents Substitution from applying in cases of 
Strong Crossover configurations by assuming that unfixed nodes unify temporarily with the 
node under which they are suspended. This formulation is not adopted here. 
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be utilised here and if one wishes to exclude it explicitly we could employ the 
slightly longer specification: <To><T>><Ti><jo> (shortened to CA in Kempson 
et al. 2001). 
With this lexical entry the string in (70) below can be processed 
successfully. The tree shows the parsing stage at which the reflexive pronoun 
is being processed: 
(70) John; likes himself; 
(71) ? Ty(t) 
0 
Ty(e), Fo(John') ? Ty(e --'t) 
01 
? Ty(e), 0 Ty(e -. (e -+t)), 
Fo(Ax. Ay. Like'(x)(y)) 
The path specification that is needed here to allow copying of the formula 
value John' at the subject node is: <To><Tl> <To>. Since this path is included 
in the interpretation of the underspecified description <To><T; ><', o> in the 
lexical entry for himself the parse of the string is predicted to be successful: 
(72) Ty(t), Fo(Like'(John')(John')) 
zl"'ý 
Ty(e), Fo(John') Ty(e -"t), Fo(Ay. Like'(John')(y)) 
Ty(e), Fo(John') Ty(e -"(e -+t)), 
Fo(Ax. Ay. Like'(x)(y)) 
4. e. Pronouns 
Strings like the following are excluded by Principle B of Binding Theory which 
excludes a pronoun from being bound in its local domain: 
(73) John; likes him; 
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The procedural equivalent of this restriction is provided by defining constraints 
on the operation of the process of Substitution. Again we are going to employ 
the path route description <To><T; ><jo> explicated above which locates the 
arguments in a predicate-argument structure currently being developed (the 
co-arguments). By using this description we can specify that a formula value 
can only. be used as a replacement for a metavariable if it is not appearing at 
the point of Substitution at another node in the most local propositional tree, 
i. e. if it is not a co-argument of the same predicate: 
(74) SUBST(John) 
IF Fo(U), Ty(e), ? 3x. Fo(x) 




A slight complication arises here because we need to take into account cases 
like the following where a forbidden formula value replacement is to be found 
at an unfixed node: 
(75) *John; he; dislikes 
The route description <To><1 ><Io> does not cover this case because we 
need to be able to look into the unfixed node lying below the current node13: 
(76) ? Ty(t) 
01 
? Ty(e), Fo(U),? 3x. Fo(x), 0 ? Ty(e --*t) 
x 
Ty(e), Fo(John') 
For this reason we will modify the route specification to: <To><Ti>< o><J*>. 
This path now covers the case above by interpreting the underspecified 
13 In Cann et (2005) the previous specification covers these cases because of slightly 
different assumptions about the Normal Form Constraint. 
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description as: <To><jo><j*> which takes us to the unfixed node. According 
to the rule below the formula value at this node is not available for copying by 
Substitution 14. We also add the insertion of a requirement that will disallow an 
identical formula value to become a co-argument in the same predicate 
argument structure in order to exclude strings like *Heilikes John;: 
(77) SUBST(John) 
IF Fb(U), Ty(e), ? 3x. Fo(x) 
THEN IF <To><T-, ><lo><1*> (Fo(John')) 
THEN abort 
ELSE put( Fo(John'),? -'(cA(Fo(John'))) ) 
ELSE abort 
where CA =[ (<to> <11> <l; ><lo>) v (<To> <? >><? >> <lo>) l 
In the tree in (76) above any attempt to substitute John' for the metavariable 
U will lead to abort which is what we need to exclude the string in (75) 
(John; he; likes). These restrictions on Substitution also cover part of what 
Principle C in Binding Theory is designed to account for in that they disallow a 
pronoun from c-commanding a coreferential name in the same minimal 
predicate-argument domain (of course here the notions of "coreference" and 
"binding" are not appropriate). However, the same Principle is assumed to be 
needed in order to exclude strings like the following: 
(78) He, said that John, is happy 
However it has been repeatedly pointed out that this pattern should not be 
excluded by means of the grammatical formalism since structurally similar 
constructions are in fact grammatical: 
14 In Kempson et al. (2001) the issue is handled slightly differently by making reference to 
future extensions to the current tree that could result in a formula becoming a co-argument: 
SUBST(John ) 
IF {-'cCA(Fo(John')), Fo(U), ? 3x. Fo(x)} 
THEN abort 
ELSE put(Fo(John')) 
The connective -c is defined as a negation that refers to any extension of the current node 
that could result by means of computational actions. -c CA(x) is an abbreviation for: CA(x) 
->c 1, i. e., if CA(x) is the case then the node can only be computationally extended to 1. The 
symbol 1 is a proposition that necessarily does not hold at any node in the model. Therefore 
such an extension will be impossible. This proposition therefore excludes CA(x) from all 
computational developments of the current tree-node. Note that the usage of the abbreviation 
CA above is distinct. 
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(79) Hei did what John, always does (from Sag 2000) 
(80) The teacher warned him; that in order to succeed Walter; was going to have to work a 
lot harder from now on. (ibid) 
(81) It was rather indelicately pointed out to him, that Walter, would never become a 
successful accountant. (ibid) 
(82) If you try to tell him; that the reason why John's; dog was taken away from him was 
rabies, he'll get very upset. (ibid) 
(83) I've never been able to explain to her; that Betsy; s gophers destroyed my lawn each 
spring. (ibid) 
(84) She, was told that if she wanted to get anywhere in this dog-eat-dog world, Mary, was 
going to have to stepping on some people. (McCray 1980: 331) 
(85) She; was told that the company needed Mary;. (McCray 1980: 334) 
(86) She; was told that under no circumstances would Mary; have to compromise herself. 
(ibid) 
Since we do not want to exclude the above, we can attribute the apparent 
unacceptability of strings like the one in (78) to pragmatic factors. Use of a 
pronoun presupposes that there is an accessible term in the context so that 
Substitution can operate immediately. Violations of this pragmatic (soft) 
constraint leading to Substitution delay can occur in order to derive contextual 
effects. If there is no need for a contextual effect-inducing delay, then the 
string out of context might look unacceptable. This is the case for the string in 
(78) and therefore we need not exclude it by making provisions in the 
grammar. As required, the DS rules formulated above will allow all the above, 
(79)-(86), to be processed successfully since the pronouns occur, not as part 
of the minimal predicate-argument structure, but embedded inside the 
propositional argument of a verb. This means that while the metavariable 
contributed by the pronoun can be left unsubstituted initially, during 
Completion and Elimination, the pointer by Anticipation will have the chance 
to revisit the node occupied by the metavariable and substitute it if a value 
has become available. 
Having introduced now an appropriate replacement for the Binding 
Theory we can examine how the data presented by latridou (1991), Bhatt & 
Pancheva (2001) and Chierchia (1995) can be reinterpreted in DS terms. 
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5. Conditionals and Binding Conditions 
5. a. Cataphoric effects 
The main argument against a theory of anaphora that makes crucial use of 
the linear order of terms in a sentence is that such a theory cannot account 
for data like the following: 
(87) If John; is happy, he; smiles. 
(88) If he, is happy, John; smiles. 
(89) *He; said that John; is happy. 
The contrast between (88) and (89) is taken as evidence that c-command 
rather than linear order is the relevant factor accounting for such 
grammaticality contrasts. But, as we have just seen above, this claim cannot 
be sustained since there are a lot of counterexamples to a syntactic grammar- 
internal Principle C restriction which will exclude (89). On the other hand, data 
like (88) do pose a problem for processing accounts like DS and DRT where 
the explication of anaphora relies on the timing of the introduction of terms in 
the structure and replacement of variables or metavariables contributed by 
pronouns. The claim that such data are real counterexamples has not gone 
unchallenged since it has been argued that most such cases are cases where 
the individual referred to by use of the proper name has been made salient in 
the context by some other means, e. g. previous linguistic reference. 
Therefore the pronoun in the protasis does not rely on the name in the 
apodosis in order to acquire a referent (see Bolinger 1979, cf. Cann & 
McPherson 1999). However, even if this claim is true, there are examples 
involving quantificational phrases which cannot be handled in this way. Below 
are some constructed examples and examples from the literature: 
(90) If he, is happy, a friend of mine; smiles. 
(91) If he; is late a man; will start making excuses 
(92) If he; is upset a friend of mine; goes to the pub 
(93) If a friend of mine; is upset he; goes to the pub 
(94) A friend of mine; goes to the pub if he; is upset 
(95) *He; goes to the pub if a friend of mine; is upset 
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(96) If he; has a boring wife, a man; should find a mistress 
(from Reinhart 1983: 116) 
(97) If he, lies to a studentk, a teacher, loses hisk trust (from Chierchia 1995) 
(98) if it; is well-cooked, a hamburger tastes good. (ibid) 
It could be claimed that all the above involve either specific indefinites (see 
e. g. Fodor and Sag 1982) or generics. Therefore they cannot be taken as 
counterexamples since they are in some way referential and can receive the 
same treatment as examples involving proper names as in (88) above. 
However, first of all, the claim that there is a discreet type of indefinites which 
can be characterised as "specific" is strongly disputed by DS which is 
committed to an avoidance of positing ambiguity in favour of 
underspecification of content (see Kempson et al. 2001: ch. 8; for 
counterarguments against a distinguished type of nominals that can be 
characterised as "generics" see Papafragou 1996). Secondly, even if one 
could invoke ambiguity of indefinites, the problem is not solved because, 
although less frequent, there are cases of cataphoric effects involving, for 
example, universal quantifiers. The following are examples from the literature: 
(99) Every mother, is upset if her, child is late from school (from latridou 1991) 
(100) If her; child is late from school every mother; is upset (ibid) 
(101) Wenn sein Chef glücklich ist, so ist jeder Angestellter! auch glücklich. 
when his; boss happy is so is every office-worker also happy 
When his; boss is happy, every office-worker, is happy too. 
German from (Shaer & Frey 2003) 
And the following are attested examples culled from texts found on the web 
(see Appendix 3 for sources and context): 
(102) Even if she is not working, every mother needs a break from her kids. 
(103) Even if she surrendered her child of her own free will, every birth mother is left with 
a sense of emptiness and loss -- if not regret and resentment -- for it's impossible to 
"forget and go on as if it never happened. " 
(104) Product Description: It doesn't matter if she's 5 or 105, every female LOVES these 
rich, thick feather boas. 
(105) By the same token, if Jihad renders every American fair game, then, by virtue of his 
ongoing intention to commit murder, every Jihadist has also foregone his right to life. 
The following is a quote from Dudman (1991): 
301 
(106) If ordinary people are allowed to have any, it would be no surprise to find their 
metaphysical apprehensions enshrined in their forms of speech. 
Dudman (1991: 203) 
The problem that these sentences pose is that, according to DS assumptions, 
the processing of quantificational terms like a man, every mother, etc. relies 
on the introduction of a fresh variable in the structure (otherwise we could not 
prevent accidental bindings of variables by quantificational binders). 
Pronominals, on the other hand, rely for their interpretation on the presence of 
a term in the Discourse Context which will provide a copy to replace the 
metavariable introduced by the pronominal. When a pronoun is encountered 
during the processing of the sentence-initial if-clause in the examples above, 
there is no replacement available since the quantificational term has not been 
parsed yet. However, when the quantificational term is encountered later on 
the pointer has left the LINKed tree which, we have assumed, the content of 
the if-clause occupies. The pointer, according to current assumptions, will not 
have the chance to return to this tree and the metavariable will remain without 
a replacement causing the strings to be characterised as ungrammatical. 
Therefore, for an interpretation of such pronominals as dependent for the 
substitution of their metavariable on the introduction of the quantified term, we 
must set up a delaying strategy. 
Conditionals are not the only domain where such delayed substitutions 
can occur. Most adverbial clauses allow this pattern (the following examples 
are from Reinhart 1983): 
(107) In his; own way however, each man; is petitioning for the same kind of administration 
(108) As its; major source of income, each club, collects a playing fee from the players 
every half hour 
(109) Near his; child's crib nobody; would keep matches 
Therefore the delaying mechanism operating here does not seem to be an 
ad hoc device reserved for conditionals only. Moreover, other anaphoric 
phenomena seem to allow this delay too. VP-ellipsis is analysed in DS as the 
introduction of a metavariable whose subsequent replacement makes use of 
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tree structure available in context. The following shows that ellipsis resolution 
can also be delayed: 
(110) ... If you haven't done so yet, we recommend you read the tutorial. (from an instruction page on the web) 
In fact a delaying mechanism is already needed because of the cases of 
Reconstruction. As we saw earlier, "the so-called "reconstruction effects" are 
simply a large class of apparent counter-examples to the c-command relation" 
(Barss 2003: 672). 
(111) Which picture that he dislikes did every student try to hide? 
The one with his girlfriend 
(112) Pictures of herself;, Mary; would never buy. (from Culicover 1996: 452) 
(113) Herself;, Mary, would never endanger. (ibid) 
(114) Herself;, Mary; says she; would never endanger. (ibid). 
(115) His; mother, every man; loves. (from Jacobson 1999) 
(116) His, mother, I heard that no man; loves. (ibid) 
It has been suggested in Cann et al. (2002) that cases like the one in (111) 
can be handled by the already present delaying mechanism provided by DS, 
namely the device for introducing and resolving unfixed nodes. They propose 
the following rule which allows the substitution of a metavariable contained 
inside an unfixed node when a suitable replacement has been found: 
(117) *Reconstruction 
{ {<T, >Tn(X), ... Fo(a[U]), ... }, ... { (MOD)Tn(X), Fo(p), Ty(Y), 0} } 
{{ <t. >Tn(X), ... Fo(a[ß]), ... }, ... {(MOD)Tn(X), Fo(p), Ty(Y), 
0} } 
where MOD E{ <to>, <Ii>) * 
Since the analysis of conditionals that we have provided here allows them to 
be parsed as LINK structures attached to unfixed nodes it will be natural to 
assume that the treatment of Reconstruction phenomena proposed above 
extends to conditionals too. We thus assume that such cataphoric 
phenomena are associated with the processing of unfixed nodes which, 
exceptionally, can support delays in the substitution of metavariables. We will 
use a slightly different treatment here presented in Gregoromichelaki (2003) 
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because we believe that it is more incremental and models the anaphoric 
resolution as soon as a value has become available more accurately. 
5. b. Substitution Delay 
DS defines an unfixed node as a tree branch whose exact position on the tree 
will be resolved at some later time after its initial construction. This resolution 
is effected by the operation Merge which collapses a fixed node bearing the 
pointer and a "compatible" unfixed node. For this collapse to be implemented 
most locally when appropriate conditions obtain, an unfixed sub-tree will be 
carried down the tree, always hanging below any node currently under 
development (the Normal Form Constraint, see Kempson et al. 2001: 277). 
Merge can be attempted from every node under which the unfixed sub-tree is 
suspended with general "compatibility" constraints resolving whether the 
operation will be successful or not. 
For the explanation of the cataphoric cases, the only stipulation that we 
need to introduce is that, during the completion of an unfixed sub-tree, the 
parser is allowed, as an alternative route, to defer fully completing its 
decoration and return to the node from which the underspecified dominance 
relation is defined. This move should be restricted to occur only during the 
construction of an unfixed node because this is the only case where the 
pointer will be allowed to return to the point at which processing was 
abandoned. The rule below defines the movement of the pointer from a node 
embedded into an unfixed node to the topmost node of the sub-tree under 
construction where the unfixed relation originates: 
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(118) Pointer movement under Reconstruction15 
IF <U><T. >(Tn(x) A ? Ty(t)), Fo(U), ? 3x. Fo(x) 
THEN IF <To> <ti> ?X 
THEN abort 
ELSE go(Tn(x) A ? Ty(t) ) 
ELSE abort 
Below is a schematic illustration of the input and the output of the rule: 
(119) Input: Tn(X), ? Ty(t) 
<T*>Tn(X), ? Ty(e) 
<U><j. >Tn(X), Fo(U),? 3x. Fo(x), 0 ... 
Output: 
. 
Tn(X), ? Ty(t), 0 
<T, >Tn(X)? Ty(e) 
<U><T. >Tn(X), Fo(U),? 3x. Fo(x) ... 
The only reason that such an incomplete structure will not eventually give rise 
to ill-formedness is that the pointer will be able to return to the undeveloped 
nodes as a side-effect of subsequent essential parsing steps. As we will see 
below, these steps crucially involve attempts for the execution of Merge when 
two nodes, one fixed and the other unfixed, are being tested for merge- 
compatibility. 
15 The appropriate formulation of this rule has benefited by a crucial suggestion by Ronnie 
Cann (pc. ). 
305 
In the cases of interest, where an unfixed tree branch contains a 
metavariable and has therefore remained incomplete, none of the non- 
terminal nodes above the node with the metavariable will have either Formula 
or Type values, awaiting as they do a proper value to replace the 
metavariable. In that respect what we seek to model is the sense in which 
such incomplete unfixed subtrees constitute a "liability" for the parser which 
will attempt to resolve them at any available opportunity. In order to do that, 
we will link the completion of such structures to the Normal Form Constraint, 
which also characterises a notion of "liability" for the unfixed node, and the 
operation of Merge. 
We will assume that if the option to attempt Merge is taken up at any 
point in the parse while the unfixed branch is still incomplete, then the pointer 
will be required to return to the "open" node and attempt its completion. If, 
during one of these returns to the metavariable-decorated node, the 
appropriate value has become available, then Substitution of the metavariable 
can occur and the entire unfixed subtree can be completed as a 
consequence. Because of the (modified) rule of Completion the pointer is 
then licensed to return to the fixed node from which Merge was attempted. 
For illustration consider the string in (100) repeated below16: 
(120) [Which of the pictures that he; dislikes ] did every student; try to hide? 
An unfixed node carrying a LINKed sub-tree constructed by processing the 
left-dislocated phrase (which of the pictures that he dislikes) will be initially 
introduced but will remain incomplete because of the unavailability of a 
replacement for the metavariable contributed by the pronoun he. The pointer 
16 The system will apply without modification to multiple occurrences of pronouns in the 
reconstructed part, and furthermore, there is no locality restriction between the two 
antecedent-sites: 
(i) Which picture that she had taken from him did each boy decide that his mother didn't need 
to return? 
(ii) Which picture that he had given to her did each painter try to insist that his sponsor return 
to him? 
(iii) Which picture that she had taken from him did each boy decide that a friend of his could 
keep? 
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will be allowed to return to the root node of the tree under construction 
because of the rule in (118). The following schematic diagram depicts the tree 
at the stage at which processing of the ? Ty(e) unfixed node has been 
abandoned and the pointer has returned to the ? Ty(t) node: 
(121) Which of the pictures that he; dislikes 
Tn(X), ? Ty(t), 0 




? 3x. Fo(x), Fo(U) Fo(lýx. Dýy)(x)) 
According to the Normal Form Constraint the unfixed subtree will hang below 
each node being processed following the pointer17. Merge can be attempted 
at each such node. As a result, when Merge is attempted at the Subject node 
whose formula value has been derived by parsing the phrase every student 
the modified rule for Merge that we define below will cause the pointer to 
move to one of the nodes inside the LINKed tree where the unsubstituted 
metavariable can be found. Below we depict the stage at which the phrase 
every student has been processed and the pointer moves inside the unfixed 
subtree to substitute the metavariable: 
17 Note that we assume here that the unfixed node always hangs underneath the node at 
which the pointer resides, which would not necessarily be the lowest node on the tree. That 
the unfixed node follows the pointer is essential for Merge to be attempted at each node. 
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(122) Which of the pictures that he; dislikes did every student; 
Tn(X y t) 
Ty(e) ? Ty(e --"t) 
"rxStudenV(x)" 
<r. >Tn(X)? Ty(e), ? 3x. Tn(x) 
which Pictures(y)" 
? Ty(t), 
? 3x. Fo(x), Fo(U), 0 Fo(Ax. Dislike'(y)(x)) 
Having a value for this metavariable available now due to the processing of 
every student, Substitution can occur and the entire unfixed subtree can be 
completed as usual. The rule of Completion will return the pointer to the node 
from which Merge was attempted: 
(123) Which of the pictures that he, dislikes did every student; 
Tn(X), ? Ty(t) 
Ty(e), 0 ? Ty(e --*t) 
"T, X, Student'(x)' 




Ty Ty(t), Fo(Dislike'(T, x, Student'(x)(y)) 
Fo(r, x, Student'(x)) ? . Fe(x), Fo(U) Fo(Ax. D)(y)) 
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Merge can be attempted again but it will be unsuccessful because of the 
incompatibility of the distinct Formula values decorating the two nodes. 
However the unfixed subtree is now complete and, as soon as the Direct 
Object node has been constructed Merge can again apply and now 
successfully collapse the two nodes18: 
(124) Which of the pictures that he; dislikes did every student; hide 
Tn(X), ? Ty(t) 
Ty e) ? Ty(e -*t) 
"r, x, Student'(x)" ? Ty(e), 0 Ty(e -*(e -")) 
Fo(Ax. iy. Hide'(x)(y)) 
<j. >Tn(X)? Ty(e), Ty(e), Fo("which pictures(y) n Dislike'(r, x, Student'(x))(y)) ? 3x. Tn(x) 
hick pictures(y) " 
1L ? -T-y{#}, Ty(t), Fo(Dislike'(r, x, Student'(x)(y)) 
Fo(r, x, Student'(x)) ? 3x. Fo(x), Fo(U) Fo(Ax. D)(y)) 
18 We have condensed the string to "Which of the pictures that he disliked did every student 
hide? " 
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(125) Which of the pictures that he; dislikes did every student hide 
MERGE 
Tn(X), ? Ty(t) 
Ty(e) ? Ty( e 
"T, x, Student'(x)" ? Ty(e), 0 Ty(e -*(e ->t)) Ty(e), <t, >Tn(X) Fo(, \u., \z. Hide'(u)(z)) 
Fo("which pictures(y) A Disfike'(T, x, Student'(x))(y)") 
"which pictures(y) " 
L 
? Ty(t), Ty(t), Fo(Dislike'(T, x, Student'(x)(y)) 
Fo(T, x, Student'(x)) ? 3x. Fo(x), Fo(U) Fo(Ax. D)(y)) 
Now, in order to be able to define this process formally we need to be a 
bit more explicit about how Merge operates. First of all, we need to give a 
simplified definition of the consistency check which tests whether two nodes 
are compatible for Merge (see Kempson et al. 2001: 324-325 for the exact 
details). This is performed by employing the formula NOMERGE defined 
below: 
(126) NOMERGE =V{ 3xy (DU{x) A <1*>DU(y) A -'(DU; (x) A DU(y)) } 
where DU stands for sets of decorations on a node and DU; for the set of the 
decorations on the node at which the pointer is located 
The formula NOMERGE holds at a node if some of its decorations are 
incompatible with the decorations of a node dangling below it. For example, it 
could be that the fixed node is of Ty(e -it) and the dangling node is Ty(e). If 
this is the case then NOMERGE holds at the Ty(e --; t) node. The definition of 
Merge in Kempson et al. (2001) employs the formula NOMERGE inside the 
definition of the rule for Merge in order to make sure that merging of two 
nodes is only possible when they carry compatible decorations (remember 
here that Computational Rules might be presented in a condensed form as 
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input and. output tree descriptions but they do in fact consist of the same 
types of actions that are employed in lexical actions; we employ the explicit 
format here in order to be able to modify the definition of the rule): 
(127) Merge 
IF <1*> T 




This rule says that if there is a dangling daughter at the current node then no 
action will be taken (symbolised by 1 above) in case one of the following two 
conditions hold: (a) either the fixed node has a daughter already or (b) 
NOMERGE holds at the node, i. e. if the fixed node has decorations 
incompatible with those at the unfixed node. Otherwise (ELSE) the action 
merge will be performed. 
What we need to do now is to modify the definition of Merge so that 
when an unfixed node is considered for merging with a fixed one, if there is 
an unresolved metavariable inside the suspended node, then the pointer can 
move directly at that node where the metavariable resides. The modified rule 
is as follows: 
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(128) Merge (modified) 
IF <1*> T 
THEN IF IT 
THEN 1 
ELSE IF <j*><D>Fo(U), ? 3x. Fo(x) 
THEN go(<I*><D>Fo(U), ? 3x. Fo(x)) 




As previously the rule first checks whether the current node has an unfixed 
daughter. If this is the case it then checks whether the node has a fixed 
daughter already. If this is true then nothing will change (1). If it is not true, 
then a check is performed to see if there is a metavariable awaiting 
Substitution inside the subtree associated with the unfixed node. Note that 
the modality <D> can look into both dominated and LINKed nodes. If such a 
metavariable is found the pointer will be moved there and the usual parsing 
rules will take over in case there is a replacement available for the 
metavariable at this point. On the other hand, if there is no unreplaced 
metavariable inside the unfixed subtree the consistency check will be 
performed by the formula NOMERGE and, if it is successful, merging of the 
two nodes will occur. Note how conducting the consistency check performed 
by employing the NOMERGE formula becomes conditional on having 
resolved any unreplaced metavariables. This is natural in this context since, if 
the unfixed subtree has remained incomplete, the consistency check will not 
give results that can be maintained later in the parsing process, thus 
threatening the monotonic nature of the task (for example since an 
incomplete unfixed subtree has no Formula value and still requires a fixed 
position, it could merge with a completed node which provides such fixed 
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values: "*Which of his pictures that every student dislikes Mary"). In case the 
rule applies and there is still no Formula value available for the metavariable 
inside the unfixed subtree the pointer movement rule in (118) (in conjunction 
with Anticipation) will be able to return the pointer to the fixed node again. 
We are almost there. The only thing remaining is to also modify the 
Completion rule from Cann et al. (2005) repeated below: 
(129) Completion 
{... { Tn(n), ... }, { <T; >Tn(n), ..., Ty(X),..., 0)) 
{... {Tn(n), 
..., <li>Ty(X), ..., 




where ie{0,1, *} 
We have to modify this rule because we do not want the movement of the 
pointer from the (completed) unfixed node dangling underneath a fixed node 
it is not going to merge with to cause the insertion of a decoration at the fixed 
node stating that the unfixed node will remain dominated by its current mother 
(<j; >Ty(X)). This might cease to be the case if Merge is not performed at that 
point. Therefore we have to split the Completion rule into two separate rules, 
one for movement of the pointer from unfixed nodes to fixed nodes and 
another one for the remaining cases: 
(130) Completion (fixed nodes) 
{... { Tn(n), ... 
}, { <T; >Tn(n), ..., Ty(X),..., 0)) 
{... {Tn(n), ..., <j; >Ty(X), ..., 
0), {<j; >Tn(n), ..., Ty(X), .... }} 
where iE {O, 1) 
(131) Completion (unfixed nodes) 
{... { Tn(n), ... }, { <T. >Tn(n), ..., Ty(X), ..., 0}} 
{... {Tn(n), ..., 0}, {<j. >Tn(n), ..., Ty(X), ... 
}} 
The two rules now allow movement of the pointer out of an unfixed subtree 
without having to decorate the fixed node with anything recording the 
presence of the unfixed node. So as soon as an unfixed subtree has been 
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completed the pointer will be allowed to freely return to the node located 
immediately above it. 
This completes our discussion of Reconstruction effects and their 
proposed DS treatment. We illustrated the modifications to the framework 
with an example involving a left dislocated wh-phrase but exactly the same 
analysis, can be given for if-clauses containing pronouns that depend on 
quantificational terms that will be introduced later: 
(132) If her; child is late from school every mother, will be upset. 
This is because we have assumed that the content provided from such 
clauses also decorates unfixed nodes. Such unfixed subtrees containing 
metavariables can also go through a stage of being radically incomplete 
awaiting an appropriate substitution for the metavariable to be found. As soon 
as a node of the tree hosting the content of the consequent is able to provide 
a value for the metavariable inside the unfixed subtree, the pointer by Merge 
will move inside the incomplete subtree and complete it. The unfixed subtree 
will then Merge with the situation node at some later stage. 
We have also nothing further to say about the treatment of the 
pronominal binding effects and their procedural explanations as made 
available by the framework we are exploring here. In the next chapter we will 
consider other forms of anaphoric resolution that have been claimed to pose 
challenges for the unified treatment of anaphora advocated by DS. We will 
examine these phenomena in the context of the proposed analysis for the 
processing and structure assigned to conditionals and its interaction with the 
phenomenon of quantificational binding. We will then attempt to see whether 
we could still maintain a unitary analysis of anaphoric effects. 
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CHAPTER 8 
ANAPHORA AND QUANTIFICATION IN CONDITIONALS 
We now turn to examine the interaction between the analysis of 
anaphoric phenomena in DS and the account of quantification as it applies in 
the domain of conditionals. We will first review other approaches, point to 
certain problems and then present an alternative view of the issues that arise. 
1. The Resolution of Anaphora and Quantification 
Geach (1962) argued that pronouns in natural languages can be treated as 
the bound variables of a predicate logic language'. This would seem to be a 
justified assumption if only single sentences are taken into account. For 
example, the pronoun he below can be interpreted as the variable x bound by 
the universal quantifier introduced by every: 
(1) Every man thought he was happy 
(2) Vx. Man(x) -> Thought(x, Happy(x)) 
Problems for this assumption were pointed out subsequently. Pronouns do 
not always appear inside the scope of the operators that supposedly bind 
them (see e. g. Evans 1977,19802): 
(3) A man; was happy. He; was going home. 
(4) If a man; is happy he; is going home. 
Resolution of these problems has been taken to involve an account of the 
context in processing discourse rather than simply appealing to the structure 
of isolated sentences. As one of our concerns here is to define how 
interpretations are built up dynamically (as far as conditional sentences are 
concerned) we will have to examine the issue of the resolution of so called 
unbound anaphora cases which arises very critically in this domain. We will 
1 Geach also suggested that there are also pronouns of laziness standing for linguistic 
expressions. 2 As reported in the literature, the issue of donkey sentences is far older than modern formal 
treatments since it goes back to Stoic philosophical inquiries. 
315 
first see how classical Discourse Representation Theory (DRT), Dynamic 
Semantics (DPL and Dynamic Binding) and the Situation and E-type accounts 
address the issues involved. Then we discuss whether there are any new 
insights to be gained by taking the DS perspective to these phenomena. 
I. a. Classical DRT 
DRT (Kamp 1981, Kamp & Reyle 1993, Heim 1982) is motivated by the need 
to give an account of how the process of interpreting a text or discourse leads 
to the generation of a representation of its content. The process of 
interpretation and resulting representation can then provide solutions for 
syntactic and semantic puzzles. Under the view adopted by Kamp 1981 and 
Heim 1982, structured natural language strings are taken as the input for 
rules whose application results in the construction of explicit logical form 
representations, LFs, (Heim 1982) or (descriptions of/constraints on3) partial 
models reflecting the discourse content (DRSs, Kamp 1981). Kamp's (1981) 
framework is more clearly compatible with present assumptions in that he 
takes those representations to model mental representations. Therefore we 
will mainly concentrate on that account pointing out parallels with Heim's 
approach. Kamp's representationalist stance can be discerned in the 
intermediate partial model representations (DRSs) generated by processing 
discourse. DRSs, are represented graphically in box format. They comprise: 
(a) a set (universe) of variables, x, y, z,.., taken as representations of the 
entities mentioned in the discourse (discourse referents), and, (b) conditions 
which comprise predications on the discourse referents that must be satisfied 
by the entities corresponding to those discourse referents in the model 
representing the world. 
3 see van Eijk 2005: 10, cf. Kamp 1981: 189 
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(5) 




In DRT not only pronouns are analysed as variables/discourse referents but 
also indefinite NPs. A DRS universe is populated by the processing of such 
expressions and the values associated with such referents can be any entities 
in the model as long as they satisfy the conditions ascribed to them. Definite 
noun phrases and pronouns are assumed to also introduce such referents. 
However the latter must be identified with other referents already present in 
the representation. We shall now see what the motivation is for analyzing 
indefinites in this way in DRT. 
The traditional way of analyzing indefinite NPs is as existentially 
quantified terms (see, e. g. Russell 1919, Geach 1962), an analysis which is 
implicitly sustained in syntactic accounts with general application of QR (see 
e. g. Hornstein 1995) or which invoke ambiguity effects in the interpretation of 
indefinites (Farkas 1999) or in Generalized Quantifier theory (Barwise & 
Cooper 1981). According to such an analysis, a sentence like (6) can be 
interpreted as shown in (7): 
(6) A man loves a woman. 
(7) 3x 3y Man(x) A Woman(y) A Loves(x, y) 
Following initial observations by Lewis (1975), DRT abandons the traditional 
analysis of indefinites as existentially quantified. This is because in certain 
environments indefinites seem to assume quantificational forces other than 
existential. These contexts include generic sentences, the scope of adverbs 
of quantification and conditionals. Consider the following interpretations of 
indefinites: 
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(8) A woman seldom awoke at dawn. 
(9) A woman always awoke at dawn. 
(10) A woman usually awoke at dawn. 
Lewis (ibid) argued that quantificational adverbs like seldom, usually, never 
etc. can be interpreted as unselective quantifiers determining how many value 
assignments to the free variables in the modified sentence in their scope 
should make it true. The sentences in (8)-(10) have a reading in which what is 
stated is that few/most/all women at some past time awoke at dawn. If 
indefinite noun phrases are consistently analysed in the traditional way as 
existential quantifiers then this reading cannot be derived without additional 
assumptions4. In DRT this has been taken to imply that indefinite descriptions 
in general are best analysed as contributing free variables/discourse referents 
to the semantic representation. In the domain of conditionals similar 
observations can be made regarding the distinct behaviour of indefinites as 
compared with referential terms. In (11) below the proper name Mary occurs 
in the antecedent of a conditional. The interpretation of the clause involves 
considering alternative occasions: namely all the different occasions in which 
Mary is upset. The reference assigned to Mary doesn't change even though it 
is embedded in this way: 
(11) If Mary was upset, she drank milk. 
On the other hand, when an indefinite occurs in the protasis of a conditional it 
seems to acquire the potential of referring to all the alternative individuals that 
satisfy the verbal predicate in that sentence. In (12) below we consider 
occasions in which any donkey whatever might have been upset and drank 
milk: 
(12) If a donkey was upset it drank milk. 
Sentences like the one immediately above are termed donkey sentences and 
exemplify one of the main reasons for the establishment of the DRT analysis 
of indefinites. Kamp (1981) (among others) observes that donkey sentences 
4 Lewis (1975) introduced in fact such additional assumptions but these need not concern us 
here. 
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like the one in (13) seem to receive interpretations which can be represented 
with the predicate logic formula in (14): 
(13) If Mary owns a donkey she feeds it 
(14) Vx [Donkey(x) A Own(Mary, x)] -. Feed(Mary, x) 
The apparent universal force required in the translation of such indefinites 
cannot be explained by their traditional analysis as existential quantifiers 
without further assumptions. Since there is an intimate connection between 
universal quantification and implication in predicate logics, one way to attempt 
approaching this phenomenon while maintaining the analysis of indefinites as 
existential quantifiers would be to attribute the apparent universal force to the 
logical equivalence between wide scope universal quantifiers and conditionals 
with an existential quantifier in the antecedent. For example, the formulae 
shown in (16) and (15) are logically equivalent: 
(15) Vx [ Donkey(x) A Owns(Pedro, x) ] -* Rich(Pedro) H 
(16) [ 3x Donkey(x) A Owns(Pedro, x) ] --> Rich(Pedro) 
In that respect, it could be claimed that (15) can be taken as a representation 
of the content of (17) below because of its equivalence with (16): 
(17) If Pedro owns a donkey he is rich 
However, Kamp argues, this approach, which is roughly the approach that will 
be presented here, will not work for the classical donkey sentences. The 
reason for this is the fact that anaphoric connections can occur between 
protasis and apodosis. For instance, in donkey sentences like (13) above 
(repeated below), the apodosis contains a pronominal assumed to be 
dependent for its reference on the indefinite a donkey: 
(18) If Mary owns a donkey she feeds it 
5 This connection is somewhat lost in accounts of conditionals as definite descriptions as in 
e. g. Schlenker (2001), Schein (2001). The connection is also linguistically manifested, for 
example, by the fact that negative polarity items like any can occur in the antecedent of a 
conditional: 
(i) *1 send any letters and I expect them to read them. 
(ii) If I send any letters I will expect them to read them. 
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If we make the additional assumption that pronouns are translated in the 
traditional way as free variables, then the logical representation for (18) is 
given by a predicate logic formula as in (19) below. But this formula does not 
represent the intuitively correct interpretation because the variable 
corresponding to the pronoun it is free (i. e. not inside the scope of the 
existential quantifier). Instead the formula in (20) with the wide scoping 
universal seems to capture more closely the intuitive truth conditions: 
(19) [3x Donkey(x) A Owns(Mary, x)] --ý Feed(Mary, x) 
(20) Vx [Donkey(x) A Owns(Mary, x)] --" Feed(Mary, x) 
This seems to be verified by the additional observation that sentences with 
relative clauses modifying a universal quantifier expression as in (22) below 
and conditionals like (21) seem to involve identical truth conditions: 
(21) If a man owns a donkey, he feeds it. 
(22) Every man who owns a donkey feeds it. 
(23) Vx Vy [ Man(x) A Donkey(y) A Own(x, y)] , Feed(x, y) 
Therefore it is proposed that both types of sentences, relatives with universals 
and conditionals, require virtually identical logical form representations. The 
indefinites contained in such clauses must somehow acquire universal force 
rather than the existential semantics predicted by the traditional Russellian 
account. If we are to avoid translating indefinites sometimes as universal and 
sometimes as existential quantifiers then the DRT solution of translating them 
as free variables/discourse referents has to be adopted. Additional 
confirmatory evidence for this analysis is provided by scope considerations: it 
seems that if indefinites were to be taken as contributing existential 
quantifiers they should be allowed to extend their scope in a way not 
permitted for other bona fide quantifiers, like universals, in order to explain 
how the pronoun acquires its reference in examples like (24): 
(24) A donkey, came in. It; is pretty. It; seems to be hungry. I am going to feed it. 
(25) #Every donkey, came in. It; was hungry. 
With respect to anaphoric potential, indefinites then seem to behave more like 
referential expressions like proper names which have unlimited anaphoric 
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scope. This behaviour is taken to provide evidence for the DRT claim that 
indefinites do not contribute the traditional existential quantifier in the 
semantic representation. Instead, an analysis as open formulae containing a 
("novel") variable (Heim 1982, the Novelty Condition), or as introducing a new 
discourse referent (Kamp 1981) is necessary to account for these properties. 
This analysis firstly models the potential of such terms to modify their context 
of occurrence in terms of subsequent anaphoric possibilities and secondly 
accounts for their seemingly variable quantificational force: in the presence of 
a quantificational term in the same scope domain free variables/discourse 
referents can become bounds. This is what explains how the effect of variable 
quantificational force is brought about. On the other hand, under the 
assumption that pronominals require identification/coindexing with a 
variable/discourse referent already present in the discourse representation, 
the extended binding potential of indefinites is explained because the element 
they introduce becomes available for such purposes. The existential readings 
most frequently associated with indefinites are then analysed as arising from 
a general operation of existential closure in the syntax (Heim 1982) or 
attributed to the interpretation process for DRSs in Kamp (1981), Kamp & 
Reyle (1993). The latter is as follows: The semantics for natural language 
presented in Kamp (1981) define truth not for each sentence individually but 
rather for the whole discourse whose content is represented by a DRS K. K is 
taken to be a partial model (cf. van Eijk 2005: 6). In order for the discourse to 
be evaluated as 'true' relative to a DRS K in a model M, K must be 
embeddable in M by means of an embedding function. A function f embeds K 
in the model M if it assigns individuals to the discourse referents that satisfy 
all the conditions specified in the K. The truth definition states that if such an f 
can be found then the discourse is true relative to M. Since the verification of 
the whole DRS relies on the existence of an embedding function for the 
discourse referents contributed by indefinites, the effect of existential 
quantification is achieved indirectly through the truth evaluation of the DRS. 
6 Kamp's semantics of implicative conditions amount to unselective quantification over free 
variables in the antecedent, see below. 
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The referent introduced by an anaphoric NP in DRT must be identified 
with an "old", "familiar", discourse referent but selection of such a referent is 
not unrestricted. A discourse referent is only available if it appears in a local 
DRS universe. Locality is defined according to the postulated hierarchical 
structure of the DRS (which, in effect, reflects its semantic interpretation see 
Chierchia & Rooth 1984). The content of propositions that are asserted as 
true in a discourse is inserted in the main (matrix) DRS. Propositional 
connectives like negation and implication and quantifiers like every establish 
hierarchical structure in a DRS by introducing subordinate boxes. Negation 
introduces a subordinate box prefixed by - whereas conditional sentences 
and universal quantification are analysed as causing 'box-splitting', that is, 
introducing two subordinate DRSs in the main DRS related by the connective 
(this is partly revised in Kamp & Reyle 1993): 
(26) 
K, K2 
The possibility of having subordinate DRSs with their own universes requires 
the definition of accessibility relations between sub-DRSs so that already 
present discourse referents can be reused for anaphoric resolution purposes. 
The accessibility relations defined for DRSs in effect require that antecedents 
for discourse referents can only be found in the universes of other DRSs in 
case those can be reached by moving in the direction left and upwards. So a 
discourse referent in K2 above can be identified with any discourse referent 
occurring in either K, or K (or in K2 itself of course). However, a discourse 
referent in K cannot access one in K, or K2 nor can a discourse referent in K, 
access a referent in K2. For the representation of donkey sentences such 
accessibility relations explain the felicitous anaphoric relations that can be 
established between terms in the protasis and the apodosis of a conditional. 
Below in (27), the identity symbol between discourse referents, e. g. z=x, 
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indicates that the relevant discourse referents have been identified because 
an anaphoric relation has been assumed to hold between the respective 
linguistic terms (a man, he) that gave rise to them: 
(27) If a man owns a donkey he feeds it 
X, y Z, s 
man(x) feed(z, s) 
donkey (y) z=x 
own(x, y) s=y 
K, K2 
K 
The semantics assigned to such structures reconstructs the apparent 
universal force that indefinites seem to be associated with in these cases. 
According to the DRS evaluation rules, the DRS K above is true with respect 
to a particular model M just in case there is an embedding function f from the 
universe of K into M. To check whether f satisfies K we have to check 
whether f assigns individuals to the discourse markers in the universe of K 
such that the conditions inside K are satisfied. Here the only condition we 
need to consider is the embedded implicative condition K1 K2. Such 
conditions will be satisfied by f if for all extensions g of f which verify the DRS 
depicted as the first box there are extensions h which verify the DRS depicted 
as the second box. Now, since the universe of K contains no discourse 
referents f will be the empty function. The evaluation rule for will then 
consider all extensions of the empty function f which satisfy K1. To satisfy K, 
a function g must assign to x and ya pair of man and donkey where the man 
owns the donkey. All of those embedding functions g must then be able to be 
extended to functions h such that the man in the pair feeds the donkey in the 
pair. This makes the implicative condition equivalent to unselective universal 
quantification over man-donkey pairs since for every pair of man and donkey 
that participate in the ownership relation we must find that they also 
participate in the feeding relation. In this respect, since the consequent is 
interpreted with respect to the functions that verify the antecedent we now 
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have a notion of subordination of the interpretation of the consequent to the 
antecedent. Under this assumption therefore the antecedent can be seen as 
providing the context for processing the consequent. 
However, despite its success with analysing donkey sentences, as we 
saw in the previous chapter, the DRT account cannot be the whole story as 
regards anaphora and conditionals. The anaphoric relations in conditionals 
can certainly go the other way: 
(28) A farmer feeds a donkey if he owns it. 
There is no explanation for these phenomena in DRT unless some syntactic 
processing taking place before DRS construction is postulated independently. 
In this respect, we are again obliged to make a distinction between sentence- 
internal and discourse phenomena which does not provide a unified model of 
linguistic interpretation. Moreover, despite the claimed uniform analysis of 
indefinites and pronouns in DRT, quantificational expressions, e. g. universals, 
are treated completely distinctly from other NPs in that they are assumed to 
introduce superstructure above the referents they introduce so that they 
become invisible from the main DRS for anaphoric purposes. And despite the 
fact the there is a claimed uniform analysis of indefinites and 
pronouns/definites, the Novelty/Familiarity distinction in Heim (1982), shown 
to be technically problematic in Chierchia (1995), and the requirement for 
identification with "old" referents in Kamp do not really bear this claim out. 
Moreover, the ad hoc Existential Closure mechanism introduced by Heim and 
the semantic interpretation designed to existentially interpret indefinites 
assumed by Kamp once more characterise these elements as somehow 
"special". Nevertheless, the same effects of introducing referents in the 
representation can be equally achieved by the use of a universal expression, 
especially as far as plural pronouns are concerned: 
(29) Every British soldier, aimed and then he; killed an enemy soldier. 
(from Carminati et al. 2002) 
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(30) Every/Each executive; went home. He; broiled a steak. He; ate dinner. Then 
he; watched television. 
(from Carminati et al. 2002) 
(31) Every British soldier, is on leave. They; went to town. 
The phenomena seen in (29)-(30), termed non-c-command binding and 
telescoping, cannot be handled in classical DRT without further ado (see e. g. 
the Accommodation approach of Roberts 1989, and also Kadmon 1987, 
Poesio & Zucchi 1992). However, experiments reported in Carminati et al. 
(2002) show that subjects' reactions to such sentences do not justify any 
special mechanisms postulated in order to accommodate them. Moreover, it 
is not clear that plural anaphora should receive such a distinct treatment from 
singular anaphora as the one proposed in Kamp & Reyle 1993 to account for 
the successful anaphoric relation in (31) (see Wang et al. 2005). 
1. b. Dynamic Semantics 
DRT has also been criticized as "non-compositional" by Groenendijk and 
Stokhof (1990,1991). The doctrine of strict compositionality (involving a 
Montagovian homomorphism between syntax and semantics) is not relevant 
for present considerations since the DS approach that we employ here is 
unashamedly representational and partly top-down. DS is compatible with 
traditional truth conditional semantics (for LOT representations) because the 
dynamics deemed necessary for interpretation in other frameworks is 
incorporated inside the grammar formalism that constructs the 
representations for sentences while interacting with pragmatically motivated 
processes (cf. Geurts 1999, Dekker 2002). The Dynamic Semantics view of 
linguistic meaning is as a function from existing information states (or 
contexts) into new information states. Such functions are called "information 
updates" or context change potentials. In Heim's (1982: ch. 3) version of 
dynamic semantics, construal rules at LF are abandoned and LF-formulas get 
recursively associated with context change-potentials by the semantics. The 
dynamic system, of Groenendijk and Stokhof (DPL, 1990,1991), further 
elaborated in Chierchia (1992,1995), differs from DRT in that it takes a 
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`context' to be a semantic, as opposed to a syntactic/representational, object. 
This object is conceptualised as an information state consisting of a set of 
assignments (or pairs of a possible world and a variable assignment <w, g>), 
namely those assignments that assign entities to the variables appearing in a 
formula such that the formula is verified in the model. A static semantics, like 
that assigned to DRT formulas can be thought of as being given by the set of 
assignments that satisfy a formula. In DPL on the other hand, every formula 
receives as its interpretation a set of ordered pairs of possible input-output 
assignments. For our purposes what is important in this type of semantics is 
the analysis of indefinites: Promoted as one of its main advantages, DPL 
goes back to the original Russellian conception of indefinites as existential 
quantifiers. However, the need for indefinites to allow binding beyond their 
syntactic scope is now achieved by assigning special properties, reflecting 
context manipulation, to the existential quantifier and conjunction. In cases 
involving the existential quantifier, the information state changes by modifying 
the input assignment so that it assigns an object as the value of the bound 
variable that satisfies the scope of the quantifier (q below). The general rule 
of evaluation for 3xq is given below: 
(32) Q3xq l _{<g, h>Ithere issome k: k[x]gA<k, h>E QcpI 
By this rule, a pair of an input assignment g and an output h belongs to the 
interpretation of 3xcp just in case there is ak which differs from g at most at 
what it assigns to x (k[x]g) and <k, h> is a possible input/output pair for rp. 
The rule for evaluating atomic predicate-argument formulas with respect to a 
model M= (D, F), Da domain of entities and F an interpretation function, is 
as follows: 
(33) Q R(t,... tn) ]1 ={ mag, h> Ih=gA<Q tt ]n ... fftnJJ > (=- F(R) ) 
Processing of such formulas does not change the context (h = g). Instead a 
test is performed on the incoming assignments to see whether they satisfy the 
predication. Sentence sequencing is modelled in DPL as conjunction of 
formulas. To explain how cases of E-type anaphora are handled we need a 
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rule for conjunction that passes on values of variables from one conjunct to 
the other: 
(34) Qcp A Y] _{ <g, h> I there is some k: <g, k> E Qcp]J & <k, h> E [yi] 
This rule characterises A, similarly to 3, as both Internally (between conjuncts) 
and externally (beyond the conjunction) dynamic. This is because the 
assignments that are passed on from the left to the right conjunct are those 
that from the initial assignment g give as output an assignment k satisfying ýp 
and k in turn can be updated to h in terms of W. This process can be repeated 
indefinitely thus extending the scope of an initial existential quantifier far 
beyond its syntactic scope. This rule in combination with the rule for 
existential quantification permit the dynamic treatment of discourses like: 
(35) There is a man;. He; walks. 
Pronouns are modelled as free variables and the discourse is treated as a 
conjunction: 
(36) 3x[Man(x)] A Walks(x) 
The pair <g, h> is in the interpretation of the conjunctive formula just in case g 
applied to 3x[Man(x)] produces an output k which in turn produces an output 
h for Walks(x). Evidently, k must satisfy both Man(x) and Walks(x). It thereby 
follows that the conjunction above is equivalent to: 
(37) 3x[Man(x) A Walks(x)] 
which is the desired result and, according to Chierchia (1995), the main law of 
Dynamic Semantics. Conditionals in Dynamic Semantics are treated as 
internally dynamic but externally static in that they pass on assignments for 
the antecedent to the consequent but not beyond. A conditional formula is 
interpreted as follows: 
(38) PP --' qV B= 
{<g, h> Ih=gM or all k. <h, k> ¬ Qcp1 there is some I. <k, j> ¬ Qyll } 
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The output assignments in the interpretation of a conditional do not differ from 
the initial inputs. Therefore conditionals are also tests: only those 
assignments are retained which having an update k that satisfies the 
antecedent of the conditional they can be updated to aj such that the 
consequent is satisfied. In effect, this results in an indirect assignment of 
universal force to an existentially quantified term in the antecedent since we 
require that all assignments k must have at least one update j that satisfies 
the consequent. Groenendijk & Stokhof (1990) also suggest that an externally 
dynamic version of the interpretation of the conditional could be defined to 
deal with the telescoping cases like the one seen in (29)-(30) above. 
As we have already said the assumption that such a radical change of 
what meaning consists in is not necessary under DS assumptions as here 
truth-conditional content is only assigned to LOT representations. The hope is 
that we can maintain a more conservative view of truth conditions7 by 
assigning the dynamic effects captured by Dynamic Semantics frameworks in 
terms of the dynamics of the construction of LOT representations reflecting 
constructively the introduction of content. In a framework that models 
performance, like DS, such content, stored in the model of the context, can be 
reused to resolve anaphora. In what regards the latter, Dynamic Semantics is 
more abstract in that it does not model context change in a direct constructive 
way but rather by the 'idealised' psychologically unrealistic view of sets of 
(total) assignments. Therefore, unlike DRT, Dynamic Semantics is not directly 
embeddable in a procedural performance model. The consequences of such 
choices can be seen in Chierchia's (1995) analysis of conditionals. As we saw 
in the previous chapter in order to maintain a direct compositional mapping 
between natural language and truth conditions not only Dynamic Semantics 
but also multiple transformationally related syntactic representations have to 
be assumed. Moreover, pronominal anaphora is taken to require both his 
version of dynamic semantics (Dynamic Binding with Existential Disclosure) 
The interpretation of the epsilon calculus does not constitute a radical departure from the 
traditional semantics of predicate logic (see Meyer-Viol 1995). 
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and an E-type strategy postulating in effect that such pronouns are 
numberless (for arguments against this view see Kanazawa 2001). Dynamic 
Binding reconstructs a (syntactic) notion of scope while the E-type account 
takes care of pragmatically driven interpretations. From a theoretical point of 
view the question that arises at this point is whether this dichotomy in 
Chierchia's analysis can be eliminated in favour of a more integrated account 
of pronoun reference resolution. 
1. c. Situation Semantics and E-type Analyses 
In the present approach the way to capture the apparent universal force 
associated with conditionals has been by analysing them as involving the 
introduction of epsilon calculus terms whose interpretation ultimately results in 
universal quantification over situations. In adopting a situation semantics we 
follow Berman (1987) and von Fintel (1994) who employ Kratzer (1986)'s 
implementation where a possible situation can be seen as a basic entity of 
the model structure. A possible situation is conceptualised as a part of a 
world. Thus, besides individuals, models come with a set S of possible 
situations. There is a partial ordering, s, in the set S relating members of S to 
each other in such a way that there is for any situation sESa unique 
maximal situation (a world) of which s is a part, i. e. each situation belongs to 
one unique possible world. Instead of the unselective quantification view of 
classical DRT, in the situation analysis, all cases of indefinites exhibiting 
multiple quantificational forces can be attributed to quantification over 
situations. This is also the view taken here although instead of employing free 
variables for the analysis of indefinites and existential closure (or disclosure) 
we attribute uniform name-like content to all quantificational NPs by adopting 
the epsilon calculus in the LOT representation language. In combination with 
the analysis of pronouns as metavariables, able to pick up terms introduced 
by quantificational NPs, we are able to provide a solution to the analysis of 
sentences like the following which are problematic for other frameworks: 
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(39) If a man is in Athens then he's not in Rhodes (from Heim 1982) 
By adopting T-terms over situations in combination with the potential of having 
epsilon terms scopally interacting with them we explain how it is possible that 
the indefinite in the above is perceived to acquire universal force. On the 
other hand, because the pronoun he in the consequent is able to directly pick 
up the term introduced by the indefinite we do not need any processes of 
definite description-like content reconstruction for the pronoun, the latter 
involving as it does the problematic uniqueness presupposition (the E-type 
analysis, criticised for this reason in Heim 1982, cf. Heim 1990). Similarly 
sage plant sentences can be analysed without problems as there are no 
uniqueness requirements8: 
(40) If a man buys a sage plant here he always buys three others along with it. 
Moreover the constructive view of context employed by DS does not face the 
often noted problem associated with context dependent E-type approaches 
(e. g. Cooper 1979) which cannot readily provide an answer for the 
unavailability anaphoric reference in the following: 
(41) John is a cat; -owner. #It1 is grey. 
Although we do not want to exclude the above as ungrammatical in all cases, 
the modelling of context presented in Cann et al. (2005, Ch. 9) explains the 
infelicity of the anaphoric reference indicated in particular contexts since it 
presupposes that the inferential construction of a term representing a cat has 
to be appealed to, otherwise the string will be ungrammatical. 
8 With regard to the individuation of situations we adopt Berman's (1987) vagueness 
hypothesis but here in what concerns the individuation of events/situations at the level of LOT 
(and not natural language) semantics. Since DS is supplemented by a pragmatic account like 
Relevance Theory such temporary underspecification can be resolved by context-driven 
inferential processes. Moreover, because we do not adopt any E-type definite description-like 
interpretations for pronouns and definites we do not need to make any problematic 
assumptions regarding the definition of minimality for situations. The situations quantified 
over are simply those that are considered relevant (in the technical sense of Relevance 
Theory) in a particular context. 
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We now turn to look in more detail into how the DS approach resolves the 
problems associated with other frameworks pointed out above. 
2. The DS Approach to Quantification 
2. a. The problems with DRT and related frameworks 
We saw earlier that the DRT and E-type approaches to anaphora face the 
following problems: 
a. Indefinites and other quantificational noun phrases are treated 
distinctly in that quantificational expressions are assumed to create 
subordinate structures which serve as accessibility barriers whereas 
indefinites are treated as variables. 
b. Cataphoric phenomena in conditionals and other structures are 
problematic or at least they involve utilising a completely separate 
level of syntactic (sentence-internal) analysis. The same goes for 
conditionals with anaphoric links in postverbal protases (these issues 
were dealt with in Chapter 7). 
c. The Novelty/Familiarity Condition which belies the unified treatment of 
definites and indefinites. 
d. The E-type approach does not provide an explanation of how terms 
are introduced. 
e. The phenomena of quantificational and modal subordination seem to 
defy the proposed analyses with the result that ad hoc, unrestricted 
processes of Accommodation have to be invoked. 
We will now attempt to present the solution to these problems that DS has to 
offer. We will restrict our attention mostly in the domain of conditional 
structures and we will provide certain modifications to the formalism to deal 
with some specific issues having to do with the interface of sentence 
processing and context construction. We have assumed that conditionals are 
analysed by means of T-terms involving situations interacting scopally with 
other terms. For the most part, below we will omit the added complication of 
adding the explicit situation argument on the tree when its inclusion does not 
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make any difference to the argumentation presented. However towards the 
end of the chapter we will see that the assumption of having this argument 
represented explicitly as a term provides a solution to some novel 
"quantificational subordination" data involving the interaction between 
universal NPs and the scope of the conditional. 
2. b. Quantificational terms as names 
As we saw in Chapter 3, DS analyses the contribution of quantificational 
expressions uniformly as deriving terms in the epsilon calculus. Upon initial 
introduction these terms are incomplete in that they consist solely of the 
quantificational binder, the variable and the Restrictor contributed by the 
common noun processed, e. g.: a phrase like a man will give us: E, x, Man'x9. 
These incomplete terms provide the input to the Q-Evaluation Rule which 
allow the Nuclear Scope, the predication on the term, to be incorporated 
inside the term itself. For illustration, consider sentence (16) below: 
(42) A man saw every woman 
At the first stage of the parsing of this string the following formula will be 
constructed at the top node of the tree: 
(43) Fo Saw' t Woman' ex Manx ) )10 
This formula is still semantically incomplete in that there is no way of knowing 
whether it is a specific man who every woman saw or whether for each 
woman there is a (potentially different) man who saw her. In order for the 
ambiguity to be resolved the formula in (43) will always be accompanied by a 
Scope Statement (indicated by the predicate Scope) which will 
unambiguously indicate which term depends on which other. In a scope 
statement a term is represented by the variable it binds which is guaranteed 
9 For readability purposes we will sometimes omit the commas between the components of 
such terms. Additionally we will drop parentheses and brackets when there is no risk of 
misunderstanding. 
10 For readability purposes dotted underlining will be employed to avoid excessive use of 
parentheses. 
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by the parsing rules to be fresh and unique (e. g. the term Ex Manx above will 
be represented by x). The variables in such a statement are ordered 
according to their dependencies: 
(44) Scope(x < y) 
The symbol < between the two variables x and y indicates that the term 
employing the variable on the left (Eýx, Man: x) outscopes the term employing 
the variable on the right (E, y, Woman'y). If such a scope statement 
accompanies the formula in (43) above then the interpretation that the whole 
represents would be expressed in predicate logic as follows: 
(45) Bx [Man'x A Vy (Woman'y --* Saw'yx) ] 
On the other hand if the dependency is presented the other way round, i. e., 
(46) Scope(y < x) 
then the equivalent interpretation in predicate logic will be: 
(47) Vy [ Woman'y -+ 3x(Man'x A Saw'yx) ] 
The formula in (43) and the Scope Statement accompanying it will be utilized 
at the end of the parse as input to the rule of Q-Evaluation which will 
construct the appropriate complex terms that record inside their restrictors the 
scope dependencies selected to hold: 
(48) Fo( Saw'Ty, Woman'y, e, x, Man'x ), Scope(x <y) 
Q-EVALUATION RULE 
Man'a A (Woman'ba --. Saw'ba a) 
where a=s, x, Man'x A Woman'b. -. Saw'b, x 
where b., = T, y, Woman'y --. 
Saw'yx 
where ba = T, y, Woman'y->Saw'ya 
(49) Fo( Saw' TyWomany e, xtMan'x ), Scope(y <x) 
Q-EVALUATION RULE 
Woman'b -º (Man'ab A Saw' b ab) 
where b=T, y, Woman'y --' (Man'a,, A Saw'ya,, ) 
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where a,, = e, x, Man'x A Saw'yx 
where ab = c, x, Man'x A Saw' b ab 
We will now see how these rules interact with anaphoric processes so that 
notions of variable binding, E-type interpretations and deictic anaphora are 
unified under a single account. 
2. c. The interaction between quantification and anaphora: a DS view 
As we saw, anaphoric elements like pronouns are analysed in DS as always 
providing metavariables (U, V, W etc. ) which must be substituted from among 
the terms already present in the representation. In the cases characterised in 
other frameworks as bound anaphora, where a pronoun occurs inside the 
scope of a quantificational term, instead of analysing the pronoun as a free 
variable/discourse referent, DS assumes that the incomplete term provides an 
available replacement: 
(50) Every man thinks he is right 
(51) Think' (Right'rtx, Man'x) (r, x, Man'x) 
The application of the Q-Evaluation Rule then derives a representation of the 
appropriate truth conditions in which the pronoun occurs in effect as a 
variable bound inside the term. Consider the rule for quantifier evaluation 
which applies at the end of the parse: 
(52) Q-Evaluation Rule: 
{ .. {Ty(t), ..., Worid(w[xl]), Scope(x, <... < x), Fo(cp[v x Lp /x]) ,... } } 
{... { Ty(r)e 
..., 
World(w[x1]), Scope( x1<... < Xn-1), ..., 
Fo( fn xny, [vxnWnlxn]n((P))' ... 
} } 
where for x occurring free in cp and w[xt]= a world variable x1 or w[x1]=vtx1qj, 
the values fn xn W[v xn 4nýxnln((P)' for ve {c, r, 
Q} and f[xtj((p) are defined by: 
(a) fTXw((c) = 4J[a/x] --' gq[a/xl 
where a=Tx(y1-->cp) 
(b) fr,, (VP) = 4)[b/x] A cp[b/x] 
where b=cx(giA p) 
(c) fo Xw ((P) _ ((P[c/xl) (cp[c/xl) 
where c= v0x((tp)(q)) 
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(d) fvvX, l ((P) = w[X, ]: (P 
Application of this rule has the effect initially of removing the incomplete term, 
wherever it occurs, and replacing it with its variable. When the term is 
reintroduced in the formula in its complete form the variable has become 
bound inside the term: 
(53) Think'(Right'x)(x) 
(54) Man'a -" Think'(Right'a)(a) where a=T, X, Man'x --> Think'(Right'x)(x) 
This gives us the effect achieved in other frameworks by translating a 
pronoun as a variable which is then bound by the quantifier (but notice that 
the pronoun never behaves as anything else but a regular anaphoric element 
inducing the operation of Substitution). 
For the cases of cross-sentential anaphora involving quantificational 
expressions the same procedure is followed: it is assumed that the epsilon 
term constructed by the processing of a previous sentence remains available 
in the Discourse Context for the replacement of the metavariable contributed 
by a pronoun subsequently: 
(55) A man came in. 
(56) Ty(t), Fo( Man'a A Came-in'a where a=e, x, Man'x A Came-in'x) 
(57) He sat down. ' 
(58) Ty(t), Fo( Sat-down'(U) Substitution 
(59) Ty(t), Fo( Sat-down'(a) where a=e, x, Man'x A Came-in'x ) 
There is another way of processing sequences like the above: the possibility 
of building LINKed trees also allows them to be processed in tandem, i. e. we 
can initiate the interpretation of the second sequence before we have 
completely finalised the first one: after the construction of a type t tree 
structure has been completed and before the Q-Evaluation Rule applies we 
can invoke a general LINK rule, not induced by lexical input, to create a 
transition to a new tree: 
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(60) LINK Introduction Rule: 
IF Ty(X) 
THEN make(<L>); go(<L>); put(? Ty(X)) 
ELSE abort 
(61) 
Ty(t), 7Sc(x), ? Ty(t) 
Fo(Came-in'(e, x, Man'x)) 
Ty(e), Ty(e -*t), 
Fo(c, x, Man'x) Fo(Ax. Came-in(x)) 
Now processing of the pronoun he in the string he sat down will ensue in a 
metavariable decorating the subject node of the new tree. The incomplete 
epsilon term E, x, Man'x can be used to replace this metavariable. After the 
processing of the LINKed tree has finished, the LINK Evaluation Rule can 
apply to allow return of the pointer to the main tree and the incorporation of 
the formula derived from the LINKed tree into the formula decorating the main 
tree: 
(62) LINK Evaluation Rule: 
{... {Tn(X), Ty(t), Fo(9) }, {<L1>Tn(X), Ty(f), Fo(ip), 0}, ... } 
{... {Tn(X), Ty(t), Fo(g n ip), 0) }, {<L'>Tn(X), Ty(t), Fo(gi) }, ... } 
The Q-Evaluation Rule will now apply to the whole newly introduced formula 
((pALp) thus extending the scope of the epsilon term across the two sentences: 
(63) 
Ty(t), ? fix), TY(t), 
Fo(Man'a A Came-in'a A Sat-down'a) Fo(Sat-down'(c, x, Man'x) 
Ty(e), Ty(e-*t), Ty(e), Ty(e-4), 
Fo(e, x, Man'x) Fo(Ax. Came-in'(x)) Fo(c, x, Man'x)) Fo(Ax. Sat-Down'(x)) 
As evidence that we need this additional method of processing juxtaposed 
sentences consider cases like the following where the content of the second 
sentence must be "subordinated" to the propositional attitude or dream report 
(cf. Farkas 1997): 
(64) John thought that a man came in. He sat down. He started talking. 
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(65) John dreamt that a man came in. He sat down. He started talking 
Allowing the second and third sentences in the discourses above to be 
processed as contributing LINKed trees to the main tree hosting the 
propositional attitude/dream report predicate will permit us to show that they 
can be interpreted as a continuation of the content reported in the embedded 
clause. The effect derived by this method of processing is equivalent to the 
formula derived from input containing a single sentence with coordinated 
clauses: 
(66) (John thought that) a man came in and he sat down 
In this case, however, the lexical entry for and will achieve the LINK transition 
instead of employing the general LINK Introduction Rule (see Cann et al. 
2005). The result will be exactly the same as previously after application of 
the LINK Evaluation Rule: 
(67) A man came in and he sat down 
(68) Ty(t), Fo(Came-in(s, x, Man'x) A Sat-down(E, x, Man'x)) 
(69) Ty(t), Fo( Man'(a) A Came-in'(a) A Sat-down'(a) 
where a=c, x, Man'x A Came-in'x A Sat-downx') 
We will now see how adopting these same methods of processing will provide 
a solution to the puzzle of donkey sentences without making special 
provisions for the processing of pronouns. 
2. c. 1. Donkey sentences in DS 
We saw earlier that DRT and similar frameworks were partly motivated by the 
need to provide a solution to the problem posed by anaphoric relations 
holding among the components of donkey sentences: 
(70) If a man; owns a donkeyk he; feeds itk. 
(71) Every man; who owns a donkeyk feeds itk. 
The solution to this problem in DRT involved defining accessibility relations 
holding among the sub-DRSs of a representation for the content of a 
discourse. Discourse referents are available for identification with referents 
introduced by pronominals if they reside in the same or a superordinate DRS. 
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This explains regular types of anaphoric linkage. The availability of discourse 
referents introduced in the antecedent of a conditional to referents in the 
consequent is achieved by the special stipulation of allowing accessibility 
from the consequent to the antecedent (leftwards) but not in the opposite 
direction. Since universal quantifier expressions are interpreted as introducing 
the same type of implicative substructure inside a DRS as a conditional, the 
same accessibility restrictions will apply. This explains the claimed contrast 
between (70)-(71) and the following: 
(72) # If every man; owns a donkeyk he; feeds itk 
(73) #A man who owns every donkeyk feeds itk 
We will see that at least for the cases involving conditionals there is reason 
the dispute these judgements. Firstly though we have to see how to handle 
donkey sentences involving relatives in DS. 
2. c. 1. a. Donkey sentences with relatives 
In DS the problem posed by the processing of donkey pronouns with 
antecedents inside a relative clause (Every man who had a donkey fed it) can 
be dealt with by the usual assumptions relating the processing of a main and 
a LINKed tree. Kempson (2003) discusses the following case: 
(74) Every child [ who a friend of mine had upset ] cried 
The processing of this string involves a relative clause modifying the universal 
quantifier. The relative clause contains the indefinite a friend of mine. The 
potential scope dependencies concerning this indefinite cause ambiguity: It 
can depend on the universal quantifier in which case the following formula 
reflects the truth conditions of the sentence": 
(75) Vx [ (Child'x A 3y(Friend'y A Upset'xy)) -+ Cried'x ] 
Alternatively, the indefinite can be interpreted with scope wider than the 
universal: 
" For simplicity of illustration we omit reference to the indices of evaluation where their 
inclusion would not make a difference to the argumentation. 
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(76) 3y [ Friend'y A (dx (Child'x A Upset'xy) --" Cried'x) ] 
The DS derivation of both interpretations is achieved from identical tree 
representations by manipulating the order of elements in the Scope 
Statement (therefore resolution of scope in DS is non-configurational). Both 
readings can result from the building of a main and a LINKed tree and 
copying of Formula values from one to the other. For the interpretation in (76), 
with the term representing the epsilon term derived from the indefinite having 
widest scope, we can assume that this term depends only on the index of 
evaluation (world or situation) in the main tree so that the term representing 
the universal has scope narrower than it. On the other hand, if the 
interpretation in (75) with the universal having wide scope is selected, in DS, 
there are two ways for it to be achieved: either (a) the variable assigned to the 
c-term depends on the situation/world of evaluation introduced on the tree 
representing the content of the relative, or, (b) the c-term depends on the 
variable introduced by the T-term (we will show the world of evaluation as a 
label w1, w2,..., w here, and as an argument of the monadic World predicate, 
see Chapter 4,4. b. 1)12. In order to ensure this we must now redefine the 
predicate DOM seen earlier in Chapter 4, which takes care of constraining the 
choices available for the replacement of the metavariable introduced in the 
scope statement constructed for an indefinite. Remember that the Scope 
Action for Indefinites rule introduces a metavariable as the first member of the 
scope statement regarding the variable introduced by an indefinite as well as 
a requirement that this metavariable must find a replacement which satisfies 
the predicate DOM: 
12 We will also omit reference to the situation argument for simplicity; however it must be kept 
in mind that there is the possibility for wide or narrow scope for the term contributed by the 
indefinite with respect to the situation arguments too; following the analysis presented in the 
previous chapters this can be handled in exactly the same way as with any other arguments 
so for readability purposes we omit its inclusion in the representations. 
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(77) Scope Action for Indefinites: 
IF { Indef(+), ? Sc(x) } 
THEN gofirstt( ? Ty(t) ); 
put(Scope(U<x), 
? 3y. (DOM(y) A Scope(y < x) A Vr(Scope(y < r) -. Scope(x < r)))) 
ELSE abort 
We can now define the predicate DOM as follows: 
(78) Tn km DOM(a)13 r=> 
In ýM ? Ty(t) A 
(fl. [Ty(e) A <jo> <jo> Fo(a) ]) v <j0> Fo(v[al) v World(v[ai) 
v <U>World(v[a) ] 
where v[a]= (q, a, cpa where q= e/T/Q14) v (v[a) = a) 
This definition will allow the variable introduced by processing the indefinite to 
establish a dependency on one of three kinds of variables: (a) on a variable 
which is included in an argument subtree of the local tree, or, (b) a variable 
which is itself an argument in the local tree, or, (c) a world variable, indicated 
as the argument of the predicate World, which can be the local world variable 
or some higher one. Having established this modification we can now resume 
illustration of the two ways an indefinite inside the relative that modifies a 
universal expression can appear to have narrow scope with respect to it. 
In case the E-term has narrow scope with respect to the world or 
situation of evaluation inside the LINKed tree, the completion of this term can 
be finalised before processing of the main clause resumes. This is because 
the other term on which it depends is part of the same LINKed tree to which it 
belongs. Below it is shown how after the LINKed tree has been completed the 
epsilon term (simplified to: E, y, Friend'y) derived from processing the indefinite 
13 In Kempson et al (2001) where the situation argument is treated as a label there is a 
slightly different definition of the predicate DOM. 
14 Q stands for any other quantificational binder like those contributed by expressions like 
most, few etc. (see Kempson et al. 2001) 
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a friend of mine has been evaluated with respect to the LINKed tree to 
become: s, y, Friend'yAUpset'yz, abbreviated on the tree representation as aZ 
(indicating that it contains the free variable z, the variable that will be bound 
by the r-binder): 
(79) Every child who a friend of mine had upset 
? Ty(t), World(w2), Scope(w2 < S) 
? Ty(e) ? Ty(e --it) 
? Ty(cn) Ty(cn -+e), 
Fo(AP. T, P) 
Ty(e) Ty(e -+cn) 
Fo(z) Fo(Ax. x, Child'(x)) 
Ty(t), World(w, ), SGope(w}<y) 
Fo(w,: Upset' z az where aZ c, y, Friend'y n Upset'zy) 
Ty(e), Ty(e -*t) 
Fo(a2) Fo(Ay. Upsetzy) 
Ty(e) Ty(e ->t) 
Fo(z) Fo(Ax. Ay. Upset'xy) 
When processing of the whole string has been finalised the resulting formula 
will be: 
(80) Cry'(r, z, Child'z n w,; (Upset'zaZ )), Scope(w2 < z) 
where aZ = s, y, Friend'y n 
ÜpseYzy 
Evaluation of the latter will produce the following15: 
(81) w2: (Child; b n_wý; Upset: bab --+ Cry'b) 
where b= (T, z, Child'z. A. w, _Upset'zaý -f Cry_z) 
where ab = (s, y, Friend'y A w,: Upset'by) ). 
This formula is equivalent to (75) (ignoring the contributions of indices of 
evaluation). 
15 Incidentally, we see here the benefit of assuming that a situation term is a proper argument 
rather than a label: since according to the current rules the label is attached externally to the 
formula, the term when copied to a completely independent tree will not bear an indication of 
its index of evaluation. 
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The second way of assigning narrow scope to the (interpretation of the) 
indefinite with respect to the universal is to assume that the variable y 
representing the c-term inside the LINKed tree is explicitly declared to depend 
on the variable z representing the T-term. In these cases the Q-Evaluation 
Rule cannot apply for this term while it is located inside the LINKed tree 
because the other term on which it depends does not occur there16. For this 
reason the scope statement will have to be lifted from the LINKed tree to the 
root node of the main tree. Since there is an established dependency 
between the lifted variable and the terms in the main tree the Q-Evaluation 
Rule (modified as shown below) can apply taking into account this variable 
too. The rule achieving this lifting is as follows: 
(82) Scope statement Lifting Rule: 
{{ Tn(X),? Ty(i),... ), 
{... {MOD(Tn(X)), Ty(t), ..., Scope(... z, <x;... ), ..., 0}}} {{ Tn(X),? Ty(t),..., Scope( ... z; <x;... ), ... }, {... {MOD(Tn(X)), Ty(t), 
..., 
0} }} 
MOD e{ <to>, <j, >, <L-' > }* 
For reasons that are explained in the previous footnote and below, we will 
assume here that such lifting is optional and that it can equally apply to both 
tau and epsilon terms. The tree representing the state of the tree 
representation after the relative has been processed and under the 
assumption that the indefinite is intepreted as dependent on the universal 
with a lifted Scope Statement is as follows: 
16 Kempson (2003) seems to reserve this analysis for cases where the indefinite takes widest 
scope, i. e. where it also takes wide scope with respect to the T-term, because it depends on 
the higher index of evaluation. However since the scope statement for the indefinite appears 
as including a metavariable (e. g. U<y) and this metavariable can be replaced by the variable 
representing the index of the main clause structure (e. g. Scope(S2<y) there is no technical 
reason why the evaluation of the epsilon term should be prohibited from occurring in the 
relative clause structure. The alternative proposed here of free lifting can be extended to 
cover all cases where the indefinite (or other types of term as we will see below) depends on 
another term. This could provide a solution to the following: 
(i) The woman who every man respects is his mother. 
(ii) The man who builds each television set also repairs it 
(iii) Somebody in every city despises it 
(iv) Every boys mother likes him 
(v) The uniform that every nurse, had thrown away that night was now lying on her, 
bed 
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(83) Every child who a friend of mine had upset = 
? Ty(t), World(w2), Scope(w2<z<y) 
? Ty(e) ? Ty(e --"t) 
? Ty(cn) Ty(cn --e), 
Fo(AP. T, P) 
Ty(e) Ty(e -+cn) 
Fo(z) Fo(Ax. x, Child'(x)) 
Ty(t), Scope(w, < z<y), 
Fo(w,: Upset' z eyFriend_y) 
Ty(e), Ty(e -it) 
Fo(e, y, Friend'y) Fo(Ay. Upset'zy) 
Ty(e) Ty(e -it) 
Fo(z) Fo(Ax. Ay. Upset'xy) 
The resulting formula after all the lexical input has been processed will be: 
(84) Cry'(r, z, (Child'z A wI _Upset. (z)(ýyFriend'y))) Scope (w2 <z< y). 
We now need to introduce a minor modification to the Q-Evaluation Rule in 
order to be able to process such structures. The amendment consists in 
substituting the T-term inside the restrictor (ip) too with its bound variable so 
that it can include the newly constructed name after evaluation. 
(85) Q-Evaluation Rule: 
{.. {Ty(t), 
..., World(w[xi), ..., 
Scope(xl<... < x), Fo(cq[v xn (p[vxpnxj Ix]).... } } 
{... { Ty(t), ..., World(w[x, ]), Scope( x, <... < xn-1), ..., Fo( 
f x w[v xn yrn/xn]n«P)), ... } } 
where for x occurring free in cp and w[x, ]= a world variable x, or w[x, ]=v, x, tp, 
the values fvn Xn wIv Xn wnlxnln((P)' for ve {c, T, Q} and f,, fx,, (cp) are defined by: 
(a) fr 
x W(v xý wýýxý)ý 
(ý) tp[a/x] --> (p[a/x] 
where a=Tx(Lp-"cp) 
(b) ((P) = qi[b/X] A (p[b/X] 
where b=cx(gJA p) 
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(C) fQxw[vx"(cp) = (q[C/X]) ((P[C/xl) 
where c= vox((yi)(c )) 
(d) f vg,,, ] (q) = w[X, L (P. 
Applying the Q-Evaluation Rule to the formula in (84) will yield the following: 
(86) wZ: (Chil.................. b_: pset'bab -. 
Friend'ab_n_Cry: b. 
where (T, z, Child'z A w, 
Upset. za1 --. Friend's y Cry. z) 
where aZ = (e, y, Friend'y A Cry'z) 
where ab= (c, y, Friend'y A Cry'b ) 
The same treatment can now be given to donkey sentences with 
universal quantifiers as the head and an indefinite contained inside the 
relative. According to whether the scope statement for the epsilon term 
representing the indefinite has been lifted or not, the metavariable contributed 
by the pronoun in the main clause will be replaced by either a complete or an 
incomplete term. The two alternative trees, first with a lifted scope statement 
and then with it in situ, are shown below17: 
(87) Every man who owned a donkey fed it: 
Ty(t), Scope(z<y), Fo(Feed' (EyDonkey'y) (T, z, Man'z A Own' EyDonkey'y z) ) 
Ty(e), Ty(e-"t), Fo(Xz. Feed' eyDonkeyy z) 
Fo(T, z, Man'z A Own' cyDonkey'y, z) 
Ty(cn), Ty(cn--+e), Ty(e), Ty(e-*(e-+t), 
Fo(z, Man'z A Fo(AP. T, P) Fo(EyDonkey'y) Fo(Ax. Az. Feed'xz) 
Own' EyDonkey'y z) 
Ty(e), Ty(e--+cn), Fo(Ax. x, Man'(x)) 
Fo(z) 
Ty(t), Scope(z<y), Fo(Own' EyDonkey; y, 
Ty(e), Fo(z) Ty(e->t), Fo(, ku. Own'eyDonkey'u) 
Ty(e), Ty(e--"t), 
Fo(eyDonkey'y) Fo(Ax., \u. Own'xu) 
17 For simplicity of illustration we omit the indices of evaluation as they do not affect the 
result. 
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(88) Every man who owned a donkey fed it: 
Ty(t), Scope(z), Fo( Feed' (a2) (T, z, Man'z A Own'as z) ) 
Ty(e), Fo(T, z, Man'z n Own'az z) Ty(e-*t), Fo(, \y. Feed'a2 y) 
Ty(cn), Ty(cn--+e), Ty(e), Ty(e-(e-*t), 
Fo(z, Man'z A Own'a. z) Fo(AP. T, P) Fo(a, ) Fo(Ax. Ay. Feed'xy) 
Ty(e), Ty(e-+cn), 
Fo(z) Fo(Ax. x, Man'(x)) 
Ty(t), Fo(Own' aZ z, where aZ = E, y, Donkey'y A Own'yz ) 
Ty(e), Ty(e-t), 
Fo(z) Fo(Ay. Own'as y) 
Ty(e), Ty(e--*t), 
Fo(a1) Fo(Ax. Ay. Own'xy) 
The respective interpretations corresponding to each choice are as follows: 
For (87) initially we derive the formula: 
(89) Scope(z<y), Fo( Feed' (eyDonkey'y) (T, z, Man'z A Own' ey_Donkey'y z) ) 
with Scope Statement: Scope(z<y). After application of the Q-Evaluation Rule 
the derived formula will be: 
(90) (Man'b A Own'abb) -- Donkey'ab A Feed'abb) 
where b=T, Z, Man'z n Own' a2 z_-. Donkey'azn Feed'a? z 
where aZ = c, y, Donkey'y A Feed'yz 
where ab = E, y, Donkey'y A Feed'yb 
For (88) the resulting formula will be: 
(91) (Feed' aS rz Manz n-Qwn'aZ-z where aZ = c, y, Donkey'y A Own'yz) 
After the application of the Q-Evaluation Rule the formula will be transformed 
to: 
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(92) (Man'b n Own'abb --, Feed: abb 
where b=T, Z, . 
Man'z A 
Own'a, z -, Feed'aZ z 
where aZ = c, y, Donkey'y A 
Own'yz 
where ab= e, y, Donkey'y A Own'yb ) 
The two formulas have equivalent predicate logic representations even 
though in DS there is a difference regarding the stage at which the epsilon 
term is evaluated. 
Now we will look at how terms embedded inside conditionals can give 
rise to what in other frameworks are described as bound variable or E-type 
uses of pronouns (or, what, in DRT, motivates the definition of accessibility 
relations constraining the identification of referents). Since the issue is 
broader than donkey contexts we turn to the general problem that has been 
termed quantificational subordination or telescoping. 
2. c. 2. Quantificational Subordination: The DS solution 
2. c. 2. a. Accessibility of terms 
In standard DRT and DPL the interpretation of universals makes use of the 
semantics/representation of implication with the result that antecedents for 
pronouns are only available in the direction from the antecedent to the 
consequent with everything else introduced inside the scope of the 
conditional inaccessible from superordinate positions. As we saw earlier, 
unlike classical DRT, Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991) a. o18. consider the 
possibility of allowing the processing of universals and conditionals to be 
either externally static or externally dynamic in order to achieve the effects 
observed in the type of phenomena termed quantificational subordination, 
illustrated below: 
(93) Every student; walked to the stage. He; took his diploma from the Dean and sat down 
again. 
(94) Every chess-set; comes with a spare pawn. lt; is taped to the bottom (of the box) 
(from Sells 1984) 
18 see e. g. Fernando (1993). 
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(95) Every British soldier aimed and then he; killed an enemy soldier. 
(from Carminati et al. 2002) 
(96) Every story, pleases these children. If it; is about animals, they are excited. If it; is 
about witches, they are enchanted, and if it; is about humans they never want it, to 
stop (Belvadi 1989) 
(97) John introduced every new student; to the chairperson. Bill introduced him, to the 
Dean (from Chierchia 1995) 
(98) Fast jeder Stuhl;, den wir gesehn haben, war echt schön. German 
almost every chair it we saw have was really beautiful 
Leider war er; auch viel zu teuer. 
unfortunately was it also much too expensive 
(from Shaer & Frey 2003 ) 
For the same reasons Roberts (1989) employs the operation of 
Accommodation; this technique allows the extraction of information 
introduced inside the inaccessible domain of the conditional and its copying to 
a new domain where it serves the role of providing antecedents for anaphoric 
elements: 


















Given the non-monotonic and non-compositional character of the 
Accommodation method it seems more appropriate to take it as an abstract 
description of the pragmatic processes that affect the interpretation of 
discourse. But if this is the case then Accommodation as an independent 
process can have no status in a grammar and would be superseded by 
general pragmatic/inferential principles, like the principle of relevance, which 
interact with grammatical encoded rules. For what concerns us here, since 
the circumstances that allow Accommodation have not been precisely 
defined, it is difficult to determine in a compositional way which portions of the 
discourse representation can and will be copied; therefore Accommodation 
cannot be incorporated in the grammar formalism either in the form of general 
computational rules or as part of specialised sets of lexical actions. It has 
been pointed out by Wang et al. (2005) that it is the discourse relations 
between propositions, derived pragmatically, that predict such felicitous 
accessibility of information to different domains. Since we agree with the 
general spirit of this suggestion (although not with its implementation) we will 
not attempt to provide here a discussion of how the appropriate context is 
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selected that makes terms introduced inside purported inaccessible domains 
available or that precludes such accessibility. A pragmatic approach like 
Relevance Theory provides the criteria and the method for achieving these 
results and, from the present point of view, the grammar formalism should 
only provide the structural means that underpin such choices. In addition, an 
argument against a special-purpose procedure for the handling of such cases 
comes from the psycholinguistic literature where there is evidence that, at 
least "quantificational subordination" cases are not processed any differently 
than normal "anaphoric" cases (see Carminati et al. 2002). Therefore, what 
we will be concerned with here is (a) modelling the means that make terms 
available when context dictates that they are needed, and (b) define the 
absolute structural restrictions that preclude such accessibility in all contexts. 
2. c. 2. b. DS modelling of quantificational subordination 
2. c. 2. b. 1. Processing of juxtaposed clauses as subordinate 
To start with, we take (93) repeated below: 
(101) Every student; walked to the stage. He; took his; diploma from the Dean and 
returned to his; seat 
The predicate logic formula representing the interpretation of (101) is shown 
below (omitting irrelevant details): 
(102) Vx (StudenYx -. Walked'x n Took: diploma; x n Returned=to: seat'x ) 
The interpretation of the first sentence of (101) is as follows: 
(103) vx (Student'x -> Walked'x) .............. 
Following the rules defined by DS for the processing of (101) the following 
formula will be derived at the root node of the tree: 
(104) Walked'(T, x, Stud ent'x ), Scope(..., x) 
This formula taken along with the Scope Statement is equivalent to (103). At 
this point, according to standard DS assumptions, we can apply the Q- 
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Evaluation Rule. After its application we will derive the following, which is also 
equivalent to (103) but which also makes available for copying the completed 
T-term (abbreviated as a): 
(105) Student'(a) --* Walked(a) where a=T, X, Studentx - Walked. x. 
However, if we assume that this is the correct formula derived by processing 
the string in (101) we potentially get into trouble. We have to copy the 
completed T-term in the tree derived as the semantic representation of the 
content of the second sentence of (101) as a replacement for the 
metavariable contributed by the pronoun he. But if we then apply the usual Q- 
Evaluation Rule for T-terms we derive a formula with undesirable truth 
conditions: 
(106) Took-diploma'(a) where a=i, x, Student'x --* Walked'x 
Q-EvaluaiionRule 
(107) Student; (a) Walked; (a) - Took =diploma: ýa) 
where a=r, x, Student'x Walked 
'(x) -> 
Took. dplomp(x) 
The resulting formula could be true in a situation where some students did not 
walk to the stage and they did not get a diploma from the dean. However, in 
such a situation (101) is perceived as false since intuitively it states that all 
students walked to the stage. For this reason, Kempson et al. (2001) propose 
a more complicated rule for the restructuring of terms in such cases: 
(108) Q-Evaluation Rule: 
< 
..., 
< X1 ..., Xn 
>, 
..., 
t >: T[V Xn qJnlXnl 
<..., < X1, ..., Xn. 1>, ..., 
t >: fnXnwn((P) 
where for x occurring free in cp, the values fn. 
n gn(cp), 
for v=T are defined by: 
(a) fT x ((P) _ (x --' (ý A 4)))[a/x] if qi =x --. ý 
(c yp)[b/x] otherwise 
where a=Tx(X-->(ýAcp)) 
where b=Tx(i) (P) 
However this rule, although giving the right truth conditions in this case, faces 
two problems: Firstly, the framework as currently defined does not allow re- 
evaluating terms once they are copied in a subsequent structure: application 
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of the Q-Evaluation Rule relies on a term's variable being in the Scope 
Statement; however, a copied term will not provide such a scope declaration; 
therefore the Q-Evaluation Rule cannot take this term into account. The 
second issue concerns exactly the fact that lack of a scope declaration for 
copied terms as provided by the currently defined rules provides the correct 
result by not allowing the term to be re-evaluated: If a copied term was 
allowed to enter the Scope Statement then it should be accompanied with the 
stipulation that it must necessarily take wide scope with respect to other terms 
in that tree. This is because terms copied to another structure should not be 
allowed to depend on other terms newly introduced there. For example, the 
following sentence: 
(109) A man came in. Every woman saw him. 
cannot have an interpretation where for every woman there is a man such 
that he was seen by her. But if we allow the completed epsilon term to appear 
in the Scope Statement of the tree derived by parsing the second sentence 
we will have to stipulate that it necessarily has wide scope with respect to the 
r-term derived from the universal. It seems that in that respect complete terms 
behave more like proper names (interpreted as rigid designators). 
The solution to this problem can be given by assuming that in the 
telescoping cases in (93)-(98) above what is actually copied is an incomplete 
term, i. e. a term which has not been evaluated yet. This should give the right 
results in the cases involving universals and without the special Q-Evaluation 
Rule in (108) above. The assumption that we need to make to achieve this is 
that a LINK relation is initiated from the completed propositional node before 
the Q-Evaluation Rule has applied. We take as evidence for the validity of 
such a constraint regarding the telescoping cases the presence of a singular 
pronoun in the linguistic input which, from our perspective, indicates that 
indeed the incomplete T-term has been copied. Such a term will not introduce 
a new Scope Statement declaration in the LINKed tree and will necessarily be 
evaluated at the main tree after the LINK Evaluation Rule (in (62)) has 
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allowed the pointer to return there. Here is a schematic representation 
illustrating the copied term and its eventual evaluation in the main tree: 
(110) Every student walked to the stage. He took his diploma ... 
Ty(t), Fo( Walked'{T, x, StudenYx) A Took-his_diploma; Lrtx, St tc J3 x) ), Scope( X) 
Q-EroluarionRu(e 
Ty(t), Fo(Walked'(a) A Took-his-diploma'(a) 
where a=T, x, Student. x -- Walked'x A Took-his-dploma'x), Scope(... 
L 
Ty(t), Fo(Took; his=diploma'{T, x, Sfudent3)» 
We will see now how to achieve such representations for juxtaposed 
sentences. 
We have assumed that the LINK connection among trees defines a 
single inferential domain (the global tree) which, in that capacity, serves as a 
scope extending device for terms. To model this intuition more appropriately 
we will now retract the multi-purpose LINK Introduction Rule shown in (60) 
and repeated below: 
(111) UNK Introduction Rule: 
IF Ty(X) 
THEN make(<L>); go(<L>); put(? Ty(X)) 
ELSE abort 
Instead we define LINK Introduction on a case-by-case basis with appropriate 
constraints in each case. This seems a reasonable assumption since LINK 
Introduction can take many forms: in relatives and, as we saw, in conditionals 
it can be introduced across languages either by specialised lexical items or 
specialised Computational Rules; on the other hand, in cases of coordination, 
it is the lexical input from and, but, etc. which provides the appropriate 
construction. In the case of interest, where we LINK two trees derived from 
two juxtaposed sentences, we have to assume that the only reason for doing 
so must be the desired correlation of interpretations (i. e. some type of 
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subordination) which will lead to the scope extension for terms. Otherwise, 
since the trees remain available in the Discourse Context, there would be no 
reason for such extension. Therefore we will make it a condition for the 
application of the LINK Introduction rule that the Scope Statement is still 
intact, i. e., the terms in the main tree have not been evaluated yet. 
To implement this we introduce a new predicate which is satisfied only 
when the variables in the Scope Statement have been consumed by the Q- 
Evaluation Rule19. The new predicate introduced is called ScEval and is 
defined as follows: 
(112) Tn l ScEval H Tn l Ty(t) A Scope(O) 
This predicate in the form of a requirement is needed in any case since 
currently there is no way to force the Q-Evaluation Rule to apply. We will 
therefore define a requirement ? ScEval which is part of the Axiom and which 
will force the Q-Evaluation Rule to apply at the end of the parse. By exploiting 
the presence of this requirement, we can modify the (now specialized) LINK 
Introduction rule as follows: 
(113) Propositional LINK Introduction Rule: 
IF Ty(t), ? ScEval, 
THEN make(<L>); go(<L>); put(? Ty(t)) 
ELSE abort 
This rule can only take effect if the Q-Evaluation Rule has not been applied 
yet since we assume that application of the latter immediately satisfies the 
requirement ? ScEval which will be removed by Thinning. We will now see 
how this rule will allow us, in combination with some auxiliary assumptions, to 
parse successfully cases of quantificational subordination. We first examine 
the significance of the use of a plural vs. a singular pronoun in order to pick 
19 We take the Scope statement to include a set of predications regarding the predicate <: 
Scope({<(x, y), <(y, z), ... 
}). We notate it as Scope(x<y, y<z, ... ) for simplicity. 
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up a referent constructed by the parsing of a universal quantificational 
expression. 
Although in the epsilon calculus c- and r-terms seem to be treated as 
duals, in systems of Natural Deduction the names used for eliminating 
universal and existential statements carry somewhat distinct notions of 
arbitrariness with the consequence that distinct conditions of use for these 
names have to be defined. As a result, for our purposes, it is natural to 
suggest that derivation of complete E- or T-terms has distinct inferential 
potential. We will firstly take for granted that copying of completed terms 
indicates that the inferential effects for that propositional domain have been 
derived and that the incomplete variants have been superseded and are no 
longer available20 for copying. The common unavailability of universal 
quantifier expressions anteceding singular pronouns can be explained by 
taking into account what kind of existential "presuppositions" or inferences 
are associated with the use of a universally quantifying expression in a 
particular context: 
(114) # Every man, bought a bike. He; was pleased with it. 
(115) # If every student; bought a bike he; would be pleased with it. 
A T-term, after it has been evaluated, represents a set of entities rather than 
the set's individual members21. Therefore a plural pronoun must be used to 
pick up this set: 
20 The incomplete terms must remain available for exceptional instances of substitution to 
deal with cases where revision is required. As has been pointed out by many researchers, it 
cannot be the case that the completed term is the replacement of the metavariable 
contributed by the first pronoun he in (ii) below as this would lead to inconsistency: 
i. A: A man fell over the cliff 
ii. B: He did not fall. He jumped 
We can assume that in these cases what is copied in the second tree is the incomplete 
(ExMan'x) rather than (E x Manx A Fell-over-the-cliffx). However, since such cases involve 
non-monotonic retraction of the derived content we do not have to define a grammatical 
zprocess 
accounting for them here. 
Epsilon terms also represent a set of individuals. However in this case there is no 
presupposition/inference carried that the set has more than one member. In contrast 
universal quantification in natural language "presupposes" both the existence of individuals 
satisfying the predication and the fact that there are a number of them (but note that this is 
not a hard-wired part of the meaning of every but rather a pragmatically derived effect). 
354 
(116) Every man; bought a bike. They; were pleased with it. 
(117) If every student; bought a bike they; would be pleased with it. 
On the other hand, the presence of a singular pronoun in the telescoping 
cases indicates under present assumptions that a single individual standing 
for (a potentially empty) set is currently being used. 
With these new assumptions we now return to the processing of (101) 
(repeated below). The resulting intermediate formula after parsing the first 
sentence will be as shown in (119): 
(118) Every student walked to the stage. He took his diploma from the Dean and returned 
to his seat 
(119) Ty(t), ? ScEval, Fo(Walked'(T, x, Student'x) ), Scope( X) 
Now before evaluation of the T-term we can apply the rule in (113) and attach 
a LINKed tree to the current node. This tree is going to accommodate the 
content of the second sentence of (118). After parsing of the second 
sentence with the assumption that the incomplete r-term is copied there as 
the subject we derive the following schematic representation: 
(120) He took his diploma from the Dean 









The LINK Evaluation Rule can now apply and copy the formula decorating the 
top node of the LINKed tree to the root node of the global tree. This will give 
us the following formula at the top node of the first tree: 
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(121) Ty(t), ? ScEval, Fo(Walked'ýrtx, Student'x) A Took=diploma'{r, x, StudenYxý), 
Scope( .... x) 
When we apply the Q-Evaluation Rule to the above we will get the following 
formula which shows the correct truth conditions (without having to modify the 
evaluation rule for T-terms): 
(122) Student'(a) -* Walked'(a), n. Took: diploma'(a) 
where a=r, x, Student'(x) -, 
Walked'(x). 
nTook_diploma'(xo 
H Vx [Student'(x) --. (Walked'(x) A Took-diploma'(x))] 
We now once more return to (94) repeated below in (123) and see 
whether it can still be processed successfully under our new assumptions. 
The predicate logic formula that represents the relevant interpretation of the 
first sentence is as shown in (124): 
(123) Every chess set comes with a spare pawn. It is taped to the bottom of the box. 
(124) t/x (Chess _set. x 3y (Pawn_y n Comes=with'(x y)ý ) 
Since in this reading the indefinite introduces a referent/variable inside the 
scope of the universal quantifier, it is predicted in classical DRT that the 
variable/referent will be inaccessible from the main DRS. However the 
continuation lt is taped to the bottom of the box shows that such a referent 
can be available under certain circumstances. Wang et al. (2005) argue that 
quantificational subordination is easier with the discourse relations of 
Elaboration and Narration than with other relations such as Result, 
Background or Commentary. The relation between the two sentences in (118) 
above can be characterised as Elaboration so that the circumstances are 
right for the copying of an incomplete term to take place. As we said earlier 
we will not be concerned here with determining this type of restrictions 
(especially since encoding precise discourse relations in such a way seems 
particularly limiting in providing a basis for explanations, see Rouchota 1996). 
In fact, if we tried to base application of the Propositional LINK Evaluation on 
some encoded discourse relation we will derive incorrect results: even though 
the same discourse relation as above seems to hold between the two 
sentences in the following discourse the plural pronoun is equally appropriate: 
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(125) Every chess set comes with a spare pawn. They are taped to the bottom of the box. 
Under the current analysis, use of the plural pronoun indicates that there 
would be no LINK relation between the two trees and no copying of an 
incomplete term. Nevertheless the discourse relation remains the same so 
presence or absence of a LINK association cannot be mapped to a set of 
well-defined discourse relations. For this reason we have to make clear that 
what we-are interested in modelling here is how an antecedent can become 
available through the processing of previous discourse regardless of its 
accessibility status due to the pragmatic circumstances. We will now show 
(briefly) how this happens. 
The initial representation of the content of the first sentence of (94)/ 
(123) is as follows: 
(126) Comes-with'(rx, Chess_ set'x, , ytPawn'y_), Scope(x<y) 
We can now assume that the Propositional LINK Introduction Rule applies 
and the parsing of the second sentence of (123) starts. The metavariable 
introduced by the pronoun it at the subject node can be replaced by the 
incomplete s-term. After the LINK Evaluation Rule has applied we derive the 
following schematic representation: 
(127) Fo( (Comes-with' rxChess . set'x, cyPaw(y) A (Taped-to-the-bottom' cyPawn'y) ), 
Scope(x<y) 
Fo(Taped-to-the-bottom' eyPawn'y)) 
After application of the quantifier evaluation rules the following formula is 
derived which gives the correct truth conditions for (123): 
(128) (Chess-seta) -ý ýPawn: bý) n Comes . with : ba a) _n __(Taped-to-the : 
bottom'ba). 
where 
a= Tx (Chess . set; x) -, (Pawn'bx)_n_(Comes . with'_bxx)_n Taped; to; the: bottom: b, ý 
b, = E, y, (Pawn'y) A (Comes-with'yx) A (Taped-to-the-bottom'y) 
ba= E, y, (Pawn'y) A (Comes-with'ya) A (Taped-to-the-bottom'y) 
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This concludes the processing of telescoping cases involving juxtaposed 
clauses. We will now turn to cases of quantificational subordination with 
conditionals and see whether the same tools can be utilised successfully. To 
start with we will see some new data which contradict standard assumptions 
regarding accessibility of referents and which we would also like to 
incorporate in our analysis. 
2. c. 3. Conditionals with anaphoric links between antecedent and 
consequent 
2. c. 3. a. Novel data 
It has been standardly assumed that conditionals provide one of the clearest 
cases where distinct treatment of universal and indefinite expressions is 
justified. It is argued that a universal quantificational expression processed 
inside the antecedent of a conditional adds another layer of (in)accessibility 
so that the universal expression cannot be the antecedent for a pronoun in 
the consequent: 





man'(x) donkey(y) z=? 
owns(x, y) s=? 
However this assumption does not seem to be verified if we look at the data 
more carefully. The following are attested examples culled from the texts 
found on the web (see Appendix 5 for full list, context, and sources): 
(131) ... If every choice is an opportunity, it's also a sacrifice... 
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(132) So, if every vote counts, then it has to count in ALL counties- over and under votes. 
(133) Educational expenses could be paid out of a general fund that would give grants, 
low interest loans or scholarships. If every student were given a grant of $5000 per 
year, then he could attend some type of school. If a more exclusive school were 
desired, then he could supplement the grant. 
(134) In the opposite case, one would also expect that if every player invests then he 
spends the largest possible amount of money e= min; E, {e; } on each activity. 
(135) Funny -- if every director thinks he can do better than the writer, why doesn't he just 
do the writing himself instead of hiring a writer to give him a script to "improve 
upon"? 
(136) If every man's house is his castle, then his garden must be his retreat! 
(137) If every indictee knew he was indicted, he would have time to hide or destroy 
evidence. 
(138) ... even if every spaceship were made of diamonds, it would be cheaper in 
comparison with its virtual price. 
(139) Warren has this theory that if he faces every shot like it's a corner then he'll save it 
no problem ... 
(140) ..., because if every player knew he would be going on the block at the end of every 
season, he would hustle his tail off and make it to every practice, ... 
(141) After his proposals failed to be included, Jefferson then concluded that if every man 
could not be a part of a militia, then he should be a part of the army. 
(142) We imagine - though we don't know for sure because they wouldn't let us on Little 
League - that if every boy doesn't want to play professional sports then he wants to 
own a professional team. Ex-Red Hat CEO Bob Young has realized that dream. He 
is now the new owner of the Tiger Cats, the football team in his hometown of 
Hamilton in Ontario. 
These data refute the claim that universal quantifier expressions and 
indefinites behave so much differently with respect to anaphoric potential that 
they merit completely distinct treatments. Moreover, similar data also occur 
with other "proper" quantificational expressions and when-clauses (see 
Appendix 4-5 for full list and sources): 
(143) If few electricity generators have major market shares then they can execute market 
power and push prices above competitive levels.. 
(144) In retrospect, I guess if few programs/services are hardcoding 1, then they are 
wrong and specifying bin or daemon equal to 1 would be worse. 
(145) If most people would simply 'eat right'then they'd get nearly all of the benefits. 
(146) If most people perceive the downtown as dangerous, then they will not spend time 
there, invest there, nor live there. Consequently, the downtown will suffer. 
(147) But that argument only goes to show how truly stupid Stupidity is. Here's how to 
counter it: if most people don't know the difference, then they won't object if you use 
the right word. And the few people who do know the difference will notice, and will 
be pleased that you've got it right. So by getting it right you please everyone. 
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(148) If most people accept the doctrines of socialism, then they will adopt socialism. If 
they accept some fundamentalist religious dogma, then they will adopt theocracy. 
(149) If most of the looters are black, then they are black, and nobody can deny that. 
(150) Malvern Girls' College is situated in one of the most beautiful areas of Britain, at the 
foot of the Malvern Hills. Founded in 1893, the College enjoys a deserved reputation 
for excellent academic results. In 2005 the pass rate at A-Level was 99%, with 82% 
gaining Grade A-B. The College is committed to providing for the education of the 
whole person, so when every girl leaves she is well-equipped to fulfil her own 
individual potential with a sense of social commitment, responsibility and 
enthusiasm. The Head emphasises that the College caters for a wide range of ability 
on entry. 
(151) It's tradition that when every witch turns 13, she must leave her family and start on 
her own. 
Therefore it seems that the DS stance of treating nominal expressions 
symmetrically makes the right predictions for these cases. All types of NPs 
can introduce terms which must be available for anaphoric purposes. The fact 
that in certain cases those terms do not seem to be available has to be 
attributed to contextual factors as discussed above (in this we concur with 
Wang et al. 2005). We turn now to a (schematic) illustration of the processing 
of such cases. 
2. c. 3. b. Processing routine for conditionals with dependent 
universals 
Since the universal quantifier expressions provide the clearest case of scope 
extension under the previous assumption of scope subordination being 
indicated by the use of singular pronouns, we will take those as the paradigm 
case and present how their processing interacts with the processing of 
conditionals. We will present the analysis of (131) above repeated simplified 
below as representative of these cases: 
(152) If every choice; is an opportunity, it; s also a sacrifice 
The analysis of conditionals in Chapter 4 presumes that the antecedent 
provides a LINK structure attached to the situation node of the tree 
constructed by the processing of the consequent: 
(153) The global tree derived by processing if P, Q: 
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Ty(t), Fo( Q(i, s, Ps) ), Scope(..., s) 
Ty(esj, Fo(T, S, Ps) Ty(e, --'t), Fo(At. Qt) 
LINK 
Ty(es), Fo(T, S, Ps ) 
Ty(cns) Ty(cns-+es)... 
Ty(t), Fo(Ps) Ty(t->cns)... 
Ty(e), Ty(e -->t), Fo(At. Pt) 
Fo(s) 
Since the only purpose for the tree derived from the antecedent is to provide 
the situation argument for the main tree and since this situation T-term is only 
constructed after processing of the lexical input of the antecedent has been 
completed we have made the natural assumption that the scope statement for 
the r-term constructed out of the antecedent is generated at the topmost Ty(t) 
node, i. e., at the root node of the tree that will accommodate the input from 
the consequent (this is ensured by instructions in the LINK Evaluation rule for 
conditionals see Chapter 4: (134)). Now in case some other term inside the 
antecedent is directly dependent on the situation variable we will make use 
again of the option of lifting its scope statement as exemplified earlier for 
relative clauses. Indeed the Scope statement Lifting Rule (repeated below) 
does not discriminate between relatives and other structures : 
(154) Scope statement Lifting Rule: 
{{ Tn(X),? Ty(t),... }, 
{... {MOD(Tn(X)), Ty(t), ..., Scope(... z; <x;... ), ..., 0}}} { {Tn(X),? Ty(t),..., Scope( ... z; <x;... ), ... }, {... {MOD(Tn(X)), Ty(t), 
..., 
0) }} 
MOD e {<To>, <Ii>, <L-'>}* 
In the cases of interest where a T-term derived from a universal quantifier 
expression is dependent on the situation argument, its scope statement can 
be transferred to the root node of the main tree (the consequent) and await its 
evaluation there. If that option is taken then the term available for replacing 
the metavariable contributed by a pronoun in the consequent can only be the 
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incomplete T-term (note that scope statement lifting is optional and in fact it 
must be the dispreferred option given the processing delay that it causes; the 
term can perfectly well be evaluated with respect to the situation variable 
locally which will cause a dependency that will only become obvious at the 
topmost node). Here is an illustration of this option for (152): 
(155) If every choice; is an opportunity it; s also a sacrifice 
(156) Ty(t), Scope(s<x), Fo(Sacrifice' Tx, Choice. x, res, _Opportunity. 
(r, x, Choice'x)(sý ) 
Ty(e3), Ty(es- +t), 
Fo(T, s, Opportunity'(T, x, Choice'x)(s)) Fo(At. Sacrifice'(T, x, Choice'x)(t)) 
LINK Ty(e) Ty(e--(es-*t)) 
Fo(T, x, Choice'x) Fo(Ax. At. 
Sacrifice'xt) 
Ty(es), Fo Opportunity'(r, x, Choice'x)(s) ) 
Ty(cns) Ty(cns-'e5)... 
Ty(t), Scope(s x), Ty(t--+cn3)... 
Fo(Opportunit x) (s) ) 
Ty(e), Ty(e, -*t), 
Fo(s) Fo(At. Opportunity'(r, x, Choice'x)(t)) 
Ty(e), Fo(r, x, Choice'x) Ty(e-+(es-+ t)), Fo(Ax. At. Opportunity'xt) 
The Q-Evaluation Rule can now apply to the topmost node's Formula value to 
derive the completed semantic representation: 
(157) Fo( Sacrifice' rtx, Choice'x ts Opportunity'L c,. choice'x)(s) ), Scope(s<x) 
Q-Evaluation Rule 
(158) Opportunity. (ab)Lb). - Choice'(a, ) -. _ 
Sacrifice'(ab)(b) 
where b=T, S, Opportunity'(as)(s) -" 
Choice'(aS)--i Sacrifice'(as)ýs) 
as T, x, Choice. (xý --4 
Sacrifice'(x)(s) 
ab = r, x, Choice. (x) --. 
Sacrifice'(x)(b). 
These data which, to our knowledge, are highly problematic for any current 
linguistic theory that deals with discourse anaphora have been dealt with in 
the DS analysis with the minor modification of allowing scope statements for 
T-terms to be lifted if they depend on a term which is to be evaluated at a 
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higher node. The latter assumption also handles the extrawide scope cases 
like the following from Farkas & Giannakidou (1996): 
(159) A student made sure that every invited speaker had a ride. 
(160) (In general, ) a guide ensures that every tour to the Louvre is fun 
(161) Yesterday, a guide make sure that every tour to the Louvre was fun 
This concludes our account of donkey sentences, quantificational 
subordination/telescoping and finally quantifier "binding" effects across the 
antecedent and consequent of a conditional. We have provided a uniform 
account that covers all three types of phenomena. We were able to provide 
this analysis because of the simple assumption embodied in DS that all 
quantificational expressions provide LOT terms that have the status of the 
arbitrary names used in systems of Natural Deduction. Such names, once 
derived by the processing of linguistic input, can then be naturally taken to 
serve as replacements for the enrichment of the incomplete conceptual 
content provided by pronouns. Internally to a set of trees associated by LINK 
relations (a global tree) such names can be utilised as replacements even 
before they have been fully completed and evaluated. Such use will derive 
the effect described in static frameworks either as "bound variable" or E-type 
interpretations. Donkey sentences, either involving conditionals or relative 
clauses, can be treated without any further assumptions besides the non- 
configurational DS account of scope. This approach to quantification and 
anaphora predicts the existence of examples which in other frameworks have 
been considered either as requiring special provisions for their treatment (see 
e. g. (93)-(98) and Appendix 4) or as ungrammatical (as in (131)-(151) and 
Appendix 5). However, we have seen here firstly that the predicted 
"ungrammatical" instances do in fact occur in actual discourse and given the 
appropriate context and that a uniform account of all such cases can be 
maintained without special provisions. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the previous chapters we saw how the formal apparatus defined in the 
framework of Dynamic Syntax (Kempson et al. 2001; Cann et al. 2005) for the 
processing of nominal relative clauses can be straightforwardly applied in the 
modelling of the processing of conditional structures. All central notions of DS 
have remained unchanged under this extension. Firstly, the DS account of 
anaphora as copying of available terms has been exploited in order to explain 
the semantic properties of conditional sentences: a newly introduced situation 
term constructed by processing the protasis is copied into the structure 
induced by the processing of the consequent in order to serve as the situation 
argument there. Additionally, it has been shown that exact parallels can be 
drawn between the semantic structure that can be assumed to underpin if- 
clauses and nominal terms. For this reason, the present account was able to 
employ in the analysis of if-clauses all the processing means that DS makes 
available for phenomena affecting the left and right periphery of the clause, 
initially defined solely for the processing of nominal phrases. From this 
perspective, the fact that a single semantic representation is achieved by 
means of parsing several distinct surface forms is attributed to the distinct 
processing means which are made available for building interpretations, not 
to multiple levels of structural analysis. The distinct inferential properties of 
each surface structure can then be seen not as properties of multiple 
structural representations but as the result of the interaction between the 
parsing dynamics and context dependent reasoning. An extension to the DS 
toolbox in order to deal with cataphoric phenomena in conditionals and 
reconstruction environments has been proposed. Finally we saw some new 
data which call for a reconsideration of the analysis of the phenomenon of 
Quantificational Subordination. We demonstrated how fundamental DS 
assumptions predict the existence of such data and provided the parsing 
routines for handling such cases appropriately. 
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Of course we do not pretend that we have exhausted all the issues that 
affect the processing of conditionals. There are many problems that await 
further research. The relevance-theoretic assumptions informally utilised here 
should be explored further in a more formal and precise way in order to 
determine whether they provide the appropriate semantics/inferential effects 
in combination with the DS account. The DS theory of tense, aspect and 
modality, partly handled in Perrett (2000), needs to be reconsidered in order 
to accommodate the assumptions made here. A compositional account of the 
processing of structures involving even if , only if and unless remains to be 
given (see e. g. Lycan 2001, Geis 1985, Iten 2002). In general, the present 
account should be extended to the processing of other adverbial clauses and 
a general theory of adverbial adjuncts should be provided compatible with the 
assumptions in Marten (1999). All in all it feels as if we have only scratched 
the surface of what might prove to be a lifetime project of research. 
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Non-Restrictives With Quantifiers 
(1) In contrast to most arthouse films, which tend to attract an older, upscale audience, 
'Amelie' is playing to a slightly younger audience, which augurs well for it. 
http: //Www. pipeboost. com/Demo/MSNBC-Article1. htm as retrieved on 18 Apr 2005 
20: 25: 00 GMT 
(2) One quibble -- the portrait of a junior officer serving as the deputy spokesperson of a 
major embassy struck me as not very representative of the experience of most junior 
officers, who are more often assigned to visa work for their first couple of jobs. That said, 
I still found her story interesting. On balance, I found this to be a very educational and 
entertaining book that deserves to be widely read. Has anything this good been written 
about the Canadian diplomatic service? 
http: //www. afsa. org/inside/feedback_p2. cfm as retrieved on 3 Jul 2005 12: 12: 35 GMT 
(3) Holbek could not of course make use of such performance data, as he was working with 
texts collected in nineteenth century Denmark, a period when most collectors (who of 
course lacked modern recording methods) habitually omitted or excised materials not felt 
to be part of the text proper. Mrs Kerfont's comment validates a sexual reading of this and 
other symbols. 
www. extenza-eps. com/WDG/doi/abs/10.1515/fabl. 2003.001 as retrieved on 6 Jul 2005 
22: 13: 34 GMT 
(4) The arrangements for this hearing will have taken more time than the story tends to 
suggest, but Suetonius' point is that Claudius made a quick decision (confestim), not that 
the whole problem was resolved quickly. This is the reading offered by most scholars, 
who of course assume that cognitio and ius ordinarium constitute distinct legal systems. 
But even on this view the logic is problematic: either the litigants objected to the judge on 
the general principle that anyone with a pending lawsuit should be ineligible to act as 
judge, or (as is more likely) they objected because the lawsuit in question was one in 
which the judge himself was their opponent. In either case, it is not clear how the judge's 
reply - that the lawsuit at issue was scheduled for a different court system - could 
possibly have been satisfactory. 
http: //www. ulg. ac. be/vinitor/rida/1999/TURPIN. pdf. as retrieved on I7Jun 2005 12: 00: 14 
GMT 
(5) About 80 percent of the irrigation in Nepal is provided through systems designed, built, 
and operated by farmers at their own initiative with minimal government involvement. 
Often the construction if carried by few wealthy individuals who then recoup their 
expenses by collecting funds from farmers of the newly irrigated land who then own and 
operate the system. The Chattis Mauja system is an example of the extent and 
sophistication, both technically and organizationally, of such irrigator-managed systems. 
Constructed about 50 years ago, it irrigates over 7,500 acres of land cultivated by farmers 
in fifty-four villages. It is managed by them through a three-tiered organizational structure 
with fifty village communities at the base, nine area committees, and a central committee. 
There is even an informal fourth-tier organization in that the Chattis Mauja central 
committee consults with representatives of three other user-managed systems that also 
draw water from the Tinau river. 
http: //magnet. undp. org/Docs/dec/monograph/PopularPartic-NEP1. htm as retrieved on 30 
May 2005 16: 17: 59 GMT 
(6) One difference I noted was that, in this war, the American soldier is a technological 
wonder. Nearly every soldier owns a laptop, which he or she uses to play games or 
exchange e-mails from home. 
http: //www. staugustine. com/stories/022104/opi_2142736. shtml as retrieved on 7 Jul 2005 
06: 31: 48 GMT 
(7) 7. Try Guerrillas Tactics From China to Cuba to Vietnam history teaches the power of a 
guerrilla movement. Weak forces can flourish if they take up a guerrilla stronghold and 
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resist being drawn into the open. Guerrillas are not organized like regular soldiers. The 
U. S. went into Vietnam with thousands of cooks, bakers, clerks, chauffeurs, chaplains 
and public relations officers. The smaller force of guerrillas had none of these, but 
virtually every soldier had a gun, which he used. A lean guerrilla organization can make 
quick decisions, seize opportunities and fill voids. A guerrilla force does not have the 
resources to waste on a lost cause. It does not hesitate to give up a position and move 
elsewhere-a flexibility envied by more entrenched forces (Reis and Trout, 1986). 
Selected References Bevin, Alexander. How Great Generals Win. New York: Norton, 
1993. Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited with an introduction by Anatol Rapoport. 5. 
Manage Momentum 
http: //www. cfar. com/cf/index. cfm? fuseaction=Publications. PublicationTracking&intPublica 
tionlD=75. as retrieved on 9 July 2005: 17: 56 GMT 
(8) Voter turnout will be maximized by hands-on GOTV efforts. GOTV should be more than 
signing up voters leading up to the election, it should be about energizing voters NOW. 
What better way to maximize this than to have a consistent message passed to every 
county chair, who then passes it on to every District chair, who then passes it on to every 
block captain, who then discusses it with their friends and neighbors at the park, the pool, 
the coffee shop, the diner. This takes very little resources once a consistent message is 
decided upon and the chain starts. It just takes a little energy at the roots, and we know 
how much energy our roots have! 
http: //www. ncdp. org/node/413 as retrieved on 13 Jun 2005 18: 52: 49 GMT 
(9) Each demonstration write-up consists of concepts that can be taught, materials needed, 
set-up and demonstration procedures, questions to discuss with the students, and 
detailed explanations as to how and why the demonstration worked. It is my hope that the 
questions and explanations have been written in a manner that the junior high students 
can understand. Without teaching that age group, it is difficult to know for certainty what 
kinds of questions they may have. Hopefully, the questions and explanations will be 
understandable to every teacher, who then can use the information in a way that their 
students can understand it. 
http: //htdconnect. com/-chargers/chemhome. html as retrieved on 8 May 2005 09: 46: 31 
GMT. 
(10) It is God's life-changing power that is able to touch every individual, who then has the 
responsibility to touch the world around him with the absolutes foun in the Bible. In the 
end we must realize that the spirit of the age - with all the loss of truth and beauty, and 
the loss of compassion and humanness that it has brought - is not merely a cultural ill. It 
is a spiritual ill that the Truth given us in the Bible and Christ alone can cure. 
http: //razorskiss. net/wp/? p=106 as retrieved on 7 Jun 2005 04: 01: 26 GMT 
(11) The land was not owned by individuals -- it was regarded as a sacred gift from 
"Umvelingangi" (the Creator) and as an asset for all members of the extended family to 
use and produce food for the whole family. Fifteen year old teenagers were allocated 
small pieces of land called "Isife" and were allowed to decide what they would like to 
grow. The colonizers, in their efforts to create scarcity in order to dominate the nation - 
they came and forcibly channeled the country's wealth i. e. land and natural resources to 
few white settlers who then had power over the majority of the indigenous people. Impact 
of globalizations on women is devastating: rather than eradicate poverty in the African 
countries, globalization have contributed to further sinking the countries into economic 
crisis. South Africans have witnessed: 
* Trade liberalization 
* Privatization 
* Decrease in social expenditure 
* The gap between policies and implementation. 
http: //www. gifteconomyconference. com/pages/Sizani. html as retrieved on 12 May 2005 
21: 36: 00 GMT 
(12) One of the greatest challenges of gender mainstreaming seems to be the "Equality 
paradox" of the Finnish context. As the Finnish equality legislation is quite advanced, 
there seems to be no conspicuous need for enhancing equality issues (even if the vertical 
and horizontal segregation of labour markets still prevails). In principle, the politicians and 
high officials speak for gender mainstreaming and they are even proud of the equal 
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status of Finnish women and men, when the issue is presented abroad, but in the normal 
praxis of the department, it is difficult to take up gender questions without being labelled 
as a "feminist" or something equally negative. Matters dealing with equal opportunities 
seem to get piled up with few persons, who then get burned out. The other consequence 
is that the tone and content of the prevailing discourse is gender neutral. 
http: //www. skk. uit. no/WW99/papers/Horelli_Liisa. pdf. as retrieved on 17 Jun 2005 
18: 09: 22 GMT 
(13) Employers could enroll their workers in a health insurance purchasing cooperative 
(HIPC). 23 One HIPC would be established for each of four designated geographic areas in 
the state, and each HIPC would offer all of the certified health plans in its area to every 
enrolled worker, who then would have to choose one of these plans. 
http: //www. heritage. org/Research/HealthCare/BG1121. cfm as retrieved on 11 Jun 2005 
14: 34: 26 GMT 
(14) At the celebration of the completion of a Sefer Torah, this central point of 
Jewishness is revealed in each and every Jew, who then acts in the mission of ... http: //www. sichosinenglish. org/books/sichos-in-english/12/15. htm as retrieved on 3 Mar 
2005 06: 11: 30 GMT 
(15) It is God's life-changing power that is able to touch every individual, who then 
has the responsibility to touch the world around him with the absolutes ... http: //razorskiss. net/wp/? p=106 as retrieved on 7 Jun 2005 04: 01: 26 GMT. 
(16) 12: 02PM - OK, here's the deal. Some people really get off on those cheerful, ironic, 
peppy Canadians calling themselves the Barenaked Ladies. Brandon- err, Jason 
Priestley, the Biff dude from 90120, liked 'em so much he directed a full-blown movie for 
them. The band had a few jingles that got picked up on the Alternative Radio, which 
basically means Columbia or Sony or whomever owns their mortal souls, jammed about 
half a mil into every A&R guy who then jammed $50 and a line of blow into every regional 
Program Director at every Alternative Radio Station (which basically equates to, in my 
opinion, some bald 40-year-old middle manager pulling a fax of Acceptable Songs off a 
fax and typing them into the DJputer) and thusly we were subjected to their peppy happy 
jingles every waking second of the day. Now, one of their happy jingles made its way into 
a Mitsubishi commercial (You know, the peppy song that starts by some nerd saying 
"Eyyyyyyyyyiiit's been... ") and is on heavy HEAVY rotation throughout the 50 states on 
every major TV channel. Let me be clear: I don't like the song. I like even less that it plays 
at least twice each hour. 
http: //www. billdugan. com/log/2001/oct/ as retrieved on 1 Apr 2006 14: 53: 46 GMT. 
(17) Northanger Abbey 
Chapter 3 
Every morning now brought its regular duties - shops were to be visited; some new part 
of the town to be looked at; and the pump-room to be attended, where they paraded up 
and down for an hour, looking at everybody and speaking to no one. The wish of a 
numerous acquaintance in Bath was still uppermost with Mrs. Allen, and she repeated it 
after every fresh proof, which every morning brought, of her knowing nobody at all. 
http: //www. pemberley. com/etext/NA/chapter3. htm 
(18) Date Posted: 03: 40: 05 02/23/00 Wed 
Author: Anonymous 
Subject: Topaz Posting from WF 
Subject: Wantoks forum admin Steven Kami purposely covers up the truth - EMMANUEL 
TOPAZ 
In fact Kami allows the mild criticism that most students post because it resembles free 
speech and throws most students off balance who then become critical when one or two 
of them question the objectivity of the forum administrator. Kami was unprepared that his 
forum would be used by some to voice criticism and give evidence of corruption against 
his friends and employers and has found himself in a difficult situation. Instead of coming 
clean as his father would have told him and tell the forum audience what pressure he 
faces as well as his special interest in protecting his ghost law firm who has bankrupted 
countless national lawyers he continues to worry about his paycheck hiding behind the 
mask of forum administrator and putting out the bush fires as needed. 
http: //www. voy. com/5575/552. html as retrieved on 10 Jun 2005 13: 07: 31 GMT 
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(19) Dr. McCormack announced that it was time to identify two representatives from each 
Advanced Concentration to serve on the Recruiting Committee. This is a group that will 
discuss the recruiting procedures and make phone calls to some of the prospective 
applicants. Also, we need two representatives from each Advanced Concentration for the 
Admissions Committee. The Admissions Committee has a bigger workload; they preview 
every completed application, which then gets read by four Committee members. For the 
Admissions Committee, there are a couple of meetings in December and for January 
through April we'll meet every week (usually Thursday afternoon starting at 1: 00 PM until 
whenever we finish). Dr. Baker suggested that the Chairs provide us with a list of people 
they would be willing to assign to this Committee and then we could contact them to ask 
them if they would be willing to serve. Dr. Sumners agreed it would be a good idea. 
Furthermore, Dr. Sumners pointed out that on our web page we have a list of mentors 
who have said they would be willing to have someone in their lab, and he suggested they 
should also be willing to serve on this Committee. 
http: //idp. med. ufl. edu/ADVISORY/2000-0928. htm as retrieved on 30 May 2005 23: 04: 31 
GMT. 
(20) Suicide attempts. The unrelenting physical debilitation has caused cruel isolation and 
loneliness, and sometimes caused me to act in desperate ways. Often, I feel I can no 
longer continue. On several occasions my husband found me in the early morning hours, 
sitting on the floor sobbing, with a loaded gun in my hand. Thankfully, I didn't carry out the 
act, because I know God has a plan for each of us. Sorrowfully, with every passing day 
which then turns into years, the temptation to again attempt suicide remains. I am 
completely debilitated and my life is a living hell. 
http: //www. fda. gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/00n_1665/emc000007. txt as retrieved on 4 
Dec 2004 23: 07: 10 GMT. 
(21) Overspecialization of knowledge, on the one hand, brought about a 
scientific/mathematical esotericism that is inaccessible to the general public and at times 
divorced from reality, and on the other hand, effected the truncation of the function and 
the purpose of business. Neo-Tech, through its full integration of philosophical principles, 
reveals a stunningly new picture of the universe and opens a new path of science that is 
not only free of Platonism (a divorce from reality) but also will bring a new 
revolution/evolution of scientific knowledge that is accessible to every conscious being, 
which, then, in turn will make possible the world-wide realization of highly advanced 
technological societies and scientific literacy. 
http: //www. neo-tech. com/zero/part8. html as retrieved on 1 Feb 2005 08: 00: 51 GMT 
(22) There is no evidence of BSE in the United States, at least in part thanks to an FDA rule 
prohibiting the use of most mammalian tissues -- which are the apparent carrier of the 
disease -- in feed for cattle and other ruminants. We're continually strengthening our 
enforcement of this feed rule by inspecting thousands of renderers and feed mills. 
http: //www. fda. gov/oc/speeches/2002/gmaO6O9. html as retrieved on 20 Apr 2005 
13: 12: 42 GMT 
(23) As witnessed in the Acts of the Apostles and other ancient Christian writings, the faithful 
of the first centuries took Communion every Sunday, which then was called the Lord's 
day. 
http: //www. orthodoxinfo. com/general/kingdomofheaven. aspx as retrieved on 18 Apr 2005 
16: 04: 51 GMT 
(24) And yes, this ISN'T the only depiction of dinosaurs and man co-existing. There were clay 
statues of Stegosaurus, Allosaurus, Brontosaurus Iguanadon, etc (I'll re-post them, they 
were on another post before, if you want). Nor is it the first time they were WRITTEN 
ABOUT. In Enoch (and related texts to Enoch) it talks about the Nehplilim (angel/human 
hybrid offspring) further hybridizing with 200 of every known animal which then became 
'great monsters' which were up to 45ft in height and devoured the Earth, filling it with 
blood, eating other animals, HUMANS, and even each other. They ARE dinosaurs. The 
significance of this Brontosaurus (or Apatosaurus both names are valid) being depicted in 
PRE-DYNASTY times is that this is when this event of angels and human marrying 
creating hybrids was going on. I don't need anyone's approval on this, I have 
MOUNTAINS of evidence, I was just merely sharing this new found piece. Don't knock 
what you haven't even looked into. I HAVE. 
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http: //www. unexplained-mysteries. com/forum/lofiversion/index. php/t39957. html as 
retrieved on 15 Jul 2005 22: 15: 25 GMT 
(25) To save time you can limit the comp size (always keep scale and rez the same: e. g. 1/2 
size at 50%). When it plays back in the Comp Window the actual speed is noted in the 
Time Control window. To extend the length of preview with limited RAM you can Shift-0 to 
load every other frame which then plays back at a kind of cut rate real time. Ram preview 
can be used to check mouth actions with a sync audio track; Com+Opt scrub timeline for 
close analysis. Obviously it pays to have as much RAM devoted to AE as possible (if you 
are running OS9). If you aren't able to preview as much as you think you should, try 
purging all your RAM at Edit>Purge>All. AE knows what parts of the comp have been 
changed so subsequent previews render only the new material. 
http: //www. geogrif. com/aetoons3. html as retrieved on 27 Mar 2005 09: 05: 05 GMT 
(26) That resolution was rejected at the time by the Palestinians and every Arab regime, 
which then vowed to evict all Jews from the land, eradicating the embryonic nation. Now, 
after four wars and numerous terrorist acts, we are asked to believe that Israel's enemies 
have suddenly had a change of heart and that a diplomatic land grab is not a prelude to 
seizing the rest of the country. 
http: //www. jewishworldreview. com/cols/thomas05O799. asp as retrieved on 26 Feb 2006 
07: 23: 52 GMT 
(27) At Anderson Technologies, Don Anderson and his one machinist built the entire 
mechanical assembly from my fully detailed parts drawings. I had developed a fast 
method to make a detail drawing of every individual part which then got welded up into 
each sub-assembly. We didn't bother with formal final assembly drawings like most 
companies.... the three of us knew where the stuff went. Don's twosome even added all 
the hydraulic system parts and hose plumbing, a major job in itself. I made the first 
drawing in March, and the fully tested mechanical assembly was delivered to the film 
studio in September.... only three guys to do the whole deal! Sure felt sorry for how other 
companies worked. 
http: //www. laughingplace. com/News-PiD108470-108471. asp as retrieved on 29 Mar 
2005 14: 38: 07 GMT 
(28) "Throughput times were too long, as a form had to be filled out for every order, which 
then had to be passed through the various internal clearance points via inter-office mail. 
http: //www. homeandoffice. hp. com/enterprise/downloads/eads. pdf as retrieved on 17 Jun 
2005 15: 49: 12 GMT 
(29) In some states, notably Utah and Colorado, "6" signs are missing from the segments of 
the highway that duplex with current interstate highways. In some state and local 
jurisdictions, Route 6 mileage markers are found every mile, and in many places the 
current 6 is given such names as "6 Hwy" (Ohio) or "Hwy 6 Trail" (Iowa). Most old 
segments, which have been bypassed either by a newer Route 6 or by placement of 6 on 
an interstate highway, are not marked in the western states. In the Midwest and East, 
however, they are most commonly given new names or numbers, sometimes as part of 
the policy of giving street numbers to every road in the county. Isn't it annoying to arrive 
at an intersection in the middle of nowhere, to find a sign: "224`h Street West and 345`h 
Avenue South"? 
http: //www. augustana. edu/academics/geography/department/route6/story. html as 
retrieved on 13 Apr 2005 14: 21: 02 GMT 
(30) Unlike most other sciences which are based on experimentation, astronomy is a science 
of observation. The astronomer has to rely on the gathering of information. Light, of 
course, has always been his prime source of information and the necessity to explore its 
various properties soon became obvious. The astronomers started by mapping the sky 
which enabled them to distinguish the structure of galaxies. Later, by decomposing light 
coming from stars through a prism, spectroscopy was born. Thanks to this technique, 
astronomers were able to measure the surface temperature of stars. 
http: //isdc. unige. ch/Outreach/Science/science. html as retrieved on 20 Apr 2005 03: 19: 22 
GMT. 
(31) The Prophet (PBUH) told us, "There are in the month of Ramadan in every day and 
night, those whom Allah (SWT) grants freedom from the Fire, and there is for every 
Muslim a supplication which he can make and it will be granted. " (This supplication, which 
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is never rejected, occurs at the time of breaking the fast. ) 
http: //www. islammessage. com/bb/lofiversion/index. php/t2076. html as retrieved on 17 Aug 
2005 06: 39: 26 GMT 
(32) Among those that were left disadvantaged from India and Brazil placing their specific 
interests in command were: 
- the majority of developing countries which will find that their markets will continue to be 
flooded by dumped products from the US and EU. For the South as a whole, the 
opportunity to correct the distortions in agriculture trade legitimized in the Uruguay Round 
has been lost 
- the African cotton-producing countries which failed to get negotiations on US cotton 
subsidies to be put on a fast-track independent of the agriculture negotiations, or even a 
commitment that all cotton subsidies will be eliminated; 
- the Group of 33, which were left with nothing more than a vague commitment that their 
demand for ??? Special Products%o and the ??? Special Safeguard Mechanism%o and in 
particular, the coverage of products under such a mechanism, would be a subject of 
negotiations; 
- most developing countries, which had rightfully opposed the text on market access of 
non-agricultural products as a prescription for their deindustrialization. Indeed, the US 
scored a big win on NAMA for the text is a detailed agenda for the radical liberalization 
that transnational corporations have long wanted. As the US National Association of 
Manufacturers saw it, ??? This is a huge accomplishment, and a big win for the INTO, the 
United States, and the world economy. The really big accomplishment for industrial 
negotiations is that all countries have accepted the principle of big tariff cuts and sectoral 
tariff elimination. %o 
most developing countries, which have now agreed to speed up their offers of services 
for liberalization. Dilemma 
It was not that India and Brazil were not sensitive to the demands of other developing 
countries. In fact, they were given high marks for consulting the different developing 
country groupings. It was simply that by becoming central actors in the elaboration of the 
proposed framework, they had painted themselves into an impossible situation. And the 
more meeting interests began to diverge from a strategy of promoting the interests of the 
bulk of the developing countries, the more they trumpeted the claim that the July 
Framework Document was a victory for the South. It is testimony to the prestige of India 
and Brazil among other countries in the South that up till today, many developing 
countries do not realize how badly they lost in Geneva. 
http: //www. southcentre. org/info/southbulletin/bulletin85/bulletin85-06. htm as retrieved on 
2 Jun 2005 07: 55: 48 GMT 
(33) Programs composed of expressions. Lisp programs are trees of expressions, each of 
which returns a value. (In some Lisps expressions can return multiple values. ) This is in 
contrast to Fortran and most succeeding languages, which distinguish between 
expressions and statements. 
http: //www. paulgraham. com/diff. html as retrieved on 18 Jun Apr 2005 18: 39: 39 GMT 
(34) Layer 5- Session - provides coordination between applications on each host. 
Layer 6 Presentation - ensures communication between applications by translating data 
structures, formats and codes. 
Layer 7 Application - provides the interface by which the user interacts with the network. 
Note that layers 5-7 are somewhat unclear in most network designs, which concentrate 
on layers 1-4. 
OTDR Optical Time-Domain Reflectometer, used to find flaws in fiber optic cable. 
Packet switch A device that moves packets from one network to another. 
PhoneNet AppleTalk running on twisted pair copper wiring, using adapters. 
http: //www. rochester. edu/its/ncs/documentation/glossary/glossary. html as retrieved on 17 
Jun 2005 18: 34: 20 GMT 
(35) Doing this will cause iRider to download at least 2 or more pages simultaneously, if there 
are that many waiting to download, minimizing small delays in the download process. 
Note that this doesn't eliminate all delays, such as those caused by slow websites and 
other factors. 
On certain websites, downloading multiple pages at once can make iRider less 
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responsive - if you notice lagging response to mouse clicks or other actions, you may 
want to reduce the Minimum. (On current computers, lagging response is most noticeable 
on sites that use elaborate client-side scripts to build fancy menus or perform other tasks. 
When more than one page is running such a script, it can interfere with your use of any 
browser. Responsiveness issues can be acute on most other browsers, which download 
all pending pages simultaneously, and this is one reason iRider queues pages according 
to the Connection settings. ) 
iRider uses a lot of memory 
iRider has sophisticated memory management features that will use available memory to 
speed access to open pages but release memory for use by other programs as needed 
when available memory drops too low. This distinquishes it from most other browsers, 
which rely on system virtual memory swapping if you open too many pages, resulting in 
very poor performance in all running programs. In iRider, you can open arbitrarily large 
sets of pages without difficulty. 
http: //www. irider. com/support/faq. htm as retrieved on 15 Jun 2005 08: 41: 31 GMT 
(36) Highlights from the Rome tasting stand out: a 1982 malvasia with flavors of apples, 
minerals and pears; a 1980 semillon that tasted of hazelnuts and wax and seemed 
impossibly young. As the wines aged, the youthful acidity seemed to give way to mineral, 
earthy flavors. Yet unaccountably, in contrast to most white wines, which get darker with 
age, the golden colors of the young wines turned pale as they got older. How to explain 
this? 
http: //www. italianwinemerchant. com/IWM Weekly_e-letter/IWM_03_17_05_Fiorano. htm 
as retrieved on 20 Apr 2005 03: 26: 01 GMT 
(37) As the patient was received their belongings were checked. Under the circumstances 
almost everything had to be taken from them for fear of contamination, and that which 
was saved was put through the decontaminator. Almost every man had a belt, which he 
did not want to let out of his possession. One man, after his belt had been thrown into the 
trash barrel, reached in and grabbed it. At his insistence the attendant ripped the belt 
open, and between the two thin layers of leather were three one hundred dollar bills in 
American currency neatly rolled into almost infinitesimal size. Small wonder he held onto 
his belt! 
http: //www. chgs. umn. edu/Histories_Narratives_Documen/Minnesotans_and_The_Holo 
caust/America_at_Dachau/America_at_Dachau_-_Hospitaliz/america_at_dachau_ 
_hospitaliz. 
html as retrieved on 20 Jun 2005 22: 56: 49 GMT. 
(38) Most of the time one has to keep one's head well down, but a combination of sinus and 
cardiac disabilities makes it necessary to stand up quite often, so there is plenty of time to 
look around at whatever's going on... time to observe how seagulls fly.. and time to carry 
away to the rubbish bin outside the front porch such detritus as the seasons yield. In the 
summer, weeds by the ton, in the autumn and spring dead leaves, and the occasional 
commentary on our urban society - the odd beer bottle among the marigolds, and once I 
found a used hypodermic... but mostly it's paper and wrappings and carbon paper.. and 
ice cream cones, unidentified pieces of styrofoam.. just an endless supply, as if every 
passerby carried a wastebasket which he dumped in the churchyard. Among the lot, I 
managed to drop a roll of negatives, and have never since found them. And once, while I 
sweated away in near-darkness, planting a rose bush, my spectacles dropped out into 
the vegetation. Finding them was a real miracle. 
http: //www. montreal. anglican. org/parish/ndg/trinity/tt9802. htm as retrieved on 28 Jun 
2005 18: 13: 18 GMT 
(39) But there is one Law of the Medes and Persians which is sensibly relaxed these days. 
We, the newly joined, have always been given to understand that whatever else you do, 
you must never, never betray any interest in your profession--in short, talk shop--at Mess. 
But in our Mess no one ever talks anything else. At luncheon, we relate droll anecdotes 
concerning our infant platoons; at tea, we explain, to any one who will listen, exactly how 
we placed our sentry line in last night's operations; at dinner, we brag about our Company 
musketry returns, and quote untruthful extracts from our butt registers. At breakfast, every 
one has a newspaper, which he props before him and reads, generally aloud. We 
exchange observations upon the war news. We criticise von Kluck, and speak kindly of 
Joffre. We note, daily, that there is nothing to report on the Allies' right, and wonder 
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regularly how the Russians are really getting on in the Eastern theatre. 
http: //www. pagebypagebooks. com/lan_Hay/The_First_Hundred_Thousand/Blank_Cartrid 
ges_The_Laws_Of The_Medes_And_Persians_p5. html as retrieved on 4 Jul 2005 
01: 15: 38 GMT. 
(40) She said The Bäse consists of three elements: 
- -An Element who had fixed his opinion, his candidate, and sticks to him. 
- An Element who decided not to vote. 
- And an Element who is wavering, and he is the one to whom all invitations and debates 
are addressed, to convince him to vote for one of the candidates. 
She said every candidate has a message, which he keeps repeating to people's attention 
until they memorize it... 
http: //grannyinsanity. blogspot. com/2004_10_17_grannyinsanity_archive. html as retrieved 
on 14 Apr 2005 11: 19: 38 GMT. 
(41) The school's 1,100 students, from kindergarten through 12th grade, are placed in 
simulated families. They live in one of 117 houses with several other students of different 
ages and a house-parent couple. Every kid has a bike, which he or she can pedal to the 
newly constructed Town Center, a grassy circular area modeled on "the world's timeless 
community gathering spaces, such as the town center of Siena, Italy, the Agora in 
Athens, and St. Peter's Square in Rome. " 
http: //slate. msn. com/id/2071150/ as retrieved on 5 Jul 2005 16: 43: 45 GMT. 
(42)'It was so clever of him to guess your secret so as to win your heart, ' said she. 'And of 
course be told you his, in return ?' 'No, I don't think he has got any, ' returned Zoulvisia. 
'Not got any secrets? ' cried the old woman scornfully. 'That is nonsense! Every man has 
a secret, which he always tells to the woman he loves. And if he has not told it to you, it is 
that he does not love you! ' 
http: //www. online-literature. com/andrew_lang/olive_fairy/20/ as retrieved on 28 Jun 2005 
20: 31: 02 GMT. 
(43) In the server I'd create personal folders and specify for every folder access rights: admin, 
certain user, all users, etc. I don't need quota management. Is this the way it should be 
configured? Or is it done this way: every user has a login which he uses to access 
whatever client computer he is using and he is automatically connected to the server and 
the server's drive is mapped locally? Which one is better? Which one requires the most 
management? Which one can be done in plain XP Pro and which one needs a server 
OS? Or am I completely lost and the network should be configured completely 
differently? Will I be able to do it or we'll need a VAR to set it up? 
http: //forums. enterpriseitplanet. com/history/topic. php/1540-1. html as retrieved on 30 Jun 
2005 09: 14: 51 GMT 
(44) There is one big drawback, though. Users won't be able to install Service Pack 2, unless 
they integrate SP2 in the installation CD. And that's probably too much trouble for most 
users, who of course are better off buying a legal version anyway. It is expected that 
Microsoft will change the setup files soon to prevent this hack. 
http: //www. theregister. co. uk/2005/06/03/xp_hack/ as retrieved on 7 Jul 2005 23: 31: 27 
GMT. 
(45) The audience for the debate largely sided with Suzuki. Not surprisingly, most Americans 
(who of course never read Philosophy East and West) tended to prefer Suzuki's timeless 
truths to Hu Shih's medieval past, his idealized Zen Japan to Hu Shih's remembered 
Chinese tradition. Given the longstanding American weakness for a timeless Orient (and 
the postwar shift in America's Pacific alliances), this may have been inevitable. In any 
case, Suzuki's style of Zen went on to boom in America, spreading from the beats in the 
'50s, hippies in the '60s and "self-realization" movements of the '70s to become the 
frequent feature of pop psychology and "new age" California culture and the earnest 
interlocutor in comparative philosophy and Buddhist-Christian dialogue that we see today. 
http: //www. stanford. edu/group/scbs/Resources/Papersibielefeldt. zen wars. html as 
retrieved on 4 Jul 2005 14: 19: 10 GMT 
(46) How many prosecutors have been called down and disciplined for such 
unconscionable behavior? The answer is simple, damn few and far between! Why? 
Because the How about talking to Academy members about this? These folks are bright, 
visionary and creative. It appears that most Academy members, who certainly care about 
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intellectual property rights, profits they helped create, and their job future are shocked, 
appalled and very troubled by the hasty MPAA actions and they would prefer a 
suspension of this action and an opportunity to help find and execute the better solutions. 
http: //www. filmthreat. com/News. asp? ld=1446 as retrieved on 27 Jan 2005 06: 17: 16 GMT 
(47) Then there was the "backyard dog" law the supes passed last month, decreeing which 
types of water bowls "pet guardians" should use and the proper amount of kibble to feed 
Fido. While I'm sure the pooches are thrilled, last time I checked, they don't pay taxes. 
Neither do most homeless people with dogs, who of course are exempted from the law. 
Along with freedom to urinate on the street, the homeless are apparently free to mistreat 
their dogs. Supervisor Bevan Dufty sponsored the legislation at the request of the San 
Francisco Commission of Animal Control and Welfare, which argues that the law will 
make it. easier prosecute cases of neglect. Though laws against animal cruelty are 
necessary, ones mandating tip-proof water bowls have perhaps taken it a step too far. To 
quote Alioto-Pier, who opposed the ordinance, it's just a little "too Big Brother 
http: //www. sfgate. com/cgi-bin/article. cgi? file=/gate/archive/2005/02/08/cstillwell. DTL as 
retrieved on 8 Jul 2005 00: 42: 16 GMT. 
(48) How many prosecutors have been called down and disciplined for such 
unconscionable behavior? The answer is simple, damn few and far between! Why? 
Because the so-called "Criminal Justice System" (excuse the oxymoron) is the largest, 
fastest growing industry in the United States. A large segment of the legal profession has 
a vested interest in this lucrative industry. Its my opinion that most attorneys who 
primarily practice criminal law, whether defense or prosecution, and most judges (who of 
course are in the same union) do not wish to rock the boat they are riding on for a variety 
of reasons, some excusable, some not. I view the legal profession as no different than 
any other profession when it comes to cleaning its own house. Attorney Canons, codes of 
ethics and prescribed guidelines for professional conduct mean absolutely nothing unless 
vigorously and swiftly enforced. 
http: //www. m2solids. com/kensu/woody. html as retrieved on 29 Jun 2005 11: 05: 51 GMT 
(49) Voter turnout will be maximized by hands-on GOTV efforts. GOTV should be more than 
signing up voters leading up to the election, it should be about energizing voters NOW. 
What better way to maximize this than to have a consistent message passed to every 
county chair, who then passes it on to every District chair, who then passes it on to every 
block captain, who then discusses it with their friends and neighbors at the park, the pool, 
the coffee shop, the diner. This takes very little resources once a consistent message is 
decided upon and the chain starts. It just takes a little energy at the roots, and we know 
how much energy our roots have! 
http: //www. ncdp. org/node/413 as retrieved on 13 Jun 2005 18: 52: 49 GMT 
(50) It is God's life-changing power that is able to touch every individual, who then has the 
responsibility to touch the world around him with the absolutes found in the Bible. In the 
end we must realize that the spirit of the age - with all the loss of truth and beauty, and 
the loss of compassion and humanness that it has brought - is not merely a cultural ill. It 
is a spiritual ill that the Truth given us in the Bible and Christ alone can cure. 
http: //razorskiss. net/wp/? p=106 as retrieved on 7 Jun 2005 04: 01: 26 GMT 
(51) Dr. McCormack announced that it was time to identify two representatives from each 
Advanced Concentration to serve on the Recruiting Committee. This is a group that will 
discuss the recruiting procedures and make phone calls to some of the prospective 
applicants. Also, we need two representatives from each Advanced Concentration for the 
Admissions Committee. The Admissions Committee has a bigger workload; they preview 
every completed application, which then gets read by four Committee members. For the 
Admissions Committee, there are a couple of meetings in December and for January 
through April we'll meet every week (usually Thursday afternoon starting at 1: 00 PM until 
whenever we finish). Dr. Baker suggested that the Chairs provide us with a list of people 
they would be willing to assign to this Committee and then we could contact them to ask 
them if they would be willing to serve. Dr. Sumners agreed it would be a good idea. 
Furthermore, Dr. Sumners pointed out that on our web page we have a list of mentors 
who have said they would be willing to have someone in their lab, and he suggested they 
should also be willing to serve on this Committee. 
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http: //idp. med. ufl. edu/ADVISORY/2000-0928. htm as retrieved on 30 May 2005 23: 04: 31 
GMT 
(52) They looked like the many Iraqis I had met over the years, but something had come out 
of them, some long subdued and oppressed core of selfhood that I was not, frankly, 
certain could be there. It was like the genie of the "Tales of 1,001 Nights" when he 
suddenly emerged from the lamp. Such smiles also emerged out of the long-oppressed 
Eastern Europeans after the fall of the Soviet Union; but they have not yet come out of 
most Russians, who of course lived the model of Stalinist domination that Saddam 
adopted for his country. 
http: //www. uexpress. com/georgieannegeyer/? uc_full_date=20050201 as retrieved on 8 
Jun 2005 03: 37: 45 GMT 
(53) Enduring Grace presents the special contributions of women mystics. It gives a clear and 
realistic description of the women, their lives and the times in which they lived. In doing 
this, they come alive as real people who faced day to day difficulties, no different than the 
modern day reader. In regard to some of their more unusual behavior, Flinders 
encourages the reader to view the mystics with compassion and understanding. Flinders 
illucidates how very ordinary women transformed themselves into extraordinary 
individuals who made extraordinary contributions. She further illustrates how these 
women belong to us all and gives every female reader a legacy which she can claim as 
her own. 
http: //www. amazon. com/exec/obidos/tg/detaiU-/0060626453? v=glance&vi=customer- 
reviews as retrieved on 28 Mar 2004 19: 40: 39 GMT 
(54) also read a story where this person (forgotten who) surrounded by his guards told his 
visitor - that had just threatened him in some way - that there was no way that he could 
kill him while he was surrounded by his most trusted guards, who of course never left his 
side. Upon which the visitor just told the guards to reveal their true identity... 
http: //allempires. com/forum/get_topic. asp? FID=14&TID=2128&DIR=N as retrieved on 22 
Feb 2005 03: 37: 44 GMT 
(55) Question: What does the goddess Athena control? Answer: Every goddess has a realm 
which she controls. Some realms have physical boundaries, like an island or a spring. 
Some are more spiritual such as a process or quality. Athena is the Greek goddess of 
wisdom. She was also the goddess of industries and prudent intelligence in war. Athena 
is not the source of all wisdom, but she is certainly believed to be the source of some of 
it. 
http: //www. fjjkluth. com/athenal. html as retrieved on 2 Jul 2005 14: 32: 26 GMT 
(56) by Norton Rose 
Despite old adages about employees being a company's greatest asset, this is not 
reflected in most company accounts which measure employees in terms of a labour cost 
made up of elements such as pay, benefits and investment in training 
http: //www. adecco. com/Channels/adecco/human+resources/the+law+at+work/human+ca 
pital. asp as retrieved on 18 Jul 2005 16: 14: 29 GMT 
(57) For example, the author shows that industry information has become more valuable in 
terms of portfolio diversification benefits than country information, especially after the 
introduction of the euro, which contrasts with the literature of the 90s. Therefore, 
investors should change their view in the euro area to a sector-based approach. Most 
institutional investors, which are the biggest investors in the euro area, have already 
changed their view into a sector-based approach. As a consequence, euro area portfolio 
managers are nowadays tracking sector indices instead of country indices. One of the 
chapters in part II of the thesis shows the implications of that change for the banking 
sector. Stock returns of big banks have become more correlated, while this is not the 
case for smaller banks. The author argues that this is not a result of a similar 
performance or product portfolio of these banks, but is likely the result of the change in 
perspective of most euro area investors. 
https: //dspace. ubib. eur. nl/handle/1765/6666? mode=full as retrieved on 2 Jul 2005 
15: 17: 11 GMT 
(58) The Kendall Howard Rack Mounted Centerline Vented Shelf is one of the strongest most 
stable shelves on the market. Unlike most centerline shelves, which may "teeter", our 
centerline shelf is rock solid. The mounting flanges are not only press welded onto each 
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side but wrap completely around the bottom to give it unprecedented stability and 
strength. This patent pending design will truly prove to be one of the strongest racking 
components you can own. 
http: //www. electronix. com/catalog/product_info. php/cPath/248_379/products_id/14034 as 
retrieved on 30 Apr 2005 19: 53: 16 GMT 
(59) Sound Doctrine A Tactical Primer Charles Sid Heal In recent years, law enforcement has 
suffered a number of tactical fiascoes. Besides the loss of life and deterioration in public 
confidence, officers and agencies have been the subject of both civil and criminal 
sanctions. Unlike most tactical books, which teach tactics as a skill set this book 
emphasizes an intuitive application of fundamental principles. These principles have 
evolved over centuries of tactical operations and form a body of sound doctrine. Heal not 
only presents a distillation of the more than ninety tactical texts, but provides an insightful 
and compelling call for rethinking tactics of law enforcement. Assuming no prior 
experience or understanding of tactical matters, Heal draws from everyday life such as 
competitive games, driving, or planning a vacation to show how to reconceptualize a 
difficult situation. Because the fundamental concepts he explores apply to all types of 
emergencies, Sound Doctrine is suitable for not only law enforcement, but firefighters, 
private security and other emergency responders. 
http: //www. lanternbooks. com/detail. html? id=1930051115 as retrieved on 2 May 2006 
12: 12: 28 GMT 
(60) NEAR Security Radar (Pilot) This is the second version of the NEAR Security Radar 
which the EastWest Institute's NEAR (New European American Russian) Forum attempts 
to provide you with concise analysis which we believe you will find relevant and helpful in 
your work. The Radar is designed to provide a trilateral EU, US and Russian analysis of 
key developments in the matrix that combines the topics set as the main areas of focus 
for the NEAR Forum. This pilot issue focuses on the most important events, which have 
occurred in the South Ossettia during the week of 8-16 July 2004. The weekly issues of 
the Near Security Radar will offer an in-depth analysis of both past and upcoming events 
as seen and discerned from the NEAR Forum staff in Russia, the European Union 
(Brussels) and the United States. The issues will be mailed to you electronically and 
posted on our web site at http: //near. ewi. info. We welcome your suggestions and 
comments. 
http: //www. ewi. info/programs/news. cfm? title=Program%2ONews&l1=Programs&12=Global 
%20Security&13= as retrieved on 3 May 2005 00: 53: 02 GMT. 
(61) Are there exhibition opportunities for students? 
Yes. Unlike most art educations, which culminate in one group show of the graduating 
class, CalArts students have many exhibition opportunities throughout their time in 
residence. There are seven on-campus galleries at CalArts for the purpose of exhibition 
of student work. First and second-year BFAs typically participate in several group 
exhibitions per year, while 3rd and 4th year BFAs along with all MFAs have solo shows 
each year. 
http: //www. calarts. edu/schools/art/faq. html as retrieved on 30 Apr 2005 20: 40: 13 GMT 
(62) Research is advancing on promising new means of treating drug addiction using 
immunotherapies and sustained-release (depot) medications. The aim of this research is 
to develop medications that can block or significantly attenuate the psychoactive effects 
of such drugs as cocaine, nicotine, heroin, phencyclidine, and methamphetamine for 
weeks or months at a time. The promise of the new medications rests not only on their 
longer action, but also on differences in the way they operate. Unlike most existing 
treatments, which are active in the brain itself, immunotherapies act by binding the drug 
in the bloodstream and preventing it from reaching the brain. This represents a 
fundamentally new therapeutic approach that shows promise for treating drug addiction 
problems that were difficult to treat in the past. Despite their potential benefits, however, 
several characteristics of these new methods pose distinctive behavioral, ethical, legal, 
and social challenges that require careful scrutiny. 
http: //darwin. nap. edu/books/0309091284/html/1. html as retrieved on 30 Apr 2005 
16: 30: 42 GMT 
(63) Common Nonmetric Business Paper Sizes 
Width precedes height; Inch measurements are exact; Metric measurements are 
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approximate (calculated at 1 inch = 25.4 mm and rounded off); Standardized sizes are 
listed at left; Variants are listed at right; Most variant sizes, which are device dependent, 
are simply intended to accommodate registration marks. 
http: //home. inter. net/eds/paper/dtpofficepaper. htmI as retrieved on 1 May 2005 14: 20: 01 
GMT 
(64) April 17,2005 
Looking down at a deep draft 
Unlike most NFL drafts, which feature a handful of can't-miss prospects on whom there is 
a consensus, this year's class remains an enigma. In this case, one man's blue-chipper is 
another man's bust. 
http: //www. newsday. com/sports/columnists/ny- 
spglaub174222087apr17,0,3842639. column? coll=ny-sports-columnists 
as retrieved on 15 Jul 2005 04: 24: 59 GMT 
(65) The few minutes it takes to adjust the direction of the telescope's beam may not seem 
like much to an outside observer. Even for most scientific purposes, which focus on a few 
celestial objects for long periods of time, taking a few minutes to point the telescope is 
time well spent. For SETI@home, however, the time it takes to mechanically move the 
feeds from one point to another is simply time wasted. The shorter the amount of time 
spent on adjusting the telescope, the more time will be left for actual observations, and 
more candidates that will ultimately be revisited. 
http: //www. planetary. org/stellarcountdown/reobservations_l. html as retrieved on 30 Apr 
2005 00: 05: 57 GMT 
(66) 03/03/2005: Holcim report whets shareholder appetite The 2004 report of cement giant 
Holcim makes a refreshing change from most company reports, which focus on the 
financial ups and downs of the past year. In the introduction, Holcim explains to 
shareholders why it pounced twice in January to announce major planned acquisitions, 
one in Britain and the other in India. 
http: //aggregateresearch. com/reports/ as retrieved on 15 Jul 2005 21: 30: 28 GMT 
(67) There's been plenty of talk over the past week about "froth" in the real-estate market, 
much of it very general and a lot of it irrelevant to most local markets, which tend to more 
closely resemble middling Tampa or Phoenix than super-hot spots like San. Francisco or 
West Palm Beach. Consequently, all this bubble talk can't be taken too seriously -- what 
really matters are the regional fundamentals, which too few people pay attention to. 
http: //levelgaze. blogspot. com/2005_06_01_Ievelgaze_archive. html as retrieved on 3 Aug 
2005 17: 23: 39 GMT. 
(68) Do T cell responses to mutated self antigens reveal how immunity against cancer is 
generated? Not exactly. Tumors that are elicited by short, intense exposure of rodents to 
potent carcinogens carry large numbers of mutations, and these tumors arise over weeks 
or several months. These experimental models do not adequately reflect the 
pathogenesis of most human cancers, which result from multiple discrete mutations 
accumulated sequentially over decades 
http: //www. pubmedcentral. gov/articlerender. fcgi? artid=503781 as retrieved on 28 Aug 
2005 22: 32: 18 GMT 
(69) "The inconclusive result does not mean we have found another case of BSE in this 
country, " Clifford said. "Inconclusive results are a normal component of most screening 
tests, which are designed to be extremely sensitive so they will detect any sample that 
could possibly be positive. " 
http: //lists. ifas. ufl. edu/cgi-bin/wa. exe? A2=indO4O6&L=sanet-mg&P=17085 as retrieved on 
28 Aug 2005 23: 54: 48 GMT. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Universals as Topics 
(1) What a disappointment King turned out to be. I so hoped her reverence for life would be 
genuine. Like the drifter in her song, she, too, "fell into someone's wicked spell. " As for 
every one of her records, cassettes and CDs that once helped me walk the path, the 
garbage has become their final destination. The Natural Woman turned out to be a 
callous capitalist. Gone is the magic woven by her music. So are the blue and gold hues 
of her Tapestry; they now are tainted with the blood on Castro's hands. 
http: //www. cubanet. org/CNews/y02/feb02/22e4. htm as retrieved on 18 Jun 2005 
19: 49: 40 GMT 
(2) As for every thing else he said some of it maybe true but due to the fact that we are fans 
of the show on this forum i think he should leave, as he clearly isn't nor wants to be and 
in fact has probably never watched it! 
http: //168.215.229.9/thread. asp? b=2&t=7304 as retrieved on 22 Feb 2005 04: 29: 51 GMT 
(3) As for everyone who keeps imagining what they would have done, how they would have 
reacted, etc, the thing you are all forgetting is that you probably don't have the training 
and resources that the President of the United States has. 
http: //archive. avsforum. com/avs-vb/history/topic/414151-1. html as retrieved on 8 Aug 
2005 08: 43: 27 GMT. 
(4) I'd like to thank Aldermen Harris, Johnson, Bates, Sansone and Mayor Titter for their 
support on killing this issue. What impressed me most, however, was the commitment 
made by Alderman Lloyd Harris of Ward 3. Not only did Mr. Harris vote no on this issue, 
he went out and polled the citizens prior to the meeting. Mr. Harris made contact with 
Pacific residents in all three wards. He stood out in front of stores, the post office and 
other locations around the city. Each person who he contacted, he asked their opinion on 
this issue. Not once did Mr. Harris find a resident who was in favor for an appointed chief 
of police. This gave me hope for the residents of Ward 3 because Alderman Harris does 
care for your opinion. 
http: //www. zwire. com/site/news. cfm? newsid=15169584&BRD=1409&PAG=461 &dept_id= 
544418&rfi=6 as retrieved on 15 Jun 2005 
(5) "He's well-grounded, " Willis said. "Irregardless of him playing in the NFL, he's going to be 
special -- and special in a leadership role. Every person who crosses his path, he affects 
them in a positive way. " 
http: //sports. espn. go. com/espn/columns/story? columnist=forde_pat&id=2163271 as 




(1) Editorial Reviews -Product Description: It doesn't matter if she's 5 or 105, every female 
LOVES these rich, thick feather boas. These are professional weight, not skimpy and 
they are over five feet long! They can be silly or sexy or glamorous or just plain fun. Solid 
peach. 
http: //www. featherfinding. info/boo_feather-collectibles. html as retrieved on 26 Aug 2005 
08: 08: 47 GMT. 
(2) While my situation is not as long and as tumultuous as yours, I have found ways to keep 
my GD in my life. At first it was the same as you... backing off. OBD would threaten to 
keep GD from me. I would fight with her and the vicious cycle would continue. Then 
started saying, "it's your choice of course, but you would only hurt GD if you kept her from 
me. " Now, OBD needs me waaaay too much... I'm free daycare. Which is what I was 
thinking you could offer Jessica. Free daycare. Even if she is not working, every mother 
needs a break from her kids. With my daughter, sad as it is for me to admit, mostly she 
will cooperate if she is getting something out of it, or if it takes some responsibility off her 
shoulders. Perhaps you can appeal to that side of Jessica. You present it as how you are 
helping her, she doesn't have to know your true goal. 
http: //www. steptogether. org/forum/showthreaded. php? Cat=&Number=395301 &page=&vi 
ew=&sb=5&o=&vc=1 as retrieved on 1 Mar 2005 21: 58: 25 GMT. 
(3) As for the birth mother, understand that she was told, at some point, that she wasn't 
needed any more and if she really loved her child she would gracefully disappear. Even if 
she surrendered her child of her own free will, every birth mother is left with a sense of 
emptiness and loss -- if not regret and resentment -- for it's impossible to "forget and go 
on as if it never happened. " Isolated in secrecy, birth mothers have no way of knowing 
the emptiness they feel is "normal". So, thinking they have failed yet again, they hold this 
shame close to their heart in the same dark place where they hide their primal grief over 
the loss of their child. 
http: //www. vhl. org/newsletter/vhll995/95dcadop. htm as retrieved on 4 Aug 2005 16: 24: 38 
GMT. 
(4) "Then came a band of fifty Sikhs-and a heroic scene. The Sikhs, as you know, are a 
fierce fighting brotherhood. As soon as he can raise one, every man wears a beard which 
he curls around a cord or ties to his ears. The Sikhs also wear their hair long like women 
and curl it in a topknot under their turbans. These Sikhs were Akalis of a fanatic religious 
sect. They wore the kirpan, or sacred sword. 
"With them were fifteen of their young girls and women. The women also wore sacred 
swords, and although dressed in orange saris like Hindu women, they wore little cotton 
trousers which reached to their tiny, sandaled feet. They were pretty girls and not so loud 
voiced and excited as the Hindu ladies. They simply smiled-as if they liked danger-which 
they do. 
http: //www. jesusradicals. com/library/gregg/examplesofnonviolence. html as retrieved on 




(1) At the turn of the century, there was no question about it --marriage was thought to be 
the ideal state for every woman, and she pretty much spent most of her young life 
preparing for it. However, there were definite etiquette rules that she.. 
http: //www. lahontanvalleynews. com/apps/pbcsad. dll/adIink? Spot=spotlight, Sports&Req= 
70046880106276463 as retrieved on 26 Sep 2004 07: 46: 21 GMT. 
(2) Written. Evaluations: It is important that each client attend every session. If he/she 
misses a session, Iris Counseling Center will notify the Court for appropriate action. After 
the 12 session program, group leaders provide a written evaluation which addresses:... 
http: //hadm. sph. sc. edu/students/kBelew/iris. htm as retrieved on 22 Mar 2005 12: 18: 55 
GMT. 
(3) Every man, and he need not be always a professional sportsman, longs for being the 
best at something sometimes. 
http: //www. mylanex. com/en/o-nas/novinky/pribehy. php as retrieved on 18 Jun 2005 
18: 30: 45 GMT 
(4) Personality: He gives away nothing with his eyes or his body language; he looks almost 
completely robotic except sometimes his look will just border on dislike, amusement or 
curiosity. He is a very hard one to get a handle on. He will not speak unless directly 
addressed in such a way that requires an audible answer. He is beyond graceful in 
everything that he does, looking as if every move is precisely planned, but it's not. 
Inwardly he finds his whole situation ironic, as he had once been the master of a large 
house with many servants and slaves. Often mentally comparing his current situation with 
one from his own past, this is where the amusement comes from. 
http: //www. ravenswing. com/-keys/independent/dark_angel_desc. html as retrieved on 27 
Jul 2005 21: 46: 37 GMT 
(5) As long as I am not able to vote at the Lebanese Elections at my Lebanese Consulate I 
would feel that I am not been giving my full constitutional rights. No excuses, no 
equivocations, while my French, American, Syrian friends may vote at their local 
consulate, I feel that I am unfairly treated. The same request extends to every regularised 
Lebanese who works legally overseas and who happens to be overseas during the 
Elections; he should be able to exercise his constitutional right to vote, and he should be 
able to do it at his nearest consulate or embassy. All those vehement talks, reasonings, 
excuses, shoutings against my requests do not hold water. Voting is a constitutional right 
of every Lebanese, and he should be able to exercise it when he is overseas. Let us see 
your reaction to that! 
Chawki Nassar (by LibanVote) 
http: //www. libanvote. com/cg i- 
bin/dcforum/dcboard. cgi? az=read_countfrom=23&forum=DCForumID79 as retrieved on 
27 Jan 2005 13: 41: 56 GMT. 
(6) Each garden has a gardener who maintains it. He / she takes care that it grows und 
stays in order. He / she is responsible for the discussion under the main tree.. In 
addition, he / she makes sure that the ripe fruits are harvested and processed into 
marmalade (i. e. the experiences recorded and processed). The one planting an own 
palaver-tree is the person who moderates the discussion and carries out the 
safeguarding and processing of the experience in its shadow. 
http: //unpan1. un. org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/NISPAcee/UNPAN015612. pdf. as 
retrieved on 20 Jun 2005 15: 33: 55 GMT. 
(7) A good theory simply weaves together observations into ordered patterns that predict 
events. If you can't readily infer from a theory the observations and the accuracy of the 
observations that it is built upon, then that theory is asking you to make a leap of faith that 
is probably unwarranted. Thus, to claim that people have a need for achievement or have 
an oedipal complex implies a basis in facts that aren't readily apparent, and a type of 
neural or mental mechanics that is as obscure as any of Ptolemy's planetary loop the 
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loops. So one must avoid postulating little mentalisms like drives, needs, egos, and the 
like, and simple note the patterns in which people, like the stars in heaven, move. 
Theories should mirror the facts or our own experience, and should be judged on the 
basis of how they make that experience comprehensible and predictable. Every man can 
know himself, he only has to observe himself. Effective thinking thus should be the 
province of every man, and he should never meekly surrender it to any'expert'. 
http: //www. homestead. com/flowstate/files/zselfhelp. html as retrieved on 21 May 2005 
02: 52: 15 GMT. 
(8) In Fits it's all about speed. Every player gets a board which he needs to fill with colored 
tiles (Small and large triangles and squares in 4 colors). The dice defines which tile to 
pick from the tile holder and the player needs to place this piece on his/ her board. But 
the piece can't touch other pieces of the same color. The fun part is that the dice can't lay 
still for more than five seconds. So after one minute you have lots of pieces on and 
besides your board and are pretty stressed to make it all fit on the board. The first player 
who can make it all fit on his board, wins. 
http: //www. boardgamegeek. com/game/10565 as retrieved on 26 Jun 2005 23: 37: 59 GMT 
(9) The idea of universal brotherhood is one for universal application, however. The 
challenge comes to every man, and he meets it where it affronts his sense of justice. For 
some, this is on the question of religious prejudice, for others, racial, etc. For 
theosophists, the fight must be against all prejudice -- against the materialism and 
ignorance that are the causal synonyms of prejudice. The theosophical philosophy, 
perhaps, rather than any individual, leads the fight for tolerance, because Theosophy has 
the whole of Humanity for its object. All those who work to abolish any particular prejudice 
are allies of the Theosophical Movement to the extent that they dedicate their efforts to 
some portion of their fellow-men. 
http: //www. wisdomworld. org/additional/Youth-CompanionsAsk-/QandA-No. 3- 
Dec. 1947. html as retrieved on 23 Jan 2005 08: 20: 12 GMT 
(10) Marriage is the great dream of every woman and she feels it is a dream that can 
absolutely change her life. As society is changing towards becoming a hi-tech society, 
marriage is becoming a terrible dream for many women. 
http: //www. tribuneindia. com/2002/20020203/herworld. htm as retrieved on 6 Feb 2005 
00: 15: 21 GMT. 
(11) They Grow'em Tough on the Llano!, (nv) Star Western Aug 1943; Banks Presnall paid 
all too careful heed to the admonition: 'There's times when every man meets something 
he can't get around. Then he needs a gun to blast himself through! '. 
http: //users. evl. net/-homeville/fictionmag/s571. htm as retrieved on 30 Aug 2005 
00: 52: 27 GMT 
(12) Liberty is given to every individual. If he wants to turn himself towards a good path and 
be righteous, the power is in his hands; and if he wants to turn himself towards the path 
of evil, the power is in his hands.... Man is unique in the world and there is no other 
creature similar to him in this regard: that he on his own, with his knowledge and 
thoughts, will know good and evil and do whatever he wants, and there is nobody who 
will prevent him from doing good or evil. 
Maimonides, Mishna Torah, Laws of Repentance 5: 1 
http: //www. aish. com/shmooze/equal_measures_of free_will. asp as retrieved on 2 Jul 
2005 12: 28: 41 GMT. 
(13) After all, every murderer when he kills runs the risk of the most dreadful of deaths, 
whereas those who kill him risk nothing except promotion. 
http: //www. spicyquotes. com/html/Albert_Camus_Murder. html as retrieved on 4 Jul 2005 
04: 43: 44 GMT. 
(14) Men in a State of Nature are absolutely free and independent of one another as to 
sovereign Jurisdiction , but when they enter into a Society, and by their own consent become Members of it, they must submit to the Laws. of the Society according to which 
they agree to be governed; for it is evident, by the very Act of Association, that each 
Member subjects himself to the Authority of that Body in whom, by common Consent, the 
legislative Power of the State is placed: But though they must submit to the Laws, so long 
as they remain Members of the Society, yet they retain so much of their natural Freedom 
as to have a Right to retire from the Society, to renounce the Benefits of it, to enter into 
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another Society, and to settle in another Country; for their Engagements to the Society, 
and their Submission to the public Authority of the State, do not oblige them to continue in 
it longer than they find it will conduce to their Happiness, which they have a natural Right 
to promote. This natural Right remains with every Man, and he cannot justly be deprived 
of it by any civil Authority. Every Person therefore who is denied his Share in the 
Legislature of the State to which he had an original Right, and every person who from his 
particular Circumstances is excluded from this great Privilege, and refuses to exercise 
his natural Right of quitting the Country, but remains in it, and continues to exercise the 
Rights of a Citizen in all other Respects, must be subject to the Laws which by these 
Acts he implicitly, or to use your own Phrase, virtually consents to: For Men may subject 
themselves to Laws, by consenting to them implicitly; that is, by conforming to them, by 
adhering to the Society, and accepting the Benefits of its Constitution 
http: //www. historicaldocuments. com/inquiryintotheRightsBC. htm as retrieved on 18 Apr 
2005 15: 05: 29 GMT. 
(15) "Talk to every woman as if you loved her, and to every man as if he bored you, and at 
the end of your first season you will have the reputation of possessing the most perfect 
social tact" 
http: //en. thinkexist. com/quotation/talk_to_every_woman_as_ifyouu_loved_her- 
and_to/165784. html as retrieved on 19 Jun 2005 20: 49: 45 GMT. 
(16) But a greater awakening has come since April, 1917. It has taken the ploughshare of fire 
to reveal our true selves: this war is running the furrows deep in the hearts of men and 
turning up desires of which they were unconscious themselves in their days of ease. Men 
are flocking to Washington at the sacrifice of business and personal interests willing to 
pour out their all for the great stake of democracy; the moment came when the 
possession of self-government was imperiled and all leapt forward ready to lay down their 
lives to preserve it. This war has revealed the deeper self with its deeper wishes to 
every man and he sees that he prizes beyond life the power to govern himself. Now is the 
moment to use all this rush of patriotism and devotion and love of liberty and willingness 
to serve, and not let it sink back again into its hidden and subterranean depths. Let us 
develop the kind of institutions which will call forth and utilize these powers and energies 
for peace as for war, for the works of peace are glorious if men can but see the goal. Let 
us make a fitting abiding place for men's innate grandeur. Let us build high the walls of 
democracy and enlarge its courts for our daily dwelling. 
http: //sunsite. utk. edu/FINS/Mary_Parker_Follett/XXXIV. txt as retrieved on 20 Apr 2005 
02: 25: 25 GMT 
(17) In the server I'd create personal folders and specify for every folder access rights: 
admin, certain user, all users, etc. I don't need quota management. Is this the way it 
should be configured? Or is it done this way: every user has a login which he uses to 
access whatever client computer he is using and he is automatically connected to the 
server and the server's drive is mapped locally? Which one is better? Which one requires 
the most management? Which one can be done in plain XP Pro and which one needs a 
server OS? Or am I completely lost and the network should be configured completely 
differently? Will I be able to do it or we'll need a VAR to set it up? 
http: //forums. enterpriseitplanet. com/history/topic. php/l540-1. html as retrieved on 30 Jun 
2005 09: 14: 51 GMT 
(18) 40. All men on the program (which includes the halfway house) are subject to drug 
testing at anytime. The belongings of every man, and he himself, are subject to being 
searched at anytime. Refusing a test or a search automatically means that the man will 
exit the program. If a man is found to be using alcohol or any other mood-altering drug, 
he will, in every case, have to exit the program for at least 30 days. This exit includes 
being barred 
http: //www. nashviIlerescuemission. org/Handbook. pdf as retrieved on 27 Jun 2005 
18: 20: 14 GMT 
(19) Two things emerge here. There is a door of missionary opportunity before every man 
and he need not go overseas to find it. Within the home, within the circle in which we 
move, within the community in which we reside, there are those to be won for Christ. To 
use that door of opportunity is at once our privilege and our responsibility. In the way of 
Christ the reward of work well done is more work to do. Philadelphia had proved faithful 
399 
and the reward for her fidelity was still more work to do for Christ. 
http: //www. apostle. org/lectures/rev3phi. htm as retrieved on 26 Jun 2005 09: 22: 18 GMT. 
(20) KC: When did you develop an interest in graphic design and architecture? Have you 
always loved the visual arts or was it a later development? 
ALW: Probably at school. I always used to draw from when I was very young. 
Architecture came much later and I still have a battle with it as it focuses a lot of the 
frustrations I feel in the public and political arena and how people have been 
disempowered over their own domain. Northern man has allowed himself to become 
trapped into the requirements of a commercially driven building industry and the people 
who finance the purchase of houses. Building is something natural and instinctive to 
every man and he's lost that bit of his world and the high art that it produces. Most 
architects are stuck on vanity, reputation and commercial gain in my experience. Look 
how differently people build down in the desert and deeper into Africa. 
http: //www. renderingislam. com/alwhiteman. htm as retrieved on 1 Feb 2005 00: 48: 20 
GMT. 
(21) Second as regards politics. Politics means the discussion and determination of matters 
of public policy. Shall the Government maintain a large army or a small one? Shall it 
charge Custom Duties on goods imported from abroad? How shall it impose and collect 
its taxes? Each question of this kind is a matter of national policy, and therefore of 
politics. Consequently matters of politics are of the utmost importance and the concern of 
all citizens. Every citizen, if he is a good citizen, will bring to bear on such questions his 
best judgment and will do whatever his duty demands toward putting into effect such 
policies as are determined upon. 
http: //freemasonry. bcy. ca/texts/politics. html as retrieved on 9 Jul 2005 07: 42: 01 GMT 
(22) "Every individual intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led 
by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his original intention. By 
pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of society more effectively than 
when he really intends to promote it. " -Adam Smith, (1776) 
Wealth Of Nations (New York: Modern Library, 1937), p. 423. During the prosperous 
years of the 1920's, it was said that "every man could have his castle and he could have 
it in any style he wanted. " Floral Park, with its rich cornucopia of architectural styles, is 
particularly representative of that trend. 
http: //www. floral-park. com/index_files/page0001. htm as retrieved on 16 Aug 2005 
23: 18: 05 GMT 
(23) Every man has his own courage, and is betrayed because he seeks in himself the 
courage of other persons. Ralph Waldo Emerson 
http: //www. brainyquote. com/quotes/quotes/r/ralphwaldolO4714. html as retrieved on 26 
Jun 2005 16: 42: 26 GMT. 
(24) "What should I do to be happy, to fulfill myself? " Every man has his own intimate answer 
to this question, even when he does not formulate it explicitly. This answer works like a 
watershed: an inch to the left or to the right ends up taking the raindrop to Atlantic or 
Pacific Ocean, to final and definite fulfillment or failure. There are only two possible 
answers, as Augustine of Hippo has already pointed out in City of God: a man seeks 
either his own advantages trying to safeguard his life or those of God (and, through God, 
those of the remainder of mankind) burning cheerfully his life up to its complete 
annihilation. 
http: //www. hottopos. com/videturl3/hae. htm as retrieved on 1 Jun 2005 11: 41: 28 GMT 
(25) Every man has his particular work to perform, but unless it be on some large ranch 
where the force of men employed is sufficiently large to require the services of a chef, he 
is also expected to assist in keeping house. It is an unwritten law of the ranch that 
everybody on the place must share in this work and if anyone shirks his duty he must 
either promptly mend his ways or else quit his job. It is seldom, however, that this rule 
has to be enforced, as the necessities of the case require that every man shall be able to 
prepare a meal as he is liable to be left alone for days or weeks at a time when he must 
either cook or starve. 
http: //www. worldwideschool. org/library/books/geo/geography/ArizonaSketches/chap4. htm 
I as retrieved on 14 May 2005 13: 10: 49 GMT. 
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(26) We need to become acquainted with our frailties and deficiencies, that we may know 
where our weakness lies; otherwise, like Sampson, we are likely to expose ourselves to 
numerous temptations and troubles. Every man has his weak side, and every wise man 
knows where it is, and will be sure to keep a double guard there. Yet our limitations and 
incapacities can only be discovered by a considerable degree of self-acquaintance. How 
often have we attempted things beyond our reach and assayed to do things out of our 
powers; we were blind to our deficiencies through self ignorance. It has been truly said, 
"A wise man as well as a fool has his foibles: but the difference between them is, that the 
foibles of the former are known to himself and concealed from the world, while the foibles 
of the other are known to the world and concealed from himself. " 
http: //phifologos. org/pink/1934/self-knowledge. htm as retrieved on 21 Jun 2005 12: 32: 51 
GMT . (27) The castle was scratch built by Cheryl Oudshoorn. The game is a6 player affair with 2 
German (the Guards) and 4 allied players (Polish, French, Dutch and British) For the 
Allies it is every player for his country and he must get 2 POWs out before any of fellow 
prisoners do, the Germans goal is to prevent any one player from getting 2 men out. 
http: //www. fortunecity. com/underworld/lylat/l1/colditz3d. html as retrieved on 19 Aug 2005 
12: 30: 19 GMT. 
(28) Why is this interesting for the mailman list? Starship uses qmail. With qmail, every user 
has his own mailboxes, and he can handle everything like myname-other at site from his 
myname home directory. This is great. For Mailman, it is very bad, since it gives you 
headaches whenever you want to set up a mailman list named zope-users, when a user 
zope is also existent. 
http: //mail. python. org/pipermail/mailman-users/1999-February/000598. html as retrieved 
on 22 Aug 2005 09: 13: 03 GMT 
(29) Since I would not work on Sunday, we started on Monday, laying the job out with three 
men. On the day we started the actual building, it started to rain, which it did every day up 
to mid-morning. I hired every man who applied if he knew which end of a hammer to hold. 
On hiring them, I told them not to start unless they would work in the rain. We would stop 
only in the hardest downpours. I used up to 20 men; and Trent, Lindsey, and I had on 
raincoats and rubbers every day. When we drove the last nails at near noon Saturday, 
there were several hundred people already on the seats. When we figured up, we found it 
cost less than $1 per person's seat, including my 19 percent profit. That was a pretty 
good investment for UT, as every seat was sold for $2.50. The bleacher was used for 
seven years, though it was not always as full as it was that first time. 
http: //freepages. genealogy. rootsweb. com/--caroltapp/rsdysart. html as retrieved on 15 
Sep 2005 11: 40: 41 GMT. 
(30) The idea of prices to guide dispatch decisions was introduced to the electricity sector in 
1982 by Schweppes. Prices offer a unifying framework for communication, aggregating 
information in complex systems, and keeping the overall system efficient whilst allowing 
for decentralisation of individual decisions. In the energy market prices can be introduced 
as shadow prices to guide decisions, as audited prices to pay generators based on 
calculated costs or as market prices. In a perfectly competitive market assuming an 
infinite amount of buyers and sellers market prices equal variable costs of the most 
expensive generator required to match demand. If few electricity generators have major 
market shares then they can execute market power and push prices above competitive 
levels. Transmission constraints and short-term price inelastic demand increase market 
power. 
http: //www. nautilus. org/DPRKBriefingBook/energy/neuhoff. pdf as retrieved on 15 Sep 
2005 11: 40: 41 GMT 
(31) Every journalist has a novel in him, which is an excellent place for it. 
http: //www. brainyquote. com/quotes/quotes/r/russelllynIO0848. html as retrieved on 25 Jun 
2005 15: 42: 56 GMT 
(32) One difference I noted was that, in this war, the American soldier is a technological 
wonder. Nearly every soldier owns a laptop, which he or she uses to play games or 
exchange e-mails from home. 
http: //www. staugustine. com/stories/022104/opi_2142736. shtml as retrieved on 7 Jul 2005 
06: 31: 48 GMT (repeated from App. 1) 
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(33) 7. Try Guerrillas Tactics From China to Cuba to Vietnam history teaches the power of a 
guerrilla movement. Weak forces can flourish if they take up a guerrilla stronghold and 
resist being drawn into the open. Guerrillas are not organized like regular soldiers. The 
U. S. went into Vietnam with thousands of cooks, bakers, clerks, chauffeurs, chaplains 
and public relations officers. The smaller force of guerrillas had none of these, but 
virtually every soldier had a gun, which he used. A lean guerrilla organization can make 
quick decisions, seize opportunities and fill voids. A guerrilla force does not have the 
resources to waste on a lost cause. It does not hesitate to give up a position and move 
elsewhere-a flexibility envied by more entrenched forces (Reis and Trout, 1986). 
Selected References Bevin, Alexander. How Great Generals Win. New York: Norton, 
1993. Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited with an introduction by Anatol Rapoport. 5. 
Manage Momentum 
http: //www. cfar. com/cf/index. cfm? fuseaction=Publications. PublicationTracking&intPublica 
tionlD=75. as retrieved on 9 July 2005: 17: 56 GMT (repeated from App. 1) 
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APPENDIX 5 
Quantifiers Embedded in if/when Clauses with anaphoric links in 
the consequent 
(1) 3) The question of relevancy is important too. Transportation statistics do not typically 
govern the behavior of the average person, but perceptions do. Perceptions dictate 
where people buy homes. They dictate property values. They determine if parents will let 
their children walk to the park or to school. They determine if folks socialize along the 
street. Perceptions affect behavior such as littering and property maintenance, how safe 
people feel, where they want to shop, and where they want to spend time. Perceptions 
are important. When perceptions are shared by many people, they can have huge 
effects. If most people perceive the downtown as dangerous, then they will not spend 
time there, invest there, nor live there. Consequently, the downtown will suffer. The same 
situation exists for neighborhoods and districts. Traffic calming can and does affect 
perceptions. Therefore, in cities where perceptions are an issue, there is nothing wrong 
with correcting them with the help of traffic calming 
http: //gulliver. trb. org/publications/circulars/ecOl9/Ec019_i5. pdf as retrieved on 9 Sep 
2005 18: 52: 04 GMT. 
(2) For me, these two quotes show that this is a complex issue. If most people would simply 
'eat right' then they'd get nearly all of the benefits. Weight and nutrition are two of a wide 
range of factors than an athlete must address to be competitive. There are a few 
examples of athletes with crap nutrition that are able to compete well. However, I believe, 
the poor nutritional decisions get us in the long run. Of course... as many will point out, 
we're all dead in the long run. 
http: //www. byrn. org/gtips/bodycomp. htm as retrieved on 15 Jul 2005 13: 44: 46 GMT. 
(3) If most of the looters are black, then they are black, and nobody can deny that. 
http: //cubed3. clifton-hosting. co. uk/viewtopic. php? id=254&p=1 as retrieved on 9 Sep 2005 
18: 52: 04 GMT. 
(4) Being perfectly imperfect means recognizing that your control over outcomes has limits. 
If every outcome were controllable, and if every mistake preventable, then it wouldn't be a 
risk - it would be a certainty. Risk taking involves chance and approximation. But more 
than that, it involves an encounter with your fallibility. Though your risks may indeed turn 
out perfectly, you as a risk taker will always have imperfections. 
http: //www. cec. globalsources. com/ART_PRNT_8800037227. HTM as retrieved on 7 Jun 
2005 22: 42: 25 GMT. 
(5) Well, and they fail to forget the number of over/undervotes that were thrown out in 
predominantly Republican counties. So, if every vote counts, then it has to count in ALL 
counties- over and under votes. They will never get over it. 
http: //freerepublic. com/focus/news/659575/posts as retrieved on 30 Oct 2004 12: 30: 25 
GMT. 
(6) The good news, though, is that none of the stuff I didn't like was Bill's fault. Remember: 
The screenwriter is the person least accountable for how bad a movie is, what with all the 
other people who muck with it before it hits your eyeballs. (Funny -- if every director 
thinks he can do better than the writer, why doesn't he just do the writing himself instead 
of hiring a writer to give him a script to "improve upon"? ) 
http: //www. coldfusionvideo. com/v/victimofdesire. html as retrieved on 29 Apr 2005 
11: 21: 30 GMT. 
(7) Journalists used the presence of the expert who is deeply involved in the issue to ask 
about sealed indictments which both politicians and lawyers are objecting so much about. 
Residovic said this unpopular form of indictments (legal practice insists on public 
character of indictments to prevent potential abuse) was used because it was dictated by 
reality. 'If every indictee knew he was indicted, he would have time to hide or destroy 
evidence. The surprise factor would be prevented, ' said Residovic. 
http: //www. medienhilfe. ch/News/2002/BiH/MOL0712. htm as retrieved on 3 Jun 2005 
10: 41: 38 GMT. 
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(8) Warren has this theory that if he faces every shot like it's a corner then he'll save it no 
problem ... http: //www. winnipegsoccer. com/colo03/cc_pictures6. html as retrieved on 1 Apr 2004 
18: 24: 05 GMT. 
(9) You telling me that isn't happening now? Doing it McMillan's way, we would see better 
basketball, because if every player knew he would be going on the block at the end of 
every season, he would hustle his tail off and make it to every practice, or else when it 
came time for the annual free agent shuffle, there wouldn't be a lot of interest in his 
services. No more long-term contracts - which always wind up being renegotiated to the 
player's benefit anyhow. 
http: //www. coachwyatt. com/FEBOl. html as retrieved on 5 Jun 2005 20: 46: 50 GMT. 
(10) When- we gather as a vital faith community, we support and encourage each other. We 
"bear one another's burdens, and so fulfil the law of Christ" (Galatians 6: 2).. If each 
stands alone then he or she is weak, but together we are strong! This is God's will for the 
Church, as stated in Hebrews: "Let us consider how to stir up one another to love and 
good works, not neglecting to meet together, as is the habit of some, but encouraging 
one another, and all the more as you see the Day drawing near" (Hebrews 10: 24-25). 
http: //home. nyc. rr. com/mysticalrose/religion4. html as retrieved on 13 Jun 2005 18: 47: 59 
GMT. 
(11) The second challenge is invariably what I call the "gross-out" test. It either involves 
laying in a pit filled with insects or animals (e. g., snakes, rats, and mealworms) or the 
contestants are challenged to eat something that is, for most of our palates, incredibly 
disgusting (e. g., sheep eyeballs and bull's testicles). A random order is selected for the 
six poor fools to attempt the challenge. If each succeeds, then he or she moves on to the 
next round. If one fails, that's the end of the game for him or her. The final challenge 
usually requires the contestants to do something better than the others. Therefore, just 
completing that challenge is not enough to win. Instead, you need to complete the 
challenge better than everyone else. 
http: //www. popmatters. com/tv/reviews/f/fear-factor. shtmI as retrieved on 11 Jun 2005 
09: 15: 24 GMT. 
(12) Okay, the taking a test to vote part isn't bad. That test being money is absolutely the 
worst possible thing that it could be. "Money is the root of all evil. " Everyone's heard the 
phrase; it can't really be applied to anything concrete. But I can tell you that basing a 
country and its election processes on money would be the very worst thing for that 
election system. If you want to make a test for voter eligibility, here's a suggestion: when 
every American votes, he takes a sort of quiz on current events and such to decide if he 
is politically aware enough to participate in the election. Obviously the questions would 
not be incredibly difficult, but just enough to see if the citizens are paying attention 
enough to make reasonable votes. If a person fails the test, he doesn't vote - get involved 
and come back next year! The point? Get rid of those that don't vote based on anything 
worth basing a vote on, and encourage our citizens to really be aware of what they are 
voting for. 
http: //crash. neotope. com/200108. htm as retrieved on 29 May 2005 23: 28: 22 GMT 
(13) Eventually when every krongpa resigns, he or she would have served for six consecutive 
years. It is the most challenging and onerous task a person shoulders for his or her 
threypa. It must be noted that krongpa and pampa of all threypa are not appointed in the 
same year. 
www. bhutanstudies. org. bt/publications/ monograph/mngl 1-wayowayo. pdf as retrieved on 
22 Jun 2004 13: 22: 34 GMT 
(14) Suppose everybody in the world loves universally, loving others as one's self. Will there 
yet be any unfilial individual? When every one regards his father, elder brother, and 
emperor as himself, whereto can he direct any unfilial feeling? 
http: //www. cic. sfu. ca/nacc/articles/legalmohist/mozi_mei/wadegiles/momei_14wgl . html 
as retrieved on 13 Dec 2004 08: 18: 16 GMT 
(15) Adams insists the media's depiction of him as an out-of-control alcoholic is an ugly, lazy 
stereotype that's easily marginalized by his vast artistic output. "I don't think that 
functioning alcoholics make two albums a year, plus B-sides and tour 200 days out of the 
year, " he said. "My liver is not made of iron, as much as I wish it was sometimes. 
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Nobody's is. Once people get an idea of who you are, you become this cartoon character. 
I think if most rock people did everything people said, then they wouldn't be here. I'm not 
one of them. I'm a bad germ, but I don't have a death wish. " 
http: //www. cmt. com/artists/news/1480350/11112003/adams_ryan. jhtml as retrieved on 20 
Apr 2005 10: 38: 06 GMT. 
(16) If every man's house is his castle, then his garden must be his retreat! 
http: //www. publicservantlifestyle. co. uk/dynamic/sections/home_garden/article_display. ph 
p? id=2031 as retrieved on 2 Mar 2005 15: 58: 58 GMT. 
(17) After America's missions to the Moon, newspapers wrote that the Apollo program 
allegedly started bringing profit owing to the use of space technologies in conventional 
"earth" industries. The USA spent 24 billion dollars on the program: even if every 
spaceship were made of diamonds, it would be cheaper in comparison with its virtual 
price. Earth technologies comprised a meager part of the program's cost. It just so 
happens that it returns no profit, but only losses. Piloted space flights are a Russian kind 
of business that American scientists adhered to as a result of the pointless space race, a 
purely political propaganda race. 
http: //all. newsfromrussia. com/society/2003/04/04/45590. html as retrieved on 27 Feb 2004 
17: 33: 11 GMT 
(18) Let's put today's text under the banner of motherhood. Every text in the Bible is a 
Mother's Day text if you believe that all Scripture is profitable for teaching and reproof and 
correction and training in righteousness, and if you believe that mothers need all that for 
the sake of their weighty calling. And if every text is relevant for motherhood, it is also 
relevant for fatherhood and singleness, and marriage without children, and widows and 
widowers. All Scripture is profitable for all people in all roles when the texts are rightly 
understood and applied. 
http: //www. soundofgrace. com/piper2/piper2003/5-11-03. htm as retrieved on 11 Jul 2005 
16: 20: 05 GMT. 
(19) Lauterbach followed these impulses like stairs toward something brilliant and sublime. If 
every choice is an opportunity, it's also a sacrifice. If the poet has any responsibility, it's 
only to write good poems, which may be what the bartender in that joke is really trying to 
say: a good poem is one that serves humans, and Lauterbach remembers this again and 
again. 
http: //www. raintaxi. com/online/1997winter/lauterbach. shtml as retrieved on 27 Jul 2005 
08: 43: 20 GMT 
(20) This property of convexity, associated to the fact that only the lowest level of investment 
affects the quality is quite interesting. It tells us, at least from an intuitive point of view, 
that if at least one firm has no incentive to invest then nobody invests. In the opposite 
case, one would also expect that if every player invests then he spends the largest 
possible amount of money e= mini,, {e; } on each activity. If one however simply seeks for 
Nash equilibria of this investment game, one must concede that this intuition is not 
necessarily true. 
http: //www. core. ucl. ac. be: 16080/GabsHonor/papers/SoubeyranStahn. PDF. as retrieved 
on 17 Jun 2005 17: 41: 24 GMT. 
(21) Recently economists have considered situations in which the possibility of making a 
choice in the market changes the behaviour of people. This is known as moral hazard. An 
obvious example is danger that insurance companies face that people will buy an 
insurance policy to cover for example a small factory, then deliberately burn it down to 
claim the insurance. There would be no incentive to burn the factory down unless there 
was an insurance contract. It is sometimes argued that even if most people don't become 
criminals then they might be prepared to take more risks if they'covered' for that risk. Eg 
will a factory owner be so careful with dangerous machines if he is covered by 
insurance? 
http: //userweb. port. ac. uk/-fyshd/MAP/Iect%204. htm as retrieved on 10 Aug 2005 
16: 35: 47 GMT 
(22) The idea of prices to guide dispatch decisions was introduced to the electricity sector in 
1982 by Schweppes. Prices offer a unifying framework for communication, aggregating 
information in complex systems, and keeping the overall system efficient whilst allowing 
405 
for decentralisation of individual decisions. In the energy market prices can be 
introduced as shadow prices to guide decisions, as audited prices to pay generators 
based on calculated costs or as market prices. In a perfectly competitive market 
assuming an infinite amount of buyers and sellers market prices equal variable costs of 
the most expensive generator required to match demand. If few electricity generators 
have major market shares then they can execute market power and push prices above 
competitive levels. Transmission constraints and short-term price inelastic demand 
increase market power. In European countries other than the Nordic countries market 
power seems to be ... http: //www. nautilus. org/DPRKBriefingBook/energy/neuhoff. pdf as retrieved on 15 Sep 
20051 1: 40: 41 GMT 
(23) We should all agree that root=0, and systems require the "bin" and "daemon" mnemonic 
user and group names. In retrospect, I guess if few programs/services are hardcoding 1, 
then they are wrong and specifying bin or daemon equal to 1 would be worse. : -) 
http: //lists. debian. org/Isb-spec/2002/02/msg00069. html as retrieved on 17 Jul 2005 
18: 50: 44 GMT. 
(24) Both Brin and Browne are fundamentally wrong. It's just not true that people, even 
educated people, are inherently likely to achieve a good "consensus" politics. If most 
people accept the doctrines of socialism, then they will adopt socialism. If they accept 
some fundamentalist religious dogma, then they will adopt theocracy. Nor is it true that 
people inherently want to be free. Browne is correct to a certain point: people generally 
don't enjoy being physically restrained or tortured. But this hardly leads to the libertarian 
conception of "freedom. " People don't have some primal urge to resist paying taxes, 
abolish the welfare state, etc. Often majorities of voters impose higher taxes. In America, 
the urge to be free is mostly a cultural leftover from the era of the founders. Soundbites 
are not sufficient to convert people to the cause of liberty, because political beliefs are 
rooted (either implicitly or explicitly) in more fundamental theories of the world and of 
ethics. 
http: //www. freecolorado. com/2005/04/lalbrin. html as retrieved on 8 Aug 2005 09: 18: 03 
GMT 
(25) There's a familiar argument against this point, which goes like this: if most people don't 
know the difference between may and might, then why bother? But that argument only 
goes to show how truly stupid Stupidity is. Here's how to counter it: if most people don't 
know the difference, then they won't object if you use the right word. And the few people 
who do know the difference will notice, and will be pleased that you've got it right. So by 
getting it right you please everyone. Who but the stupid would do otherwise? 
http: //www. la-hq. org. uk/groups/ylg/archive/ylr28_4. htm as retrieved on 18 Jul 2005 
01: 28: 36 GMT. 
(26) A second story is about the Rainbow Bridge (mentioned in my May15 field notes). It is 
believed that when every Atayal dies, he/she is judged in accordance with the ancient law 
of Gaga (also know by North Americans as Gaya, the belief in the need for harmony 
between in all things and people in the universe). If the deceased has lived a 'good' life, 
he/she will be permitted to cross the Rainbow Bridge (created by the spirit of a famous, 
kind, fair and honourable Atayal man) to exist with his/her ancestors. 
http: //marcjintaiwan. blogspot. com/2005_05_01 
_marcjintaiwan_archive. 
html 
(27) Malvern Girls' College is situated in one of the most beautiful areas of Britain, at the foot 
of the Malvern Hills. Founded in 1893, the College enjoys a deserved reputation for 
excellent academic results. In 2005 the pass rate at A-Level was 99%, with 82% gaining 
Grade A-B. 
The College is committed to providing for the education of the whole person, so when 
every girl leaves she is well-equipped to fulfil her own individual potential with a sense of 
social commitment, responsibility and enthusiasm. The Head emphasises that the 
College caters for a wide range of ability on entry. 
http: //www. isbi. com/isbii-viewschool/1544-MALVERN_GIRLS COLLEGE-2. html as 
retrieved on 28 Aug 2005 00: 41: 07 GMT. - 
(28) "You ever watched the movie 21 grams? I read the book ... it says that when every human dies, he or she will weigh the same. So which weighs 21 grams - is it the breath 
or the soul of the human? And does soul have any weight? " 
406 
http: //bunnywunny. blogspot. com/2005_08_01_bunnywunny_archive. html as retrieved on 
01 Aug 2005 22: 41: 20 GMT 
(29) When every kid is freshly diapered he or she is led to his or her cot where a favorite 
plaything from home awaits. One of the teachers begins cleaning the spills and the other 
is distributing bottles to those children whose parents give them bottles at naptime. The 
other teacher is sitting between the kids who have trouble getting to sleep or who 
occasionally leap from a cot to bite his neighbor (K. ). Somebody puts on some sleepy 
music and we begin patting backs to get them to sleep. 
http: //www. thiswomanswork. com/MT/archives/001392. html as retrieved on 29 Aug 2005 
23: 03: 22 GMT. 
(30) The cost for developing, is relative high for a computer aided course, but this cost is a 
one time cost and normally the cost is split over a number of years. Of course, this model 
also has some drawbacks. When every student sits at home she misses the social 
contact with the other students in the group, but problems are there to be solved and we 
have a partial solution to this problem. If the students have access to a simple computer 
communication system where they could send and receive messages to and from 
teachers and other students in the group, that would improve the group feeling or social 
contact. 
http: //www. cs. umu. se/--bopspe/publicationsNUDU/vudumasterthesis. html as retrieved on 
1 Aug 2005 10: 19: 46 GMT. 
(31) Unfortunately, I think a lot of these so-called terrorists use the Holy War as a kind of ISA. 
It's just a wrapper that's hiding other agendas. 
I hope when every terrorist dies the three women he gets are Salome, Boudicea, and 
Medusa. 
They can serve him. They can serve him his b*****ks on a plate. 
It took me an hour and twenty minutes this evening to walk to Liverpool Street. 
Not that I'm bitter about it. 
http: //www. e-hq. co. uk/mysterial. co. uk/web/cgi- 
bin/index. cgi? action=forum&board=media&op=display&num=967 as retrieved on 25 Aug 
2005 21: 21: 33 GMT. 
